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ABSTRACT
Chain Reaction: The Tragedy of Atomic Governance
by
Mary D. Wammack
Dr. David S. Tanenhaus, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of fCstory 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
An unprecedented combination o f imagination and capital resulted in the most 
profound, and profane, achievement in modem history—the atom bomb—but the strategies 
that empowered its development caused inestimable suffering in peacetime America. 
Discrete practices o f secrecy, media manipulation, and the devaluation of scientific opinion 
evolved and coalesced during the cold war, permeating institutions and pre-empting any 
protection of the unwary fi’om exposure to radioactive fallout. While the atomic testing 
program and its consequences are often considered in light o f  national policy, this analysis 
alternatively reveals the character, fusion, and trajectory o f practices that culminated in the 
collision of the government with the health and lives o f the innocent.
m
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
It is, perhaps, the little curiosities rather than the grand design that propel research. 
Those who study the cold war era, and particularly atomic testing, either become inured to 
roadblocks o f security classifications and endless Freedom o f Information Act Requests, 
or abandon the endeavor altogether. Those who adapt, however, cling to the hope that 
somewhere within the dusty boxes or microfilm reels they will find some little something 
that will point the way to, well, probably just another box or reel. Eventually, though, 
enough little somethings form an image o f sorts; and then, like a neophyte struggling to 
make sense out of a Picasso, the researcher can finally stand back, perhaps cock her head 
to the side for a different perspective, and try to say what it all means. The whole process 
is set in motion by some little, curious something.
And so it was with the discovery o f  the muskrat.^ Immortalized by a few brief 
remarks in the transcript o f a 1956 meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission’s 
Committee on Biology & Medicine and achieving momentary notoriety as an interesting 
tidbit in a Newsweek article, the muskrat’s significance cannot be measured by either
 ^Transcript, “Special Meeting o f the Advisory Committee on Biology & Medicine to the 
Atomic Energy Commission, November 26, 1956; US DOE Archives; 326 US Atomic 
Energy Commission; Collection Secretariat; Box 1271; Folder 0&M-7 ACBM BP 
(“Transcript”). See also Newsweek, November 26, 1956, 64.
1
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brevity of reference or the fleetingness o f his fame. The twenty scientists who discussed 
his future over forty years ago decided that he offered, perhaps, the best answers to their 
questions about strontium 90—a man-made isotope—and its relationship to diseases of the 
bone. Additionally, his presence, though minuscule, validates a historian’s haunting 
suspicion; that although the AEC issued constant reassurances from 1951 through 1956 
that fallout and its associated radioisotopes posed no danger, those statements (at least as 
they pertained to strontium 90) were baseless. The AEC apparently initiated its 
investigation into strontium 90’s effect upon the biological chain only in 1956, and only 
with the fortuitous capture of the muskrat.
He had lived his whole life in a little pond just outside Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 
feeding and swimming in a stream that flowed out o f the government facility, sleeping in a 
little mud and cattail hut just above the water line. Two Oak Ridge security guards 
trapped him, but whether for sport or the stew pot is not known. When the guards 
noticed the tumor on the muskrat’s hind leg, they turned him over to AEC officials who 
promptly classified the little fellow—his fate remains, as far as is known, a government 
secret (together, of course, with any documents relating to his contribution to science.) 
Though other creatures were available, and some had already been the focus o f strontium 
90 experimentation, government scientists preferred the muskrat. In so doing, they 
discounted data gleaned from the study o f  Oxford rabbits (they were English, after all) and 
ruled out examination of the two Canadian ducks o f uncertain migration habits that had 
sickened hunters. The muskrat was a viable subject—the scientists could calculate the 
concentrations of strontium in his environment, he had a bone tumor, and he was
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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American, a very important factor during the cold war. Newsweek called the little fellow a 
“pioneer of progress” but Gioacchino Failla, the Chairman of the AEC’s Division of 
Biology & Medicine, called him a “piece o f evidence.”^
The muskrat is, however, just a “piece” of the transcript of that meeting in 1956, 
and just a single feature o f a document that reflects an institutional hierarchical culture 
permeated with, and functioning, through artifice. Indeed, and as will become clear, 
although the AEC deceived the American public, that potentially (and, ultimately, actually) 
lethal practice was only the ending link in a chain of collaborative deception that 
originated within the institution itseli^ circulating between and through the AEC and (in 
this instance) its Advisory Committee on Biology & Medicine. It is clear that the AEC’s 
substitution of theatrics and illusion for honesty, a practice seeded in the wartime 
Manhattan Project and one that grew (both functionally and in its ability to adversely 
effect the population, in proportion with the extraordinarily-rapid development of ever- 
more-powerful atomic weaponry itself) had become, by 1956, normative.
Two factors in simultaneous operation, pervasive secrecy and the pursuit o f a 
common goal, influenced decision-making and allowed the atomic testing program to 
assume its decidedly-hazardous nature. An unprecedented system of security and 
document classification guaranteed the anonymity, and thus encouraged the participation, 
of individuals who might otherwise have, at the very least, questioned the morality of 
decisions that so often cavalierly dismissed the safety and well-being of so many. In 
addition, since the two potentially-conflictive arms of the program shared a common goal-
Transcript, 46.
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-the experimentation and development of atomic weapons—any chance that one might 
provide a check upon the other was simply an apparition. Such institutional collaboration, 
though invisible to the public, effectively obliterated the possibility that the Committee on 
Biology & Medicine (ostensibly designed to guarantee, as far as scientifically possible, safe 
parameters for testing) might temper or even curtail, in the name of safety, the intent o f 
the AEC, an entity that existed solely to serve the government’s need for atomic 
weaponry.
It is important, too, to recognize the influence that institutionalism had upon the 
operation of the program. In this regard, Robert Cover’s analysis of state-sponsored 
violence, though situated within the realm o f  law and legal interpretation, can provide 
meaningful direction. I have already stated that members o f the Advisory Committee and 
officials of the AEC practiced routine deception and that those untruths detrimentally 
impacted innocent, and otherwise unwary, individuals. That interpretation, however, 
should not be taken to presume that all who knowingly participated in such organized 
immorality were unprincipled beasts, utterly devoid o f human compassion or professional 
responsibility. Instead, their participation as agents within a legally-authorized 
organizational system countered natural inhibition.
Cover held that through the hierarchical legal system—fi-om the state, through law, 
to individual victims—a judge, by interpreting law, institutes, authorizes, and legitimates 
acts o f violence upon individuals. As components o f the system through which the judge 
operates, collaborators (wardens, executioners) carry out in unquestioning fashion the 
decision of the judge, and so perform in a manner which might otherwise be morally
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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repugnant to them. This analysis explains how the organization itself operates as a force
upon participating individuals:
Persons who act within social organizations that exercise authority act 
violently without experiencing the normal inhibitions or the normal degree 
of inhibition which regulates the behavior o f those who act autonomously. .
On one level judges may appear to be, and may in fact be, offering their 
understanding of the normative world to their intended audience. But on 
another level they are engaging a violent mechanism through which a 
substantial part of their audience loses its capacity to think and act 
autonomously.^
The AEC itself an organization that functioned as a legitimate agent of the state, with all 
its attendant authority—an authority that became enlarged, deservedly or not, during the 
troublesome years following World War H -existed solely to maintain the development of 
atomic weaponry; and, toward that end, subordinated the welfare o f human beings to  a 
legitimated goal. The actors within that organizational culture, by virtue o f their 
participation, divorced themselves from the day-to-day needs and wants of those outside 
by virtue of their participation, perhaps also (even, as Cover suggests, unconsciously) 
divorced themselves also from the travesties that their participation engendered.
Ryan NCnow and Austin Sarat, eds.. Narrative, Violence and the Law: The Essays o f  
Robert Cover (Ann Arbor, MI: University o f Michigan Press, 1992). See also an analysis 
o f Cover’s insights by Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Keams, “Making Peace with 
Violence: Robert Cover on Law and L%al Theory” Law ’s  Violence (Arm Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 1995), and particularly the pointed comment that ethical 
queries (whether implicated within law, or, I would suggest, the apparatus that was the 
AEC) are problematic: “An excess o f casuistry is surely contrary to the demands o f 
solidarity, and, if  Cover is right, solidarity, not subtlety of th o u ^ t, is the sine qua non o f 
effective legal violence.” 249. Though similarities exist between arguments against 
law’s violence and a violence perpetrated by the atomic weapons program, the logical 
extension of the argument cannot be similarly applied. It is, for example, a simple matter 
to recognize the benefit afforded society by law—far more difficult (at least for me) to  
recognize many, if any, benefits afforded by atomic weapons or their testing as historically 
practiced.
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The AEC developed methods to pursue its goals in ways that proved tragic for 
many, but it is, fortunately, not necessary to rely upon supposition or models of 
institutional behavior to posit that conclusion. For example, documents prove that the 
AEC knew in 1949 that the strontium 90 released through atomic weapons testing was 
accumulating and approaching levels that threatened some type o f  biological hazard, yet it 
persisted in testing weapons that increased the strontium 90 environmental burden 
exponentially."^ And yet, even with an identified potential for disaster, the AEC failed to 
investigate the potential consequences—no scientific studies ensued, no government 
scientists placed animals in cages for the sole purpose of testing the effects o f strontium 
90—indeed, only through happenstance, in the form o f a wild muskrat near Oak Ridge in 
1956, did the AEC scientists get their first opportunity to examine the relationship 
between strontium 90 and biological organisms.^ It is time to take another look at 1956, 
the year that Eisenhower defeated Adlai Stevenson, the Salk vaccine for polio went into 
distribution, and strontium 90 hit the headlines.
Strontium’s effects were not widely known in 1956, but one was undisputed—it 
caused members of the Atomic Energy Commission to squirm. Strontium became the 
issue o f the year after the National Academy of Science announced in June that rising
See 13 infra.
 ^The government funded experiments on humans in 1959, when Argonne National 
Laboratory injected twelve terminally-iU patients with strontium 85 or calcium 45, and 
determined the extent o f tissue invasion by the substances at autopsy. The time fi’om 
injection to autopsy varied from 3 hours to 124 days. Nothing in the report indicates 
whether the exposed individuals were children or adults. Subcommittee on Energy 
Conservation and Power of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, US House of 
Representatives, “American Nuclear Guinea Pigs: Three Decades o f  Radiation 
Experiments on US Citizens” (Washington, D C.: US Government Printing Office, 
Novefinber 1986) 32-33.
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environmental levels might be more dangerous than the government had admitted/ The 
questions surrounding strontium 90 loomed like thunderclouds in the summer sky and 
placed the AEC in the middle of a storm unlike any it had ever encountered. When sheep 
deaths in 1953 and fallout-induced injuries of Japanese fishermen in 1954 angered many, 
the AEC had reassured the public with denial, explanation and persuasion, successfully 
lulling the anxious back into complacency.^ This time, however, AEC reassurance carried 
little weight, for if the scientists who sounded the most recent alarm were right, the 
victims of strontium 90 would be children.
Researchers outside the government, and at least one fi*om within, found that 
strontium 90 imitated calcium and concentrated in growing bone, posing the highest 
danger for the world’s children whose calcium requirements and consumption exceeded 
those of adults.* In light o f their admittedly preliminary findings, they warned that any
 ^See Newsweek June 25, 1956. Most of public’s education on radiation in the 1950’s 
originated with physicist Ralph Lapp. As devoted to  his profession as he was to the 
public’s right to know. Dr. Lapp translated the always-complicated world of atomic 
science for laymen during the 1950’s. Lapp did not believe that testing o f atomic weapons 
should cease, only that it be pursued in as safe a manner as possible. An outspoken critic 
of the AEC’s security policies, he was denied any direct participation within the atomic 
testing program and based his calculations and conclusions upon details gleaned fi-om the 
eyewitness accounts o f colleagues, published photographs and accounts. Nevertheless, on 
numerable occasions he embarrassed the AEC, catching them in egregious &lsehoods and 
forcing retractions. When Louis Strauss vehemently denied that radioactive fallout had 
been responsible for the illnesses of Japanese fishermen, Lapp’s public admonitions forced 
Strauss to admit the truth. The New Republic, July 9, 1956, 5.
 ^See Chapter 5 infra.
* Newsweek, June 25, 1956, 70. See also the magazine’s November 12, 1956 issue, 90, 
about Dr. William F. Newman, an AEC biochemist who broke ranks with the government 
and his colleagues (AEC scientists) who consistently promoted the safety o f strontium 90. 
Dr. Newman had studied radiation and bone metabolism since 1943, and claimed that it 
would take another ten years to establish the margin o f  safety o f strontium 90. Taking his 
case to the press in New York, he said “There is a grim possibility that we will gain this 
information from human data.” Newsweek, November 12, 1956, 90.
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continuation of testing, absent further research into the behavior o f strontium in the 
biological chain, spelled potential disaster. The fears o f the scientists spread rapidly 
through the public, assuming political prominence through election-year volleys as the 
Democrats accused the Republicans o f “smug scientific optimism”; the GOP parried that 
the Democrats desired simply to fiighten the electorate “out o f its skin.”® Congress 
threatened an investigation into fallout and the policies o f the AEC, and the United 
Nations accelerated and expanded its on-going international analysis of radioactive 
fallout.*®
Confi-onting mounting pressure, the AEC scientists struggled to convince the 
public that increasing strontium levels posed no danger. Though the AEC sounded the 
“all’s well,” independent researchers increasingly challenged that position with alarming 
mounds of data. The AEC was unable to retaliate in kind—its safety margin for strontium 
90 was not based upon the exposure o f a general population to strontium fallout
® Newsweek, November 26, 1956, 64. See also The New Republic 134, June 4, 1956, 
whose editor agreed with Adlai Stevenson and urged a moratorium on the testing o f 
hydrogen weapons based primarily upon testings value as a deterrent and upon its 
enormous, and upward-spiraling, expense: “When small boys play at war, each one can be 
a winner. One may shout ‘you can’t shoot, you’re dead!’, but the ‘dead’ rise to shoot 
again, for in the make-believe world each is invincible. But in the real world of 
competition for nuclear supremacy, the law o f diminishing returns robs us o f invincibility.”
P - 3 -
Newsweek, November 26, 1956, 64-66.
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9or even animal experiments, but upon industrial exposures o f adults to radium.** Faced 
with the continuing deterioration of public trust despite their “daddy knows best” 
assurances, AEC promoters made a strategic shift in emphasis.
** Despite the fact that the AEC had investigated the worldwide distribution o f strontium 
90 since 1949, it did not institute any studies on strontium’s effect on health and based the 
“maximum permissible” level upon dose and injury resulting from another radioisotope, 
radium. In 1949, Shields Warren, then-AEC Director of Biology & Medicine, concluded 
(based upon a one-man project from Oak Ridge) that “serious contamination” from 
strontium 90 would result from the detonation o f 3,000 20-kiloton bombs. The study, 
renamed “Project Gabriel” in 1953, broadened its base to include the Rand Corporation, 
and a sister study named “Project Sunshine” joined Gabriel. The participants were sworn 
to secrecy and forbidden to discuss the project or its findings, even with other AEC 
colleagues or officials seeking information about strontium and its effects. The project’s 
existence surfaced officially only in 1958. Barton C. Hacker, Elements o f Controversy 
(Bericeley, C A: University o f  California Press, 1994) 181-184.
Hacker attributes the extreme (even by AEC standards) security o f Project Sunshine to  
a reluctance by project members to admit the comparison, by project members, of infant 
bones collected from the US, India, Japan, South Africa, and South America, in an effort 
to establish the woridwide levels of strontium 90 distribution. In addition, he concludes 
that AEC Commissioner \^Uard F. Libby, a Manhattan Project and Biology & Medicine 
veteran. University o f Chicago geneticist and participant in Project Sunshine, continually 
downplayed the significance o f strontium’s biological effects in favor of continued 
emphasis upon his own, professional genetic concerns. Throughout his career, Libby 
never wavered and remained a staunch supporter o f continued atomic weapons testing. 
Though I am a grateful beneficiary of Barton Hacker’s devotion to the history o f atomic 
testing, his assertions that the secrecy surrounding Projects Gabriel and Sunshine 
protected only the limited personal concerns of scientists seems naive.
It seems reasonable to at least consider what Hacker does not; namely, that the 
continuation o f  the weapons testing program itself motivated stringent security measures. 
Undoubtedly, secrecy guaranteed the insulation of researchers collecting baby bones and 
protected the pre-eminence o f radiation-induced genetic study; but secrecy also protected 
the maintenance and acceleration of the testing program. With just a little fairy dust, one 
could even imagine that the government instituted Projects Gabriel and Sunshine to 
discover the dangers of strontium 90 in order to adjust the weapons development and 
testing schedule in light o f the projects’ findings—but fairy dust is hard to find these days.
It seems clear that the projects’ chief intent was to learn enough about strontium 90 to 
mitigate any damage that might result from an ever-expanding weapons program.
Secrecy protected the ability o f the government to  continue its weapons program, 
irrespective o f the results o f  either project. The constituency o f Gabriel and Sunshine, 
the pace o f atomic weapons development, and the AEC’s disregard for the conclusions o f  
its own scientists, like Dr. Warren, supports this assertion. The scientists recruited to
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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The AEC tried to channel public fears elsewhere, and officials unleashed 
alternative radioactive bugbears; namely, future power plants and sunlight at high 
altitudes. Dr. John Bugher, former AEC Director of Biology & Medicine, told health 
professionals in Atlantic City that strontium 90 was nothing compared to the radiation 
hazard that the world would soon face from atomic power plants. Merril Eisenbud, chief 
o f the AEC’s New York office, predicted that the amount of radiation children would 
receive was “probably ten times too high,” but since a portion of that dosage depended 
upon geography, they could, if concerned, “move.”*^  That this tactic was a dismal failure 
is (one hopes) unsurprising. It appears that AEC officials also recognized, probably as 
soon as they approved their advance copy of the Newsweek article, that they needed some 
new methods to deal with an anxious public.*^ Months after independent scientists went 
to the press with their strontium fears, the heads of the AEC finally did what all 
organizations do when presented with crisis—they called a meeting.
work on the projects were heavily invested in atomic weapons development. Some, like 
Libby, had participated from the very beginning; others, like John Bugher, who served as 
the AEC’s Director o f Biology & Medicine, had been long-time supporters of atomic 
testing. All, whether employees o f the AEC or not, researched radioactive effects only at 
the continued imprimatur o f the AEC. In addition, (and since even game theorists require 
hard data) the Rand Corporation, a think tank devoted to the development of atomic-age 
strategy, prospered because o f atomic weapons testing and the arms race. Finally, it must 
be remembered that as early as 1949, the Oak Ridge study on strontium 90 predicted 
“serious” strontium 90 contamination from the detonation of an accumulated atomic 
kilotonnage o f 60,000. In February 1954 (less than a year after Projects Sunshine and 
Gabriel were launched) the AEC detonated “Bravo,” a single 15 megaton hydrogen 
weapon equivalent to 250 times the kilotonnage that Warren predicted would result in 
“serious” worldwide strontium contamination.
^^Ibid., 65-66.
** It cannot be known exactly when the AEC reviewed, and granted authorization for, the 
article; however, the government required that any material published about the atomic 
testing program and/or radioactivity had to be submitted and “vetted” prior to 
publication. See Caute, The Great Fear (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1979).
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The conference on November 26, 1956, accomplished very little, but it 
demonstrates that the barriers imposed upon science and scientists in conjunction with the 
atomic age bred mistrust, disallowed meaningful evaluation, and prevented consensus. 
Within a governmental culture that ranked loyalty over competence and security over 
everything else, the twenty members o f the AEC’s Advisory Committee on Biology & 
Medicine belonged to a very exclusive club. Many of their colleagues had refused to 
participate in the persecutorial atmosphere o f the cold war—some retreated to a more- 
liberal England, others to pursue their work in venues independent of federal support, still 
others simply gave up.*"*
Those scientists who thrived, however, like the members o f the Advisory 
Committee on Biology & Medicine, served as government functionaries and voluntarily 
isolated themselves from professional colleagues. The result was an insular existence as 
the government scientist transferred the cold war features o f  loyalty and security into his 
professional behavior. These characteristics typified the scientists who met to consider the 
strontium 90 problem in 1956. Each man trusted only the results o f his own scientific
*"* In 1948, members of the American Association for the Advancement of Science came 
out “militantly” against loyalty oaths, and in 1950 demanded the protection o f scientists 
from Congressional persecution. By 1951, and perhaps because the Fuchs case had fueled 
anti-communist hysteria, the Association dropped its appeals for scientific openness. A.G. 
Mezerik declared in a February 5, 1951 New Republic article that “The scientist’s way of 
life is once again being challenged and his hopes dashed. The atmosphere of freedom in 
which science burgeons is to be supplanted once more with the atmosphere o f classified 
information, interminable security investigations and secrecy.” 12-13.
Loyalty investigations took a heavy toll on all scientists, particularly physicists. At the 
end o f the war, over 3,000 scientists belonged to the Federation o f Atomic Scientists. By 
1950, fear o f association with any organization had reduced that number by half. By 
December 1952, the AEC had investigated over “400,000 personnel.” Caute, The Great 
Fear, 465.
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investigations, rarely conferred with others, never with those outside America, and even
cast a suspicious eye toward his colleagues who joined him at the conference table.
The meeting started at 9:30 a m., and discussion began on a paper circulated
previously to the committee members by Dr. Merril Eisenbud. Although Eisenbud had
participated since 1953 on two secret studies o f strontium 90 distribution (and thus,
presumably, had a good deal of information he could have offered)*^ he limited his input
into the committee’s discussions to the conclusions o f his paper a study o f  strontium
concentrations in a North Dakota milkshed. Even then, however, he did not readily
volunteer information that would have clarified the committee’s understanding o f his data.
The following discussion began when scioitists tried to assess radium uptake and
excretion, combined with the known half-hfe o f strontium 90, in an attempt to estimate a
potential range of strontium 90 burden in the bone o f a given organism. Though tedious,
the excerpt illustrates the reluctance of even key participants to rectify misunderstandings:
Dr. Warren: . .  .1 think that in light o f these points the probability is that
it is closer on the average to the lower end o f  the range, but I think we will 
have to admit that there could be a possibility of an increase by a factor of 
ten in scattered individuals.
Dr. Failla: That is not what Eisenbud just said. He is saying for a large
population it could be 25. So the individual increase will have to be added 
to that.
Dr. Warren: No, he is not saying for a large population. As I understand
it, he is saying for scattered people in a large population.
Dr. Failla: No.
Dr. Dunham: Scattered communities is what he is talking about.
Dr. Failla: No, he is saying a large population in North Dakota.
Dr. Marinelli: There is no large population in North Dakota.
Dr. Glass: It is not a factor o f ten anyway, is it? Didn’t you admit the
factor of two from the British data which would bring this to five?
Dr. Marinelli: Yes.
Dr. Glass: So it is a difference o f five times.
See note 11 supra.
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Nfr. Eisenbud: There are relatively few numbers up there. This is very 
complicated.*®
At the very least, Eisenbud could have clarified his own data. Instead, (but admittedly 
without proof since nothing but a transcript o f the meeting exists) one is presented with an 
image o f  Eisenbud, sitting smugly while others argued and guessed about the 
characteristics o f his control group. Similar misunderstandings characterized the 
meeting’s morning session,*^ but before the lunch break they all agreed that a study o f the 
muskrat might reveal (if only in muskrats) the biological effects o f strontium.
The lack of verifiable research data on strontium 90 prior to the Committee’s 1956 
decision to study a muskrat highlights the AEC’s general disregard for human health 
unless, or until, adverse public relations threatened its existence. As early as 1949, Shields 
Warren, Director o f Biology & Medicine, warned that levels o f strontium 90 posed certain 
environmental hazards.** Warren’s “maximum” levels were based upon atomic, not 
hydrogen, weapons; and when hydrogen weapons entered the picture, those “maximum”
*® See Transcript, 41-42.
*^  Though the tone, and most of the content, of the scientists’ discussions is perfectly 
clear, there are portions o f the transcript that are puzzling—at least to this writer. An 
example, including the comments on either end for context, is illustrative:
Dr. Marinelli: [on fish that eat strontium-rich plankton] Yes. They incorporated 
[sic] in the skeleton. Do we eat fish bone? Sometimes we do. Cats do.
Dr. Failla: Then we settle on 2.5 to 25, shall we?
Dr. Marinelli: The square root of 10 is 3.
Dr. Glass: Five to 25. You accepted that factor.
Dr. Marinelli: Yes. There might be a factor o f two.
Mr. Eisenbud: There is a fector o f four according to Colmar. That should be ten. 
D r Marinelli: This is at the end o f the lifetime, mind you.
Dr. Brues: I think you should use the same philosophy at both ends. If you are 
going to stretch everything at one end, you should stretch everything at the other, 
p. 47.
** See Hacker, Elements, 181-182, and note 10 supra.
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levels were modified and increased.*® Nevertheless, the AEC soon exceeded even those 
higher levels, producing an enormous amount o f strontium with 1954’s megaton-range 
hydrogen weapons.^® Thus, despite warnings fi-om its own chief scientists, the AEC 
continued, and accelerated, the testing of weapons that would significantly increase, to 
dangerous levels, the amounts o f strontium 90 within the environment. They failed to 
even investigate the biological effects of strontium 90 until forced to do so by an enraged 
public.
So, in 1956, and in the absence of precautionary experimental study, the muskrat 
was the scientists’ best hope for some answer to the questions surrounding strontium 90’s 
biological effects. Since they knew the concentrations o f strontium released from Oak 
Ridge into the muskrat’s water, and could measure the levels of strontium taken up by the 
plants he ate, they might determine the “biological concentration” o f strontium 90 through 
“some particular chain.” *^ Although the transcript clearly reveals why the scientists were 
pleased that they had a muskrat in their classified knapsack, there is no overt suggestion of 
what they thought they would leam from the little mammal with the tumorous hind leg. 
There were, however, signs that they expected bad news.
A fair portion of the afternoon session was spent in the analysis o f mortality tables 
and bone malignancy. Dr. John C. Bugher directed the presentation, punctuated with a 
table prepared by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company charting deaths from “bone
Ib id , 182.
®^ See Transcript, 146. Only at the end of the day did anyone ask wAy strontium 90 had 
become such a problem, and Eisenbud informed the group that testing conducted within 
two or three months o f 1954 accounted for “75 per cent, I guess” o f all strontium 90 in 
existence.
*^ Transcript, 46.
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cancer”^  incidence in the United States since 1954. Bugher then estimated future deaths 
from strontium 90 upon the “maximum permissible” industrial standard for radium, and 
concluded that “in terms o f death. . .would come in somewhere about half of what we kill 
with automobiles.”^  It is impossible to extrapolate from the transcript whether the 
scientists were relieved, or alarmed, at Bugher’s conclusions; but his presentation 
convinced them all that they could comfortably postpone any recommendation concerning 
an alteration o f the existing, accepted, “safe” levels of strontium 90.
In the end, the scientists, purportedly meeting to review new data on strontium 90 
and to consider an adjustment o f the maximum permissible level o f the radioisotope, 
decided only to initiate studies on the muskrat and postponed reaching any conclusions 
that might have altered the long-established maximum permissible levels of strontium 90. 
Had they actually attempted, and agreed, to thoroughly examine a ll available evidence 
relating to strontium 90’s ability to significantly increase the potential for diseases of the 
bone, it seems reasonable to assume that the extant levels might have been reduced. This 
assumption is further supported by the fact that legitimate research, readily available to 
scientists at that time, attributed a strong correlation between the high level of calcium 
requirements of growing children and, thus, an elevated potential for disease in the 
presence of strontium 90. It seems inconceivable that twenty accomplished scientists 
would, with full knowledge o f the risks involved, refuse to reconsider an outdated value
22 A decidedly imprecise categorization that neglected the many types, and varied causes, 
o f  bone cancers.
^  Transcript, 81.
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for strontium 90 burden that had been based upon a different element, radium, and a 
different exposure group, adult industrial workers.
It is impossible to determine with absolute certainty the reasons why members of 
the AEC’s scientific board neglected to reduce an outdated, illegitimate, and even (given 
their acceptance of mortality rates fi’om strontium 90) lethal, value for the production and 
dispersal o f strontium 90. Certainties, however, are rare, and seldom the stuff o f history. 
Clearly, there could be many possible reasons why scientists failed to reduce maximum 
permissible levels of strontium 90 on that 1956 day, or even shortly thereafter. Since a 
probable reason may be the only one that can be found, it is worthwhile to look for it by 
exploring the potential consequence o f each decision that scientists might have rendered. 
The scientists had two choices other than the one they settled upon; they could have 
recommended the established strontium 90 level remain untouched or that it be reduced. 
That they did not go so far as to certify, in 1956, the accuracy of the earlier standard 
indicates that they were, apparently, unwilling to invalidate so much (outside) scientific 
endeavor that already confirmed the hazards o f strontium 90. Alternatively, a 
recommendation to reduce the maximum permissible level would have, even in 1956, 
doomed any future atomic weapons test that released strontium 90, and they all did. The 
probable reason, then, that t h ^  declined to  adopt this latter option is that it would have 
affected, adversely, the testing o f atomic weapons—the goal and purpose of the AEC and 
indeed, the Committee.
Ultimately, it was the case that their deliberations mattered little, and their 
unacknowledged though unassailable agreement with the purpose o f the AEC,
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insignificant. The transcript reveals that the Advisory Committee on Biology & Medicine
was misnamed—it did not give advice, it took it. After Bugher’s presentation of mortality
rates, AEG Commissioner Murray entered the room. When Chairman Failla turned the
meeting over to the Commissioner, he first praised the scientists, then warned them:
Murray: You appreciate. Doctor, that we have a series of tests coming up 
in the spring, and we must go ahead with those tests. The amount of 
contamination that we do in those tests will be, I think, insignificant after 
listening to this discussion. I would not want anything to happen that 
would disturb the going ahead with those tests in the spring. That is our 
immediate problem, and I don’t think arch ing  will interfere with us going 
ahead.
Apparently nothing the scientists might have decided that day would have dissuaded the 
AEC fi"om their 1957 testing series, and in the end, nothing did. In 1957 thirty atomic 
weapons shook the Nevada Test Site.
*  *  *
An unprecedented combination o f imagination and capital resulted in the most 
profound, and profane, achievement in modem history—the atom bomb—but the strategies 
that empowered its development caused inestimable suftering in peacetime America. 
Discrete practices of secrecy, media manipulation, and the devaluation and misapplication 
o f scientific opinion evolved and coalesced during the cold war, permeating institutions 
and pre-empting any protection of the unwary fi'om exposure to radioactive fallout. The 
illness and death that followed in the wake o f atomic testing has often been explained as an
24 Emphasis mine. Transcript, 103.
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unfortunate and unintended consequence o f cold war policy. It is not surprising then, nor 
especially unreasonable, that historians assess atmospheric atomic testing in tandem with 
the accompanying expansion of state initiative that took place during the cold war; but to 
do so minimizes the role o f individual actors within the structure o f that ever-more- 
powerful postwar state structure. I suggest instead that the negligent, and thus 
hazardous, nature of atomic weapons experimentation can best be explained through the 
articulation o f national policy; and that an analysis o f  the character, trajectory, and fusion 
of practices within the atomic program reflects that it was the habits and ritualized 
behavior o f individually-powerful actors, not policy, that culminated in a lethal collision 
between the government and the innocent.
Policy, however, hatched and fledged atomic weapon and thus is not irrelevant. 
America’s atomic testing program, like its wartime predecessor the Manhattan Project, 
progressed under a shroud o f secrecy and an unprecedented classification system that kept 
atomic information hidden from America’s enemies, citizens, and many government 
ofiScials. Other factors, too, contributed to the evolution of the testing program and its 
treacherous consequences. The growing fear o f communism replaced the wartime battle 
against fascism and military objectives increasingly dominated decision making, spawning 
the merger o f military and civilian institutions. In addition, the internationalization o f  US 
interest pushed foreign policy into a dominant role, increasing the power o f the executive 
proportionately.
The cold war actually began before the World War II ended and grew increasingly 
frosty during Truman’s administration. As vice president, Truman doubted Soviet
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sincerity, and his suspicions only increased after Roosevelt’s death when others 
substantiated his concerns. The OflSce o f Strategic Services suggested to Truman that 
Russia was committed to hegemony and “may well outrank even the US in military 
potential.” Against the advice o f General George Marshall and Secretary o f War Stimson, 
Truman set his course and picked at the frayed edges o f American-Soviet diplomacy 
during his first cflBcial meeting with foreign minister Molotov.^ Later, George F.
Martin Walker, The Cold War, a History (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 
1993) 18.
It is true that the relationship between the US and the USSR had begun to deteriorate 
while Roosevelt lived, but Truman’s dislike for the Soviets certainly exascerbated the 
tension. That Truman’s disregard for the Soviets was deep seated is clearly reflected in a 
December 1941 letter telling his wife Bess that the Russians were as “untrustworthy as 
Ifitler and A1 Capone.” Harry S. Truman, Dear Bess, (New York, NY: Norton, 1983) 
Ferrell, ed. 471. Later, his admiration for Harry Hopkins’ success with the Soviets, did 
not encourage him to smooth over any ruffled feathers: “. . he knew exactly how to do it. 
He talked tough to them all the time.” Merle Miller, Plain Speaking (New York, NY: 
Norton, 1974). Though analyzed in abundant literature, it is important to here review 
how Truman’s dislike o f the Soviets encouraged a pattern of antagonism and mutual 
mistrust that characterized the cold war itself.
On April 20, eight days after Roosevelt’s death, Truman called a meeting to prepare for 
the arrival of Molotov. In Charles E. Bohlen’s memorandum o f the meeting, when the 
US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, W. Averell Harriman, suggested that US and Soviet 
relations had deteriorated since the Yalta Conference, Truman wasted no time in advising 
Harriman that “he was not in any sense afraid of the Russians and that he intended to be 
firm but fair since in his opinion the Soviet Union needed us more than we needed them.” 
Although conceding to the necessity for a “give and take” with the Soviets, Truman 
undeniably expected to come out ahead on the bargaining: “The President said. . .we 
could not, of course, expect to get 100 percent of what we wanted but that on important 
matters he felt that we should be able to get 85 percent.” FRUS 1945 Volume V, Europe, 
321-334, cited in Schlesinger, ed.. Dynamics o f World Power, Documentary History o f  
US Foreign Policy 1945-1973, (New York, NY; Chelsea House Publishers, 1973), 74- 
76.
According to Secretary o f War Henry L. Stimson, at an April 23 meeting to discuss 
Truman’s upcoming meeting with Molotov, Truman declined the advice o f Stimson and 
Marshall. Secretary o f War Henry L. Stimson disagreed with Harriman and urged 
restraint: “I said that in my opinion we ought to be very careful and see whether we 
couldn’t get ironed out on the situation without getting into a head-on collision. He was 
evidently disappointed at my caution and advice and passed along the circle.. nobody
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Kennan’s 1946 “Long Telegram” solidified the notion of fundamental ideological 
differences between the United States and the Soviet Union effectively precluding any 
promise o f postwar cooperation/^ Perhaps most importantly, however, Kennan cut the 
preliminary path upon which his successor, Nitze, erected the manichean barrier that has 
divided capitalism and communism for decades/^ This polarization of ideology affected
backed me up until it came round to Marshall who wasn’t called until towards the end. 
Then to my relief a brave man and a wise man spoke.. he said that he, like me, was 
troubled and urged caution.” “Papers of Henry L. Stimson,” Stimson Diary, Monday 
April 23, 1945, Yale University Library, cited 'm lbid , 76-78.
Truman set the tone for a terse and uncompromising meeting with Molotov, speaking 
forcefully and interrupting Molotov four times. As Truman rose to leave, he handed 
Molotov the text of a press release outlining Truman’s position on the issue o f Poland. 
Molotov immediately forwarded the document to Stalin. FRUS 1945, Volume V 
“Europe”, 256-259; Schlesinger, Dynamics, 78-80. Truman’s terseness shocked Molotov 
who complained that “he had never been talked to like that in [his] life.” Walker, The 
Cold War, 20.
^  Compromise was not hopeless, but it was avoided. In 1945 then-Secretary o f State 
Byrnes negotiated an agreement with Stalin and Molotov over the inclusion o f opposition 
ministers and non-communists within Romania and Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union had 
agreed to Byrnes’ insistence on UN control o f atomic energy. Byrnes was elated that he 
had re-established Roosevelt’s “wartime understanding” with the Soviets, but Truman, 
the Republican Senate, and Kennan (fi’om Moscow) claimed he had “lost his senses.” 
W a l k e r , 36-37.
The relationship between Kennan’s philosophy and Nitze’s in NSC 68 remains 
controversial. I do not believe Kennan should be held responsible for Nitze’s alteration of 
the meaning of ‘containment’ as originally developed by Kennan—the reader will note, 
particularly in the next chapter, my debt to John Lewis Gaddis’ analysis. Strategies o f  
Containment (New York, NYiOxford, 1982).
Kennan was clearly not responsible for the developments which have become associated 
with his interpretation of Soviet Communism, and he consistently (but somewhat 
unsatisfactorily) endeavored to adjust America’s course away from the later interpretation 
o f “containment.” For example, he criticized the Truman Doctrine, see Atkinson, 
“America’s Œobal Planner” New York Times Magazine, June 13, 1947. While serving as 
Ambassador in Moscow in 1952, Kennan still hoped to ease the tension that increasingly 
plagued the two powers. In a letter to the State Department he suggested that the Soviet 
people operated quite independently of Stalin and the party leadership, and counseled 
against the adoption (or maintenance) of irrevocable policy in reaction to Stalinist 
principles: “The spiritual breach between the rulers and the ruled is one o f the things that 
most strongly strikes a person returning to Russia at this juncture after a long absence.. .1
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2 1
more than foreign affairs—it stimulated domestic development that solidified America’s 
postwar position vis a vis the Soviet Union.
Congress anchored US strategies o f communist containment to the withholding o f 
atomic secrets through postwar legislation. In 1946, the McMahon Act mandated the 
absolute security o f the atomic science, violating an earlier arrangement between the US, 
Britain and Canada for “full collaboration.” *^ In 1947, diplomacy and military might
would warn against drawing any.. oversimplified conclusions fi'om the observations I 
have just made. But I think they have sufficient force to stand also as a warning against 
the assumption into which many people have drifted: that the Soviet leaders have 
somehow found some mysterious secret o f infallibility in the exercise o f power and that it 
is not problem for them to hang on indefinitely and to mold Soviet society to their hearts’ 
desire. What is coming in this immediately approaching period may very well be a crisis o f 
Soviet power quite comparable in scope and seriousness to the original civil war or the 
death of Lenin or the purges o f the thirties—but entirely different in form.” Kennan to 
State Department, July 15, 1952, Sketches from  a Life, (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 
1989) 151-157.
Domestically, however, few exercised any ideological separation between communism 
and Stalinism. The political ramifications o f communist infiltration have been adroitly 
addressed by Earl Latham, The Comrmmist Controversy in Washington (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1966) 365.
General surveys of Kennan and Nitze’s influence upon the nation’s postwar philosophy 
abound, and a good general sampling includes: Ernest May, The American Foreign Policy 
(New York, NY: G. Braziller, 1963); Cecil Crabb and Kevin Mulcahy, American National 
Security Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole:, 1991); Karl Inderfurth and Loch Johnson, 
Decisions o f the Highest Order (Pacific Grove, CA; Brooks/Cole, 1988); Robert 
Pfaltzgraff and Jacqueline Davis, National Security Decisions (Lexington, KY: Lexington 
Books, 1990); Cames Lord, The Presidency and the Management o f National Security 
(New York, NY: Free Press, 1988).
Per the Quebec Agreement. See also claims made by the War Department that Great 
Britain had violated the Agreement when the Chancellor o f the Exchequer Sir John 
Anderson talked with a “. . politico-scientific representative of the French Government..
Secretary o f War to President Roosevelt, 15 December 1944, “Correspondence (Top 
Secret) of the Manhattan Engineer District” National Archives Nficrofilm Publication Ml 
109, 1980, Roll 3, ( “TSCMED”). Groves brought the violation to the attention of 
Stimson on 14 December 1944 and promised to postpone “insofar as practicable the 
passing o f vital information concerning it to the representatives o f any government other 
than our own” pending further instructions. Groves to Stimson, 14 December 1944,
Idem.
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became irretrievably linked with the passage o f the National Security Act.^ Additionally, 
the Atomic Energy Commission, originally designed to assure civilian control over atomic 
development, became a valuable tool in the Armed Forces arsenal/” All these efforts 
against communism caused the expenditure o f enormous resources by those charged with 
the protections o f America’s interests in a nation traditionally suspicious of peacetime 
military strength/'
Additionally, domestic faith in the United States as an invincible superpower had 
gone up in flames with the ships in Pearl Harbor and joined fears o f Soviet-style 
communism as an influential ingredient in the nation’s growing emphasis on national 
security. Even after victory in the war, the attack remained undeniable proof of US
^  Cecil V. Crabb, Kevin V. Mulcahy, American N ational Security, 16.
Operation Crossroads put the lie to the assertion that civilians controlled atomic energy, 
as evidenced by Truman’s adroit political appropriation o f  Congressional troublemakers. 
Military enthusiasm concerning the plaimed Pacific atomic weapons tests irritated an 
already-tense Congress debating the McMahon Bill, and when Commerce Secretary Henry 
A  Wallace joined with Congress to remove atomic energy fi'om military control, Truman 
sensed a showdown. Receiving a letter fi'om Wallace claiming that the Pacific Tests 
might reflect only what the military wanted them to reflect, Truman called a meeting in 
February 1946 with Secretary o f State Byrnes, Secretary o f  War Patterson, General 
Eisenhower, Admiral Nimitz and Admiral Leahy (Truman’s Chief o f Staff) to discuss 
criticism over the proposed tests. Leahy sharply criticized the McMahon Bill because it 
“carried an implication o f distrust of the Armed Services” and would cause one of the 
most effective weapons of war to a civil commission which would dole out its product, if 
it decided to make any, as it saw fit.” Tmman replied that although McMahon’s 
motivations were political he “had to be sure that this test met all o f the crackpot criticism 
and that not only would it need to be objective but we had to convince the public it was 
objective.” They agreed to add House and Senate leaders to the already large contingent 
invited to view the tests as the basis of a Presidential Commission reporting directly to the 
president. Walter Millis, ed.. The Forrestal D iaries (New York, NY: Viking Publishers, 
1951), 133. See also Chapter 4,
Between 1940 and 1995, over four trillion dollars was spent on nuclear weapons. 
Stephen I. Schwartz, “Four Trillion Dollars and Counting” Bulletin o f the Atomic 
Scientists 5 \ (Nov-Dee. 1995) 32.
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vulnerability, and undermined the confidence o f American citizens and leaders. Later 
decision-making reflects that the atom bomb only increased insecurity/^ and, in the 
analysis of threats to the nation’s security, notions of ‘probability’ were increasingly 
abandoned in favor o f formulations o f ‘possibility,’ with profound implications upon 
domestic and foreign policy. This change in methodology eventually resulted in a desire 
to protect America’s interests from every ‘worst-case’ scenario that could possibly be 
imagined.^’^’ When the nation’s enemies became conceptualized in terms of their
The bomb presented postwar American leaders with a peculiar set of circumstances. 
While downplaying reports o f radiation injury in Japan, the government had to convince 
the American people that they should support: (i) peaceful development of atomic energy 
through the establishment o f  international control; (ii) an extravagant military operation in 
the Pacific to substantiate the necessity o f a Navy and Army in a world of Superfortress- 
delivered atomic weapons; and (iii) approve the Army’s planned development of three 
national laboratories to support industrial development o f atomic energy. In a transcript 
prepared for the radio broadcast “You and the Atom” Secretary o f War Patterson lobbied 
for the public’s support o f the Baruch Plan for international control of atomic energy, 
among other things, and stressed the need for peaceful atomic utilization: “You must 
decide—and quickly—that you are willing to enter into and live up to an agreement that this 
universal force will not be available to any man or group o f  men for the purpose o f  war. .
.” Planned for the July 22, 1946 broadcast, it coincided with the joint Army-Navy atomic 
weapons tests in the Pacific (Operation Crossroads launched on July 1) the publicity 
surrounding which caused an unexpected reaction in the minds o f some, for Patterson 
warned; “Don’t discount Bikini because ships continued to float.. .Remember that 
America’s great centers o f population, our concentrations o f  industry, and our ports are 
vulnerable too. One atomic bomb would have done far more damage at Pearl Harbor than 
did the massive two-hour raid which plunged us into war.” See “Remarks by The 
Honorable Robert Patterson, Secretary o f War” 7-19-46, TSCMED.
Policy constitutive o f the memories o f Pearl Harbor gained a normative quality by 1950, 
when the Joint Chiefs o f Staff (alarmed at Soviet superiority in terms of conventional 
forces) advised the NSC 68 study group that based upon the tragedy at Pearl Harbor, 
increase in domestic force was essential to avoid “a new type o f Pearl Harbor attack o f  
infinitely greater magnitude than that o f 1941.” Strobe Talbott, The Master o f the Game 
(New York, NY:Knopf: 1988) 56, cited in John Lamberton Harper, American Visions o f 
Èz/rcpe (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1996) 292.
This fits well within the analysis of Halperin who insists that this strategy not only 
affects the product of an organization, but intra- and inter-agency relationships as well: 
“Organizations constantly hedge against unforeseen consequences and the possibility that
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potentiality, fear grew boundless and unchecked; and, in many ways, so did the institutions 
that promised to alleviate that fear/''
Certainly, the challenges posed by perceived threats to America’s interests were 
enormous, and resulted in the growth o f the “security state,” the development o f the 
military-industrial complex and a spreading fear that communism, from domestic as well as 
foreign sources, threatened the nation’s very existence/* A substantial body o f 
scholarship explains US strategy during this period through examinations o f the diplomatic 
breakdown in American-Soviet relations, the changes in American policy in reaction to 
postwar Soviet activity, the divergent ideologies and capabilities of the two major 
players/” Those explanations may provide an authorizational framework through which
their private estimates are wrong. This concern leads intelligence organizations 
continually to predict crises, for when a crisis does occur, they can point out that they 
predicted it.” Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic P olitics and Foreign Policy (Washington, 
D C :  Brookings Institution, 1974) 145.
Eric Beukel encourages the re-evaluation of the pre- and post-atomic bomb decision 
making and the interplay of imagination and objectivity. The nature of atomic weaponry 
precludes analysis based upon anything but potentiality: “. .  nobody is able to establish 
with certainty the borderline between wisdom and wishful thinking, between fact and 
belief, between reality and myth; when decision-makers are attempting to establish some 
tenable notions.. the dividing line between their subjective beliefs and facts is blurred. . . ” 
American Perceptions o f the Soviet Union as a Nuclear Adversary (London: Pinter 
Books, 1989) 24.
George W. Ball sketches a disturbing scene: “Our first reaction. . was irrational and 
demeaning. How could we have suddenly become as subject to destruction as less 
favored peoples? . .  .What I found particularly repulsive in the ensuing hysteria was the 
realization o f how little we had progressed.. now a new form o f St. Vitus’ Dance 
afflicted men and women. . fiiend against fiiend, destroying trust in human decency and 
producing a nation o f informers.” The P ast H ad Another Pattern ( New York, NY: 
Norton, 1982) 470.
A representative sample includes John Lewis Gaddis, The U nited States and the Origins 
o f the C old War, 1941-1947 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1972); id. 
Strategies o f Containment: A C ritical Appraisal o f Postwar American N ational Security 
Policy, op. cit; id. Ihe Long Peace, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1987); id. 
We Now Know, Rethinking Cold War H istory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997);
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the nation’s atomic weapons program developed, but do not answer the questions that 
drive this study.
Why, for example, was the Navy so eager to use the atomic bomb against ninety- 
five o f its own (and captured German and Japanese) ships and crafts, risking the health 
and lives o f thousands of seamen? How did the military usurp Congressional authority 
and subordinate the civilian authority of the Atomic Energy Commission’s to its own 
ends? And why was continental weapons testing conducted in such a dangerous fashion 
when simple precautions known at the time could have made it infinitely safer? Pohcy 
undoubtedly initiated, stimulated, and maintained atomic weapons testing, but to 
understand the channeling of national goals in the potent and poisonous directions taken 
by the program, one must push policy aside and locate the lethal trail o f practices that 
flowed through atomic testing.
While not ignoring traditional rubrics, the paths I have chosen to follow have been 
illuminated in large measure by social theorist Pierre Bourdieu whose explanation of 
habitus and structures suggest an alternative exploration o f atomic testing culture. The
Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance o f Power: N ational Security, the Truman 
Adm inistration, and the cold war (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); Hugh 
DeSantis, The Diplomacy o f Silence: the Am erican Foreign Service, the Soviet Union, 
and the Cold war I933-I947  (Chicago, IL: University o f Chicago Press, 1980); Walter 
Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise M en: Six Friends and the World They M ade: 
Acheson, Bohlen, Harriman, Kennan, Lovett, M cC loy (New York, NY: Simon and 
Schuster, 1986); Daniel Yergen, Shattered Peace: The O rigins o f the Cold war and the 
N ational Security State, rev. ed. (New York, NY: Penguin, 1990); William E. Pemberton, 
H arry S. Truman: Fair Dealer & Cold W arrior (Boston, MA: Twayne Publishers, 1989); 
Walker, The Cold War, Martin J. Sherwin, A W orld D estroyed (New York, NY: Knop^ 
1975); Gregg Herldn, The Winning Weapon (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 
1988); McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the F irst 
F ifty  Years (New York, NY: Random House, 1988).
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reference to the weapons program as a “culture” is a sensible one since even the most 
elementary review of atomic testing reveals that its participants belonged to a very small 
club, many spending their entire professional lives within the enclave o f government- 
sponsored atomic development. Those men then who developed, experimented, analyzed, 
and directed atomic weapons development—all within the classified cold war environment- 
-provide perhaps a nearly-perfect example o f a “particular class o f  conditions of existence 
[to] produce habitus, durable, transposable dispositions” and the program itself a system 
through which “structured structures [were] predisposed to function as structuring 
structures.”^^  Bourdieu’s analyses offer an attractive rationale for the behavior of actors 
within the atomic testing program, explaining if only in part, why experimentation with 
atomic weapons (at least within the scope o f this thesis) never lost the critical urgency 
with which it was invested at its inception.
I seek, though, not only an explanation o f how the atomic program developed as it 
did, but also some understanding o f how and why its participants allowed, even 
encouraged, its development to proceed down tragic courses. Two general characteristics 
distinguish the literature devoted to atomic testing: sterile accounts o f the operation of 
state apparatus that ignore the individual actors except as to their performance as state 
functionaries; or, alternatively, highly impassioned chronicles by or about victims that 
demonize either the participants or the government itself. Both approaches are limiting 
because they either present a “top-across” or a “bottom-across” model which, even if 
placed together in an attempt to develop some cognitive sense o f the whole picture, result
Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic o f Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1990) Chapter 3 and more particularly, 53.
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only in a compilation o f  two single-dimensional, yet parallel, trajectories. It is important
though to neither absolve all participants of responsibility behind some protective shield of
state power nor simply rage at the consequences o f that power. This thesis attempts to
answer the often unproductive fury o f victims with an interpretation that neither ignores
the responsibility o f individual actors nor endows them with unlimited choice; and,
additionally, to emphasize the (somewhat obvious but too often ignored) fact that the state
is not composed o f faceless automatons processing directives, but o f individuals whose
participation within given institutions and personal history act as limiting factors upon
choice and therefore the articulation o f state policy.
The insights o f Bourdieu combined with those of Robert Cover offer a compelling
bridge between the anger o f victims (“How could they do this to innocent peope?”) and
the straightforward declarations of process (“They did what they were told to do.”). I
think it useful to look at the ways that societal norms and values are transcended, to a
greater or lesser degree, by the habits and practices of actors within a given culture and to
also explore the determinative influence o f both individual history and the systematization
of patterns of behavior that become inscribed upon institutions and actors.
One o f the fundamental effects o f the harmony between practical sense 
and objectified meaning is the production of a common-sense world. .
The objective homogenizing o f group or class habitus that results from 
homogeneity o f conditions o f  existence is what enables practices to be 
objectively harmonized without any calculation or conscious reference 
to a norm and mutually adjusted in the absence of any direct interaction 
or, a fo rtio ri, explicit co-ordination.**
38 Bourdieu, The Logic o f  Practice, 58.
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It is unreasonable, o f course, to succumb completely to the allure of institutional theory 
and reach for it as a soothing balm for each and every affront that might be attributed to 
the activity of the atomic testing program. To do so would merely transfer the erroneous 
notion o f participants’ slavish devotion from the state to institutions. It does, however, 
deliver an attractive and coherent model through which one might reach some 
understanding o f individual participant behavior within an atomic testing program that is 
otherwise, in many ways, incomprehensible.
To understand a program which placed Americans at risk, it is necessary to look 
b^ond  the obscuring attributes o f policy and into practice, spotlighting the philosophies 
and performance o f the institutions and particpants. Certainly fear of communist 
hegemony provided the impetus for institutional development; but, once those institutions 
were created, anti-communist fervor simply facilitated the maintenance, both in terms of 
intangible ideological support and Congressional appropriations of the nation’s postwar 
institutions. Within the development of the institutions themselves, anti-communist 
commitment became subordinated to other, less idealistic and less national, motivations.
The study o f institutions and their role in American government and society is 
worthwhile. First, the organizational complexities and motivational realities that 
permeated the cold war institutions have not faded.*” Second, and most important in
*” It is impossible to ignore Mathews’ point that the mechanisms of state administration 
and control, bureaucracies, exert enormous force in America, operating “as an equal 
partner with the President, Congress and the Judiciary.” The Darker Reaches, 3.
The extraconstitutional authority and mechanized performance of bureaucracies have 
become increasingly problematical. Stanley Kutler’s investigations disturbingly 
demonstrate that the explosion of the postwar bureaucracy that accompanied the 
development o f anti-subversive law resulted in an (often abusive) exercise o f arbitrary, 
delegated power. The American Inquisition (New Yorkrlfill & Wang, 1982). See also
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terms o f this analysis, national security remains a vital component o f our government and 
atomic weapons a cornerstone o f that protective framework. The need for natural 
resources, the preservation and stimulation o f our economy, and a desire to see 
humanitarian goals implemented worldwide demand that America take an interest in 
international affairs. The end o f the cold war did not toll the bell on our fear of direct 
atomic attack and, particularly as the international realm has continued to become ever 
more sophisticated, at least in terms o f weaponry, the indirect results o f indiscriminate 
atomic or nuclear weapon deployment are an increasing concern. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union has resulted in mounting concern over the dispersal o f  atomic weapons and 
critical material to nations (or terrorist leaders) viewed as far less stable or predictable 
than the USSR."*” Indeed, the recent atomic weapons tests by India and Pakistan 
demonstrate the (almost casual) use o f weapons to threaten a long-standing foe with 
something more impressive than taunts or outdated rifles.'"
Belknap, Cold War P oliticalJustice  (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977); Steinberg, 
The Great Red M enace: U nited States Prosecution o f American Communists, 1947-1952 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984); Whitfield, The Culture o f  the Cold war 
(Baltimore, MA: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991) particularly Chapter 8.
Though terrorism is an increasingly serious element o f national security, (see Crabb & 
Mulcahy, American N ational Security, particularly 30-36), its prevention is undervalued 
by politicians who gear priorities to particular constituences rather than to a national anti­
terrorism crusade. Gideon Rose argues that Congress has been reluctant to invest money 
into a comprehensive agenda since it is patently “unusual, unsexy, and provide[s] few 
opportunities for pork” unlike, for example, missile defense. Gideon Rose “It Could 
Happen Here; Facing the New Terrorism” Foreign A ffairs, March/April 1999, 131.
The countries with declared nuclear capability include the US, Britain, France, Russia, 
China, India, Israel, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukrain and South Africa. “Tracking Nuclear Weapons” Time, May 
25, 1998, 38.
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More importantly, however, the United States maintains a large arsenal of atomic 
weapons, the components of which are manufactured nationally, tested in the Nevada 
desert and in Alaska, and carried in the holds o f  Air Force planes on routine training 
flights over the nation/^ Weapons maintenance and development continues, as do the 
institutions designed to implement the government’s atomic policy. Though the following 
reinterpretation opens only a window into a period where institutional practice jeopardized 
the health and lives o f many, it may demonstrate the necessity for competent and ethical 
oversight o f institutional design and behavior—a practical and moral imperative as long as 
the United States embraces its nuclear stockpile with unyielding arms and the threat of 
atomic warfare still haunts the dreams o f many.
*  *  *
Most scientists concede that atomic weapons development was, and is, a uniquely 
dangerous activity, and although they continue to disagree in their assessment of 
radioactivity’s effects and whether or not there is any threshold below which no injury 
occurs, it is important to recognize, de principio, that fallout from cold war atomic testing 
injured and killed thousands of Americans. Death lost no ground in the face o f 
widespread fallout—the decade o f the 1950s, when the government conducted atmospheric 
testing in the Nevada desert, has the distinction o f being the only period in this century
Department of Energy facilities that emit radionuclides are located in Washington, 
Georgia, Idaho, New Mexico, California, Colorado, Ohio, Texas, Florida, Nevada, New 
York, Tennessee, Kentucky, Iowa, Permsylvania. Environmental Protection Agency, 
“Radiological Impact Caused by Emissions o f Radionuclides into Air in the United States’ 
August 1979, EPA 520/7-79-006.
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when the nation’s mortality rates did not decline; death lost no ground in the face of 
widespread fallout/'’ It is a tragic irony that ‘friendly fire’ caused so many casualties in 
the prolonged ‘war’ against the Soviet Union; and, even more unsettling that fallout’s 
devastating potential was known to the government at the time and, as such, was 
predictable and its consequences preventable. This examination explores the nation’s 
development o f atomic weapons from World War II origins through the 1956—a period 
generally and popularly distinguished as one o f unprecedented and sustained military 
mobilization with profound global and domestic implications. In America, it was an age of 
growth and prosperity, and the surging economy counterbalanced fears of Soviet 
supremacy.'”  It was also, however, the age of atmospheric atomic testing, the 
consequences of which may be economically analyzed but, I argue, must also be explored 
at a humanitarian level—one that ignores neither the individual responsibility of the 
participants nor the decidedly uneconomic consequences to its victims.
Though grass has not yet taken root over the grave of the cold war, its drama has 
lured scholars of every stripe. The cold war can be told as a straightforward history o f the
“* Jay Gould and Benjamin Goldman have extrapolated some interesting, though unsettling 
and little-known information through their comparison o f mortality statistics from the 
Center for Disease Control, states, and nation. Noting that advances in nutrition, 
sanitation and medicine have caused mortality rates to decline over time, they examine 
how that trajectory changed during atmospheric testing. Although wars and epidemics 
cause occasional spikes in a continuum of decline, the period o f atmospheric testing 
accounts for the only stable period of mortality in this centuiy. In addition, from 1915 to 
1985, infant mortality improved from ten percent per year to one; but, little improvement 
occurred during the period o f radioactive fallout until the signing o f the Test Ban Treaty. 
Deadly D eceit (New York, NY; Four Walls, Eight Windows, 1990) passim .
”  I am indebted to Paul Boyer for his work on the cultural transformation that took place 
during the post-World War n  period. By the B om b's Early Light: American Thought and  
Culture a t the Dawn o f the Atom ic Age (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1985).
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readjustment of global power relationships or as a tangled bundle o f ironies and 
perplexities—a curious mixture o f security and insecurity; old ideologies pressed into the 
legitimatization o f new science; global transformations spawned by microscopic events; 
individuality and internationalism. It is indeed a unique period, but I propose that its 
novelty may contribute less to its popularity as a historical pursuit as its familiarity. No 
one can deny that, at some level, we are all products o f our past, but for the curious o f this 
age, the cold war is more than a focus o f inquiry, it has been and continues to be, 
constitutive."'*
Few can say that they have remained untouched by the cold war. Indeed, for much 
of the postwar period, the conflict with the Soviet Union filtered into every facet of 
American life. On a very concrete and quantifiable level, permanent mobilization and the 
military/industrial complex created a boom economy that lasted well into the 1970s, and 
government’s influence upon the academy cannot be denied, particularly given the impetus 
provided by the nation’s encouragement of science and engineering.'*” Less measurable
"** See Gaddis’ comments: “Historians chose, reasonable enough, not to await the cold 
war’s end before beginning to write about i t . . historians fell into the unusual habit o f 
working within their chosen period rather than after it. . .[confusing] the cold war with the 
stream of time.” We Now Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 282.
In this regard, I am a devout admirer of Robert Lifton and Greg Mitchell and their work 
on the effects of the bomb upon the collective psyche. “. . .secrecy, concealment, and 
falsification have not been completely sustainable but have led to  confused combinations 
of ignorance, insight, and cynicism toward authorities—along with a sense of the world as 
deeply absurd and dangerous.” Hiroshima in America, 335.
'*” And ideology. Laura Nader speaks pointedly to the effects o f  the cold war upon all 
intellectuals (“As a class, intellectuals have been caught by the nulitary-industrial 
bureaucracy. . .We oscillate between asserting our individualities and serving the ruling 
powers.”) and the attempts by anthropologists to overcome the government’s influence 
upon universities—the “seduction inherent in cold war tools.” In  “The Phantom Factor” 
she argues for some ‘down-home’ anthropology, the recognition that the loyalty 
demanded by the national security state should be recognized as a taboo, and self-
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but no less important, however, is the multiplicity o f cold war impressions and memories 
that may have varied in their impact or intensity, but have, and continue to, shape 
cognition. How many historians today spent time under their school desks during air raid 
drills; went to local meetings for civil defense information; knew someone with a bunker in 
the backyard or a supply of food and water under a bed or hidden in a pantry; or, listened 
to the every-day-no-matter-what testing o f the warning whistle at noon and prayed never 
to hear it at night? How many have watched a spy movie where all the ‘bad’ guys (with 
severe facial scarring or an eye patch) or ‘bad’ (but typically voluptuous) women spoke 
with stereotypical Russian accents; read a newspaper; listened to the news, political 
speeches, the radio, watched television? It is hard to imagine that any adult raised in 
America was not affected, in some way, by the cold war.
It is also important to recognize the ways that national security came to assume the 
dominant role in the American state, and that the public itself collaborated in that 
transformation. Although few authors use the term “govemmentality,” the historical 
pattern o f  the cold war, including the development o f a strong centralized state, increased 
national security measures, anti-communism, the crafting of the military-industrial complex 
and imperialist tendencies, may best be understood in the Foucauldian sense—as an active 
force combining totalitarianism with individuality and the management o f state forces as 
they exist within relationships. The postwar state certainly employed “tactics rather than
censorship the “emissary” o f a taboo culture. Laura Nader, “The Phantom Factor” in The 
C old War and the University, Noam Chomsky, et al. eds. (New York, NY; The New 
Press, 1997), 107-146.
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laws. . .and laws themselves as tactics - to arrange things” toward certain ends."*’ In this 
regard, Colin Gordon’s analysis o f governmental rationality is an exceptionally lucid 
vehicle to approach an understanding o f the unique characteristics of national security. As 
a “dominant component o f  modem governmental rationality,” security may operate 
independently or combine with other governmental practices, namely “law, sovereignty 
and discipline” and form into multi-faceted, functional configurations.'** When the state 
began to exert ever more influence upon society, it required the complicity of the public 
and shaped opinion in accordance with its goals. Scholars must remember that they, too, 
were shaped by national motivation and the unique characteristics of the cold war.
We read, however, that the “past has another pattern”'*” and the recognition of that 
pattern requires a diverse analysis; and, in an approach influenced by social theorists, the 
tracing of hazardous behavior woven into the institutions through practice and habituation 
to discover the effects o f atomic governance. First, since the cold war was anchored in 
national initiative, the character and development of the state and its structure is a crucial 
element. Second, the function o f policy as an authoritative, if not determinative, element 
o f atomic weapons development and the literature surrounding this issue (though highly
'*^  Foucault “Govemmentality” in The Foucault E ffect Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, 
Peter Miller, eds. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991) 95. It must be 
emphasized that pubhc perception, shaped in grand degree by the state, all but guaranteed 
public ratification o f  oppressive governmental policies, for “ideas. . may be more 
contingent, recent and modifiable than we think. . the relation between government and 
the govemed passes, to a perhaps ever-increasing extent, through the manner in which the 
governed themselves are willing to exist as subjects.” Gordon, 48. See also Foucault 
“Security, Territory, and Population” and “The Ethics o f the Concem for the Self as a 
Practice of Freedom” in EYArcs, Subjectivity and Truth, Paul Rabinow, ed. (New York, 
NY: New Press, 1994) 71,300.
'** Introduction, Colin Gordon The Foucault E ffect, 1-47.
'*” George Ball, The P ast H ad Another Pattern.
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combative) adds a necessary dimension. Third, the several chronicles of the atomic testing 
program serve as a guide to the often complicated relationship between the government, 
testing program, and citizens. In concert these topics allow the examination of the tragic 
pattern that lies embedded within the atomic testing program.
The single most characteristic feature o f the American cold war period is the 
overwhelming tendency o f the state, particularly the executive branch, to appropriate 
power in the name o f national security. Under a constitutional umbrella granting 
discretion in matters o f foreign policy, the president and his advisors instituted and 
directed policy that affected the domestic realm and reduced the legitimate prerogatives of 
congress. It is tempting to suggest that the strength o f the American state in the postwar 
period resulted entirely from patterns of control established during wartime; but that type 
of analysis is more appropriately used in explanation o f behaviors—individual activity and 
interpersonal relationships—than it is in explanation o f state development. The state’s 
ability to suppress the liberties o f citizens during the cold war was not laid down during 
World War H; it was, instead, the result o f a protracted process o f political negotiation in 
the face o f transformational events and ideology that pushed the power of the state to an 
apogee in the postwar years.*”
*” There is general scholarly consensus that an increased centrality o f the state emerged 
during the Progressive period, and though apparently dormant during the 1920s, found 
revival in the circumstances of the depression and Roosevelt’s New Deal reforms. On 
Wilson, see Richard Hofstadter, The Age o f Reform  (New York, NY; Knopfj 1955) 282- 
287. Alan Brinkley persuasively argues that the significance of the New Deal rests, in 
large measure, in public identification with the national government as a societal resource, 
reflecting a “long process o f ideological adaptation.” “The New Deal and the Idea o f the 
State” The Rise cmd F all o f the New D eal Order 1920-1980 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1989) 268-269; and The End o f Reform  (New York, NY: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1995); See also Stephen Skowronek who argues that the 19th century system of
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The role o f an enlarged centralized government, however, should not be solely 
understood in terms of its relational strength or weakness. William Novak reminds us that 
any analysis o f the state, whether developed through discussions of its capability or 
impotwice, or whether through the crafting of conceptual models identifying its function 
or form, is a patently irrelevant exercise unless those concepts and theories can be pressed 
into the service o f an explanation. Novak’s recommendation to “[build] a public history 
around the intersection o f policy and society and the actual everyday conduct and
political negotiation, carried out through parties and courts, gave way to a burgeoning 
centralized national bureaucracy that resulted in an ‘extraconstitutional’ relationship 
between the polity and the government. Building a New Am erican State: The Expansion 
o f National Adm inistrative Capacities 1877-1920 (CambridgerCambridge University 
Press, 1982). Bruce Ackerman, too, emphasizes the shift in executive influence during 
Roosevelt’s administration and argues that popular support enhanced the president’s 
ability to lead both Congress and the Court toward an ‘activist’ state. We the People 
(Cambridge, MA; Belknap Press o f Harvard University Press, 1991) 106.
Barry Karl, though, denies that any ‘progressive’ notions should attach to the enhanced 
centralization. Focusing on America’s diversity and emphasis on individuality, Karl asserts 
that consensus only develops in the glare of crisis and argues that the New Deal and its 
locally-managed programs demonstrate not centrality, but governmental sensitivity to an 
inherent resistance to strong centralized control. The crisis mentality that permeated the 
cold war would seem to support, at least in part, Karl’s thesis. The Uneasy State 
(Chicago, IL and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1983) passim  but particularly 
226-228.
Efforts to understand the relationship between social change and politics enriches the 
scholarship o f state development. Theda Skocpol has expanded upon Skowronek’s work 
to especially assert that the state embodies two roles, one as an actor in its own right and 
another as the matrix through which policies are initiated, implemented, and that 
additionally restructure subsequent political possibilities and social identities. Curiously, 
though, while she argues that the analysis of institutions and pohtical initiative suggest a 
congruence between theory and practice— “distinctive statelike contributions to US policy 
making occur exactly in those instances and arenas where a  Weberian-Hintzean 
perspective would insist that t h ^  should occur”—she also denies that any theoretical 
model can be said to apply. Protecting Soldiers and M others (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1992); Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, T. Skocpol, eds.. 
Bringing the State Back In  (Cambridge and New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), 13.
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consequences of government” coincides with the intent o f  this thesis; namely, to examine 
the impact o f atomic governance upon society.*' So, what did the strengthened pre-war 
state mean to a nation on the verge of war? By the time American officially entered 
World War H after the Japanese attack on December 7, the nation’s industries were 
already primed, a generation of young men (many veterans o f the Civilian Conservation 
Corps) were ready to fight, and Americans had already accepted the authority o f a strong 
centralized state and decisive executive.*^ Roosevelt’s reliance on technology and 
confidence in his authority as commander-in-chief led to his decision to fund, secretly, the 
most innovative and consequential endeavor ever attempted—the development o f the 
atomic bomb. A hand-picked team managed the Manhattan Project, and except for these 
men and the scientists they employed, few others knew the project’s purpose until the 
bombing o f Hiroshima.*"
*' The P eople's W elfare (Chapel Hill, NC: University o f North Carolina Press, 1996) 8-9. 
See also Louis Galambos, ed.. The New American State (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1987).
*^  For an analysis o f how the administration and the social and cultural components of the 
1930s contributed to national involvement in World War II, see Michael Sherry, In the 
Shadow o f War (fi&w Haven and London; Yale University Press, 1995.
The complicity o f citizens in state functioning should be more often emphasized in 
historical application. In an interesting article, Meg Jacobs’ illuminates the circularity 
between policy and society in an examination o f the Office o f Price Administration, a 
national initiative managed on the local level. She finds that during the war and early 
postwar period, national manipulation o f the market in the form o f price controls was 
effective and had public support as long as the system operated efficiently. When national 
controls proved ineffective or inefficiency interrupted supplies, the formerly-cooperative 
local coalitions coalesced into strong national alliances against govemmental-controUed 
price schemes. “How About Some Meat? Consumption Politics and State Building from 
the Bottom Up, 1941-1946” The Journal o f American H istory 84:3 (December, 1977).
** The following are ‘official’ histories, developed under the auspices of either the Federal 
government or its contractors; a contingency unfortunately necessary in a field of classified 
documents—but one that raises important issues concerning the relationship between the 
state and scholarship. See Barton C. Hacker’s The D ragon’s  Tail (Berkeley, CA:
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By the time Japan fell, however, Truman had succeeded Roosevelt and wartime 
alliances had already begun to disintegrate.”  In an attempt to avoid the individualized and
University o f California Press, 1987) and Elements o f Controversy. Hacker developed 
both o f these at the instigation o f  the Atomic Energy Commission eager to refute a 
mounting swell of criticism and lawsuits. Hacker reviewed no classified documents. 
Hewlett & Duncan, Atom ic Shield  (University Park, PA: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 
1969). For the Eisenhower period, see R. Hewlett and J. Holl, Atom s fo r  Peace and War 
1952-1961 (Berkeley, CA: University o f California Press, 1989). Jack Holl served as 
chief historian for the DOE and Hewlett for the AEC. Hewlett includes information firom 
some classified material and it is thus difficult to ‘source’ some o f  his comments for 
accuracy or interpretation. See also Philip Cantelon, Richard G. Hewlett and Robert C. 
Williams, eds.. The American Atom  (Philadelphia, PA: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 
1984) for a convenient compilation of major documents.
In addition, Martin Sherwin offers a concise analysis o f weapons development during 
World War II. This is a significant contribution to scholarship since Sherwin posits that 
the bomb solidified a connection between the ‘real’ war and the ‘cold’ war. A World 
D estroyed (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1975).
For an ‘insider’ treatment o f  the Manhattan Project and one scientist’s avoidance of 
military disciplinary strictures, see Richard Feynman’s entertaining Surely You 're Joking, 
M r. Feynman (New York, NY: WW Norton, 1985).
See Melvyn Leffler and David S. Painter, eds.. O rigins o f the C old War (New York, 
NY Hill & Wang, 1994) and Martin Walker’s The C old War. Walker’s many years as a 
reporter covering the cold war gives his work a unique perspective, and its insights are 
often a refreshing departure from other more sterile accounts. See also J. Dunbabin’s 
encyclopaedic International Relations since 1945: A H istory in  Two Volumes (New 
York, NY: Longman, 1994), particularly Vol. 1.
Compilations of documents include: Warren F. Kimball, C hurchill & Roosevelt: The 
Complete Correspondence, Vol. I l l  { Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); 
Harold Stein, American C ivil-M ilitary Decisions (University, AL: University of Alabama 
Press, 1963); Schlesinger, Dynam ics o f World Power, another particularly useful 
compilation o f articles from the early cold war period is provided in Peter G. Filene’s 
American Views o f Soviet R ussia 1917-1965 (Homewood, IL:Dorsey Press, 1968); 
likewise, Gabriel A. Almond’s compilation of polls. The Am erican People and Foreign 
Policy (New York, NY: Praeger, 1960) lends added dimension to a subject often confined 
to an elite, political sphere. By contrast, Herbert Druks’ Harry S. Truman and the 
Russians 1945-1952 (New York, NY: R. Speller, 1966) focuses exclusively, and 
approvingly, upon the executive. For a more critical and detached analysis, is Eric 
Beukel’s non-American perspective, American Perceptions o f the Soviet Union as a  
Nuclear Adversary (London: Pinter, 1989).
On Truman, see especially David McCullough’s Truman (New York, NY: Simon and 
Schuster, 1992). In addition, and although Nfiller’s account o f his ‘interview’ with 
Truman is questioned by (at least one) scholar, (Robert Ferrell, Review in American
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somewhat haphazard methods o f his predecessor, Truman brought the State Department 
back into the diplomatic fore and initiated plans for the postwar coordination o f national 
security.** The breakdown o f the US/Soviet relationship stimulated efforts against
History, March 1990, 5) he provides a good personal glimpse o f Truman, and Miller’s 
tapes have been recently validated by McCullough’s research, see Ferrell, Review.
Timothy Walch and Dwight M. Miller, eds., Herbert Hoover and Harry S. Truman 
(Worland, WY: High Plains Publishing Company, 1992), Robert H. Ferrell, Dear Bess. 
Those that focus upon other influential actors include David S. McLellan and David C 
Acheson, eds.. Among Friends: Personal Letters o f Dean Acheson (New York, NY; 
Dodd and Mead, 1980); James Chace Acheson: The Secretary o f State Who Created the 
American World (New  York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1998); Larry I. Bland, ed. George 
C. M arshall: Interviews and Reminiscences fo r Forrest C. Pogue (Lexington, KY: G.C. 
Marshall Research Foundation, 1991); David E. Lilienthal The Journals o f D avid E. 
Lilienthal, Vols. H, m  (New York: 1964); Arnold A. Rogow, Jam es Forrestal: A Study o f 
Personality, P olitics and Policy (New York, NY: Harper & Rowe, 1963); Walter Millis, 
ed. The Forrestal D iaries (New  YoTk,NY:Y\kmgP\ib\xsh&Ts, 1951).
For an example o f an approving analysis of the United States as a “reactor” rather than 
a “motivator”, see William G. Hyland, The Cold war: F ifty Years o f Conflict (New York, 
NY: Times Books, 1990); see also Jaime E. Nolan, Guardians o f the Arsenal (New York, 
NY: Basic Books, 1989).
** See Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance o f Power. Somewhat reminiscent o f Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr.’s The Im perial Presidency (Boston, M A  Houghton Mifflin, 1973) and C. 
Wright Mills’ landmark study. The Power Elite (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 1957) that proposed the development of a governmental troika composed of the 
military, pentagon and executive in the face of a postwar power vacuum associated with 
the abandonment o f (traditional) domestic focus, Leffler argues that the cold war 
extracted an enormous cost from the American economy and people: “[US officials] began 
to plan for contingencies. The price of preponderance—the cost o f linking Western 
Europe, Japan, and their dependencies to a US-led orbit—was an unlimited arms race, 
indisciminate commitments, constant anxiety, eternal vigilance, and a protracted cold 
war.” Leffler’s work suffers, however, from some contradiction, for the previous 
statement is followed by the approving: “Not only did US officials show a shrewd 
understanding o f Soviet weaknesses.. showed their grasp o f economic geostrategic 
realities.. .They correctly believed that open markets would fuel worldwide economic 
growth.. . ” 445, 499-500. See also John Gaddis’ most recent We Now Know (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997). Athough it conforms with the current trend toward 
more-inclusive scholarship, I am not in complete agreement with Gaddis’ ‘revised’ 
assertion that the early cold war was not bi-polar. Clearly, whether in terms o f nations or 
ideologies, the US/Soviet Union and democracy/communism distinctions are decidedly bi­
polar and were so recognized and characterized at the time. Certainly it was perceived as
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domestic communism,*” and secrecy enveloped government*^ even as the National 
Security Council entrenched a military component into executive decision making. 
Athough the Council provided notional approval for policies instituted during Truman’s
such, and although the reality may have been more complex, those multiplicities cannot 
override the fact that a belief in bi-polarism permeated the period.
The critical nature o f the historiography and the emotional interpretation demonstrates 
the significance o f  the postwar period to American scholars. The debates over the 
function o f the state and society are genteel affairs compared to the hotly-contested fi-ays 
surrounding interpretation o f American policy following World War H. The 
transformation o f  the nation’s government in the cold war years has scattered fencing 
academics on both sides (and underneath) a postwar bridge. See for example, the debates 
over diplomacy by John Lewis Gaddis, Bruce Cumings, Melvyn Leffler and Michael Hunt 
in America and the World, Michael J. Hogan, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press: 1995). There are, indeed, so many variations that the referents o f analyses nearly 
equal the number o f tomes: “consensus,” “orthodox,” “revisionist,” “radical revisionist,” 
“post-revisionist,” a d  particularum .
*” See Caute, The G reat Fear, Noam Chomsky, et. al., eds.. The C old War & The 
University, M. Belknap, C old War PoliticalJustice (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1977); Stanley Kutler, The American Inquisition, Justice and Injustice in the cold war 
(New York, NY: EBU and Wang, 1982); P. Steinberg, The G reat "R ed” Menace: United 
States Prosecution o f Am erican Communists (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994); 
Whitfield, The Culture o f the Cold war (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1991) particularly Chapter 8. In an early, yet still very useful work, the dynamics and 
transitions associated with the powerplays between Congress and the Courts concerning 
civil rights and internal security is cogently analyzed by W. Murphy, Congress and the 
Court (Chicago, IL: University o f Chicago Press, 1962). For anti-communism’s effect 
upon scientists, see Donald A. Strickland, Scientists in P olitics (Purdue: Purdue 
University Studies, 1968).
*’ Guy B. Adams and Danny L. Balfour, Unmasking Adm instrative E vil (Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications, 1998); Hugh De Santis, The D iplom acy o f Silence (Chicago, 
EL:University o f Chicago Press, 1979); H. Foerstel, Secret Science (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 1993); Anthony Mathews, The Darker Reaches o f Government (Berkeley, CA: 
University o f California Press, 1978); Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Secrecy the American 
Experience (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998). It should be noted 
that unlike Great Britain’s 30-year mandatory declassification system, the United States 
has no universal standard for document declassification.
Contemporary debates, and probably the cost o f storage, has encouraged a 
governmental analysis o f its own classification system A Review o f the Department o f 
Energy C lassification P olicy and Practice ÇNasYôxi^onDC: 1995). By May, 1999, 
however, congressional concem surrounding Chinese espionage within the nation’s
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terms, those policies were initiated and implemented according to the philosophies o f 
Truman’s chief Secretaries of State, General George Marshall and Dean Acheson.**
The atomic bomb added a critical dimension to the necessity for accurate analysis, 
and posed difficulty for scientists wary of the bomb’s overutilization in the face of a 
military establishment eager for new weapons development.*” The military won out, and
weapons laboratories prompted the Department o f Energy to suspend its declassification 
o f records pending a more ‘comprehensive’ review.
** See Ernest R. May, ed., America Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68, (Boston, 
MA; Bedford Books o f St. Martins Press, 1993); Kenneth M. Jensen, ed.. O rigins o f the 
Cold War: The Novikov, Kennan, and Roberts 'Long Telegrams ’ o f1946 (Washington, 
D C : United States Institute o f Peace, 1993); John Prados, Keepers o f the Keys: A 
H istory o f the N ational Security Councilfrom  Truman to Bush (New York, NY: Morrow 
Books, 1991); John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies o f Containment, Cecil V. Crabb and Kevin 
V. Mulcahy, Am erican N ational Security, Robert Pfaltzgraff and Jacqueline Davis 
N ational Security Decisions', Cames Lord, The Presidency and the M anagment o f 
National Security.
Steven L. Rearden, The Evolution o f American Strategic D octrine: Paul H. N itze and 
the Soviet Challenge, (Boulder, CO; Westview Press, 1984); Joseph M. Siracusa, 
Rearming fo r  the C old War: Paul H. Nitze, the H-Bomb, and the O rigins o f a  Soviet First 
Strike (Los Angeles, C A  Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, 1983); 
John Lamberton Harper, American Visions o f Europe, op. cit.'. Strobe Talbott, The 
M asters o f the Game ', James A. Bill, George Ball: Behind the Scenes in US Foreign 
Policy (New Haven, CT; Yale University Press, 1997); Steven M. Neuse, D avidE . 
Lilienthal, The Journey o f an American Liberal (Knoxville, TN: University o f Tennessee 
Press, 1996); David S. McLellan, Dean Acheson: The State D epartment Years (New 
York, NY: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1976); Gordon A  Craig & Francis L. Loewenheim, 
eds.. The D iplomats 1939-1979 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). For an 
examination o f the pattems of institutional arrangements between the National Security 
Council and other governmental agencies, see Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic P olitics and 
Foreign Policy.
The ‘cold warriors’ have produced a wealth of reminiscences, including: George Ball, 
The Past Has A nother Pattern', Dean Acheson, Power and D iplomacy (Cambridge, MA 
Harvard University Press, 1959), Present a t the Creation (New York, NY: Norton, 1969); 
George Kennan, Sketches From a Life (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1989) and 
M emoirs (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1967); Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshim a to 
Glasnost (New York, NY: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989); McGeorge Bundy, Danger and  
Survival.
*” Fred Kaplan The W izards o f Armageddon (Stanford, C A  Stanford University Press, 
1983); Robert J. Lifton and Greg Mitchell Hiroshima in America (New York, NY:
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even though many scientists warned of the dangers o f  atomic experimentation, the armed 
forces asserted, and received, primacy. The Navy’s Operation Crossroads and the Army’s 
insistence upon a continental testing site resulted in the exposure of many participants and 
unwary civilians to radioactive fallout through the I940’s and I950’s. Because of policies 
that demanded secrecy at all costs, however, much o f the information o f the early period 
of testing came to light only through litigation.^
Putnam & Sons, 1995); On cognitive problems between scientists and bureaucrats, see H. 
Peter Metzger The Atom ic Establishment (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1972). 
Less critical, but illuminating information concerning the foundational scientists and their 
philosophies, both before and after the bomb, is found in a series of volumes developed by 
the American Institute o f Physics, particularly Rudolph E. Peierls' Atom ic H istories 
(Woodbury, NY: American Institute of Physics, 1997). A. Compton, Atom ic Quest (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1956) is a good overview of the US program. See 
Andrew Brown’s analysis o f the British influence upon atomic science: The Neutron and 
the Bomb (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
“  Shields Warren, The Pathology o f Ionizing Radiation (Springfield, IL: Thomas 
Publishers, 1961); Allan Favish, “Radiation Injury and the Atomic Veteran” Hastings Law 
Journal 32: 1 (1981); A Department of Defense document: Samuel Glasstone and Philip 
J. Dolan, The E ffects o f Nuclear Weapons (Washington DC.: 1977); A Pubhc Health 
Service report. Radiological Health Data (Washington D C.: 1961); The Environmental 
Protection Agency’s Radiological Impact Caused by Emissions o f Radionuclides into A ir 
in the United States: A Prelim inary Report (Washington D C : 1979) John Fuller, The 
Day We Bom bed Utah (New York, NY: New American Library, 1984); H. Ball, Justice 
Downwind (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1986); R_ Miller Under the Cloud 
(New York, NY: Collier MacMillan, 1986); Phillip Fradkin, Fallout, an American 
Nuclear Tragedy (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1989); Jonathan Weisgall, 
Operation Crossroads (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994);Stewart L. UdaU,
(New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1994); A. Titus, Bombs in the 
Backyard (Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press, 1986).
US House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations o f the Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, The Forgotten Guinea Pigs—A Report on the Health 
E ffects o f Low-Level Radiation Sustained as a  Result o f the Nuclear Weapons Testing 
Program  96th Congress, 2d session, committee print 96-IFC 53, August 1980. US House 
Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power o f  the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, Am erican Nuclear Guinea Pigs: Three Decades o f Radiation Experiments on 
U.S. Citizens, 99th Congress, 2d session, committee print 99-NN, November 1986.
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*  *  *
Certainly, the literature surrounding atomic weapons development and testing 
provides a depth of understanding often missing in other historical fields where 
multidisciplinary cooperation is less necessary. The intricacies o f radiation and the 
peculiarities of its developers and experimenters have forced historians to slip into 
unfamiliar scientific territory to understand (at least a little) o f the physical and social 
sciences.®  ^ While the foregoing summary illustrates that commentary on the cold war 
crowds library shelves, those volumes are insuflhcient to answer the very basic questions 
that drive this study. The impotence of existing material as tools that might uncover the 
reasons for, and consequences of, fallout is, perhaps, a problem o f barriers within the field 
o f history itself where intradisciplinary studies are conspicuously absent.
American historians customarily focus upon one field (diplomacy, politics, culture, 
society, science) during a single time period (the Progressive Era, World War n, the cold 
war) and few feel entitled, or comfortable, enough to peer over their self-imposed walls. I 
suggest that these strictures, precluding as they do a progression fi’om field to field or 
period to period, limit not only research, but even the ability to conceptualize a model that 
would emphasize practice—a component o f governance with a distinct lack o f respect for
See, for example, the anthropological studies o f the atomic weapons development; 
Hugh Gusterson, Nuclear R ites (Berkeley, CA; University o f California Press, 1996) on 
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory ; D. Rosenthal, A t the Heart o f the Bomb (Reading, MA: 
Addison Wesley, 1990) on Los Alamos; Nigel Gilbert and NCchael Mulkay, Opening 
Pandora's Box: A Sociological Analysis o f Scientists ’ Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984). See also Helen Caldicott, M issile Envy ^ e w  York, NY: 
Bantam Books, 1986); Hilgaitner, Bell, O’Connor, Nukespeak, Nuclear Language, 
Visions and M indset (San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books, 1982).
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academic specialty. Thus, most interpreters rely upon a macroscopic paradigm, 
compounding and molding the matrix o f cold war issues and institutions into a narrative 
form too often reliant upon the articulation of governmental policy. Clearly these 
explanations, though heuristic, are patently insuflScient. None manage to situate the 
problem o f radioactive fallout at its source. This analysis, therefore, leans upon traditional 
scholarship yet rejects the traditional explanations and barriers; and, alternatively, tracks 
the chain o f negligence back to its source. By following the microscopic trail o f 
determinative factors throughout the broader macroscopic field, this study locates the 
source o f atomic governance—the trajectory and coalescence o f institutional practice and 
behavior—that ultimately must bear responsibility for the hazardous nature o f  the nation’s 
atomic testing program.
Since anti-Communist ideology drove institutional development, this examination 
will first explore the ways that the National Security Act thematized the development of 
the postwar bureaucracy, and discuss the influence o f individuals upon the development 
and transformation of national policy during the early cold war period (Chapter Two). 
Once the philosophical base of the postwar period is established, this review will step back 
in time to follow the chronological development o f  certain institutional practices that 
characterized atomic testing. The Manhattan Project (Chapter Three) laid the foundation 
for a pattern of atomic secrecy which continues to this day. Media manipulation joined 
internal secrecy and scientific manipulation in a decidedly unholy alliance during 1946s 
Operation Crossroads. Some scientists, alarmed because those testing activities 
threatened the health and safety o f workers and civilians, tried to intervene, but were
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shunted aside in favor o f those scientists willing to unconditionally cooperate with the 
government schemes (Chapter Four). Though Congress mandated civilian control of 
atomic energy with its Atomic Energy Act, the military exerted enormous influence upon 
the direction o f atomic development and experimentation and Chapter Five illustrates that 
the military showed complete disregard for not only the Atomic Energy Commission itself 
but also vital health and safety considerations. Finally, Chapter Six shows how the 
congruence o f extreme internal and external security measures, the egregious distortion of 
information, and the manipulation of scientists and misapplication of science played out in 
Southern Nevada with the advent o f continental testing; and, additionally, how those 
practices contributed to the hazardous national dispersal o f radioactive fallout, causing (I 
argue) illness and death.
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THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
Turning and turning in the widening gyre 
The fa lcon carmot hear the falconer; 
Things fa ll apart; the centre cannot hold; 
M ere anarchy is loosed upon the w orld.. .
William Butler Yeats
Yeats wrote “The Second Coining” before World War I’s dead and wounded had 
been tallied, but its message is universal, disturbingly echoing passages from Thucydides’ 
ancient account o f the Peloponnesian W ar as well as the torment o f Londoners barraged 
by the Blitz. ‘ Warfare is one of those curious features branded upon human existence that
 ^The motivations and consequences o f warfare, even those separated by thousands o f 
years, justify the comparison. The Peloponnesian War began in 431 be and, through the 
eyes o f Thucydides, is an autopsy of an archaic power struggle littered with hoplites, 
triremes, seiges and plague. Thucydides’ account o f the battle between democracy and 
oligarchy betrays the tangled roots o f imperialism and illustrates the more human (and 
inhumane) repercussions when states assert their superiority. : “. . the strong do what 
they can and the weak suffer what they must.”
A revolution on Corcyra broke out during the fifth year of the war, “Death thus raged 
in every shape; and, as usually happens at such times, there was no length to which 
violence did not g o .. some were even walled up in the temple of Dionysus and died 
there.” 111:81-82. Thucydides, The H istory o f the Peloponnesian War, (London: The 
Guernsey Press, 1993), V :89,111:81-82.
Beseiged Londoners sought sanctuary in bomb shelters, not temples. In June and July o f 
1944 at least 100 bombs a day fell on London, killing (on average) one person per bomb. 
The bombs could be extremely efficient-one demolished four square blocks, another 100 
buildings. Londoners learned to estimate the danger by listening to the whistling “engine” 
o f the bomb, which stopped just before it met its target. Before long though, even this 
technique proved unreliable because the Germans soon altered the bombs and set them to 
glide for varying distances before contact Life July 24, 1944 19-21.
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encompasses immutable characteristics with kaleidoscopic variation. Each war, say the 
chroniclers, rests in its own individual crypt, neatly segregated by era, scale and 
technology; yet a single crimson niche cradles the poets’ ageless and seamless ribbon of 
honor, bloodshed, and mothers’ tears. But the perspectives o f scholars and artists meet at 
a vanishing point: both have always agreed that wars end—people heal, and though 
changes often follow, everyday cares slowly replace the anxieties fostered by insecurity.
World W ar II shattered that tradition. Its end hardly lived up to the expectations 
of a weary nation; indeed, tickertape still littered Times Square when Americans realized 
that the atom bomb might just have sealed a devil’s bargain.^ A  year after Japanese 
surrender, a pollster asked a 67-year old Virginia farmer whether an atomic bomb would 
hit the US, he replied “I couldn’t tell you. Afeered it will.”^
Even in the midst o f postwar elation and prosperity, millions shared the Virginia 
farmer’s lingering “feer” o f the bomb, and emotions whirled as Americans emerged from
 ^US society in the postwar period is too often characterized as a euphoric land of 
prosperity. Paul Boyer, on the other hand, offers a compelling alternative analysis o f this 
new dimension in American life. “In the immediate post-Hiroshima period, one might 
speculate . . Americans [downplayed] their atomic-bomb fears. . But as the wartime 
climate faded. . .they may have become more willing to express openly the deep anxiety 
that many cultural observers insisted was present from the beginning.” “This primal fear 
o f extinction cut across all political and ideological lines, from the staunchly conservative 
Chicago Tribune, which wrote bleakly o f  an atomic war that would leave Earth ‘a barren 
waste, in which the survivors o f the race will hide in caves or live among ruins’. . t o . . the 
New R epublic’s. . vision o f  conflict that would ‘obliterate all the great cities o f the 
belligerents.. .[leaving only] scattered remnants of humanity living on the periphery of 
civilization.’” B y The B om b's Early L ight, 15, 24.
Even before the bombing o f Nagasaki, the Arizona Republic reported that the nation’s 
capital “is more apprehensive than jubilant over the terrifymg success.. the entire city is 
pervaded by a kind o f sense o f oppression. . and fear.” Arizona Republic, August 8, 1945, 
6 .
 ^Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. and Sylvia Eberhart, American O pinions on W orld A ffairs (New 
York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1948), 67.
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war facing a world of new problems—horror at the inhumanity o f the industrialized 
Holocaust, terror-tinged pride for the bomb that ended the war with Japan, and 
compassion toward Europe’s displaced and hungry/ Domestic uncertainties joined these 
concerns, but in a world where assembly-line genocide competed for first place on an 
updated list o f depravity with the potential for wholesale atomic destruction, isolationism 
offered no solution/ President Truman and Congress developed a novel strategy to deal 
with a far more “modem” and fiightening world than the one that existed prior to the war. 
The National Security Act, through its executive advisory component, the National 
Security Council, built a framework designed to  secure America’s superiority in the 
international realm and (though unintentionally) cast the emotive nature o f the postwar 
period into its structure. This is not to say that the visceral has ever been absent from the 
governments o f men (the “seven deadly sins” have always been particularly popular) but 
suggests, instead, that in the face o f widespread unease the Act marks a not-so-subtle 
adjustment of governmental policy; permanent mobilization.
Prior to World War I, national security remained a seemingly organic, function of 
government—its posture chiefly one of economic defense, its implications and
* The nation needed no impassioned pleas to support its European fiiends, for the hearts 
o f Americans went out to Europe’s suffering people before the full extent o f hardship 
became known. In a June 1945 poll, 85% o f Americans agreed to continued rationing and 
70% volunteered to even more extensive food rationing in the interests o f feeding Europe; 
57% assented that a two-year extension o f domestic rationing to aid Europe’s hungry was 
appropriate. Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1945, 248.
 ^As early as 1942, Truman said that the war was America’s opportunity to solidify its 
international relationships; “That German peace offensive worries me. I f  Britain were to 
run out on us, or if China should suddenly collapse, we’d have all that old isolation fever 
again and another war in twenty years. We must take this one to its conclusion and 
dictate peace terms from Berlin and Tokyo.” Harry S. Truman, letter to Bess, April 30, 
1942, Robert H. Ferrell, ed.. D ear Bess (New York, NY: Norton, 1983) 474.
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consequences unseen and unconsidered by ail but an handful. International bonds 
strengthened throughout the first half of the century, though inconsistently, and an 
awareness of the nation as a member of a larger community developed gradually as 
American participation globalized WWI and escalated when the Great Depression spread 
like a bacillus throughout the world’s developed nations. Yet, even as the domestic 
economic problems and New Deal solutions caused the nation to retreat inward, brittle 
European powers and politics again demanded American involvement. By the end of 
World War H, the future held uncertain, nightmarish, and unparalleled possibilities. A 
bundle o f motivations far more abstract and primal than economic protectionism and 
support of allies shoved national security from its defense-centered perch onto a higher 
plane o f  recognition, consideration, and participation.*
* Ronald Steel holds Walter Lippmann and his 1943 book US Foreign Policy: Shield o f 
the Republic responsible for the ideological development o f the National Security Council. 
Lippmann argued for policies based upon a calculation o f a “national interest.” Dependent 
upon the anticipation and neutralization o f potential dangers, national interest was limited 
only by the reach of national power.
Steel offers an alternative, and enticing, explanation for the emotional nature of postwar 
decision-making based upon international power relationships. Since “the perimeter 
expands in relation to the amount o f power available” security is “unmoored” and 
“becomes a function o f power and an aspect o f psychology. . It is not a specific reality, 
and it does not exist entirely in space.. .  It is an operating mechanism, and at the same 
time an abstraction.” He suggests that national security is too often confused with 
defense; “defense is a policy, national security is an attitude; defense is precise, national 
security is difiuse; defense is a condition, national security is a feeling.” “A New Realism” 
World Policy Journal, Summer 1997, 1.
The “top-down” model by Steel fails to consider, however, that the president and 
congress additionally relied upon (emotional) national support in order to construct the 
National Security Act and Council. See Meg Jacobs’ analysis that popular support was 
crucial to policy implementation and its eventual success or failure. “How About Some 
Meat? Consumption Politics and State Building from the Bottom Up, 1941-1946” 
December, 1977.
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With the National Security Act, the nation’s leaders hoped to anchor America 
firmly (and safely) within the postwar world through a dramatic restructuring of the 
nation’s inefficient and outdated administrative structure. Truman claimed that the “only 
new thing new in the world is history you don’t know” but history failed Truman—World 
War n  had unleashed a potent whirlwind for which there seemed no precedent—the 
features and problems o f  the new world had rendered the past a mute companion.^ A
 ^Merle Nfiller PIcnn Speaking (New York, NY: Norton, 1974) 69. A voracious reader, 
Truman claimed that even as a child he almost always had his “nose stuck in a book.. a 
history book mostly” and saved dimes to buy a copy o f Plutarch’s Lives. History seems to 
have functioned as a guide for Truman, and he credited Plutarch for helping him overcome 
a political opponent who reminded him of Nero. “And I noticed some o f those same traits 
in old Stark. . The only thing new in the world is the history you don’t know.” Idem. 9 
and passim .
The ways that leaders have used, and misused, history in the twentieth century are 
exemplified by Richard Neustadt and Ernest May. The authors suggest that decision 
makers, with few exceptions, fail to  use history to its best advantage—to interpret 
influences and predict outcomes. Using case studies in this work designed as a training 
manual for public and private policy makers, t h ^  praise some individuals as exceptionally 
cognizant o f the history embedded within individuals, institutions, and nations. General 
George Marshall was one o f these “gifted” leaders who thought in a time stream, he 
“looked not only to the coming year but well beyond, and with a clear sense of the long 
past from which those futures would come.” Thinking in Time (New York, NY: The Free 
Press, 1986), 248.
The assumption that Truman and other national leaders made use o f history when 
possible (for good or ill) is, perhaps, a bit naive and/or simplistic. In a recent work on the 
development o f  American social science, Dorothy Ross argues that the American ethos 
itself has seriously constrained historicism. Although Ross focuses on the profession of 
history and not on those lay individuals who might rely upon (or simply enjoy) history, 
her work illustrates that the atom bomb and other transitional aspects that accompanied 
World War II may have only reinforced traditional American notions o f superiority and the 
nation’s “natural” tendency for progress. As she points out in her study of early 
twentieth-century social science development, American history is just now breaking out 
o f the confines of a conventional liberal interpretational mode that focused upon American 
exceptionalism and was infused with nationalism. Under these broad interpretations, 
progress always accompanied transition and rendered historical comparison relatively 
useless: “Flux was contained by the liberal shape o f American society, by economic, 
social, or political systems that rendered conflict harmonious, business downturns 
temporary, and progress likely.” 388. Though disenchanted by the overuse o f theory.
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novel and ambitious undertaking, the National Security Act promised to streamline the 
armed forces, coordinate policy decisions, and institute consistency throughout 
governmental agencies.
Historians and political scientists have not ignored the National Security Act; 
indeed, the literature is replete with analyses o f its organization, function and production.* 
Charting the waves and patterns o f currents that flowed out o f the National Security 
Council, these analyses emphasize international relationships and/or equally broad, 
domestic dynamics. In the process, however, they have ignored a dangerous undertow.
As the authorizing vehicle for atomic weapons development and testing, the 
National Security Act was a vital component o f postwar governance. Officially, it 
provided organizational structure and its associated Council coordinated the foreign policy 
directives of the executive. Though the Act’s creation was clearly a response to 
governmental inefficiency and international realities, an examination of its official roles and 
intentions carmot explain the myriad behaviors that controverted the Act’s intent. First, it 
did not streamline government activity, it bred inefficiency. Second, although 
solidification of national interests against external foes underpinned its creation, close 
examination reveals motivations and assumptions strategically designed to enhance
“New” historians motivated Ross, leading her “to regret that so much o f twentieth-century 
social science is historically vacuous and to see how scientism and liberal ideology have 
interacted to enforce political and ahistorical constraints on social thinking.” The Origins 
o f American Social Science (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1991) xxi. In this regard, see also NCchael H. Hunt’s critique on the state o f “state” 
history and twentieth-century diplomatic historiographers, “The Long Crisis in Diplomatic 
lEstory” America in the World, Michael J. Hogan, ©d., (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995).
* See note 60, supra.
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internal positions rather than achieve superiority in the face of external contingencies. 
These contradictions, then, suggest an unofficial, subterranean matrix o f influence.
An examination of practices at the highest level of government decision-making 
requires a focus on individual activity and influences, and the following analysis gestures 
toward the personal rather than the political.^ By spotlighting internal relationships and 
comparing the ideology o f George Kennan and Paul Nitze, the two most pivotal 
individuals in postwar American foreign policy, this inquiry explores the unique 
motivations that stimulated the Act’s creation and the assumptions that controlled its 
operation. This study proposes that the anxieties of the war years and its immediate 
aftermath both initiated and infiltrated America’s postwar organizational structure, and 
when embedded, those same anxieties limited ideological shifts and severely circumscribed 
the potential for innovation or modification.
Inherent within the National Security Council were two interlocking beliefs. First, 
despite a traditional reluctance to maintain a high level of peacetime preparedness, 
postwar America required a strong military presence; and, second, that the continuation of 
the nation’s vitality required coordination of its military, political and economic interests. 
More importantly, however, it rationalized the potential terror o f atomic obliteration and 
directed it at an ever-present “enemy.” The Act shaped postwar institutions and solidified 
the peculiar characteristics o f World War II into a governmental fi’amework that 
innoculated peacetime policy and practice with an urgent, militaristic, imperative. The
® This is, admittedly, a convenient distinction for organizational purposes and does not 
dispute the fact that politics and personality are indivisibly bound.
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National Security Council institutionalized the vulnerability o f America, arguably the most 
powerful nation in the world. It institutionalized fear.**
*  *  *
During World War II when Roosevelt defined America’s strategic fi-ontier at the 
Rhine River, he broadly signalled America’s intention to safeguard not only her borders, 
but her international interests and relationships.** By the end of the war, the nation’s 
“interest” became irretrievably tied to “survival” as the realities o f modem warfare became
*° In a nationwide poll, 85% o f Americans agreed that the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki was a “good thing”, but 27% also believed that “experimenting in smashing 
atoms will cause an explosion which will destroy the world.” Public Opinion Quarterly, 
Fall 1945, 385.
In 1946 (before Operation Crossroads), a survey for the Committee on the Social and 
Economic Aspects o f Atomic Energy found that 64% of a sample answered “yes” to the 
question “Do you think there is a real danger that atomic bombs will ever be used against 
the United States?” O f those, 29% believed “the danger that you or any members of your 
immediate family will ever be killed by an atomic bomb” to be “fairly great” or “very 
great.” Hazel Erskine “The Polls; Atomic Weapons and Nuclear Energy” Public Opinion 
Quarterly 21, 1963, 107.
In May, 1946, 72% those participating in a nationwide poll believed that a world 
organization should pass and enforce a law so that no country could make atomic bombs, 
including the US The same poll found that 56% of those believed that the same world 
organization should enforce the destruction o f all existing atomic bombs, even though the 
US possessed all bombs in existence. 118. Asked whether he thought there was a danger 
that atomic bombs would be used against the US, a 67-year old Virginia farmer said; ‘1 
couldn’t tell you. Afeered it will.” Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. and Sylvia Eberhart,
American Opinions on W orld A ffairs (New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1969) 67.
Paul Boyer asserts that scientists (and other social groups) played upon the very natural 
fears o f Americans and utilized every possible method to place their agendas before a 
vulnerable public. ‘T he emotions they worked so mightily in 1945-1947 to keep alive and 
intensify created fertile psychological soil for the ideology of American nuclear superiority 
and an all-out crusade against communism. . .their rhetoric of fear continued to  echo 
through the culture, to be manipulated by other people pursuing other goals. The 
scientists offered one avenue o f possible escape fi’om atomic fear; Truman offered another. 
Truman won.” By the B om b's Early Light, 106.
** See Crabb & Mulcahy, American N ational Security.
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all too apparent. Oceans and mountain ranges lost their status as strategic boundaries; the 
atomic bomb obliterated its targets along with those barriers—rendering them insignificant 
features on the world’s map.*^ Technology had dissolved America’s traditional reliance 
upon its relative geographic isolation. When potential destruction was limited only by the 
range of the B-29 Superfortress, the notion of national security achieved primacy, but not 
without profound domestic consequences.*^
The long-standing sibling rivalry between the Army and Navy reared its ugly head 
when Truman proposed a re-organization of the military to accommodate the new reality. 
Congress and the Army backed the unification o f the military, but the Navy was less 
enthusiastic. *“* Sensing that the Army and its Air Corp held the high ground (owing to 
General Marshall’s successes and the delivery system of the new atomic bomb) the Navy 
cast a wide and persuasive net, claiming boldly that the Army’s plan would “weaken
*^  This reality constituted a fiightening new feature in the postwar world, and was 
emphasized by Truman when he submitted the NATO treaty to the Senate on April 12, 
1949: “. . The world has grown too small. The oceans to our east and west no longer 
protect us fi’om the reach o f brutality and aggression.” Cited in The American Foreign 
Policy, Ernest R. May, ed., (New York, NY: G. Braziller, 1963).
** Radiation wasn’t the only invisible danger in the postwar world. The Superfortress 
amazed official spectators and reporters with a tale rivaling The Em peror’s New Clothes. 
In a demonstration, “flying so high it was out o f sight” and carrying a supersonic, armor 
piercing bomb “too fast to be seen or heard” the government “kept secret” the bomb’s 
mission and effectiveness. New York Times, July 24, 1947, 6.
*'* Though enchanted with the potential o f the bomb to revolutionize warfare, the military 
faced an uncertain future in the wake o f World War II as more than two-thirds of 
individuals in a poll agreed that the atomic bomb made a large army and navy unnecessary. 
Public Opinion Q uarterly, Fall 1945, 384.
In June, 1946, Forrestal threatened to resign should the president back the “mass play- 
steam roller tactics o f the Army.” Truman admitted that Forrestal’s “misgivings” had 
foundation and would “see that any such tactics were not successful.” The D airies o f 
James Forrestal, “Meeting with President” 19 June 1946, 169. See also Lord, The 
Presidency and the M anagement o f N ational Security, (New York, NY: Free Press,
1988), 69.
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civilian control.. .[leading] to expanded military influence throughout American life.”** 
The Navy finally acquiesced when Secretary o f the Navy James Forrestal agreed to serve 
as the new Secretary of Defense at Truman’s request.** With the Navy’s objections laid to 
rest. Congress finally reached a compromise and passed the National Security Act on July 
26, 1947.*’
The Act signaled the beginning o f a new era. ‘The most sweeping reorganization 
o f national security policy” created a Department o f Defense, the National Security 
Council to advise the President on all matters relating to national security (foreign or 
domestic), the Joint Chiefs o f Staff to represent the armed forces and provide mihtary 
advice, and the Central Intelligence Agency.** The National Security Act, however, did 
more than attempt the coordination o f previously-fi-agmented governmental components—
** Crabb & Mulcahy, 12. See also Chapter 4, infra., for the Navy’s battle for vitality.
** James Forrestal provided a link between the Navy and the philosophy o f consolidation. 
In 1945, Forrestal commissioned the Eberstadt Report that suggested a military council 
would avoid repetition o f  FDR’s haphazard strategic maneuvering. In a meeting held 
before the Japanese surrender, Forrestal and Eberstadt envisioned that centralized policy 
should eminate from a Cabinet-level, bifurcated board that would create and define 
national policy (not surprisingly composed o f a joint State-War-Navy contingent) and 
maintain information on military resources for war. James Forrestal D iaries, 87; See also 
Lord, The Presidency artd the M anagem ent o f National Security, 69.
The New York Times hailed Forrestal’s apointment as “the best guarantee that could be 
given the unification of the services will be carried out intelligently and efficiently. . It has 
been painfully evident all through the long hearings and debate in Congress that there are 
many in the Navy who still distrust the whole idea.” July 27, 1947, 8.
*’ National Security Act o f 1947, US Congress, US Statutes a t Large, 80th Congress, 1st 
sess., 1947, vol. 61.
** The Act did not eliminate duplication o f  intelligence, for the Department o f  State, the 
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force continued to maintain their own intelligence services. 
See, for example, the CIA’s “Review of the World Situation” dated 10 March 1948, Harry 
S. Truman Papers, Truman Library “President’s Secretary File,” microfilm collection, 
Georgetown University Library.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
56
it entrenched a  military component into all presidential decisions and symbolically affirmed 
the worst postwar fears o f  Americans.
The illusory nature o f a military unified (and more efficient) under a Secretary o f 
Defense shielded the duplicitous reality of a new system that did not temper, but rather 
accomodated, long-standing competition.*^ Eager to avoid controversies in his new 
position, Forrestal sought conciliation, but thereby unavoidably rewarded the inter-service 
competition. Forrestal undoubtedly assuaged some of the anxiety the branches held 
toward the new system, but the multiplicity engengered by the new Secretary’s policy of 
appeasement harbored implications that ranged fi"om the ludicrous to the disasterous.
During a 1948 meeting, two agenda items found the Navy nearly swamped with 
the potential superiority o f  the other forces. Fearing Soviet insurgency in Greece’s civil 
war, the Council discussed alternative methods to determine the extent of Soviet 
involvement.^ Secretary o f the Navy John L. Sullivan ridiculed a State Department 
proposal that all branches share in an inteUigence survey, claiming “that the Council could
*^ Charles E. Neu has characterized the military struggles as “open political warfare” and 
claims that even though Congress strengthened o f the Secretary o f Defense and reduced 
the authority o f the military in 1949, “parochialism.. .remained strong.” “The Rise of the 
National Security Bureaucracy” in The New American State, Galambos, ed., 88.
’* Greece’s civil war provided the perfect opportunity for an early Cold War scrimmage 
between capitahsm and communism. The CIA reported in September 1947 that the 
Greek government was in danger o f falling because of Soviet sponsored communist 
guerrillas, and posited that “At any time US armed intervention may be required to 
prevent its collapse and to restore the situation” thus salvaging a strategic Eastern 
Mediterranean presence and preventing “profound psychological repercussions throughout 
Western Europe and the Near and M ddle East.” “Review of the World Situation as it 
Relates to the Security o f the United States” dated September 26, 1947. Harry S.
Truman Papers, “President’s Secretary File,” microfilm collection, Georgetown 
University Library.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
57
get all the information it wanted from Admiral Sherman without any formal action.” *^
The Council rebuffed Sullivan’s offer and subsequently introduced an item concerning air 
intelligence. Forrestal anticipated Sullivan’s resistance and quickly difrused the escalating 
confrontation. Stating that he had already issued a directive to the CIA that gave the Air 
Force the primary responsibility, Forrestal immediately announced that he had decided to 
modify his earlier decision and protect the Navy’s interests in the field o f air intelligence.’  ^
Clearly this conciliatory behavior undermined one o f the purposes o f  the Act; efficiency.
When applied to atomic weapons development, the duplication o f responsibility 
strategically employed by the Army, Navy and Air Force in the early years of 
consolidation under the, new Secretary of Defense resulted in a multiplication o f testing 
and  risk.’’ The compromising Forrestal established an arena through which the military 
might maneuver for position to solidify its own authority; yet, the continuing influence of 
the armed forces was also contingent upon the nation’s emerging philosophies that were 
intended to secure US superiority and European stability.
The atom bomb decreed an urgent investment in the successful implementation of 
foreign policy, and it is an excellent vehicle through which to explore the effect of 
individuals (and personality) upon national policy. Dismayed by Roosevelt’s ad  hoc
’* Minutes of the 5th Meeting o f the National Security Council, January 13, 1948, 5 Harry 
S. Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, “President’s Secretary File,” microfilm 
collection, Georgetown University Library. Sullivan’s intransigence eventually failed him 
and he resigned in April, 1949 when his plans for a new fiush-deck carrier were scrapped. 
See Hammond “Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers” 'm American C ivil-M ilitary Decisions, 
Harold Stein, ed., (University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1963).
^Ib id .
”  See Chapter 4 for an example o f the Navy’s contribution to atomic testing and Chapter 
6 for the Army’s role in continental testing at the Nevada Test Site, irtfra.
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diplomacy and disregard o f the State Department during the war; and, in light o f perceived 
Soviet designs in Europe, Truman tried to establish a coherent and effective foreign policy 
during the postwar years.’"* US policy, Truman believed, should reflect a schematic 
expression o f behavior developed pursuant to  an objective and unified sense o f purpose. 
This reassuring plan may describe the intent o f  policy formation; however, it bears little 
relationship to the articulation or expression o f  policy in the years following WWH when 
the “objective” became an ephemeral manifestation, transformed by both personalities and 
politics with little reward or consideration afforded irmovation or perception.
A strengthened State Department and National Security Council fostered the 
illusion (among citizens and Congress) that the policies adopted with regard to the 
deteriorating US/Soviet relationship were joint and consentual endeavors. To all 
appearances, the new cooperative venue would stifle the misconceptions of individuals yet 
encourage successfial planning through intelligent and inventive solutions forged 
(purposefully and necessarily) through reasoned and enlightened consideration. The truth 
is that the postwar policy o f the Truman administration was only notionally a committee­
generated effort. But we cherish our myths, and the fantasies that spring fi’om them were 
as comforting during the early atomic age as they were to the throngs who carried gifts to 
the oracles at Delphi or waited patiently while Apollo’s priests interpreted the entrails of 
sacrificial bulls ’* Behind the phantasm o f institutional decision-making based upon an
’"* The arena o f foreign policy is a good example o f the notional characteristics o f a more 
“efficient” postwar government. By 1949, twenty-one different agencies maintained 
overseas posts. Neu in Galambos, 88.
’* This is not to suggest that the leaders and public o f the Truman era (or the ancient 
Greeks and Romans) were necessarily “primitive,” unsophisticated or unenlightened; but 
to emphasize that during the various (and on-going) crises o f the post-World War n
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expanded information-gathering system, consideration, compromise and consensus, 
postwar US/Soviet policy was driven by a handful o f  individuals as prone to human error, 
inflexibility, and personal motivations as the ancient oracles and soothsayers.
The content o f  the National Security Council’s US/Soviet policies was highly 
dependent upon the philosophies of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, 
particularly its directors. During the scope of this examination, George Kennan and Paul 
H. Nitze were responsible for the development o f America’s positioning against its former 
ally and future nemises, the Soviet Union. Both Kennan and Nitze shared the view that 
communism and capitalism were incompatible and both believed that, given such extreme 
polarity, the challenges posed by the Soviet Union required active resistance. They 
differed, however, on the form that resistance should take. Since the crucial shifts in US 
policy during this period may be traced upon the paths carved by Kennan and Nitze, a 
study of their personalities and motivations is essential.
*  *  *
B ut the towers o f the Krem lin cast a  long shadow .. .the more I  see o f the life o f this 
intem ational society the m o rel am convinced that it is the shadows rather than the 
substance o f things that move the hearts, and  swcy the deeds, o f statesmen.
George F. Kennan, 1947^^
period, the belief that a small group o f individuals would choose wisely among a multitude 
o f alternatives undoubtedly eased mounting anxiety. See Bourdieu, The Logic o f 
Practice, 93-97.
’* Kennan’s final lecture at the War College, M em oirs 1925-1950 (New York, NY: 
Pantheon Books, 1967). George Kennan is often confused with his grandfather’s cousin, 
the Russian scholar George Kennan, who wrote Siberia and the Exile System, published in 
an abridged edition by the University o f  Chicago in 1958, for which the subject o f this 
examination wrote an introduction. A spiritual thread seems to link the two men who 
shared a name and an appreciation for Russia—they were both bom on the same day o f the 
year, played guitar, owned the same type o f sailboats, and both founded organizations to 
assist Russian refugees. Idem . 8.
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In 1947 when Marshall became Secretary o f  State he chose George Kennan to 
head the State Department’s new Policy Planning Staff. Impatient with the weak 
character o f committee-produced “policy papers,” Marshall appreciated Kennan’s 
decisiveness and ability to clearly articulate his views. Kennan’s ideology soon permeated 
postwar strategy.”  He looked beyond Soviet “shadows” and investigated the motivations 
of Stalin’s Soviet Union, bringing to the fore his extensive knowledge o f the character o f 
the Soviet Union and the aims of Soviet communism. In addition, he developed and 
promoted a postwar strategy intended to facUitate, in the absence of any cooperative 
mechanism, the coexistence o f the two nations.
Kennan’s childhood provided excellent preparation for his later career. Shortly 
after his birth in 1904, Kennan’s mother died and he was raised by his father, older sisters
”  See May, op. cit. 5. For a compact description o f Kennan’s ideology and influence, see 
Crabb & Mulcahy, Am erican National Security, particularly 67-72.
Walker is critical o f Kennan and claims that Kennan’s “Long Telegram” resulted in the 
growth o f totalitarian methods at the expense of democracies. It seems, however, that 
Walker has failed to distinguish whether responsibility falls in Kennan’s lap, or in the laps 
of those who chose their own interpretation(s) based upon segments o f Kennan’s analysis 
rather than one that Kennan designed as a philosophy rather than as a set o f unrelated 
maxims.
Kennan’s personality is complexly illusive and Walker might have been too readily 
influenced by Kennan’s unorthodox pre-war musings. In 1931 he wrote that the Soviets 
were “unalterably opposed to our traditional system, there can be no possible middle 
ground or compromise between the tw o .. .the two systems cannot even exist in the same 
world unless an economic cordon is put around one or the other o f them.” Interestingly, 
despite the fact that Kennan abhorred socialism, he was not enchanted by democracy, 
either. In a 1938 book he wrote that “benevolent despotism” in America would relieve the 
“shrill disorders o f democracy” and suggested that “immigrants, blacks, and “frivolous” 
women should be denied suffrage. He was, however, not completely disenchanted with 
women, and he praised his wife for “the rare capacity o f keeping silent gracefully. I have 
never seen her disposition ruffled by anything resembling a mood.” Walker, The Cold 
War, 31-33.
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and eventually a austere stepmother in an “eighteenth-century puritan” household in 
NClwaukee. He grew up resourceful and introverted, but gained an appreciation of social 
grace and deportment in a community imbued with a “tremendous universal respect for 
respectability.”’* IBs father, a farmer turned successful lawyer, spoke French, German and 
Danish, and when Kerman was four, temporarily installed the family in Kassel, Germany to 
introduce his children to the “purest” German.’  ^ In Nfilwaukee, Kennan joined his father 
in the rich German culture o f the Wisconsin city, and warm memories o f Europeans 
comforted him at Princeton where he found himself “hopelessly and crudely Midwestern” 
and uncomfortable with “Easterners.’”*
After graduating from Princeton in 1925, Kennan applied for one of the few jobs 
open in the new Foreign Service because he “did not know what else to do” *^ and found 
himself serving as vice consul in Hamburg by 1927. At ease with the language he had 
learned at eight, curiosity and an adult recognition o f his own inadequacies drove him to 
consider leaving his position for post-graduate study in the US. A supervisor thwarted 
his planned resignation when he offered Kennan a chance to  keep his post while pursuing 
graduate work at the University of Berlin—if he would immerse himself in Russian 
language and history. Kennan jumped at the offer, and while in Berlin met and married 
Annelise Soerensen, a Norwegian woman. In 1933 when the United States officially 
recognized the Soviet Union, Kennan and other specialists set up the Moscow Embassy, 
where Kennan served until his removal in 1937. He returned to Moscow in 1944 and
’* Harper, American Visions, 138.
Kennan, Memo/rj, 19. 
’* /W ,9 -1 0 .
31 Ib id , 17.
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remained until 1946, sympathetic toward the staggering sorrow o f the Russian people in 
the wake o f the war and also perplexed by official Soviet attitudes towards himself and 
others in the diplomatic corps who were so eager to serve in Russia—it was, he said 
“doubly hard .. to find ourselves treated as though we were the bearers o f  some species of 
the plague.’” ’ He harbored a profound distaste for Stalin’s regime and wrapped Stalinism, 
communism, and the Russian people into three distinct packages, remaining hopeful that 
Stalinism and its associated oppression would eventually fail.
Kennan attracted the attention o f Washington before Marshall became Secretary of 
State. Increasingly fiustrated with the seeming inability o f US leaders to set aside their 
own assumptions and appreciate the fundamental differences between the two countries, 
Kennan did not miss his first opportunity to try and enlighten the naive. Left temporarily 
in charge when Ambassador W. Averell Harriman was away fi'om Moscow, Kennan used 
the relatively-minor incident of the USSR’s feilure to adhere to the directives o f World 
Bank and Intemational Monetary Fund, launching a “pedagogical” diatribe at 
W ash ing ton .T he  “Long Telegram” springboarded Kennan’s career as well. Even as
” /b/dL, 190-195.
”  Kennan’s “Long Telegram” was dated February 22, 1946, and in it he sought to correct 
the “naive” behavior of Washington. “Here was a case where nothing but the whole 
truth would do. They had asked for it. Now, by God, they would have it. . .1 composed a 
telegram o f some eight thousand words—all neatly divided, like an eighteenth-century 
Protestant sermon, into five separate parts. (I thought that if it went in five sections, each 
could pass as a separate telegram and it would not look so outrageously long.)” Ibid.,
293.
Kennan had little patience for those he believed instituted short-sighted policies. He 
later criticized the Truman Doctrine, and used it as an excuse to promote a “working 
planning staff.. an organization for thinking” that he believed the Truman administration 
lacked. Under Kennan’s influence, the Truman Doctrine “might have had a  more general 
and positive character in the public mind—not to resist Soviet aggression but to restore to 
Greece and Turkey the stability that will make them independent enough to  choose their
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Kennan received a Commendation from the State Department, Secretary o f the Navy 
Forrestal ordered the now-famous paper reproduced and distributed to thousands of high- 
level officers o f the armed forces, declaring it required reading/"* Kennan told 
Washington what it wanted to hear; and, with the help of a supportive President and 
Cabinet, he proposed policy that he believed would curtial the spread of communism while 
avoiding the complete alienation o f the Soviet Union/*
Kennan held that the Soviet Union represented the antithesis o f a liberal 
democracy and that the only method available for the survival o f the Soviet’s totalitarian 
state was to “undermine the general political and strategic potential o f major western 
powers.’”* His proposed solutions to the threat o f the Soviets involved containment of
own governments and preserve their national integrities.” Kennan in “America’s Global 
Planner,” New York Times M agazine, July 13, 1947.
""* Kennan, M emoirs, 295. Kennan had no way (at that time) o f  knowing that the future 
Secretary o f Defense, James Forrestal, had already commissioned a similar study through 
Professor Edward F. Willett o f Smith College who had contributed to the Eberstadt 
Report. Sending a copy o f “notes” for the study to Walter Lippman, Forrestal 
acknowledged that a December article by Walter Lippman December article prompted the 
study. Millis, ed., Forrestal D iaries, 128.
’* Kennan later admitted that timing, rather than a unique insight, stimulated the postive 
response to his beliefs: T t was one o f those moments when official Washington, whose 
states o f receptivity or the opposite are determined by subjective emotional currents as 
intricately imbedded in the subconscious as those of the most complicated o f Sigmund 
Freud’s erstwhile patients, was ready to receive a given message. . Six months earlier this 
message would probably have been received in the Department o f State with raised 
eyebrows and lips pursed in disapproval. Six months later, it would probably have 
sounded redundant, a sort o f preaching to the convinced. This was true despite the fact 
that the realities which it described were ones that had existed, substantially unchanged, 
for about a decade, and would continue to exist for more than a half-decade longer.” 
Kennan, Afemo/rj, 194-195.
’* Kennan “Long Telegram” cited in May, American Cold War Strategy, 3.
A favorable 1947 New York Times M agazine article entitled “America’s Global 
Planner” characterized Kennan as something of a renaissance man: “. . he has had twenty 
years o f foreign service in western Europe, Portugal, the Baltic States and Soviet Russia, 
he has not lost his enthusiasm for philosophy, and instinctively in his conversation he
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the Soviet sphere and a tactical informational campaign designed primarily to encourage 
domestic support for the interception o f Soviet designs. Since popular sentiment toward 
the Soviet Union had been influenced by the wartime alliance, American perceptions 
needed to be shifted toward an alternative that affirmed the domestic threat o f Soviet 
communism. Kennan also argued that the best weapon against Stalinist totalitarianism 
was capitalism. Particularly since, to him, totalitarianism was only a temporary condition, 
a “device of despair, arising from specific and particularly painful problems o f adjustment 
at given stages in the development o f individual peoples.””  Though Kennan proposed a 
military presence to “contain” the Soviet sphere, it would only be necessary until the 
United States could prove the superiority o f capitalism as an economically superior model. 
A united front composed o f domestic support, military readiness, and the prosperity 
through capitalism, Kennan believed, would force a “break-up or the gradual mellowing of 
Soviet power.’”*
keeps referring to first principles o f humanity and government. . .Plato’s ‘The Republic’ 
[is] a favorite o f h is.. . ” Highlighting the traits prized by Marshall, the article praised 
Kennan for his steadfastness, a quality that may have resulted in his inability to shift gears 
once Acheson replaced Marshall as Secretary of State. “Mr. Kennan’s knowledge, 
temperament and character make him particularly well suited to a job that combines the 
long point o f view with hard-headed thinking.” July 13, 1947.
Halperin discusses the problems faced by “ideological thinkers” such as Kennan when 
circumstances change. “Staff men who have had a long period o f involvement in a 
particular area and become committed to a doctrine. . tend to see all issues in terms of a 
particular value, to disregard conflicting information and roadblocks, and to press hard for 
the particular solution which would support the dominant variable.” Halperin, 
Bureaucratic Politics, 23-23.
”  Atkinson, “America’s Global Planner” New York Times M agazine, July 13, 1947 
38 [Kennan] “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” Foreign A ffairs 25 (July 1947) 575- 
576, 581-582.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
65
Devastation in postwar Europe presented the perfect opportunity for the 
application o f Kennan’s strategy. When the guns fell silent, the wartom populace faced 
yet another enemy as nature’s caprices stifled the 1946 harvest and brought on the worst 
winter in living memory during 1946-47.”  Compassion for millions suffering food and 
fuel shortages lent vigor to intervention in European recovery. Since US support was 
essential not only for humanitarian reasons but also to stifle communist influence in 
marginalized countries, Marshall’s national campaign for the European aid package 
efficiently accomodated the goals of the Kennan strategy for peaceful coexistence. In a 
speech before the Aimual Conference o f Governors, Marshall warned that if the United 
States did not help Western Europe reassert itself economically, they would “drift into the 
Russian orbit.”"** Marshall claimed that his short speech was written on a plane to the 
conference, but “with public opinion divided” its content was actually carefully crafted to 
incorporate State Department philosophy into the minds o f the American public."**
Walker’s compact description of the problem bears inclusion; “Even before a wave of 
blizzards struck Britain in January, the government had been forced to cut coal supplies to 
all industries by half. Unemployment rose to six millions, double the peak of the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, and electricity was limited to a few hours each day. Food 
rationing was more severe that it had been during the war.” Walker, The Cold War, 47.
New York Times, July 15, 1947, 1.
"** Marshall was, after all, a graduate o f his Under Secretary’s crash course—Acheson’s 
‘Shaping Public Policy 101.’ Shortly after his appointment and before a speech to the 
National Press Club, Acheson suggested to Marshall that he work with an established text, 
saying; “the Secretary o f State was never off the record, and that his speeches were never 
directed to swaying an audience to a specific result, but to putting out ideas for thought at 
home and abroad. It was important, therefore, to say exactly what one meant to say, 
clearly—no more, no less. Substance was more important than manner o f delivery—within, 
of course, reasonable limits.” Marshall demurred, preferring his informal method of 
relaying ideas situated only in his head. Confident o f his ability to effectively deliver a 
speech without a text, he agreed that a small group o f  aides, including Acheson, could 
serve as a “jury” to  assess his performance before the Press Club. Their verdict came as a 
blow to the General (he was “as disappointed as a small boy”) and although he continued
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Although Marshall did finish the speech on the plane, it was a joint effort o f Marshall, 
Kennan and Chip Bohlen, Marshall’s Special Assistant/’ At Marshall’s request, both 
advisers submitted independent speeches, and, in the meantime, the impatient Marshall 
began one o f his own. Marshall merged the best o f each; and, without clearing his final 
product with the President, took his case to the people."*"
Marshall’s speech outlined three points that formed the kernel o f America’s 
ripening ideology of intemational influence: That communism posed an immediate threat 
to the fi’ee world; and, that the public might often become confused with the issues 
because the delicacy o f the situation required diplomatic phraseology which was often 
unclear; and third, that despite the public’s “need to know,” much information could not 
be divulged. Thus, American leaders required only immediate public support and faith."*"*
to argue that he believed his performance exemplary, Acheson told him “This was not the 
way to put out policy proposals.. .1 reminded him that he had asked us for the 
ungamished truth. . .sadly he agreed to the use o f  texts.” Acheson, Present at the 
Creation, 215.
"*’ Kennan, M emoirs, 342. Bohlen and Kennan were both Russian specialists, but Bohlen 
had been schooled in Paris instead of Berlin. “Intellectual and professional brothers” 
Kennan praised Bohlen highly and proclaimed “no friendship has ever meant more to me 
than his.” Idem ., 62.
"*’ Larry I. Bland, ed. George C. M arshall Interview s and Reminiscences fo r  Forrest C. 
Pogue (Lexington, Ky: Marshall Research Foundation, 1991) 559.
"*"* The speech itself is very clear. In an attempt to convince any fence-sitters, Marshall 
played upon his audience’s sympathies and resurrected the ghost of the stmggling 
American colonies. Marshall noted that details would have to wait because “studies” were 
being made to bring out the facts; until then, those facts couldn’t  be divulged: “ . . peace 
has its difficulties. . it is necessary that I be very careful in what I say publicly and when I 
say it. I f  it had been practicable for me to talk to you off the record and in great 
confidence, there is much that I would like to discuss with you.” New York Times ‘Text 
o f Address by Marshall” July 15, 1947, 6.
American leaders increasingly relied upon “faith” as espoused by the Christian ethic 
and subsumed it into nationalistic goals as the struggle against communism began to 
resemble a medieval crusade. Harold E. Stassen (a Republican candidate in the 
Presidential primary with Dewey) believed that religious feith was also necessary to avoid
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Kennan’s formal policy prescription went to President Truman as NSC 20/4, and in 1948 
Congress rewarded Marshall for his convincing arguments and fully funded the European 
aid package/^
Kennan incorporated into NSC 20/4 his belief that, over time, the Soviet Union 
would abandon radical communism in favor of a less aggressive system based upon the 
economic advantages of a capitalist economy. He did not deny that military strength 
might be necessary to protect free nations from Soviet takeover, but suggested that 
“readiness” would sufiBce as a “deterrent” and as a “source o f encouragement” to friendly
w ar “It is a competition between the ideology of materialism sponsored by the 
Communists, which denied the fatherhood o f God. . and worships the things o f the earth 
controlled by rulers of men, as opposed to an ideology based on the fundamental concepts 
o f our religious beliefs.” New York Times, July 24, 1947, 4.
Faith played an enormous role in the two most frightening features o f the early Cold 
W ar communism and the bomb. The bomb was proof that America contained God’s 
chosen people, and this belief tempered American fears of the atomic bomb, including 
those of the President, “enfolding” the bomb within the nation’s traditions. Truman asked 
for guidance even as he announced the success of the Hroshima weapon: “We thank God 
that it has come to us, instead of to our enemies; and we pray that He may guide us to use 
it in His ways and for iCs purposes.” Boyer, By the Bom b's Early Light, Ch. 18.
Kennan drafted the plan for European recovery and presented it to Marshall on May 23- 
-justifiably proud o f this endeavor, Kennan claimed it “finally broke through the confusion 
of wartime pro-Sovietism, wishful thinking, anglophobia and self-righteous punitivism in 
which our occupational policies in Germany had thus far been enveloped, and placed us at 
long last on what was, and for six years remained, a constructive and sensible path.” 
KjesmaiL, M emoirs, 335.
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nations.'*^ Kennan argued strenuously against policies that supported aggression against 
the USSR, characterizing such viewpoints as the “sheerest nonsense.” ’^
Kennan made a significant distinction between the ofiScial threat o f the Soviet state 
and that posed by the Communist party, and it is this subtle (though critical) understanding 
that supported his belief the Soviets posed (primarily) a political rather than a military 
threat.'** Though disagreement abounds, a careful reading of the Long Telegram and 
consideration of Kerman’s recommendations support this assertion. Bolstered by 
international Marxism, the Soviet state clung to a “dogma” influenced by Russia’s 
traditional fear of invasion together with a centuries-long development o f insecurity based
^  Kerman ventured that military preparedness directed toward a “peak o f war danger” 
would be less effective than a moderate force because “this type o f effort would be 
effective only for the period toward which it was directed; for the subsequent period it 
would have the reverse effect. I f  the Soviet leaders knew that we were undertaking a 
defense effort of this nature (and it is certain that they would know it), they would be able 
to plan for maximum military and political pressure at a date when our own military effort 
might be expected to have subsided.”  NSC 20/2 D(2)(a). See also, generally, NSC 20/2 
Kennan’s forthright analysis was unambiguous: “To speak o f possibilities o f 
intervention against USSR today, after elimination o f Germany and Japan and after 
example o f recent war, is sheerest nonsense. If  not provoked by forces o f intolerance and 
subversion “capitalist” world o f today is quite capable of living at peace with itself and 
with Russia. Finally, no sane person has reason to doubt sincerity o f moderate Socialist 
leaders in Western countries. Nor is it fair to deny success o f their efforts to improve 
conditions for working population whenever, as in Scandinavia, they have been given 
chance to show what they can do.” NSC 20/4 (H).
'** There is academic disagreement on this issue, and this analysis generally follows the 
conclusions o f John Lewis Gaddis in Strategies o f Contaiment, particularly Chapter 2. cf. 
“The Question of Containment " Foreign A ffairs 56, no. 3 (January 1978) 430-1. For a 
brief discussion of the controversy surrounding the scope and intent o f Kennan’s analysis, 
including the 1947 criticisms by Lippman, see John Lamberton Harper, Am erican Visions 
o f Europe, Chapter 5. Harper makes a  distinction between “passive” and “active” military 
components, and holds that Kennan’s containment strategy sought to establish an 
American passive military subservient to  political control; and thus, a more effective tool 
o f diplomacy. Idem. 192-193.
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first upon fear o f invasion and secondly upon fear o f more modem organized societies
surrounding them.
For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration. . .And they 
have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for 
total destmction of rival power, never in compacts or compromises.'*®
According to this model, then, communism supported the power o f the Soviet state rather
than vice versa, and thus it was the ideology, and not the Soviet military, that demanded
American attention. Kennan’s proposed solution was not militaristic, but political. “We
must see that our public is educated. . .It must be done mainly by Government. . World
communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on domestic and diseased tissue.. .
5750
Upon Truman’s reelection, he appointed Dean Acheson to replace the sixty-nine 
year old Marshall, and Kennan’s influence w a n e d . I D s  replacement. Dean Acheson, had 
distinguished himself over many years in Washington, beginning as under-Secretary of the 
Treasury under Roosevelt. Though they had differences o f opinion, particularly over 
Keynesianism, Roosevelt and Acheson held each other in high regard. Roosevelt had fired 
Acheson in 1933 when he disagreed with FDR’s gold purchase program, but Acheson 
remained staunchly supportive of the President and operated behind the scenes as an
'*® G. F. Kennan “Long Telegram” in O rigins o f the C old War, Kenneth M. Jensen, ed. 
20- 21 .
Ibid. 30-31. Time has, perhaps, offered some support for Kennan’s analysis of Soviet 
motivations. A  1946 telegram prepared by Soviet Ambassador Mkolai Novikov stresses 
America’s imperialistic tendencies, offensive military buildup and economic superiority as 
threats to the Soviet Union itself. 3-16.
Marshall faced surgery to remove a kidney. McCullough, Truman, 725.
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“interventionist” throughout 1940 and 1 9 4 1 In 1941, the President proclaimed that 
Acheson was “without question the ablest lawyer in Washington.” "^*
Like Kennan, Dean Acheson was a complex man whose sympathies did not always 
seem to lie in twentieth-century America. An American “blade o f steel” with an English 
Victorian mindset,^'* Acheson and his sister were raised in Connecticut, the “most English” 
part o f America. Acheson’s environment—his parents, governess, maid and cook were 
all British subjects—resulting (quite naturally) in a tendency to exhibit both English 
mannerisms and a certain anglophilia, characteristics that he found occasion to both 
celebrate, and defend, during his lifetime.**
Acheson was put on the 6st track early and he did not stop until he had neared the 
pinnacle. In 1903, at age ten, he entered Groton to prepare him forYale, and had earned 
his law degree from Harvard by 1918. Armed with a recommendation from Felix 
Frankfurter, Acheson began his career in 1919 at an envious level, as clerk for Louis 
Brandeis.*^ In 1920, Acheson joined the firm o f Covinton and Burling, and soon traveled
Acheson assisted White House attorneys in defense o f  Roosevelt against Congressional 
opponents, and stayed in Washington, benefitting from long-standing connections. 
Harper, .(4/nmcaw Visions, 258-259.
FDR memo to William Knudsen, et al., February 8, 1941, DAP-SL, cited in Harper, 
Ibid., 260.
*“* Acheson, “Real and Imagined Handicaps o f Our Democracy in the Conduct o f Foreign 
Afl&irs,” cited i n 236.
**7»M,242.
** After Acheson publicly announced his support of Alger Hiss in January, 1950, the 
comments o f a Republican Senator from Nebraska focused not on Acheson’s support of 
Ifiss, but his deportment; “I look at that fellow, I watch his smart-aleck manner and his 
British clothes and that New Dealism in everything he says and does, and I want to shout. 
. You stand for everything that has been wrong in the United States for years!” cited in 
McCullough, Trunum, 760-761.
Harper, Am erican Visions, 246.
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Europe in “sophisticating” advocacy against the US government, representing Norway 
and Sweden in their World War I claims, and Arizona in its suit contesting Boulder Dam.**
Though privately influential throughout the 1930’s, it was the coming of war that 
brought Acheson back firmly into the official Washington fold. In 1941 Acheson became 
Assistant Secretary of State for economic affairs and during the war years served as a 
planner for the Food and Agricultural Organization and the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration. Between 1945 and 1947, Acheson served for a time as 
Undersecretary of State for Marshall, after which he enjoyed a brief 18-month hiatus 
practicing law before he returned in 1949 to serve as Secretary of State for Truman’s 
second term.*®
During his stint away from the nation’s service, Acheson participated as an advisor 
and consultant, promoting changes he believed would result in better government. While 
serving on Congress’ Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch, he 
favored strengthening the Secretary o f Defense and the combination o f the higher echelon 
officers o f the Foreign Service and Department of State into a single unit. These were not 
the only changes he believed necessary, and when confirmed as Secretary of State,
Acheson implemented administrative modifications within the Office of the Secretary 
itself. Once Acheson began to shift responsibilities and procedure, Kennan found the 
mantle of Director of Policy Planning an ill fitting garment.
Ibid., 250
*® Robert Beisner offers a concise analysis o f Acheson’s changing sympathies toward the 
Soviet Union in the early postwar years. “Patterns o f Peril; Dean Acheson Joins the Cold 
VIamoT^’ D iplom atic H istory, 20;3, Summer, 1996, 321.
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Although Marshall and Acheson were both decisive, their approaches to decision- 
making were extremely different and after Acheson took over, the Secretary o f State’s 
Office was a vastly different place for Kennan. General Marshall relied on military 
methods. He chose men on the basis o f their ability and expertise, and believing that it 
was impossible to plan and operate at the same time, necessarily relied upon others for one 
or the other function.** Marshall’s methods were honed by many years o f reliance upon 
others; Acheson’s were shaped by a lifetime of success proving others wrong.
Acheson was not inclined to accept either Kennan’s experience or ideology. The 
stature that Acheson enjoyed among Washington’s power brokers may have given him too 
much confidence in his own ability to direct foreign policy, efficiently foreclosing other 
(perhaps more reasonable) alternatives. According to Kennan, Acheson showed no 
confidence in opinions that did not coincide with his own plan o f  action.** While
** When Marshall took over the State Department, he was appalled that there was no 
“plarming” resource, ‘T found out that there was nothing, no planning agency at all. You 
can’t plan and operate at the same time. Thty are two states o f  mind. . You just had a hit 
or miss affair going on around there.” Bland, M arhsall linterview s, November 20, 1956, 
562-563
Henry Stimson praised General Marshall, and among the many reasons why Stimson 
believed Marshall ‘great’ was his ability to achieve cooperation and success through trust: 
“he was always willing to sacrifice his own prestige.. .His trust in his commanders is 
almost legendary.. he leaves the man fi-ee to accomplish his purpose unhampered. Henry 
L. Stimson with McGeorge Bundy, On A ctive Service in Peace and War (New York, NY: 
Harper & Brothers, 1947). 662-663.
** See Yjstman M em oirs, “The thought o f consulting the staff as an institution and 
conceding to it, as did General Marshall, a margin of confidence within which he was 
willing to respect its opinions even when that opinion did not fully coincide with his own. . 
. All this would have been strange to him.” 450.
See also McLellan who analyzes the Kennan/Acheson relationship, but note that in 
discussing the Acheson transformation o f the State Department, even McLellan seems to 
recognize that Acheson’s style encouraged the same problem Marshall and Kennan had 
tried to solve; namely, the successful separation of planning and operation as separate 
functions: “The problem o f blending daily operations with long run prognostications.
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Kerman’s appraisal of US/Soviet relations was based upon his Soviet experience and his 
own personal understanding of Soviet history whose proposals were based upon American 
goals informed by his own individual interpretation. Acheson, on the other hand, relied 
completely upon second-hand information. He had not been in Europe since 1939, and his 
understanding was predominantly shaped by discussions with ambassadors from England 
and France, those most willing to dramatize Europe’s situation to secure aid.*  ^ In 
addition, according to one of his biographers, Acheson was not inclined to consider the 
unique characteristics o f Soviet culture because he was a pragmatic man who “did not 
become a prisoner o f a priori moralistic, deterministic, idealistic or Manichean images and 
states o f mind.”*"’ Acheson himself later admitted that his perspective was, perhaps, 
narrow. In 1957 he acknowledged that his legal experience had been a double-edged 
sword while he served as Secretary o f State—that although logic was an essential element 
in both the practice o f law and foreign policy, the habits o f advocacy narrowed a lawyer’s 
perception to that o f his client’s interest.*'* It is unclear, however, whether Acheson was 
referring to a specific instance of “narrow perception” or whether this was a general 
comment upon his secretaryship.
International and domestic crises meant that Acheson had a number of interests to 
protect when he took office: the nation’s, his President’s, and his own. The Berlin Airlift
often at variance with each other, is one which has never been successfully resolved.” 
NlcLeMan, D ean Acheson 172.
*^  Harper, Am erican Visions, 277.
*^  David S. McLellan, Dean Acheson: The State Department Years. Acheson’s most 
recent biographer, James Chace, considers him a “pragmatic realist always distrustful of 
universal sohxûonsl^ Dean Acheson, 439.
*"* Dean Acheson to Hans Morgenthau, January 3, 1957 DAP-SL, cited in Harper, 
American Visions, 251.
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was in its seventh month, the new Republic o f South Korea faced a threatening North, and 
the NATO treaty was still being hammered out. Before he had completed a year in office, 
the Soviet Union tested its first atomic weapon and China had fallen to the communists.** 
Domestically, HUAC’s attack on the Truman administration picked up steam with 
Whittaker Chambers’ denouncement of Alger Hiss, an Acheson friend and brother o f 
Acheson’s protege Donald Hiss.** Though temporal proximity was the strongest link in 
this chain o f events, in combination they certainly appeared to many as a signal o f a world­
wide, Soviet-driven, conspiracy. The man who had, in 1947, counseled Truman to boost 
anti-communism and “scare the hell” out of the country to gain support for Turkey and 
Greece, was now caught up in a whirlwind he had, at least in some measure, unleashed.
Not surprisingly, a shift in the philosophy o f the administration, and thus, the NSC, 
accompanied the 1949 personnel change. When Dean Acheson changed Kerman’s 
position to “Counselor” and Paul Nitze assumed the role o f Director o f the Policy 
Planning Staff **^ Since Kerman believed that the Soviets posed a political, rather than
** According to Acheson, Communist success in China was “expected.” Ibid., 192.
** In 1946, the names o f Acheson, Alger lEss and Henry Wallace all showed up on an FBI 
list o f “high government officials operating an espionage network.” Harper, American 
Visions, 266.
*^  There are several different reasons proposed for Kennan’s relegation to “counselor.” 
Kennan himself indicates that his resignation resulted from a requirement that all his views 
be run past a committee for their approval before reaching the Secretary of State, and that 
given these circumstances, he resigned. He does note, however, that differences between 
his “long-term” outlook and the “short-term” views of “his friends in Washington,
London, Paris and The Hague” played a role. O f particular interest is Kennan’s statement 
that he did not believe in the reality o f a Soviet military threat in Western Europe.
Kscmasi, M emoirs, 464.
Acheson asserts that Kennan “left the Planning Staff to devote himself to the duties o f 
the Counselor to the Department” but it is clear that Acheson had little regard for 
Kerman’s views, claiming thty “were o f no help.” Acheson, Present a t the Creation, 346, 
151.
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military threat, he no longer fit into an administration “content” (to use Kennan’s term) 
with the division of Europe and a militaristic fear o f the Soviet Union. Concordant with 
Acheson’s philosophy, Nitze was less apt than Kennan to rely primarily upon economic 
development to contain the Soviet influence and was “more inclined that Kennan to 
approach the cold war as a war.”**
*  *  *
On January 1, 1950, Nitze took his seat at the head of the Policy Planning table 
and, as an economist, brought a different package of skills to his position than his 
predecessor. While Kennan savored the cultural distinctions of the international 
community and devoted his entire life to an examination of international relationships, 
Nitze had cast a more-critical eye toward Europe believing that the turmoil following 
World War I forever threatened stability. Nitze’s confidence (in all endeavors) was
Nitze says that soon after he became Deputy Director in 1949, Kennan “made it clear 
that he would like to step down. He was convinced that his usefulness as policy director 
was near an end and that he should leave the Foreign Service to do research and write. 
Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 86.
May suggests domestic politics rather than ideology played the major role in the 
change, and asserts that Acheson, under fire from conservatives as a “striped pants snob” 
who served as a “lackey o f  British lords and communistic radicals/’ needed a dynamic 
leader who might help quell animosity with direct action. The heat must have been intense 
after Acheson proclaimed his loyalty to Alger FQss on January 25, 1950 for Acheson later 
indicated that the methods employed within Washington “would have aroused the envy of 
the Borgias.” See May, Am erican Cold War, 7-9 and Caute, The Great Fear, 42-43. 
Republicans in both houses had called on Truman to fire Acheson even before Ifiss was 
convicted of perjury. McClellan, Truman, 759.
** May, 9. Elitism peppers Nitze’s comparison of Marshall and Acheson: General 
Marshall was a “man o f impeccable character, who represented the best that middle-class 
America can offer,” but Acheson “had the grace and bearing o f an Aristocrat.” Nitze, 
From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 85.
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undoubtedly spurred by successes gained outside the political or governmental realm, for 
he became independently wealthy in 1935, a major coup during a time which many 
suffered.*® His memoirs reveal glimpses o f a man at ease in the world o f numbers, a realm 
where shades o f grey are equated with mistakes, not nuance, and extremely confident in 
his ability to recognize those muted hues wherever they appeared.
Nitze’s childhood seems to have been a somewhat eclectic one. His father 
graduated fiom Johns Hopkins at eighteen and earned his degree in philology at twenty- 
three. An attraction for economics did run in the family, however, and Nitze’s 
grandfather, a German who settled in America following a vacation, opened a bank in 
Baltimore and profited professionally fi’om the growth o f the railroad industry. In 1909, 
when Mtze was two, his father accepted an appointment as head o f the University of 
Chicago’s Department o f  Romance Languages and Literature, a position he maintained for 
thirty years. Nitze describes his mother, “the greatest influence” his life, as somewhat of a 
rebel—a unique woman who divorced herself fi"om the typical duties o f  a professor’s wife, 
preferring instead the company of the dancer Isadora Duncan and crusading lawyer 
Clarence Darrow. She was, he says, “a favorite. . on the more fashionable North Side of 
Chicago.”™ Nitze’s childhood was certainly rich with variety, but one period in particular 
seems to have been formative.
The outbreak o f  World War I made a lasting impression upon a seven-year old 
Nitze, and perhaps influenced the course o f his life (and ideology) more than even he
Ibid., XX.
70 Ibid., x-xii. Curiously and disappointingly, Nitze names only his sister Polly, identifying 
the rest of his 6mily only through their relationship to him.
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recognized. Six months out of every year, including the fateful one o f 1914, the Nitze
family lived in Europe. The young boy found himself watching as Germany mobilized
against Russia, standing at the window o f their rented apartment even as troops marched
to the front. Despite his father’s best attempts, they were unable to leave Germany before
England declared war and moved in with relatives in Frankfort. There, Nitze became
attached to an older cousin who was passionately interested in the war, and who was,
before the year was out, killed by Russian soldiers at Tannenberg.’*
Whether because o f his youthful impressions or measured adult rationality, Nitze
found World War I vastly more significant that World War H, proclaiming:
I would say that the emotional dedication o f the people on both sides in 
the First World War was far greater than it was in World War n. Even 
though more lives were lost in the Second World War, the impact of the 
First on the structure o f civilization, the disillusionment and brutalization 
of man and his humanity, were such that the civilized world was never 
again the same.™
Again, it is difficult to say whether the experiences o f a small child—trapped in Germany at 
the very beginning o f war, a charged moment when routine disintegrates and a mixture o f 
fear and exhiliration permeates the very air, and who wears, sewn onto his clothing, a 
replica o f the American flag to distinguish him from an (English) enemy—influenced the 
adult more than later education and experience. It is, however, easy to see that it could.™ 
It must be remembered that that very same small boy who lost a fiiendly cousin to Russian 
guns and who was harassed by Germans because he spoke English, later influenced.
Ibid., xii. 
^ I b id ,  xüi.
™ My suggestion here is influenced primarily by the emphasis that Nitze himself places 
upon this period in his life.
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developed, and articulated the policies o f his nation during volatile post-World War II
relations with both Russia and Germany.™
Finishing high school at the age o f fifteen, Nitze went to preparatory school in
Connecticut and then entered Harvard, graduating summa cum laude with a degree in
economics and an interest in sociology. It was his mastery of economics that led, in 1929,
to a misadventure with the Soviet Union. When an investment banker agreed to fund the
freshly-graduated Nitze’s passage to Germany in exchange for a report on German
investments, Nitze toured Europe and ran into a fiiend in Berlin. On a trek through
Finland, they lost their way and hiked aimlessly for three days:
Unknowingly, we had crossed the border into the Soviet Union 
and might still be there, buried in a Soviet prison, if we had not 
run into a Good Samaritan, a Russian fishing on a desolate lake.
The Russian showed them the trail back to Finland and suggested that they run: “And run
we did until we had recrossed the border!”™
By 1940, he had formed opinions not only about the Soviet Union, but also about
Germany. His views toward Germany coalesced when he read Oswald Spengler’s The
Decline o f the West. For Nitze, the book condensed the “faults o f the German
temperment; it was brilliant, full of profound feeling and thought, but dogmatic, rough,
tactless” and he believed that the Germans possessed “tendencies toward cultural decay.
™ In a review o f Nitze’s biography, David S. Patterson, touches upon Nitze’s “pessimism 
o f human nature” and suggests that his memoirs are worthy of note because he is “almost 
by default, a symbol o f the continuities o f American foreign policy.” See “Quintessential 
Cold Warrior” D iplom atic H istory, Winter 1992, 150-151. In so saying, however, 
Patterson completely overlooks a more significant issue: namely, that Nitze is not just a 
‘symbol’ of continuity—but one o f its architects.
™ Nitze, From H iroshim a to Glasnost, xvi.
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socialistic Caesarism and war.”™ It seems clear that it was easier for Nitze to approach 
the cold war as a “war,” because he tended, unlike Kennan, to subsume cultures into 
nationalities and then transformed those nationalities into enemies.
Nineteen-forty-nine was a year of transition for Nitze, the State Department, and 
the world. On September 3, the crew of an Air Force B-29 picked up airborne 
radioactivity. They traced the cloud over the United States and across the Atlantic, where 
planes from Great Britain’s Royal Air Force continued the monitoring. By September 19 
the US leaders knew that the radioactivity came from the Soviet’s first nuclear device, 
code-named “Joe One.”™ On September 23, the American public learned that the 
frightening power to obliterate entire cities with a single plane and a single bomb would 
forever be shared.
The Soviets’ atomic capability, combined with reported economic development, 
prompted Truman to order the réévaluation o f national security policy.™ Nitze shaped
Ibid., xx-xxi. The reader might note that Nitze considers “brilliance” a fault, though 
perhaps this is only an inadvertent grammatical error.
™ Miller, Under the Cloud, 71; Neuse, D avid E. Lilienthal, The Journey o f an American 
Liberal, 221.
™ It is important to note that had Kennan still held a position of influence, and had he been 
correct, (a regrettable double assumption), American strategy in the years following the 
Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb might have taken a completely different form In 
1948, NSC 20/2 suggested that diplomatic difficulties with the Soviets might rest in their 
lack o f atomic capability : “The fact that they have not been able to dispose over atomic 
weapons, whereas we have, has probably been, if anything, a contributing factor in Soviet 
intransigence in the past in matters of the international control o f atomic energy and 
possibly in other matters as w ell.. To the Soviet mind it is unthinkable that we, enjoying 
this factor of military superiority, are not taking it into account in our plans and attempting 
to exploit it for political purposes. They therefore must assume that our international 
positions, particularly in matters o f the control o f atomic energy, are predicated on this 
superiority and contain a margin o f excessive demand, which would not be there if a better 
balance existed in the power o f disposal over the weapon. For this reason, they may 
actually prove to be more tractable in negotiation when they have gained some measure o f
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that review, NSC 68, and thereby infused his philosophy into the framework of policy- 
transforming the character o f  atomic age strategy into the form it would hold for much of 
the cold war.
In NSC 68, Nitze agreed with Kennan that communism and capitalism were not 
compatible, but Nitze apparently doubted Kennan’s assertions that coexistence was 
possible. Concerned that European nations might risk economic instability if forced to 
expand militarily, Nitze sought the expansion of US military capabilities to  complement 
NATO ® In addition, Acheson was convinced that since the Soviets had proved their 
atomic capability, “massive conventional rearmament” was required.*® In order to 
accomplish this goal, Nitze and his assistants turned to the same tactic Truman had used to 
great success, they inflated the crises to cataclysmic proportions. “The issues that face us 
are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destmction not only o f this Republic, but of 
civilization itself.”** Though its architects hoped that its public release would “rally” 
America and the West, it was (officially at least) kept under wraps until Kissenger
power o f disposal over the weapon, and no longer feel that they are negotiating at so great 
a disadvantage.” NSC 20/2 B(4) The accuracy of this analysis can never be known, for 
before it could be tested a new philosophy enveloped in and articulated through NSC 68 
dictated policy.
™ See also Harper, who suggests that Nitze formed “basic assumptions about European 
intentions that were rooted in his interwar isolationism-cum-hostility toward the Old 
World” and agreed with Acheson that Europe could not be left to the Europeans, op. cit. ,
294. Even Kennan’s colleague and fiiend. Chip Bohlen, harbored concerns about 
European strength in the shadow of NATO, with tendencies to “drift back to its former 
bad habits o f disunity. FRUS, 1950, 3, 620.
*® Walker, 77ie Co/i/ITar, 73.
** NSC 68. See also May’s engaging discussion of the process o f policy management and 
the adroit’ maneuvers necessary to convince President Truman and Secretary of Defense 
Johnson. May, American C old War Strategy, 9-15.
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declassified it in 1975.™ Despite Truman’s order to keep the document secret, however, 
knowledge o f it spread through the Washington mmor mill.™
Acheson unabashedly claimed that NSC 68 was designed to “bludgeon the mass 
mind o f ‘top government’ resulting in “action” instead of “decision-making.”*'* The
*^  Walker, The Cold War, 73; May, American Cold War Strategy, 16.
*^  Although Truman insisted that NSC 68 be handled with “special security precautions” 
to insure that its contents remained under lock and key while he consulted with agency 
directors sympathetic to his views on a reduction o f the military, pertinent “leaks” 
rendered Truman’s caution markedly insufficient. See May, Am erican Cold War 
Strategy, 13-15.
The council was eager to  implement NSC 68. Since Truman’s hesitation rested 
primarily with the expense o f  the proposals contained in the document, as the first order of 
businss on April 20, the Council recommended the immediate (by April 25) appointment 
o f an ad hoc committee to be designated by the Secretary o f the Treasury, the Economic 
Cooperation Administrator, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and the Chairman of 
the Council o f Economic Advisors. In addition, the committee didn’t want to allow any 
time for second thoughts should the President approve the documents conclusions.
Rather than postpone action, the Council also established a separate committee and 
authorized it to make recommendations regarding the re-organization o f the government 
called for in NSC 68.
In response to calls for interim action pending an executive decision, (including one by 
James E. Webb, Acheson’s under secretary, for the president to “say something to the 
country.. some time in early June”) only three members voiced restraint. Secretary of 
Defense Johnson suggested that since the project already had priority it “should not be the 
product o f haste,” Secretary o f the Air Force Symington “felt that the whole job should 
be done properly, not in any half-measures” and Maj. General J. H. Bums, the Assistant 
to the Secretary of Defense “said that the whole military establishment was working on 
this as a priority project and that the military program could not be expected before the 
middle o f June.” Rather than prepare an interim report, the Council decided to “expedite” 
a response to the president. “Minutes of the 55th Meeting o f the National Security 
Council” April 20, 1950. Harry S. Truman Papers, “President’s Secretary File,” microfilm 
collection, Georgetown University Library.
*^* Even as Acting Secretary o f State, Acheson was not shy about exerting his influence 
upon the President. In January 1946, he bypassed customary coordination between the 
Secretaries of War, State, and Navy, inducing the President to agree to a request made by 
Byrnes at the first meeting o f  the United Nations in London. Byrnes planned to announce 
the change o f status of certain Pacific islands into either Trusteeships or under special 
arrangements for strategic areas—upon the President’s assent, Acheson immediately cabled 
the approval to Byrnes. The Secretaries of War (Keimeth Royall) and Navy (Forrestal) 
requested an immediate audience with the President and Forrestal bluntly stated that
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document itself proves that Acheson, in his memoirs, did not rely upon exaggeration.
NSC 68, with all the nuance o f a club, was (as Acheson had so carefully planned) 
extremely effective. ** Its persuasiveness resulted from three factors: a warning that 
destruction would follow the absence o f an aggressive foreign policy, an appeal to history, 
and manichean representations o f the conflicting ideologies o f the United States and the 
Soviet Union.** Although one can place NSC 68 under many different lights and reveal its
Acheson’s action was “a desertion o f the general idea of cooperation by getting hasty 
decisions out of him on a particular point of view, and I told him I propose to make such a 
representation to Acheson in very strong terms.” Millis, Forrestal Diaries, 21 January 
1946, 131.
** The role Acheson played as Secretary of State was different than he had earlier 
conceived it. As Under Secretary, he had advised Marshall that the Secretary’s speeches 
were “never directed to swaying an audience to a specific result, like voting in an election, 
but to putting out ideas for thought at home and abroad.” By 1950, under fire in the 
Senate as a communist sympathizer, Acheson traveled promoting support for the 
philosophy of NSC 68 and had clearly abandoned using ideas for bait—deciding instead to 
dynamite the pond. He “made points clearer than truth” and deemed that “(Qualification 
must give way to simplicity o f  statement, nicety and nuance to bluntness, almost brutality” 
in order to convince his listeners. In yet another link between foreign policy and religion, 
Acheson referred to his various engagements as “preaching.” Acheson, Present a t the 
Creation, 374-375.
The text of Acheson’s speech at the University o f California at Berkeley combined his 
avowed “bluntness” with moral righteousness: “Good and evil can and do exist 
concurrently in the whole great realm o f human life. They exist within every individual, 
within every nation, and within every human group.. The struggle will go on, as it always 
has, in the wider theatre o f the human spirit itself. . .” Turning to capitalism versus 
communism, he continued: “. .  it also does not follow from this coexistence o f good and 
evil that the two systems, theirs and ours, will necessary be able to exist concurrently.” 
Ironically, and although the government’s loyalty programs silenced critics under the guise 
o f subduing communist subversion and began a massive system o f classification restricting 
information to all but a handful o f individuals, Acheson praised the principles of US free 
society: ‘Tt does not fear, rather it welcomes, diversity and derives its strength from 
freedom of inquiry and tolerance even o f antipathetic ideas.” Acheson, cited in 
Schlesinger, Dynamics o f W orld Power, 410-416.
** Curiously, the “politico-centrism” of cold warriors seems, even today, as an acceptable 
(and preferred) ethos (patriotic); while ethnocentrism appears (we hope) on the wane.
The two, however, are logically (and morally) equivalent. Emily S. Rosenberg, a cultural 
historian, argues that the “binary structure” which characterized NSC 68 “fit comfortably”
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skeleton and inherent discursive strategy (as many already have) it is important to analyze 
NSC 68 in relational terms, particularly through its shift in emphasis and the implications 
o f that shift upon the more limited, though vastly consequential, question o f American 
atomic policy.
While Kennan’s NSC 20/4 relied upon general ideological principles that separated
the United States and the Soviet Union as independent, though interrelated actors, NSC
68 instead compared the two and claimed that in the event of atomic warfare, the Soviet
Union might hold the high ground, at least initially:™
A police state living behind an iron curtain has an enormous advantage 
in maintaining the necessary security and centralization o f decision 
required to capitalize on this advantage.**
within American culture and suggests that attitudes about Native Americans, World War 
n , and the Truman Doctrine are all examples o f such symbolic formation. “Rosenberg’s 
Commentary” in May, American Cold War Strategy, 161-163. In applying her thesis to 
twentieth-century international expansion, she observes that the nation’s “exporters” o f 
culture fail to recognize “That the advance o f international liberalism could generate its 
polar opposite—entrenched conservatism and a narrrow range of options.. There could, 
American liberal-expansionists believed, be no truly enlightened dissent against the 
ultimate acceptance of American ways, and this faith bred an intolerance, a narrowness, 
that was the very opposite o f liberality.” Rosenberg Spreading the American Brecon 1890- 
1945 (New York, NY: Hill & Wang, 1982) 234.
*^  This is not to say that Kerman had not already considered the implications o f Russian 
atomic weapons. Indeed, in 1945 he prepared an ominous statement outlining his belief 
that the Soviets would not hesitate to use an atomic weapon, should they be given the 
opportunity: “There is nothing—I repeat nothing—in the history of the Soviet regime 
which could justify us in assuming that the men who are now in power in Russia. . would 
hesitate for a moment to apply this power against us if by doing so they thought they 
would materially improve their own power position in the world.” Written admittedly in 
haste, Kerman asserted it was a “reflection only o f an anxiety lest this matter be handled 
on the basis o f the same effort to curry favor with the Stalin regime that seemed to me to 
have inspired our other policies up to that time.” Note, however, that Kennan’s 
statement, however frightful, is qualified (as are others contained in the entire document.) 
See Kennan, M emoirs, 296-297.
Nitze decided that the significance o f the bomb lay in the fact that it “enormously 
enhanced the effectiveness o f a single bomber.” Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 42.
** NSC 68, “Vm Atomic Armaments”.
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Kennan had certainly believed (and NSC 20/4 asserted) that capitalism possessed logical 
advantages over a communist system in the postwar world, and that the Soviet Union 
would move in the direction of capitalism if given an opportunity (and time) to recognize 
the advantages o f such a transition. It is important to look at the ways the two advisers 
pointedly differed upon a seminal issue; namely, how  superiority was to be measured, and 
even, defined.
Clearly, between Kennan’s analysis and Nitze’s, a fundamental change had 
occurred in the fulcrum of the relationship between the two nations. The Soviet 
development o f an atom bomb obviously obliterated America’s ability to threaten (if not 
use) a weapon only it possessed. Kennan’s faith had rested not in weaponry, however, but 
upon an abiding trust in democracy; a trust that superceded his fear o f communism. It 
appears that Nitze took an opposite view; that is, that US survival depended upon an 
increased military presence and a corresponding shift owqy fi’om fundamental democratic 
principles.
NSC 68 posited Soviet “advantage” in terms o f security and centralized decision 
making and reinforced the reliance upon those elements o f governance that already 
existed and infringed upon the rights o f Americans. At the time NSC 68 was crafted, the 
United States did not lack security precautions, particularly in the case o f atomic workers. 
Truman had already seized on the issue o f communists in government and issued three far- 
reaching Executive Orders that enhanced the state’s ability to act against communism
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through the denial of rights to citizen workers.*® In addition, there seems to have been no 
lack of “centralization of decision” though Nitze considered that characteristic only o f the 
Soviet Union.®® Was Nitze actually, though rather covertly, proposing that the United 
States become further “totalitarianized” in order to increase her chances in a war fought 
with atomic weapons? The answer cannot be known. What is clear is that NSC 68 clearly 
influenced the direction o f atomic policy, and that direction veered sharply away from 
traditional guarantees in a democratic nation.
*  *  *
*® E.O. 9806, 9835, and 10241. An (admittedly liberal, nearly radical) analysis o f the issue 
o f anti-communism during Truman’s administration can be found in Caute, The Great 
Fear. See also Earl Latham for a more in-depth analysis, though one that lacks 
examination of the implications o f the Soviet’s first atomic weapon detonation upon the 
fray. The Communist Controversy in Washington.
The expansion of state power against workers coincided with the state’s need for 
workers. By 1954, plants operated by government contractors were entitled to fire any 
employee believed to threaten security—a dicey situation for employees. One factory fired 
over 250 employees based upon “anonymous letters, phone calls or personal visits.” By 
1956, over three million workers were employed “at will” (unprotected by either union 
contract or employment agreement) and required to hold security clearances. The New 
Republic, September 10, 1956, 8.
®® The National Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission both served only in 
an advisory capacity to the President, who ultimately rendered his decision unilaterally.
‘Tt is recognized that, in the event o f hostilities, the National Military Establishment must 
be ready to utilize promptly and effectively all appropriate means available, including 
atomic weapons, in the interest o f national security and must therefore plan accordingly. . 
The decision as to the employment o f atomic weapons in the event of war is to be made 
by the Chief Executive when he considers such decision to be required.” NSC 30, 
September 16, 1948. See also “Use o f  Atomic Weapons” approved September 10, 1952; 
“In the event o f a positive decision, the President would authorize the Secretary of 
Defense to use atomic weapons under such conditions as the President may specify.” 
Memorandum from James S. Lay, Jr. to Secretaries of State, Defense and the Chairman o f 
the Atomic Energy Commission, “Atomic Energy Policies Approved by the President on 
Recommendation of the National Security Council or its Special Committee.. for the 
information of the President-elect.” December 1, 1952, Secretariat collection; Box 1277, 
Folder O&M 12 National Security Council.
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Though not even completed, the philosophies shaping NSC 68 influenced one of 
the most momentous decisions o f the century, the development o f a “super” weapon—the 
H-bomb. On November 10, 1949, President Truman, in the wake o f the Soviet atomic 
detonation, asked Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and AEC Chairman 
David Lilienthal to examine the possibility o f a hydrogen weapon. Confiident in his own 
belief that the weapon should be developed, and perhaps confident also o f  his ability to 
control the committee’s recommendation and Truman’s decision, Acheson told Nitze to 
coordinate the H-bomb decision with the “broader inquiry being gestated by the National 
Security Council”-N S C  68.®*
Kennan, who had been working on the problem of international control o f atomic 
energy, was denied a voice in the deliberations, but he tried to make a contribution 
nevertheless. No longer director o f a staff. Counselor Kennan alone formulated a 
memorandum that he considered “one o f the most important, if not the most important, of 
all the documents I ever wrote in government.”®^ Kennan’s analysis challenged a foreign 
policy that he considered “ambiguous and inconsistent”— one that ostensibly supported an 
international decision to  abolish atomic weapons whilst political and military leaders based 
their defense policies on the use o f  atomic weapons. Stressing a moral imperative, Kerman
®* Acheson, Present a t the Beginning, 346. Nitze erroneously cites November 19. The 
date, of course, represents only the officia l beginning of the inquiry—moral and practical 
questions about the development o f a “super” weapon had divided scientists and others 
with “inside” information since the end o f the war. More formally, Lilienthal suggests that 
the issue began to pick up steam in October, 1949 with Lewis Strauss’ recommendation 
that the General Advisory Committee “make an intensive effort to get ahead with the 
Super.” David E. Lilienthal The Journals o f D avid E. Lilienthal: The A tom ic Energy 
Years, 580, 576.
®^ Kerman A/emo/rs, 472.
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did not propose the abandonment o f atomic weapons, but urged that the United States 
develop and articulate publicly a determination that atomic weapons would never be used 
in a first-strike capacity.®’ Acheson derided Kennan’s iconoclastic analysis, and told him 
to “go out and preach his Quaker gospel but not push it within the Department”®'* and then 
turned to Nitze for a study that proposed a massive military expansion bolstered by 
conventional and atomic weapons.®* Acheson could not act (at least officially) unilaterally 
on the H-bomb decision, and although the committee suffered fi-om the outset fi’om a
®^ Kerman’s recommended a substantive declaration, and his passion and eloquence 
deserve inclusion; “We deplore the existence of all weapons o f indiscriminate mass 
destruction. We regret that we were ever obliged to make use o f one. We hope never to 
have to do so again. We do not propose ever to do so, unless we are forced to  it by the 
use o f such weapons against us. Meanwhile, we remain prepared to go very far, to show 
considerable confidence in others, and to accept a certain risk for ourselves, in order to 
achieve international agreement on their removal from international arsenals; for we can 
think o f nothing more dangerous than a continued international competition in their 
development.” In hindsight, Kennan hypothesized that Acheson’s only reaction was 
probably “one o f bewilderment and pity for my naivete.” Memoirs, 474.
It seems clear that Kennan’s belief that Soviet fear, not militarism, posed the greatest 
threat was an influential factor in his belief that the US should demonstrate a certain 
amount of public good faith concerning atomic weaponry.
®^ Cited in McCullough, Truman, 757
®* Acheson, Present at the Creation, 347. Kennan and Acheson also disagreed over the 
rearmament of Germany. Kennan believed that NATO acceptance o f West Germany 
would threaten any attempt at conciliation with the Russians, and “most incongruous and 
unpromising; namely, the effort to operate a democratic political system on a territory 
occupied by Soviet troops and under the control o f an inter-AUied body that included a 
Soviet commander.” Their disagreements grew as the years passed reflecting according 
to  Kennan “the differences in our respective backgrounds. He, having never lived in 
Eastern Europe or Russia (and perhaps sharing Sigmund Freud’s view that the people east 
o f  the Elbe were ‘baptized late and very badly’) . . . ” Yjeaaan M emoirs, 446-447.
Pressed by his responsibilities to the president, Acheson notes that he wanted risks 
measured on a “different scale” than that delivered by the Soviet experts. ‘Trom  the 
outset, in trying to outline with these groups the field o f inquiry relevant to the decisions, I 
became aware, without full comprehension, that our colleagues Kennan and Bohlen 
approached the problem of policy definition with a very different attitude and from a 
different angle from the rest o f us.” Acheson, Present a t the Creation, 347.
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collision of ideologies and temperaments and the members of the AEC advised against it, 
he orchestrated his hoped-for escalation.
Truman’s hand-picked trio o f theorists could not have been more disparate.®* 
Given Acheson’s impetus in the development of the premises outlined in NSC 68 and his 
reluctance to accept any risk in terms o f foreign policy and defense development, he surely 
began deliberations already convinced that no “moral argument” should hold sway.®  ^
Secretary Johnson, determined not to exceed the President’s budgetary restrictions on 
defense, and perhaps as equally determined to remain contrary, was a cantankerous and 
disagreeable participant, unwilling to discuss anything that might not reduce the budget.®* 
Lilienthal, on the other hand, opposed vehemently any enhanced atomic weapons 
development. It is likely that none o f the three men relished their task, but when the 
Soviet Union detonated its first atomic device, the postwar musings about a massive, 
almost unimaginable weapon turned firom a whispered chorus o f “can we’s?” into a steady 
refi-ain of “should we’s?” and those voices could not then be denied.
*  *  *
®* The three men met officially only twice, once on December 22 and again when their 
report was presented to the President, on January 31, 1950. McCullough, Truman, 758. 
®^ See Acheson, Present a t the Creation, 348. If Acheson shared what might be called 
“moral” qualms about the H-bomb, he certainly didn’t express them, stating that such 
restraint had no place in government, and noted of Kerman that he “had no right being in 
the Service if he was not willing to face the question as an issue to be decided in the 
interests of the American people under a sense of responsibility.”
®* Since Johnson played little other role in the decision, this abbreviated analysis will not 
delve further into Johnson’s participation.
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Before proceeding to an examination o f Lilienthal and the AEC’s role in the 
negotiations on the “super.” it is important to note that the consequences of decision­
making may have been as, or more important, than the consequences of the bomb’s 
development and experimentation. In this visual age, it is no surprise that the bomb itself 
overwhelmes our imaginations and has concealed the significance that I argue must be 
attached to the shifts in personnel, and therefore policy, that immediately preceeded the 
bomb’s development. Many are at least glancingly familiar with the development and 
experimentation of the H-bomb and few have not been awed (or stricken) by photographs 
or fifim as monstrous mushroom clouds o f  radioactive steam, sea water, and vaporized 
coral proclaimed the breadth of American science and power. It is important though, to 
pause for a moment and consider how the very contemplation of a thermonuclear weapon 
resulted in fractures that rent the customary rubrics of science and politics; and, ultimately, 
because it resulted in a limitation of perspective, contributed to a dramatic transformation 
in the development (and articulation) o f  policy itself.
Certainly, disagreements abound within those fields concerned with governing man 
and nature, and the early atomic age was no exception. From the first public detonation in 
Mroshima, scientists argued about atomic weapons development, short- and long-term 
effects, and shared with politicians the debates surrounding international control, strategies 
o f deployment, and related policy issues.®® Conflicting individuals in both groups, of 
course, drew upon their own personal expertise, but also linked that wisdom in a 
functional equilibrium with motivations that were both purely personal but also relational.
99 See Chapter 4, infra.
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Status and prestige, both within society and within one’s profession, can only be 
developed and expressed through relationships; and, although it is impossible to discern 
the extent to which these motivations stimulated the decision-making of the 1940s, they 
are often such determinative features that their roles should not be ignored. It is, perhaps, 
enough though to note that up until the thermonuclear question entered their lives, the 
advisors and scientists maintained the balance between knowledge and status—they ‘stayed 
in the game” for reasons as indeterminately varied as their histories.
When asked to consider the vastly-exaggerated thermonuclear weapon, however, 
some, after registering their refusal to endorse the plan, retired to the sidelines—others left 
the field. It is hard to imagine that a decision to proceed with the “hell bomb” was easy 
for any of the participants; for some, however, the reaction was visceral—a nearly 
instinctive abhorrence for anything connected with increasing (much less expanding 
exponentially) the power o f  the already-dreadful atomic bomb.*®® For these men, there 
was no balancing act—neither politics, ambition, nor status figured in a decision 
unassociated with relationships. And although Truman optimistically stated as he ordered 
the development o f a thermonuclear weapon that the world would not come to an end,*®* 
it must have seemed to some men that theirs already had.
*°® One is tempted, perhaps pace Kennan, to attribute “morality” to those decisions 
objecting to the development o f the H-bomb; this would be, however, simplistic and unfair 
to both objectors and proponents alike. Certainly, those who chose to support the new 
weapon did not consider themselves immoral. The detractors’ perceptions differed: at 
least one AEC member. Hartley Rowe, objected to the hydrogen bomb because the atomic 
bomb was monster enough (p. 98, infra). Oppenheimer doubted its feasibility. In regard 
to the h-bomb decision, then, any discussion o f “morality” wül only be used herein when 
the participant himself inteqected that component into his arguments for or against.
*®* McCullough, 763. The bomb did, however, have its casualties.
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The famous mushroom cloud results from the creation o f a vacuum, and the 
decision to develop a thermonuclear weapon caused a vacuum within the realm o f national 
policy, a condition that resulted in a dramatic transformion o f the intellectual and 
ideological base that had driven policy since the end o f the war. The void was filled with 
only those who supported atomic and military escalation. It may be argued, o f course, 
that the men who left (or, like Kennan, were pushed out of) government service at the 
time o f  the decision to develop the “super” had outspent their usefulness, or had become 
outmoded ideologues. But who can suggest that their experience and knowledge, indeed, 
their intimacy with the features of the rapidly-changing postwar world, would not have 
been valuable assets as the nation confronted a world where it alone did not own the atom 
bomb? Consider the abilities o f the men who could not endorse the H-bomb; Kennan, 
whose influence in the postwar field of foreign policy was, and is, undisputed; 
Oppenheimer, whose objection to the bomb forged the basis for his later removal and trial 
as a communist;*®^ and Lilienthal, a man who during his tenure as Chairman o f the Atomic
*®^ Caute provides and thorough and well-documented account o f Oppenheimer’s 
persecution. The G reat Fear, 476, 477. Oppenheimer entered the Manhattan Project as 
an admitted “fellow traveler” but Groves’ influence had him cleared for the top secret 
project in 1943. Highly decorated after the war, Oppenheimer was the “most politically 
influential scientist in the nation” and although J. Edgar Hoover asked Lilienthal to have 
him investigated in 1947, the AEC cleared him unanimously. Oppenheimer’s opposition 
to the H-bomb aroused the ire of the weapon’s major proponent, AEC committee member 
Lewis Strauss; and Oppenheimer’s 1952 suggestion that the US diversify its armory 
(implementing warning stations and guided missiles) meant a decrease its reliance upon 
atomic weapons that pushed Strauss over the edge. As Chairman o f the AEC, Strauss 
accused Oppenheimer o f disloyalty and revoked his security clearance; but magnanimously 
offered him a position as a consultant if he wished to avoid a loyalty hearing. When he 
refused, Oppenheimer faced not a hearing, but an inquisition.
The travesty that was Oppenheimer’s hearing is a  shameful ecample of political 
persecution. Not, certainly, on a par with Stalin’s infamous “show trials” but, 
nevertheless, a disgraceful example o f a perversion o f American jurisprudence. When
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Energy Commission was an influential spokesman and guardian o f civilian control, and the 
peacetime development, o f atomic science.
*  *  *
David Lilienthal preferred to focus on the “ordinary affairs o f men” and as the head 
of the civilian AEG, he insisted upon it. Under his direction, the Commission promoted 
the atom’s peaceable possibilities, including medical research and power generation, that 
he believed could help the lives o f ordinary people. Since the military’s preoccupation 
with weapons development absorbed young scientists, the AEG established hundreds of 
fellowship programs for students eager to explore the less destructive side o f atomic 
science. He resisted, sometimes successfully, military requests for ever-increasing 
amounts of scarce atomic material, and fought those who sought to broaden the already 
oppressive secrecy rituals o f the government through its atomic arm. He traveled
Oppenheimer requested his hearing, “his phone was tapped, his home and ofGce bugged, 
his mail opened and even his conversations with his attorney recorded.” Though attorneys 
for both sides required the highest level security clearances (the hearing, o f course, 
entailed testimony and discussion o f sensitive, classified issues) only the government’s 
attorney received his; Oppenheimer endured his walk over the coals without benefit of 
counsel because despite repeated requests, his attorney was never granted clearance. The 
government’s attorney enjoyed another advantage; when the three-judge panel examined 
the record, they did so with the assistance of government counsel. When the panel 
entered a ruling against Oppenheimer, they based their verdict upon issues never covered 
in the hearings.
It is impossible, o f course, to know whether Oppenheimer was truly guilty o f anti- 
American activity. It is possible, though, to recognize that he did not receive a fair 
hearing—a recognition apparent to the AEG who offered him a new hearing in 1962. The 
unfair conditions that Oppenheimer endured bubbled higher than the AEG, however, for 
although Oppenheimer refused a second hearing. President Kennedy offered him the Fermi 
Award in 1963—an award Oppenheimer accepted and later received fi’om the hands of 
President Johnson.
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endlessly delivering speaches throughout the nation: to women’s groups in Utah, the 
American Library Association, Iowa State College. Nineteen-forty-nine proved a difBcult 
year and he had had but little chance to garden or write when his one vacation was 
interrupted.
It was close to midnight on September 21 when David Lilienthal returned to his 
borrowed cabin on Martha’s Vinyard and the last thing he expected to find was a candle 
burning in his window and a man standing in his driveway. “As if  I fi'equently found him 
on a windswept moor, in the dead of night, on an island, outside a goat field” Brigadier 
General James McCormack, the AEC’s Director of the Division o f \filitary Applications, 
appeared nonchalant while he waited for Lilienthal’s return. Within minutes, McCormack 
and Lilienthal sat in the little cabin under the light of an antique kerosene lamp and 
Lilienthal learned that the Russians now shared the world’s most modem secret. The two 
men drank a beer and looked at the stars through the kitchen window.” “^^
It could not have taken Lilienthal long to realize that the new international problem 
promised the enhancement o f military influence and heightened governmental secrecy- 
two things Lilienthal had worked to overcome as Chairman of the AEC. In a curious 
twist, the Soviets had actually given the military the ammunition it needed to thwart both 
Truman’s proposed defense cuts and Lilienthal’s attempts to channel the resources o f  
atomic science into the private sector.*”^  Certainly, too, the Communist weapon
Lilienthal, Diaries, 569.
Lilienthal accepted the Chairmanship o f the AEC only after he was assured by Truman 
that he would be allowed to promote civilian applications. When Truman met for the first 
time with the entire committee in December, 1946 (Lilienthal and his “little flock”) he 
agreed with their plans for the transfer o f Manhattan i&cilities from military to civilian 
hands: “. .  the sooner the better. . we must understand that atomic energy wasn’t just a
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threatened to stifle all of Lilienthal’s arguments for more openness in government and an 
end to atomic secrecy.
weapon o f destruction—it could be a boon to mankind.” When Lilienthal asked for the 
President’s help in combating the War Department’s angst toward the civilian commission, 
Truman said‘T expect that. The Army will never give up without a fight, and they will 
fight you on this fi'om here on out, and be working at it in all sorts of places. But you can 
count on it, I am your advocate.” Lilienthal, D iaries, 118.
Truman was right, the Army (and the rest o f  the military) kept fighting, and by 1949 the 
strife between the armed forces and Lilienthal had reached critical mass. The strain o f 
budgetary woes only heightened the tensions that had been building since the end o f the 
war; a situation not lost on Lilienthal; “. . the situation within the Military Establishment 
is chaos and conflict and carnage confoimded. . The Joint Chiefs are at each other’s 
throats, no decisions can be made, and even Eisenhower is discouraged and now ill.” 
When the Army lashed out at the AEC for supposedly exposing military secrets to 
Congress in its annual report, Lilienthal prepared for a “showdown” against the military- 
one precipitated by Lilienthal’s refusal to fulfil the “requirements” o f the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff for atomic material. “. .  there is nothing sacred about any of their pronouncements. 
They are made by men, and damned vulnerable men at that, and I doubt if their statement 
of their ‘requirements’ for atomic weapons material had any background that would stand 
up to inquiry.” Ibid., 494
Though later infuriated, Lilienthal was at first a little bemused by the elaborate 
strategies to shield atomic science. On a whirlwind 1946 tour o f atomic facilities, the 
plane carried the Commission, a five-foot-long “hope chest” full of top-secret documents, 
and an armed West Pointer, Lt. Col. Noble, to guard the chest. “Some of the documents 
are such that Noble never lets them out o f his sight, off the plane, and he goes aroimd 
carrying them on him, also with a revolver. I think if we did crash, what the Army would 
be really worried about wouldn’t be recovering us, but the contents o f our hope chest.” 
Ib id  110. By 1947, Lilienthal had become appalled at the “hysteria” that threatened 
freedoms: “we should have a group o f distinguished men study the problem o f security in 
the light o f our traditions of civil liberties. . .it is not only civil liberties but our position of 
leadership in science that could be swept away by a wild nightmare o f fear leading to 
drastic and dumb limitations on scientific men and standards of ‘personal clearance’ that 
are impossible and that assume that scientists can function behind barb-wire compounds.” 
Idem. 176 The problem continued to escalate. Lilienthal came under attack from 
Congress in May 1949 because he refused to  require the AEC’s fellowship recipients to 
undergo security clearances and a closed chamber o f the Senate resounded with 
accusations that Lilienthal was giving away scholarship money to Communists or those 
who “had leanings.” Lilienthal didn’t  back down “Seemed to me an important principle 
was at stake, the extension further of this awful dossier system, beyond any necessity or 
security justification.” 529.
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The crucial battle, however, that Lilienthal was so soon to lose was one he did not 
want to fight at all. It was not lack of courage that deterred Lilienthal. Never one to shirk 
a stand-off, Lilienthal had successfully built and later championed the TVA against aU 
critics, and had triumphed repeatedly against unwarranted attacks as Chairman of the 
infent AEC.^“  Business records, documentation, and uncontrovertable testimony had 
generally been enough, especially combined with Lilienthal’s uncompromising penchant 
for standing his ground, to prove the legitimacy o f TVA management practices or to stave 
off congressional bloodhounds looking for communists who had repeatedly tried to tree 
the AEC. Those older problems centered on accountability or legal right; they could be 
concretely charted, mapped, audited, analyzed, and justified. To address his critics, he had 
opened the books o f the TVA and backed up his defense o f  his AEC with reams of 
documentation—to answer the H-bomb question, however, he would reluctantly have to 
bare his soul. On November 1, 1949, he told Dean Acheson that it was “essentially a 
question of foreign policy for [Acheson] and the President.” *”^
By the time Lilienthal went to Acheson hoping to avoid participating in the 
decision, he had already spent a month pondering the H-bomb. In early October, Lewis 
Strauss, one of the more contentious members o f  the AEC, proposed that the Commission
In his journal, Lilienthal defined courage: “What is it? Isn’t it the capacity to hang on? 
I have thought o f it. . as something active, a positive action o f some sort. There’s a good 
deal o f comment these days about my standing up to bullies and hatchetmen, and the 
editorial writers and commentators and the writers of letters to me use that word 
‘courage.’ If  it should be applied to this thing, then all it means is just that quality of 
hanging on, of not giving up no matter what.” March 15, 1947. Diaries, 160 
Ib id ., S%3.
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“make an intensive effort to get ahead with the ‘Super.’” ®^* Lilienthal invited the General 
Advisory Committee, and its Chairman Oppenheimer, to present a military, technical, and 
operational analysis to the C o m m issio n .B o th  committees met on the last weekend in 
October, and Lilienthal’s journal reflects that the only ambiguity was on behalf of the 
military, which seemed to have been “too busy with the inter-service row, or just not too 
able to grasp it.”" “ Perhaps in an attempt to focus the military’s attention on the actual 
consequences o f atomic weapons, some launched difficult questions toward the General
Ibid., 580. See also Dean’s self- and Strauss-serving January 27, 1950 memorandum 
entitled “Sequence of events leading to the decision on the ‘super’ bomb.” US DOE 
Archives, 326 Atomic Energy commission; Collection 1947-51 Secretariat, Box 4942, 
Folder 471.6 (10-5-49) Sec. 1.
Lilienthal found Strauss not a little disagreeable, but even, sometimes, despotic. When 
Strauss sided with his Congressional ally Bourke Hickenlooper against cooperation (and 
maintenance of the long-standing agreement) with the UK on atomic material and 
development in September, Lilienthal was not surprised at the natural British assertion of 
their “pride and pace in the world” against Strauss’ and Hickenlooper’s “pecking away at 
technical cooperation.. .a shameful record o f the tyranny of a tiny minority.” Lilienthal, 
D iaries,, 575. Strauss was joined in his opposition by Leslie Groves, Acheson, Present at 
the Creation, 314. A special Committee o f the National Security Council later 
recommended full cooperation. Idem. 315.
As Chairman o f the AEC, Strauss became embroiled in controversy in 1954 over the 
imfortunate “Lucky Dragon ” incident where fallout from a March 1 hydrogen bomb 
sickened Japanese fisherman and caused such high levels of radioactivity that a large 
portion o f the ‘catch’ from fishermen in the Pacific during that time were destroyed. 
Strauss initially denied the incident and when presented with evidence o f the very sick 
crew, decided that “chemical activity o f the converted material in the coral” was the cause 
rather than their exposure to high levels of radioactive fallout. Hacker, Elem ents o f 
Controversy, 150.
This was a tall order since the Committee plaimed to meet again on the last weekend in 
October. Among other requests, the GAG was asked whether: “the United States would 
use a ‘super’ if it had one available? What would be the military worth of such a weapon, 
if delivered? Would it be worth 2, 5, 50 existing weapons? What would such values be 
when modified by deüverability factors? What is the best informed guess as to the cost of 
the ‘super’ in terms of scientific effort, production &cilities, dollars, and time?” US DOE 
Archives, 326 Atomic Energy Commission; Collection 1947-51 Secretariat, Box 4942, 
Folder 471.6 (10-5-49) Sec. 1.
Lilienthal, Diaries, 580.
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Bradley. He, though, was unable to answer whether the United States would attack 
Russia if London would suffer the reprisal, suggesting only that he believed the “Super” 
would offer a “psychological” edge. Enrico Fermi believed that the nation should go 
ahead and develop the weapon, but he qualified his approval, recommending that the 
government consider later (and more carefully) whether to use it.“  ^ The others shared 
opinions obviously honed long before the meeting began. Some, including James B. 
Conant^^^ (“translucent, so gray”) and FJartley Rowe, believed a refusal to recommend the 
development of the H-bomb might somehow rectify past sins; “We built one 
Frankenstein.”"'*
When the GAC submitted their written report, no member o f the Committee was 
willing to step out and recommend the H-bomb’s development. Among their reasons, one 
seems to reflect a measure o f contrition, if not downright guilt, over A-bomb technology. 
Their refusal addressed primarily the “grave contamination” problems involved, but they 
also noted that the proposed weapon promised too much devastation and that its cost 
could not accurately be determined. Most interesting, however, is that the GAC would 
not approve the weapon because there was “no foreseeable non-military application.”"'* 
Given the rigor with which the nation’s leaders, particularly scientists, sought to assuage
*"/&/ri:,581.
Former President of Harvard University (Acheson, 152) and fiiend of the Manhattan 
Project’s Leslie Groves (Lilienthal, 82). Conant also served on a board known as the 
Interim Committee during the war that helped formulate the bomb’s development and use, 
and played a major role in urging Truman to combat the postwar bomb debate. See also 
Stimson, On Active Service, and LiAon, Hiroshima.
Lilienthal, Diaries, 581.
"'* See Gordon Dean’s summary, US DOE Archives, 326 U.S. AEC, RG Commission, 
Collection 1947-51 Secretariat, Box 4942, Folder 471.6 (10-5-49) Sec. 1.
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their burdened consciences after Hiroshima and Nagasake, this segment o f their 
explanation seems to leave no doubt that endeavors toward alternative, peacetime uses of 
atomic energy soothed their souls enough that they considered it an essential condition for 
the development of an even greater w eapon /" In addition, two physicists (Fermi and 
Rabi) thought that consideration o f the H-bomb might serve a beneficial, auxiliary purpose 
and that the Russians, presented with the threat o f possible US development, might agree 
to a joint non-development agreem ent/"
Given the highly personal nature o f any decision to proceed with the H-bomb, 
Lilienthal abandoned any search for a unified decision, urging “individual” answ ers/" 
During the Sunday afternoon session, the Commission learned that groups o f  scientists at 
Los Alamos and Berkeley were “drooling” and “bloodthirsty,” and that E.O. Lawrence 
had already decided that there was “nothing to think over.” It is impossible to say whether 
the images o f atomic scientists actually savoring the possibility o f an H-Bomb while others 
dreaded its very mention altered the final outcome, but the Commission did not hesitate to 
vote against further development. The vote was not as unanimous as it might have 
appeared (or as Lilienthal hoped it would appear)—six AEC Commission members voted 
against the H-bomb, and two half-heartedly made concessions to the majority view. Lewis
Certainly, military historians (and others) might disagree with this analysis; however, it 
seems unreasonable to assume an opposite theory (absent evidence) that military weapons 
are considered in light of some potential peacetime applications.
Dean’s summary, US DOE Archives, 326 U.S. AEC, RG Commission, Collection 
1947-51 Secretariat, Box 4942, Folder 471.6 (10-5-49) Sec. 1, 3.
See, for example, Lilienthal’s 1947 comment that “There have been matters on which 
we did not agree but which I kept plugging and pushing and polishing around sometimes 
over a period of several weeks until an answer agreeable to everybody developed.. it is 
sometimes a very strenuous thing to manage, but it is worth all the work that goes into it 
and is a recrod from which I get very great satisfaction.” LiUenthal, Dairies, 177.
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Strauss and Gordon Dean alone refused an unconditional recommendation against 
development/"
Strauss had posed ever-increasing (and ever-disturbing) problems for Lilienthal, 
and although they had been together on the committee since its inception, the early 
friendly and respectful relationship between the two had become strained. “Lewis has 
made it almost impossible to enjoy the Commission as a family, as we did when we started 
out, something I worked hard to develop.”*" Lilienthal was accustomed to disagreement 
among the members o f the Committee, but those disagreements remained, at Lilienthal’s 
insistence, a private matter between committee members. Lilienthal and the committee 
members had in the past presented a united front to the public and the President, rendering 
decisions based upon majority vote. In the year leading up to the H-Bomb decision, 
however, Strauss had begun to violate the sanctity of the AEC family. With a Republican
Strauss, a former Naval ordnance chief turned Admiral, had been with the Commission 
since its inception, and had been one o f two men picked by Truman before Lilienthal had 
fully accepted the appointment. Noting his choices were neither “crooks or fools,” 
Truman refused to identify Strauss by name, referring to him as a man “with fifty million 
dollars who sold all his holdings and put them in Government Bonds.” Although this 
bothered Lilienthal, he and Strauss (for a time) shared a good working relationship. Ibid., 
89 and passim .
Gordon Dean, on the other hand, had been sponsored for a Committee appointment by 
Senator McMahon in early 1949, and Lilienthal was clearly irritated by both the political 
nature of Dean’s appointment; and, by his relative lack o f experience. “. .  it did seem to 
me that the basis o f selection for this Commission should be. . the very best qualified man 
in the United States, regardless o f who his fiiends may b e .. .1 don’t think anyone would 
suggest that Gordon Dean, however fine a person and young lawyer he may be, would 
quite fill that bill.” Dean’s appointment seemed to Lilienthal as “the beginning o f a 
downgrading o f the importance o f the Commission by the selection of a man who has not 
demonstrated by his past activities any spec ial qualifications for so important a post.” 
Ib id , 459-461.
568.
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Congress aiming at the Truman administration, Strauss seemed determined to put the 
AEC in the crosshairs, and adroitly curried favor from Congress by criticizing the 
Commission and its members and sidestepping the Committee, complaining directly to the 
president or his immediate advisors.
Strauss’ underhanded behavior was no secret, and it became a topic of discussion 
in the hallways o f the White House when the president decided (upon Acheson’s 
recommendation) that the news of the Soviet detonation be kept secret, even from 
Congress. Though the Joint Chiefs of Staff the AEC, and Truman’s Defense Secretary 
Johnson thought that the President should make an immediate public announcement, they 
also agreed that the decision was the president’s to make. As Lilienthal and Admiral 
Souers discussed the President’s refusal, Souers asked; “. .  .what about Lewis.. will he 
feel bound to report this to Republican members?” At that time, Lilienthal still had some 
faith in Strauss, for he assured Souers that although Lewis agreed with the majority of 
them, Strauss would not betray (at least this) confidence.*^” Having known Strauss for a 
number of years, Lilienthal was Airly certain that he could, with a fair degree of accuracy, 
predict Strauss’ reactions—he was less sure o f the Commission’s other dissenter, Gordon 
Dean.
Dean wasted no time in validating Lilienthal’s original reluctance to see him join 
the Committee. Lilienthal had opposed Dean’s 1949 appointment to the Committee 
because of his relative inexperience and because it appeared that his only qualification was
*^” Lilienthal, 573. Oppenheimer saw only one good thing in the detonation o f a Soviet 
weapon; and that only if  the President would announce it immediately—namely, a “chance 
to end the miasma o f secrecy—holding a secret when there is no secret.” Idem ., 572
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the administration’s desire to capitalize upon a political appointee. Although Lilienthal 
was (at the time) assured otherwise, it became clear that Dean supported only Strauss and 
and  the Republican militaristic viewpoint. Dean’s sponsor. Senator Brien McMahon of 
Connecticut had disturbed Lilienthal with his announcement that the United States should 
“blow [the Russians] off the face of the earth, quick, before they do the same to  us—and 
we haven’t much time.”*^* Clearly, a decision to develop the H-Bomb suited Senator 
McMahon. Lilienthal knew that his, and others’, opposition to the further development of 
the “super” was in serious jeopardy.
Lilienthal feared the results of a rushed decision. When he reported to  Acheson 
on November 1, he presented the Committee’s preliminary opposition and stressed that 
since the Joint Committee was “steamed up” on the subject, due consideration might be 
neglected in fevor o f a quick decision.*^ By mid- November, the committee was openly 
divided with Dean and Strauss in the minority. Dean decided that he could not “go along 
with the GAC recommendation . . .  to forego the development of the weapon and to 
announce that fact publicly” and in an undated memorandum (but catalogued in the 
archives as January 27, 1950) stressed the importance he and Strauss had placed upon not 
only the development of the H-bomb, but a complete conjunctional réévaluation and 
overhaul o f the military.
By January 31, 1950, contemplation o f the worst possible scenario had overridden 
all objections to the development of the “super” and the Special Committee o f  the
"* Ib id ., 584.
^^ Ib id , 583.
Dean Memorandum; US DOE Archives, Record Group 326 US Atomic Energy 
Commission; Collection 1947-51 Secretariat; Box 4942; Folder 4716 (10-5-49) Sec. 1.
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National Security Council, Acheson, Lilienthal and Johnson delivered their official report
to the president that recommended the development of the H-bomb And all due speed,
as Lilienthal had feared, drove not only the decision, but its implementation. Attachments
from the Department o f Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission addressed some of
the concerns o f the detractors, but the report suggested that the President direct the AEC
to determine the “technical feasibility” o f the H-bomb concurrent with the military
development o f “ordinance” and “carriers.” Also, that the Secretaries o f State and
Defense re-evaluate “strategic plans” in accordance with the addition o f an H-bomb to the
nation’s armory—a réévaluation Acheson had already instigated. Finally, the report
confirms that the president’s closest advisors, particularly Acheson, had foresworn
probability in favor o f possibility. The report admitted that there was evidence that the
USSR did not want an escalation o f hostility and that it would not use atomic weapons
without the first use by the United States, but warned,
we carmot safely assume, however, that these hypotheses are correct.
Even if they are correct, it carmot be assumed that the Soviet Union 
would forego development o f this weapon any more than she has been 
willing to forego the development o f the fission bomb.*"
*^ ‘* “Development of Thermonuclear Weapon” US DOE Archives RG 326 US Atomic 
Energy Commission, Collection 1947-51 Secretariat, Box 4942, Folder 471.6 (10-5-49) 
Sec. 1. Researchers are denied a complete review o f the report since some sections 
remain under restriction despite a conditional declassification in 1987.
For a similar treatment o f the decision to use the H-Bomb, see James Chace, Acheson, 
229-236. Though Chace’s treatment documents handily the problems between Acheson 
and anti-communists in Congress, he does not link those two events with the decision to 
go ahead with the H-bomb, though he does include Acheson’s remark that seems to reflect 
Acheson’s concern for Truman (politically) since Acheson could not “see how any 
President could survive a policy o f  not making the H-bomb .” Idem.
Ibid. 2-3.
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This is, however, only part o f the report delivered to President Truman. The attachment 
of the AEC’s conclusions also emphasized “possibilities,” and ones which were, perhaps, 
even more dire than the Soviet threat Acheson feared.
The theoretical analysis o f the AEC’s scientific “Staff Report” provides the chilling 
chain o f unknowns upon which the development o f the H-bomb proceeded. The scientists 
estimated that an H-bomb had a “better than even chance of being technically feasible” if 
the nation made an immediate investment of 150 to 200 million dollars in construction and 
materials. While they ventured a guess as the the feasibility o f the bomb itself and its 
initial cost, they refi'ained fi'om announcing any odds they may have calculated as to the 
weapon’s effects; namely that with an air burst “the possibility would arise that the blast 
damage might be limited by part o f the atmosphere being blown out” or that the 
“tremendous quantity o f radioactive products could be generated and might have 
significant effects on persoimel down-wind” or even that “whether neutrons fi'om a small 
number of Supers, when absorbed in the nitrogen of the atmosphere, could produce 
enough radioactive carbon-14 to be a general hardship.”*" In the end, the only possibility 
that mattered was the chance that the Soviets m ight develop a thermonuclear weapon.
Exactly when Truman made his final decision is unclear, but he did not wait until 
he received the official, written, report fi^ om his Special Committee. Within seven minutes 
of receiving the Committee’s report he ordered the bomb’s development asking only, “Can 
the Russians do it?” When Acheson, Lilienthal, Johnson and the Executive Secretary of
*" Ibid. B-1, B-2. Though this last statement is qualified by a distinction between the 
number of supers detonated and whether their individual energy release was equivalent to 
ten million tons o f  TNT or forty million tons o f TNT.
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the NSC all nodded their heads, he signed the statement approving the recommendations 
of the Committee.*" The decision to proceed with the development, of course, was not a 
decision to actually use the weapon, and Truman stressed this when Lilienthal’s lonely 
voice argued against its development. The president told him that he believed that United 
States should never “use these weapons.” *^* That conviction did not outlive his term.
Truman eventually did consider the use of atomic weapons, and NSC 68 played a 
role in his change of heart. The plan remains a contentious topic among historians, but 
whether it is recognized as an example of anticipatory genius or as a self-fulfilling 
prophesy, it seems clear that it played a significant role in the direction of foreign (and 
domestic) policy. By ^ r i l ,  1950, Nitze had finished NSC 68, and although it received 
the support o f the Pentagon, State Department, the CIA and the president’s staff, Truman 
refused endorsement based upon its enormous cost. NSC 68 called for a military buildup 
estimated at $50 billion, but Truman insisted that the line be held at $ 13.5 billion. In
*" See Chace, Acheson, 234. Acheson himself explained that although he was 
sympathetic to the objections raised by Lilienthal and Conant (and other members of the 
GAC), his individual participation as limited by Truman’s request that the committee 
deliver a decision on one question—Whether or not to develop the hydrogen bomb—and 
those other objections could not play a role in his decision. Although he cited other 
justifications, the role o f a statesman compared to that o f a citizen, etc., the almost 
apologetic emphasis he himself and his biographers place upon Acheson’s steadfast 
obedience to Truman’s directive is simply not persuasive.
Acheson had enormous influence within the Truman administration and had, on other 
issues, managed quite easily to get his own way even if it differed from Truman’s original 
conception; e.g., intervention in Greece and later, the massive increases in the defense 
budget. There seems to be no reason why he could not have here, except that he was, 
himself fi'om the beginning committed to the expansion of atomic weapons.
*" McCullough, Truman, 763. Numerous caveats along this same line pepper the AEC 
and Defense addendums to the official report.
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June, with the invasion of South Korea, he changed his mind.*" By September, Truman
ordered the full implementation o f NSC 68,*" and by 1952, Truman had adopted a
chillingly cavalier attitude with regard to atomic weapons:
It seems to me that the proper approach now would be an ultimatum 
with a 10-day expiration limit, informing Moscow that we intend to 
blockade the China coast from the Korean border to Indochina, and 
that we intend to destroy every military base in Manchuria by means 
now in our control—and if there is further interference we shall 
eliminate any ports or cities necessary to accomplish our purposes.
This means all-out war. It means that Moscow, St. Peatersburg,
Mukden, Vladavostok, Peking, Shanghai, Port Arthur, Darien, Odessa,
Stalingrad and every manufacturing plant in China and the Soviet 
Union will be eliminated.*^*
Truman’s frightening proposal resulted from nearly a decade of aggression, 
stalemate and fear. Its morality and strategy was rooted in the militarism that permeated 
postwar American and conformed with NSC 68. Prior to its acceptance and 
implementation, many had attempted to justify the development of atomic weapons with a 
promise of peaceful utility.*"^ That desire to reconcile oneself with the heinous reality of 
atomic weapons may, perhaps, have resulted from a sympathetic reaction toward the 
victims of Hiroshima and Nagasake, and a growing fear that American itself might 
someday be targeted for destruction. Acheson’s State Department and National Security 
Council under Mtze managed, however, to create a new contextual reality for US
*" Interestingly, although the CIA predicted in March that an invasion would be launched 
in June, “it came as a complete surprise to Washington.” Walker, The Cold War, 72-73. 
*^ ° May, American Cold War Strategy, 204.
*^* New York Times, August 3, 1980, 22. cf. McGeorge Bundy who asserts that Truman 
never considered the use o f atomic weapons after Nagasaki.
*^  ^William R. Lawrence (the reporter chosen to cover the Manhattan project) wrote in a 
1948 article that atomic energy held enormous potential for a “promised land. . .flowing 
with milk and honey.” Hilgartner, Bell, O’Connor, Nukespeak, 39.
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policymakers. The dehumanization o f  communists and the inherent evil o f communist 
tradition negated any immorality or indecency that might have previously been attached to 
annihilation. NSC 68 thus intensified the development of anti-communist ideology and the 
progression o f atomic weapons development.
Though the influence of national policy upon atomic science and scientists is 
discussed later, it will be useful to here consider the influence o f  NSC 68 upon scientists. 
After the war, scientists pursued their profession under governmental authority, and that 
authority became increasingly oppressive and burdensome with NSC 68. There were 
certainly a number of reasons for the well-documented persecution of Oppenheimer, but at 
least one reason pertains to  NSC 68. After all, the document was stimulated by the 
consideration o f a thermonuclear weapon in the shadow o f a Soviet atomic weapons test. 
The suggestions for atomic weapons development contained within NSC 68 placed 
scientists at the core o f national security and they became increasingly instrumental as the 
government implemented N tz e ’s recommendations. A policy based upon fear- 
articulated, accepted, and solidified within the federal system under the auspices of 
“national security”—clearly compromised the scientists it depended upon. Nitze 
characterized the Kremlin’s relationship with its citizens as one based upon “universal 
suspicion, fear, and denunciation,”*^  ^but that same statement seems to also characterize 
the treatment of US scientists which, whether by design or dereliction, increased after 
NSC 68 and was far removed from Kerman’s hopes for success through democratic 
example.
*" NSC 68 (V)(a).
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*  *  *
It may be argued, of course, that my emphasis upon the internal dynamics of the 
National Security Council and its advisors is wrong—that the entrenchment o f fear within 
the executive’s highest advisory arm, and the increasing focus upon an ever-more- 
demonized enemy was caused by external forces and that the shifting ideological 
characteristics of the early postwar period were understandable and legitimate reactions to 
increased danger. There is, certainly, ample evidence that transitional international 
situations—the fall o f China, the Soviet’s demonstration o f atomic capability, and the 
Korean War—legitimately risked US interests and consequently necessitated the shifting of 
priorities. It is, as Dr. Eisenbud explained to his colleagues in 1956, “very complicated” 
and a definitive solution as to whether external or internal forces exerted more pressure 
upon national philosophical transitions may remain forever just out o f reach. It is 
reasonable, though, to suggest also that shifts in the personalities, and the different 
perceptions that those men brought to the table caused or contributed to shifts in policy.
In this chapter I have tried to demonstrate that domestic realities, together with the 
internal structure and philosophies o f the president’s advisors played a significant, if not 
primary, role in the development o f US policy toward the Soviet Union during the early 
years o f the cold war. The experiences of World War II shaped the National Security 
Council, and the institutionalization of those experiences shaped aggressive anti­
communist attitudes, the progression of atomic and thermonuclear weapons development, 
and eventually resulted in the silencing of moderate voices within the executive branch. In
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the next, this study will begin an analysis of the nations atomic testing program by looking 
at its conception—the Manhattan Project.
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THE MANHATTAN ENGINEER DISTRICT
Surely some revelation is  a t hand 
Surely the Second Coming is a t hand 
The Second Coming?
—William B utler Yeats
‘Trinity” reached its apogee on July 16, 1945, in a place the Spanish had, for
the own particular reasons yet so unknowingly apt for ours, called the Joumada del
Muerto, the Journey o f Death. The conflagration that represented years o f work went
unseen by most o f the scientists—only one refused to follow the orders to wear dark
glasses and lay face down.* Twenty-seven-year old physicist Richard Feynman
protected his eyesight fi'om ultraviolet rays behind a car windshield, then witnessed:
this tremendous flash out there is so bright. . and I see this white 
light changing into yellow and then into orange. Clouds form and 
disappear again—fi'om the compression and expansion o f the shock 
wave—finally a big ball o f orange that starts to rise and billow a 
little bit and get a little black around the edges, and then you see it’s
* The scientists were twenty miles away fi'om the shot tower and given welding glasses 
and ordered to lie face down with their feet toward the bomb. Edward Teller took the 
extra precautions o f gloves and sunscreen. James Gleick, Genius: the Life and  
Science o f R ichard Feynman (Pantheon Books:New York: 1992) 153-154. Fourteen 
years later while promoting a hydrogen bomb cratering experiment in Alaska, Teller 
had apparently become less cautious about radiation and fkllout, telling the University 
o f Alaska’s 1959 graduating class that “fallout.. carefully controlled by the work of 
many conscientious people.. contributes to radiation less than the wristwatch.” Dan 
O’Neill, The Firecracker Boys (New York: St. Martin’s GrifiSn, 1994) 90.
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a big ball o f smoke with flashes on the inside of the Are going out, 
the heat.”^
As the cloud drifted up and out in the pre-dawn hours o f July 16, 1945, the rest o f the 
scientists finally peeked—some stood in awe, some worked—Enrico Fermi calculated 
the pressure of the explosion by dropping bits o f paper—and some may have prayed/
If  one believes the later tales, the physicists conjured a splendid pantheon to join the 
remnants o f Trinity that would have filled, one might imagine, the very cosmos. Some 
called upon their western God, at least one called upon the titan Prometheus, 
Oppenheimer invoked the Hindu’s Death—destroyer of worlds. Feynman?—he 
danced.'*
And why not? The bomb was not yet a symbol o f destruction, but o f victory.^ 
They had teased life into an abstract theory and their brainchild rose at least 50,000
 ^Feynman, Surely you 're joking  M r. Feynman! (New YorkiW.W. Norton: 1985) 134.
'* Fermi was so absorbed in this task that he could not recall hearing the bomb. Laura 
Fermi, Atom s in the Fam ily (University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 1954), 239.
'* James Gleick, Gemw5„ 154-155.
 ^I remain unconvinced by retrospective pangs that deny the scientists enjoyed their 
initial triumph. It was, after, still two weeks before the new weapon would be 
demonstrated on the human population o f Hiroshima. Though the report cannot 
legitimately be denied, it is certainly difficult to look back and believe the the words 
one reporter put into the mouths o f scientists at Trinity, in a story written after 
Hiroshima; ‘“This is it!’ the scientists whispered. ‘Atomic fission.. a great new force 
to be used for good or eNH.'” Arizona Republic, August 7, 1945, 1.
On a recent television program (April 1, 1999) chronicling the development o f the 
bomb and its use, physicist Philip Morrison asserted that the goal o f the Manhattan 
Project was to prove that the bomb could not be built. “The American Century” 
American Broadcasting Company. (Morrison sat at the side o f Louis Slotin until he 
died after an accidental radiation overexposure on May 21, 1946 and threatened to 
expose the real cause o f  his death “as a symbol o f responsibility” when the government 
tried to suppress the information for fear that it would cause fear o f radiation to  spread 
across the nation. The Army re-wrote the release. Lifton, Hiroshima, 62.)
This is not to say that there was not opposition to the use o f the bomb against the 
enemy. At Chicago’s Metallurgical Lab “Met Lab,” (existing somewhat outside the
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feet above the New Mexico desert to spread out over three miles o f sky/ Years o f 
sharing ideas and frustrations, cutting through the tangles of physical science with 
thousands of transitory chalkmarks, long nights thinking, arguing, re-thinking. Against 
war’s oppressive clock, they worked first to beat German science, then they worked to 
tear through their own boundaries, and they won. So first they partied—got drunk, 
sang songs, and, like Feynman, danced.’ In retrospect, the perfectly spontaneous and
military confines o f Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, and Hanford) Leo Szilard in March 1945 
sent a memorandum to Roosevelt urging that the bomb not be used without 
substantive notice to Japan, and also warning o f the dangerousness of a post-war 
world of atomic weapons. Roosevelt died before the memorandum reached the 
presidency, so he requested a meeting with Truman. He met, instead, with James 
Byrnes on May 28, but received nothing but “fiustration.” Szilard turned to the 
scientists themselves, and sixty-seven signed a petition to Truman that asked the US to 
agree not to use the bomb until Japan had been informed of the bomb’s potential and 
offered a chance to surrender. Another petition that asked that the US submit a clear 
“statement o f intent” to the Japanese before use o f the bomb generated another eighty- 
eight signatures from the Met Lab and Oak Ridge before the Army blocked its further 
circulation because it revealed the “state o f the progress” on the bomb. Oppenheimer 
refused to allow the circulation o f the petition at Los Alamos because “he doubted the 
right of scientists to influence political decisions.” It is not known whether Truman 
ever saw the petitions. M arch to Armageddon, 17-18. Another petition,
discouraged but not snuffed out by Oppenheimer asked for a “demonstration” use o f 
the bomb at some unpopulated location. U.S. News & World Report, “Brotherhood of 
the Bomb: Two Flinty Physicists Struggle over their Terrifying Legacy,” August 17, 
1998, V. 125, n. 7, 65.
Whether Oppenheimer’s opinion about the “right” o f scientists to affect political 
decisions is correct or not, it is clear that they had not power to do so, at least after 
scientists managed to develop the bomb. Ironically, when the tables were turned, 
many politicians did not hesitate to exert their “right” to influence science and 
scientists, particularly Oppenheimer. See note 5, Chapter Two, supra.
 ^Letter from Colonel Stafford L. Warren, Chief o f Medical Section, Manhattan 
District to Major General Groves, July 21, 1945, Top Secret Correspondence o f the 
M anhattan Engineer D istrict 1942-1946, National Archives Microfilm Publication 
M l 109 [hereinafter TSCMEDj. The “reported” cloud height was less than the 
“official”—the Albuquerque Journal reported the cloud’s height at 40,000 feet, August 
7, 1945, 1; and The New York Times August 7, 1945, 1.
’ Feynman remembers only one man who did not share in the “parties” and excitement. 
Bob Wilson, the man who had recruited Feynman for the Los Alamos project: ‘“ It’s a
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communal celebration seems oddly out of place, a normal and a particularly usual 
occurrence within the otherwise particularly unusual Manhattan Project.
There was, certainly, no lack of the unusual, the peculiar, or the simply 
mystifying within the range o f  physical complexes and mental complexities that we 
now call the Manhattan Project. The fascinating story has been told and retold—with 
the suspense o f a Hitchcock thriller, enough loyalist heroes to inspire Kipling, and the 
pathos of a Euripidean tragedy—it remains, year after year, a  “hit.” Revisionists might 
even consider broadening the audience and investigate more thoroughly ingenuity of a 
different sort and look into the brothel that thrived, for a time, in the women’s 
dormitory at Los Alamos.* The widespread fascination with Manhattan indeed stems 
from the fact that it all seems so  extraordinary; a handful o f people made decisions and 
directed the building of three huge facilities that employed tens o f thousands o f people 
and funded the bomb with $1.9 billion taxpayer dollars, all while managing  to keep the 
whole business mum from 1942 until Hiroshima. Like those many people whose 
demand for news caused the Santa Fe New M exican to bum up its presses with a first
terrible thing that we made.’ I said, ‘But you started it. You got us into it.’ You see, 
what happened to me—what happened to the rest o f us—is we started  for a good 
reason, then you’re working very hard to accomplish something and it’s a pleasure, it’s 
excitement. And you stop thinking, you know; you just 5/qp. Bob Wilson was the 
only one who was still thinking about it, at that moment.” Feynman, Surely You 're 
Joking, 135-136.
* When the Army learned that scientists were not spending all their time on “approved” 
physical science, they stationed shifts o f MP’s around the perimeter. The scientists 
signed a protest and picketed. Gleick, Genius, 193.
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run,” I am also intrigued by the details o f the project but would here suggest that one 
interesting and very important feature o f the whole story is almost always overlooked.
The very physical isolation of the facilities from American society seems to 
have inspired the decontextualization of the Manhattan Project itself, and many, 
historians included, seem remarkably content to view its features (with the exception 
of the bomb, of course) finitely. It is as if the whole splendid and sordid business took 
place in some other dimension, occurring in isolation with a beginning, a middle, and 
an end. There are at least two factors that have played a role in the relegation o f  the 
Manhattan Project to its own special place and time: human nature and the 
government. Perhaps primarily (because it is, after all, customary) categorization 
seems to be a fimdamental feature o f the assimilation o f knowledge; it is simply 
convenient for humans to  impose periodization for understanding and explanation.
The government, itseff though, also must take a good share of the blame, for the 
information it released and the headlines that appeared led people to believe (if only 
for a time) that the magnificent deception had ended: “Atomic Bomb Held ‘Best-Kept 
Secret’” and “Now They Can Be Told Aloud, Those Stoories [sic] o f ‘the Hill’.”*”
The project delivered enough tantalizing detail to both justify its cost and the
” After sending a plane to  Albuquerque for a new unit, the paper promised its readers a 
second edition with a re-run o f “all the Los Alamos material.” August 7, 1945, 1.
*” “Atomic.. . ” New York Times, August 8, 1945, 2; “N ow .. . ” Santa Fe New 
M exican, August 6, 1945, 1. The latter an example, perhaps, o f one o f  the pitfalls of 
haste.
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deception, and somewhere amidst all the headlines, the billion or so dollars, and 
vaporized metal,** few realized that the project really did not end. *^
One must not think about the Manhattan Project as though it was but another 
“period room” in a museum o f Americana between, say, a dust-bowl farmstead and 
postwar consumerism. Its very purpose was to develop a new thing, and to do so 
quietly, during wartime, required new techniques of governance: secret accounts 
through which to channel unappropriated funds, private contractual relationships 
between the government, industries and universities, innovative bargains for raw 
materials on the international market, manipulation o f the media. It changed, too, the 
relationship between government and science. There was nothing new in using science 
to fulfil a national goal (it was the scientists, in fact, who approached the government 
even before the United States entered the war) but with Manhattan Project, scientists 
were enlisted, they became ‘Government Issue’ and their product government 
property.*" The government borrowed private industrial methods of research and
** See, for example, just one page o f the Arizona Republic: “Two Billion Spent on 
Project, Force Vaporizes Metals,” “Bomb Work is Secret to Builders,” and the nearly- 
miraculous “Flash ‘seen’ by Blind Girl.” 1.
*^  The Corps o f Engineers was eager to continue its participation, and on February 2, 
1946, K.D. Nichols sent a memorandum to Groves to brief him for a February 4 
meeting with General Eisenhower: “In order to avoid disintegration o f our research 
organizations, it is absolutely essential that we make commitments for research for the 
next fiscal year.. .we should be spending fi'om 20 to 40 million on such research and 
development work during. . .1947. . Commitments must be made in the immediate 
future prior to passage o f atomic energy legislation.. . ” “Memorandum to Major 
General L. B. Groves,” 2 February 1946, TSCMED.
*^ Even as the government ‘used’ the scientists, they (and their families) slept under 
blankets stamped ‘USED’ A feature that bothered Laura Fermi as long as she believed 
the blankets were second-hand. She later learned the initials stood for United States 
Engineer District. Laura Fermi, Atom s in the Family, 207.
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development and, not unlike the policies of Bell Laboratories or Proctor & Gamble, 
claimed sole ownership in the interest, here, of “national security.” It deposited the 
physics of fission and the science o f its radioactive by-products to a vault more 
sheltered than that which holds the secret formulas for commercial mouthwashes and 
off-the-shelf puddings; but, obviously, with significantly greater risk and without the 
controlling effects o f a fi'ee market—consumers simply did not get an opportunity to 
decide whether or not to purchase the product. After Manhattan, those scientists in 
America interested in fission and radiation worked only at the pleasure of the 
government, or they did not work at all." The nation entered the atomic age on the 
Project’s path and though the road widened, it stayed there—the behaviors adopted
*“* In this regard, it is interesting to look at the notes Groves took at a meeting between 
himself and Sir James Chadwick o f April 1, 1946 that illustrate the oppressive 
restrictions imposed on scientists, in both countries, even after the war and the role 
Groves continued to play. Though it could be summarized, the blunt realities are best 
expressed in the original:
Frisch wants to visit his parents who are quite old, and at present are 
refugees in Sweden. We agreed that we did not want to prevent his 
seeing them, but it would be much better to see them in England or 
some other country such as Denmark or Norway. Incidentally his 
Mother is quite badly crippled due to an accident and is unable to 
travel with ease.
Pontecorvo wants to  visit his parents in Italy, who are also quite 
aged. He is still an Italian but expects to become an English citizen 
. .  .1 told Sir James that I felt the same about him as I do Frisch. I hate 
to see him go and wish it were possible to do it in some other country, 
and possibly special precautions would have to be taken to prevent him 
from making undesirable contacts.
It is important to remember that the scientists were absolutely unable to  travel during 
the war, and this was probably their first chance to visit their respective parents.
“Notes taken after meeting between Sir James Chadwick and Gen. Groves on 1 April 
1946” TSCMED.
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during wartime constituted a massive, and lasting, shift in the relationships between the 
government, scientists, and people.
The purpose o f this chapter, then, is not to ignore the “unusual” that so 
infiltrated the entire Manhattan Project, but to look carefully at those extraordinary 
features that were so useful they became “usual” and commonplace as atomic weapons 
development continued.*^ Two features in particular, an overwhelming investment in 
secrecy and an equally intensive military objective, permeated the Manhattan Project 
and saddled atomic experimentation with the baggage it would carry for decades. As 
will become clear, the government continued, throughout the testing program, to use 
these two features to carve for itself an extraconstitutional, and nearly unassailable, 
block of authority and isolate it from the legitimate interests and rights of citizens.
This is not to say that at the beginning of the Manhattan Project secrecy and/or 
military objectives were envisioned as though they would offer some later panacea 
against opposition. An example from the waning hours o f the war, though, reflects 
that by then, at least, these principles had become entrenched.
After the bombing o f Nagasake on August 9, 1945, the War Department 
released to newspapers and radio commentators the Smyth Report: “A General 
Account o f the Development o f Methods o f Using Atomic Energy for Military 
Purposes Under the Auspices o f the United States Government 1940-1945” prepared
I am convinced that Bourdieu’s observation that these practices become ‘natural’ 
makes them decidedly more dangerous, particularly in the realm o f atomic testing: ‘Tt 
is because subjects do not, strictly speaking, know what they are doing that what they 
do has more meaning than they know.” H ^ itu s causes practices “to be none the less 
‘sensible’ and ‘reasonable’.” Pierre Bourdieu, O utline o f a  Theory o f Practice, trans., 
Richard Nice (Cambridge; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press) 79.
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by Manhattan consultant and Chairman o f  the Department of Physics at Princeton,
H.D. Smyth. The cover sheet on the document offered standard requirements of
release (“after 9:00 P.M. EWT, Saturday, August 11, 1945” for radio, and the day
following for “morning papers”) but added a new caveat:
The best interests o f the United States require the utmost 
cooperation by all concerned in keeping secret now and fo r  a ll tim e 
in the fu ture  all scientific and technical information not given in this 
report or other ofGcial releases o f information by the War 
Department.'^
A month later, perhaps because o f violations or complaints, the president (through the 
War Department) reiterated the directive and added a palliative note that the action 
was “in the national interest and not with any idea o f imposing censorship upon the 
press or radio.” In addition, it was prominently marked “CONFIDENTIAL—NOT 
FOR PUBLICATION NOTE TO EDITORS.” '^ So, the government confidently and 
quite boldly (and publicly, since it was addressed to editors) declared, through the
Emphasis mine. ‘Tuture Release” TSCMED, [undated]. Since the entire statement 
cannot be reproduced here, it is important to note that the statement (directive) was 
not distinguished in any way, even though other elements of the release were 
underlined or placed in all capitals for emphasis, this sentence appeared almost 
inconspicuous as the second-to-the-last paragraph o f a one-page cover sheet.
On July 26, 1945, Groves issued a memorandum revising the “public relations 
program for the Manhattan Engineer District.” In two and one-half pages. Groves 
established parameters for publication that placed himself at the top of a pyramidical 
regime covering all aspects o f “the principle” — atomic science. Even the change itself 
as Groves envisioned it at the time, was to  remain secret: ‘Its  contents and existence 
will only be disclosed to those whose part in the program necessitate action.” 
“Memorandum to The District Engineer fi’om Major General Groves” July 26, 1945. 
TSCMED.
September 14, 1945, TSCMED. Significantly, on August 14, 1945 the OflBce of 
Censorship had issued a press release that stated “Censorship o f news. . .will end one 
hour after President Truman announces victory over Japan.” Arizona Republic, 1.
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authority of the War Department and the president, that the public was not supposed 
to know.
There are two reasons, one obvious and the other less so, why the government 
decided to advertise its power its privilege and right to continued secrecy. The 
immediately apparent and immensely practical explanation for the shroud of secrecy 
was to prevent an external enemy (at that time, any other non-democratic, non-allied, 
even non-American nation) from developing a similar weapon. Less evident, but I 
suggest nonetheless crucial, was the necessity for the government to re-establish 
sovereignty potentially threatened by the anticipated breakdown of consensus 
following the war and also by the divisive effects o f an ever-broadening moral cum  
political dilemma that radiated from the bomb’s use. There seems to have been little 
popular agreement except for relief that the war was over, and even as some 
recognized the devastation (both atomic and conventional) o f Japan as a just 
retribution, others delved into a more fundamental questioning o f society. The New 
York H erald Tribune powerfully encapsulated their thoughts: “One forgets the effect 
on Japan as one senses the foundations o f one’s own universe trembling.” '*
Important, too, to remember that divisiveness was not confined to the faceless, even 
anonymous public, but from within government itself. The “cacophony” arose from 
within government before it spread without, and as hfichael Sherry has pointed out.
'* Sherry, In the Shadow o f War, 115. For an extremely lucid analysis o f reactions, the 
government’s attempts to stifle such reaction, and the psychological burden that 
created, see Robert Jay Lifron and Greg MitcheU, Hiroshima in America, passim .
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military figures such as Marshall, Eisenhower, and Admiral Leahy had objected to the 
bomb’s use against Japan, as did some o f the weapon’s creators, led by Leo Szilard.'® 
The War Department’s directive constitutes a virtual assertion o f state 
sovereignty to stimulate domestic consolidation. There are, of course, many ways that 
the state can exert its influence upon its citizen body, but this particular expression o f 
state sovereignty is best understood with reference to Bourdieu’s analyses o f state- 
sponsored juridical dispute resolution.^ It is now, as it undoubtedly was then, difficult 
to assess the potential influence o f  voices that posed very fundamental, moral 
questions; but, it is also impossible to ignore that those elements of dissension 
amounted to a “corffiontation” and that the “cognitive and evaluative aspects” o f 
disagreement could not be easily, or readily, resolved through the democratic process. 
In the same way that the state uses its authority, grounded in its “monopoly o f 
legitimized symbolic violence” to lend validity to the decisions of a judge, it also 
protected itself with a “quintessential form o f authorized, public, official speech which
'® Sherry, In  the Shadow o f War, 114-115 
Power is, o f course, an intoxicating topic for theorists (and others) and by choosing 
Bourdieu, I certainly do not mean to discount those many analysts who have sprinkled 
their insight throughout the decades. Foucault’s explorations along these lines are 
particularly attractive, insisting, as they do, upon the recognition o f the relational 
aspects o f sovereignty; and, certainly the field o f power relations is much broader than 
the state, reliant upon a “conditioning-conditioned relationship to a kind o f ‘meta­
power’ which is structured essentially round a certain number o f great prohibitive 
functions.. .[which] can only take hold and secure its footing where it is rooted in a 
whole series o f multiple and indefinite power relations that supply the necessary basis 
for the great negative forms o f power.” Bourdieu’s treatment, however, o f both the 
legitimacy (as legally proscribed and socially authorized) of the state and his 
exploration o f habitus as a structure through which power is both expressed and 
realized, encapsulates more succinctly and comprehensively the issues here raised. 
Michel Foucault “Truth and Power” in Power/Knowledge Colin Gordon, ed., 
(Pantheon Books, New York: 1980) 122-123.
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is spoken in the name o f and to everyone.” By reasserting its power over atomic
secrecy, the government sought consensus;
These performative utterances, substantive—as opposed to 
procedural—decisions publicly formulated by authorized agents 
acting on behalf o f the collectivity, are magical acts which succeed 
because they have the power to make themselves universally 
recognized. They thus succeed in creating a situation in which no 
one can refuse or ignore the point of view, the vision, which they 
impose.^'
Had the government’s intention been strictly to assure the secret nature o f atomic 
science, it is likely that it could have simply continued the elaborate, though expensive, 
deception that so characterized the Manhattan Project. True, everyone would still 
know about the bomb, but development and manufacturing could have progressed 
relatively unseen. To do so, though, would only have solved (for a time) the dangers 
inherently possible with enemy possesion of the weapon. I propose that the 
government’s proclamation o f  its intention to maintain secrecy had an alternative use, 
that is the suppression o f dissent through the creation o f a singular “vision” through an 
expression and reinforcement o f  state sovereignty.^ The directive marks a turning 
point in postwar America, and is thus worthy of exploration. I will argue that the
Pierre Bourdieu “The Force o f Law: Toward a Sociology o f  the Juridical Field” The 
H astings Law Journal, July 1987, 836-838.
“  It is important neither to ignore, nor sublimate, habitus as an element o f the 
acceptance o f governmental authority to restrict information and define perception, 
particularly since the government’s dictum followed so close on the heels o f wartime 
media regulation: “The habitus, a product of history, produces individual and 
collective practices—more history—in accordance with the schemes generated by 
history. It ensures the active presence o f past experiences, which, deposited in each 
organism in the form of schemes o f  perception, thought and action, tend to guarantee 
the ‘correctness’ o f practices and their constancy over time, more reliably than all 
formal rules and explicit norms.” Bourdieu, The Logic o f Practice, 54.
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statement should be taken apart, unpacked, to illustrate three features of the statement 
that inscribe it with far more meaning than might be immediately apparent; namely, the 
indisputable authority o f its source(s), its revolutionary intent, and the degree of 
permanence it demanded, and, as will be shown, achieved.
First of all, the directives came from the War Department and the president, 
two indisputably potent instruments of government. From the perhaps unwelcome 
“Greetings.. . ” to the certainly dreaded “We regret to inform you .. .”  it might be 
assumed that neither letters, telegrams, nor statements from the War Department 
lacked import and that none were received casually. Any violation o f  a War 
Department directive carried the potential for, at the very least, a censure of 
investigation, and at the utmost, charges of treason. Admittedly, the War Department 
controlled all information during the war, and the media had become accustomed to its 
dispatches and restrictions;^ certainly, too, special circumstances distinguished atomic 
development. Some individuals must have violated the the War Department’s first 
request or it would have been unnecessary for the president to reinforce it a month 
later; but whether any editor, reporter, radio programmer or personality noticed that 
this directive threatened complete postwar control (and though denied, censorship) by 
the US government o f a ll atomic information cannot now be known. There is no
^  The Office of Censorship played the major role, and the US “press and radio has 
submitted to voluntary censorship during the war.” A rizam  Republic, August 15, 
1945, 1
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doubt, however, that the 1945 threat became a promise—a clear violation, many would
later argue, of the First Amendment 24
The questions surrounding censorship and media control by the government are far 
more complex than might, at first, seem to be the case and eventually devolve into a 
wide range of issues, from judicial control, e.g. issues o f national security (the ‘clear 
and present danger test’ o f Schenk v. US', voluntary media collaboration with 
government policy that, at some levels, borders on conspiracy to orchestrated 
administrative control. James Aronson, The Press and the Cold War (New York, NY: 
The Monthly Press, 1970, 1990). Though there is no question that governments 
control information in their own bests interests (a dynamic articulated by Weber early 
in this century) Barry Karl’s brief discussion is a cogent reminder that the relationship 
between the government and the media is a negotiation—a conversation between the 
government and the media that is susceptible from both directions, to transformation: 
“Franklin Roosevelt’s use o f the intimately private press conference opened charmels 
he himself was able to keep pretty well encapsulated by his own purposes, giving 
newsmen reason to argue with his successors for a greater opermess that, in its turn, 
reached its zenith with the live television conferences pressed unsuccessfully on 
Eisenhower but initiated by John Kennedy.” See “Visiting the Recent Past” Reviews 
in American H istory,M axch 1990, 137.
Daniel Patrick Moynihan has more recently (and topically) addressed the problems 
of secrecy as they have affected the US since World War U, and particularly within the 
realm of atomic development: “The Cold War had come. Americans were used to 
secrecy during wartime.. This was wholly new. Profound aspects o f the culture, even 
the nature of energy (the oldest o f mysteries), were now to be known by a few but 
withheld from the rest. In a sense, it was the most primitive of arrangements in the 
most advanced o f societies.” Although articles from 1949 and 1950 on atomic 
weapons development (“The critical facts about this greatest o f all publicly owned 
enterprises have been withheld. . public ignorance is the extension o f secrecy far 
beyond the limits o f true security.”) that were published in Life stimulated Moynihan’s 
curiosity and analysis, I see no reason why they are not perfectly applicable to the 
immediate post-war period when the government began media restrictions pertaining 
to atomic testing. Secrecy (New Haven, CT; London; Yale University Press, 1998)
141 and passim.
It is not possible to overemphasize the role secrecy played in atomic development. 
The Atomic Energy Act permitted (but did not mandate because of a last minute 
alteration) the issuance of the death penalty against those accused o f breaching the 
security provisions of the Act. See the New York Times, that noted that a “late 
alteration” had been included stating that “even if a jury found such an intent it could 
recommend clemency or life imprisonment. July 6, 1946, 3.
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Remember, too, that it was knowledge that the government withheld. On the 
one hand, it seems perfectly reasonable to restrict “scientific and technical 
information” that might allow an enemy to assemble a bomb; on the other, and even at 
the dawning of the atomic age, the mandate gagged any opposition and rendered 
whatever national discourse that might perchance develop suppositional and, thus, 
readily dismissable.^ In time, this restriction would even prevent the dissemination of 
information that would have allowed citizens to take simple precautions to reduce the 
risks o f fallout because owy information might have benefited an enemy.
Finally, the directive provides a clear indication o f the military’s intentions for 
atomic weapons (and any other conceivable use for atomic science) together with a 
certainty that the War Department’s authority would extend beyond war’s end, 
perhaps indefinitely. Did no one at the War Department think about what it meant to 
claim sole possessory and distributory right to “all scientific and technical information.
. now and for all time in the fixture”? Did a typist even blink? The questions, of
^  There seems to be no reason why Ronald Powaski’s assertion that the lack of inter­
governmental debate about the bomb made its use against Japan a  foregone conclusion 
cannot be carried into the post-war years. See Powaski, M arch to Armageddon, 7.
See also Foucault who dealt insightfiilly, though cursorily, with the issue of post­
war political suppression o f  “specific” knowledge through a short discussion of 
Oppenheimer, where “for the first time, I think, the intellectual was hounded by 
political powers, no longer on account o f a general discourse which he conducted, but 
because of the knowledge at his disposal; it was at this level that he constituted a 
political threat.” Foucault, “Truth and Power”, 129. Foucault, though, is wrong to 
conclude, unless he does so only because o f the highly public nature o f Oppenheimer’s 
persecution, that scientists with specific, particularly atomic, knowledge were not 
oppressed politically before Oppenheimer. Indeed, the Bulletin o f Atomic Scientists, 
founded in 1945, became the vehicle through which scientists attempted to maintain 
their own freedom o f expression in the seemingly inseparable relationship between 
politics and science that developed in tandem with the atom bomb.
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course, cannot now be answered; but it is important to recognize that even at war’s 
end, the military did not intend to either relinquish, or even reassess, its atomic 
monopoly.
The statement did not fade away with the War Department nor meld into 
memory with the official dissolution o f the Manhattan Project. Secrecy and an 
associative military objective became the fiamework upon which all future atomic 
development was built, it became “usual” and its essence scriptural. The Manhattan 
project sowed the seeds of a culture o f atomic governance that has shaped 
international and domestic relationships since its inception, consuming over $5,400 
trillion dollars.^
The remainder o f this chapter approaches the isolated world of wartime 
atomic development as a cultural system. In this regard, I have been influenced by 
the work o f the noted anthropologist Clifford Geertz who argues for an analysis o f 
culture that begins with the most elemental features and then moves to an exploration 
o f those same features as they transform, and are transformed, by surrounding society.
^  $5,481 trillion as o f 1996, in 1996 dollars. Swartz, Atom ic Audit, 5.
For a  complete history, I would refer the curious to Peter Bacon Hales’ recent and 
extremely lucid, thorough, and broad-based account o f the project that takes 
appropriate and overdue notice and appreciation for the thousands of workers who 
have not yet achieved fame for their participation. Atom ic Spaces (University o f 
Illinois PressiUrbana and Chicago: 1997).
The reader is warned, however, that Hales’ interpretation o f Manhattan’s medical 
director Stafford Warren is somewhat one-dimensional, for his criticism of Warren is 
general, though flawed, informed solely by the author’s strict adherance to a negative 
view o f Groves and of medicine within the wartime project. It simply fails to 
acknowledge postive contributions by Dr. Warren (and other medical personnel) who 
were undoubtedly influenced by factors other than their profession. Physicians within 
the Manhattan Project were controlled not only by hippocratic oath, but by the Army.
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Accordingly, I have chosen to appropriate, though not duplicate, Geertz’ methods and 
have explored the isolated world o f  the Manhattan Project, particularly Los Alamos, 
by examining the attainments and learned behavior patterns o f those individuals who 
were enveloped for a time at the locus of institutional atomic development.^* There is 
certainly no more potent symbol o f US power than the mushroom cloud, yet the 
formulation and articulation o f strength represented by that cloud resulted from an 
assortment o f  relatively miniscule characteristics o f the Manhattan Project—isolation of 
scientists, military manipulation, and secrecy. The following, then, is an attempt to 
locate those significant features o f the Manhattan Project that emanated, tentaclelike, 
and transformed the society at large.^
*  *  *
Individual initiative, ability, and personality can shape, and come to 
characterize, amazingly complex institutions, and the Manhattan Project is an excellent 
example. It is almost impossible to separate the project itself from its Director,
General Leslie Groves, a former Deputy Chief o f Construction for the Army Corps of 
Engineers, whose previous tasks included management of the massive construction
*^ Since this thesis argues that certain patterns and practices became embedded in the 
atomic testing program, the attributes of cultural features that spread into “ordered. . 
system o f families of thought, whence into ‘^ artical integration. . .incongruencies. . 
independencies.” is fimdamental. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation o f Cultures 
(Basic Books, New York: 1973), 408.
^  In due deference to Geertz, this is an attempt to sort the “winks from twitches and 
real winks from mimicked ones.” The Interpretation o f Cultures, 16.
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required by military mobilization and the building on the Pentagon/" Groves was 
appointed in September 1942, less than a year after Roosevelt directed Vannevar Bush 
o f the National Defense Research Committee to proceed with the development of the 
atomic bomb. Blessed with a blank check (others had to try to find the money)
Groves acquired property, supervised construction o f  facilities, negotiated for raw 
materiel, chose the renowned physicist Oppenheimer to  head up the weapons team, 
operated his own intelligence service,^' and bargained with the president, his cabinet, 
those few members of Congress who knew about the project, and with the associated 
British “tube alloy” facility.^^
As impressive as this list of accomplishments is (and certainly he had some 
help), two others were more important. Groves wove his own intensity into the 
project and blanketed every feature with military necessity and invented and
Stanley Goldberg “General Groves and the Atomic West” in The Atom ic West, ed. 
Bruce Hevly and John M. Findlay, (University o f Washington Press: Seattle, 1998) 41. 
Goldberg convincingly argues for a transposition o f the accepted ideology that the 
bomb ended the war, asserting that Groves and the W ar Department had such an 
investment in the atomic bomb that they made sure the war would not end without it.
The Manhattan Project destroyed Groves’ belief in the security o f his earlier great 
accomplishment, the Pentagon. In his report on Trinity among comments about the 
bomb’s effects on a steel tower one-half mile from the detonation: ‘T no longer 
consider the Pentagon a safe shelter from such a bomb.” TSCMED Groves to 
Secretary o f War, 18 July 1945.
By the end o f the war, over 485 “creeps” protected all o f Groves’ secrets and 
engaged in espionage in the US and abroad. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, (New 
York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1962) 139. In this regard, see also the undated typed 
drafts o f memoranda in Groves personal files concerning suspected “Russian agents” 
and MED’s involvement: “All suspects are under continuous surveillance” and 
another, “Steps are being taken to avoid any draft deferment of Weinberg, Lomanitz, 
or any other Communists” TSCMED 
Groves kept a permanent London office staffed with three WACS who reported 
directly, and only, to him. TSCMED “432 WACS Assigned to Manhattan Project” 
August 13, 1945.
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implemented a method to secure the project’s secrecy: compartmentalization. This 
system, a task-oriented and multi-dimensional web, so diffused relationships and 
interconnections between information, people, and product that the bomb-building 
process became nearly unfathomable without a complete flow chart/ ’ As proof of 
Groves’ faith in both himself and the complex project, he handpicked a reporter to 
later piece together those selected pieces o f the story that would glamorize the project, 
justify the expense, and keep the secrects secret/"'
Much of what the public first learned o f the Manhattan Project came fi'om the 
pen of New York Times science reporter William L. Laurence, a man who was 
conditioned, perhaps, to confiront and address the unusual. Like many others on the 
team, Laurence was not bom in the United States but he was, perhaps, the only one 
who, as a child, was stuffed into a barrel by his mother and smuggled out o f Russia. 
Groves offered Laurence and his editor few details but promised them both the story 
o f a lifetime in exchange for Laurence’s services. When Laurence got his first glimpse
After the war, in testimony favoring the McMahon Act that would minimize the 
military’s control over atomic energy, Leo Szilard claimed that Groves’ 
compartmentalization caused an 18-month delay in the bomb’s development, because 
scientist were unable to put “2 and 2 together.” Weisgall, 85. Claus Fuchs, though, 
figured out enough o f Manhattan to shorten the Soviet’s weapon project by about a 
year. Moynihan, Secrecy, 144. See also Barton Hacker’s comment that secrecy 
“stood second only to making bombs that worked,” and his discussion of how 
compartmentalization compromised radiation safety. The D ragon’s  Tail: Radiation 
Safety in the M anhattan Project, (University o f  California Press, Berkeley: 1987) 84 
and more generally ch. 4.
And also cast Groves himself in a feir and flattering light: “A pleasant-mannered, 
gracious officer who outwardly never shows the strain and worry o f  his jo b .. .a 
constant source of amazement to his associates and subordinates. . .firm and blunt 
when the occasion demands, but withal considerate and fair-minded.. .” Press Release 
[undated] “Major General Leslie R. Groves Directs Vast Project” TSCMED.
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o f the Oak Ridge facility from a mountaintop, he knew immediately that Groves had 
not exaggerated—just one building in the vast complex was four stories high and half a 
mile long. He also became concerned that his editor probably had underestimated the 
length of time that Laurence would be “out o f commission,” so to tease some patience 
out o f  his boss, wrote that the story was worth waiting for: “a sort of Second Coming 
o f Christ yam.”^^
The Oak Ridge site that so impressed Laurence was just one piece o f the 
enormous, and expensive, Manhattan Engineering District (MED).'" Covering 57 
square miles, the Tennessee facility produced enriched uranium while a second facility 
in Hanford, Washington, delivered plutonium; a third, at Los Alamos—54,000 acres in 
with an industrial plant that covered over forty acres o f floor space—designed and 
produced weapons.^^ The expenses o f the project, at first, were seriously 
underestimated. When Groves took over the project, its cost was projected at $100
Spencer R. Weart, Nuclear Fear (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1988), 99-100. Groves was initially unimpressed with his new assignment. As Deputy 
Chief o f Construction during the intense mobilization, he had been in charge of almost 
“one million people.. completing about $600 million worth o f work each month.”
The bomb project was not expected to exceed a budget of $ 100 million. Groves, Ncfw 
I t Can Be Told, 4, 390. See also Martin Sherwin, A  World Destroyed, 58.
^  The project’s original name had been “The Laboratory for the Development of 
Substitute Materials” or “DSM”, but Groves’ appointment resulted in a change. On 
August 13, 1942 the project officially became “TTie Manhattan Engineer District” 
because o f Groves’ fears that the original title might arouse curiosity. Interestingly, 
and despite Groves’ insistence on the name change, he himself continued to use 
“DSM” in reference to the project as late as March 1945. See TSCMED 
Memorandum 6 March 1945, Groves to Secretary o f War.
Kevin O’Neill “Building the Bomb” in Atom ic A udit, Stephen I. Schwartz, ed. 
(Brookings Institution: Washington, D C : 1998). 58-59. On Los Alamos, see 
Groves, Now I t Can Be Told, 113.
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million;'* by December 1942, Vannevar Bush wrote the president that a bomb could 
be delivered by the “first half o f 1945” but “the total estimates for a full program reach 
the serious figure o f $400,000,000.” ®^ By 1945, the project’s cost had reached $1.9 
billion, excluding $76 million for the modification of 46 B-29 bombers assigned to the 
Project and 14,700 tons o f silver “borrowed” fi'om the Treasury Department.^
Secrecy and a dominant military objective operated in tandem to override 
seemingly unavoidable safeguards to fund the project. Not one dollar of the $1.9 
billion that the Project cost was knowingly appropriated by Congress, and it is at this 
point where the government began to deceive itself. Roosevelt started the project with 
funds from a hidden reservoir within the Treasury Department. By December 1942,
*^ Groves, Now It Can Be Told, 4.
*® V. Bush to “The President”, December 15, 1942, AEC HX Document No. 121, 
declassified NARS 7 August 79.
The $1.9 billion figure differs somewhat from others; but is believed to be the most 
current (and complete) estimate available, even according to an “official with DOE’s 
Defense Programs office.” O’Neill, Atom ic Audit, 34. The Air Force project, 
codenamed “Silverplate,” cost $76 million. Idem., 56. Since copper was scarce and a 
critical war material, silver offered a logical (if finally expensive) replacement and 
provided the material for electromagnetic coils at Oak Ridge. The silver was officially 
borrowed from the Treasury through a formal lease agreement that was amended each 
time a new request was made. Stimson guaranteed the Secretary of the Treasury that 
the silver would be used only on government property, would be stamped as “property 
o f US government” and adequately guarded. See Stimson to Secretary of the 
Treasury August 29, 1942 and Lease Agreement dated November 1, 1943, TSCMED. 
The New York Times said that the War Department borrowed more than a one million 
pounds o f silver from the Treasury at the suggestion of E.O. Lawrence. New York 
Times (August 26, 1945) E9.
It was an unusual request. When approached by an Army Corps of Engineer 
Lieutenant Colonel Nichols, a tentatively receptive Undersecretary o f the Treasury 
Daniel Bell asked how much silver the War Department might need. When Nichols 
asked (initially) for 15,000 tons. Bell chastized him; “Young m an.. I would have you 
know that when we talk of silver we speak in terms of ounces.” The War Department 
failed to return the silver within the agreed-upon five years; but in 1970 the AEC 
delivered $3.3 billion worth o f silver to Treasury. O’Neill, Atomic Audit, 56.
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that initial outlay was running short, and Vannevar Bush suggested that the president
either reconsider the pursuit of the project or approach Congress for a discretionary
outlay o f $315 million since ‘I t  would be ruinous to the essential secrecy to have to
defend before an appropriations committee any request for funds.”"" Instead, three
members of Congress, House Speaker Sam Rayburn, Majority Leader John
McCormack, and \finority Leader Joseph Martin, Jr., were briefed and they agreed to
keep expenditures ‘%uried in the Army’s budget” and also silence the questions o f their
colleagues."*  ^ Before the war was over, however, it became more and more difficult to
“silence” potential adversaries.
Groves managed to outmaneuver the administration in Spring 1945 and avoid
an investigation recommended by Secretary o f State James Byrnes. As victory in
Europe drew closer, the expense of the project had become too large to hide and
Roosevelt’s cabinet began to express doubts about both Groves and the never-ending
outlays. With Germany on the ropes, Byrnes worried about postwar public relations,
and suggested an “impartial investigation” which might protect the president,
particularly in case the bomb failed:
No harm could come from an impartial investigation and review 
[though] it might hurt the feelings of those now engaged in the
Interestingly, Bush’s suggestion to the president that he reconsider his commitment 
to the project even in light o f  a high probability for bomb delivery suggests that at that 
time, the project had not achieved its later prominence as a military “necessity.” Bush 
to President, December 16, 1942. TSCMH).
H. Foerstal Secret Science, 27.
It seems as though Congress recognized later, and perhaps with more than a little 
irritation, that traditional controls (voting and appropriations) had been subverted by 
the project. Howard Ball indicates, citing N ieho^ that the Atomic Energy Act created 
a Joint Committee to present AEC ideas to the public in an effort to avoid future 
subterfuge. Ball, Justice Dcwnwind, 225, note 9.
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project.. .Still 2 billion dollars is enough money to risk such h u rt.. 
.In any event, it would be clear that we were mindful o f the 
tremendous expenditure o f men and materials."*'
On March 6, Roosevelt forwarded Byrnes’ letter to Secretary o f  War Stimson. On 
that same day Groves sent a letter to Stimson suggesting that appropriations might be 
secured if he invited a select Congressional committee to tour Manhattan project 
facilities (though excluding Los Alamos for reasons of security) to “demonstrate the 
scope and complexities o f the project.”"*"* On March “6 or T’ (for even Groves was 
uncertain of the date) he told Stimson that Byrnes’ suggestion o f an independent 
investigation would be “impossible” because of the complexity o f the project and 
(amazingly) that “there were no American nuclear physicists not connected in some 
way with the project.”"*" Groves’ statement was, of course, false.
It is, though, just another piece o f a vast array o f evidence demonstrating that 
Groves and a handful o f individuals, through the authority of the Executive, mortared 
the Manhattan Project together with manipulation, subterfuge, and deceit."*" The
"*^ Memorandum for the President from James F. Byrnes, March 3, 1945, TSCMED.
"*"* Memorandum for the Secretary o f War from Groves, 6 March 1945, TSCMED.
"*" Memo to File from Groves, 7 April 1945. Though there is no indication that this 
memorandum was distributed. Groves may have written it a month after the event for 
some other reason than his own reference. Groves’ memoranda were generally 
informally prepared on plain paper and initialed; this one, however, appeared on 
official letterhead with a signature block for Groves, which is signed “L.R. Groves” 
TSCMED
"*" In September 1942, the president designated vice president Wallace, Secretary o f 
War Stimson, Chief of Staff General Marshall, Vannevar Bush, James B. Conant, 
General Styer, Admiral Purnell and Groves to administer the project (then known as 
S-1). “Memorandum A” September 23, 1942. Though Roosevelt had let Wallace in 
on the project, Truman had no knowledge o f it until after he became president, and 
was briefed by Marshall and Groves on April 25, 1945. See “Memo to File” “Subject: 
Report of Meeting with The President April 25, 1945.” TSCMED.
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building and funding o f the project was but one part o f  the development of the atom 
bomb, and this examination will now turn to those crucial individuals who knew little 
about government funding and executive prerogative. Groves had not hired all the 
nation’s physicists, but most o f the ones involved with the Manhattan Project fought a 
running battle not only against the barriers of atomic fission, but also against his 
methods.
Groves was so committed to secrecy that he managed to manipulate the way 
scientists “naturally” operated, probably to the detriment o f  the project."*  ^ To reduce 
“the opportunity for cross-chatter” he enforced his program o f compartmentalization
The project developed fi-ee o f any existing constraints, and the conditions under 
which it operated facilitated its ability to maneuver extraconstitutionally: “because of 
it’s [sic] magnitude and highly scientific ramifications, it was established more or less 
as a separate entity. Because o f the extreme secrecy, it was not possible for the 
business to be handled in the usual manner, and for that reason it was normal for 
General Groves to report verbally to his superiors, including the Secretary of War and 
the Chief of Staff. TSCMED [undated] Press Release.
Groves refused to relinquish control even after the formation o f the Atomic Energy 
Commission. When Major General Curtis LeMay, a top Air Force planner, asked 
Groves for the number o f atomic weapon. Groves refused; “That iiiformation is quite 
complicated and is based on many factors.. .1 cannot answer your question because I  
force m yself to fo rg e t the numbers involved.” [emphasis mine] Weisgall, Operation 
Crossroads, 286.
“. .  scientists are deeply, almost mystically, committed to the notion o f sharing 
ideas.” Ball, Justice Downwind, 19. After the war, scientists were eager to avoid the 
repetition of Groves’ methods. When Oppenheimer lobbied for the establishment of a 
civilian Commission to oversee the development o f atomic energy before the House of 
Representatives’ Military Affairs Committee, he pointedly expressed his belief that 
scientists should remain independent and uncontrolled: “Scientists are not used to 
being controlled; they are not used to regimentation, and there are good reasons why 
they should be averse to it. . the individual is to be given a certain amount o f freedom 
to invent, to think, and to  carry on the best he knows how. . .” Oppenheimer asked 
for the bill to be reinforced to assure that the Commission would “not interfere with 
scientific work except when there is a national hazard involved.” TSCMED 
“Oppenheimer Statement” October 18, 1945.
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upon even the scientists, and he tried to insure that they received only the amount o f 
information necessary for them to perform their specific, limited task."** In addition. 
Groves enforced strict rules restricting the scientists’ movement and communication. 
The government discouraged scientists from any outside personal contact, censored 
their mail; and, for the first eighteen months, forbid the scientists to travel away from 
the site. In 1944, Groves relented a bit, believing that an “improvement in  morale 
would outweigh the increased security risks.”"*®
Groves’ methods undoubtedly insured the clandestine nature of the  project but 
they did little to enhance the ability of the scientists to perform their role—unless, of 
course, the restrictions served to encourage them to get the job done and get out as 
quickly as possible. In addition, the Army’s unwillingness to accept the authority o f 
scientists and its technique of “compartmentalization” became counterproductive and 
perhaps even potentially lethal. There was, also, the very real clash o f cultures as the 
men of science met the nation’s warriors. As Oppenheimer later remarked, scientists
"** Groves, Now It Can Be Told, 29.
"*® Groves was undoubtedly a stem taskmaster, and exhibited little understanding, or 
patience, with the normal behavior o f scientists (or most human beings) in response to 
pressure. Jonathan Weisgall indicates that Groves “..  became annoyed the night 
before the test when Nobel Prize-winning physicist Enrico Fermi offered to  take bets 
from the other scientists as to whether or not the bomb would ignite the atmosphere, 
and if so, whether it would destroy only New Mexico or the entire world.”  Weisgall, 
Operation Crossroads, 5. Groves admitted his “annoyance” in his autobiography, and 
noted that he “afterward.. realized that [Fermi’s] talk had served to smooth down the 
frayed nerves and ease the tension of the people at base camp.” He could not resist, 
though, adding justification: “There was an air o f excitement at the camp that I did not 
like, for this was a time when calm deliberation was most essential.” Groves, Now It 
Can Be Told, 168, 291, 297.
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need a “certain amount o f freedom to invent, to think. . so, how did they manage to 
accomplish so much in such a stifling atmosphere?
It will be useful to look at the reminiscences o f  Richard F^mman to help 
answer this question, and explore, through his experiences, the effects of 
compartmentalization upon the project itself and the methods at least one scientist 
employed to satisfy an independent spirit within the confines o f Los Alamos. Richard 
Feynman made not only an enormous contribution to the Los Alamos project but he 
also confronted the Army head-on, achieving, “freedom to invent, to think. . .” by 
breaking almost all o f  the rules.
The government did not have to call scientists into action, and by the time the 
United States entered the war, almost one-fourth o f the nation’s physicists were 
already applying physics to warfare."" Working in loosely-organized groups formed 
around fiiendship, mentorship, and respect, some had already formed cliques of 
specialty. Feynman’s senior professor at Princeton, Eugene Wigner, had been part of 
the three-man team (with Leo Szilard and Edward Teller) who alerted Roosevelt 
(through Einstein) of the possibility o f a German bomb. Another Princeton professor, 
Robert Wilson, was preparing to leave Princeton for Britain to work at their newly- 
formed Rad Lab. Wigner stopped "W^son in his tracks when he told him of 
Princeton’s plan to develop a nuclear reactor.
The Office o f Scientific Research and Development, together with the National 
Defense Council, formalized the relationship between the government and the
"" At that time, there were more than seven thousand physicists in the US. Gleick, 
Genius, 138.
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universities, and groups o f students and professors aligned themselves to specific, and 
official, projects. Wilson convinced Feynman, still working on his Ph.D. thesis, to join 
him by giving him as much information as he knew about the German potential for a 
bomb and the British work on the separation o f uranium."' Wilson put together a 
group of about thirty physicists, shop workers and technicians divided into a 
experimental division and a two-man theoretical division composed of Feynman and 
another graduate student, Paul Olum, a mathematiciaiL
In 1942, Oppenheimer substituted a Berkeley experiment for Wilson’s. The 
short break gave Feynman time to finish his thesis and he earned his Ph.D. before 
signing on again with Wilson’s team to work for the Manhattan Project. While they 
waited for the government to ready Los Alamos, W^son sent Feynman to Chicago to 
gather all the information he could on Fermi’s atomic “pile” and, “as efficiently as a 
spy” Feynman brought back so much data that Wilson’s group began working on 
problems that Fermi’s group had not even identified. AVhile in Chicago, he impressed 
everyone who met him, in one instance explaining “on the spot how to gain a quick 
result that had evaded one of our clever calculators for a month. Feynman was 
twenty-four years old.
"' At that time, the problem of a possible German bomb and the potential of an 
American one was not secret: “The military still did not take the physicists completely 
seriously” although the scientists had agreed among themselves that most of their 
information should remain confidential. Though intially Feynman refused the offer, he 
reconsidered when he remembered that a top German physicist, Werner Heisenberg, 
had slipped firom view, and believed that i f  Heisenberg were working on nuclear 
research, the Germans had a good chance at developing a bomb. Idem., 137-140; 
quote, 138.
Philip Morrison, cited in Gleick, Genius, 157.
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Oppenheimer served as a dignified fether figure to many, easing their burdens 
as much as he could and standing between Groves and the scientists he had recruited. 
Feynman and the rest of the Wilson group impatiently left for Los Alamos before it 
was ready and shipped the Princeton laboratory out ahead of them to join with a 
dismantled cyclotron, generators, and accelerators fi'om Harvard. Feynman’s journey 
was complicated by the fact that his new bride, Arline, suffered fi'om tuberculosis; but 
when Oppenheimer arranged for Arline’s stay at an Albuquerque sanitarium and 
offered the extra money required for their travel to Santa Fe via a private room and 
wheelchair on the train, Feynman became a devoted admirer.”  Oppenheimer “paid 
attention to everybody’s problems.. he was a wonderful man.”""* The issue o f  secrecy 
already had Oppenheimer and Groves at loggerheads; but they both agreed that all 
physicists, to avoid suspicion, should buy tickets for any destination other than New 
Mexico. F^mman, though, figured that if  all the others were buying tickets for other 
states, he might as well buy his for Albuquerque.""
"' While at Los Alamos, Feynman visited his wife every chance he got, and since he 
did not own a car he often hitchiked or caught a ride with a scientist ftiend who did 
own one, Claus Fuchs.
""* Feynman, Surely You ’re Joking, 110; and Gleick, Genius, 160. The admiration was 
mutual. In 1943 Oppenheimer wrote to his department at Berkeley that they should 
hire Feynman so that he could start there at the end o f the war “He is by all odds the 
most brilliant young physicist here, and everyone knows this. He is a man o f 
thoroughly engaging character and personality, extremely clear, extremely normal in 
all respects, and an excellent teacher with a warm feeling for physics in all its aspects.” 
Gleick, 184. Berkeley and Oppenheimer, though, lost out when Cornell jumped at 
Bethe’s recommendation to Wre Feynman. Hans Albrecht Bethe “Feynman in Los 
Alamos and Cornell” M ost o f the G ood Stuff, M emories o f Richard Feynman, Laurie 
M. Brown, John S. Rigden, eds. (American Institute o f Physics, New York: 1993), 35. 
"" Ibid.
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Despite all of the praise that Groves received for directing the building of 
Manhattan facilities, most o f  Los Alamos was incomplete when scientists arrived 
because the construction crews were baffled by the instructions and plans for the 
laboratories. One theater and a couple o f “modified mobilization style” buildings were 
up, but little else was finished. In fact, when Feynman arrived the only telephone at 
the site was a single Forest Service line powered by a crank on the side of the box.""
By April the population o f  Los Alamos had swelled to about 30, and Feynman was 
reunited with his former colleague Paul Olum, who was passing the time by pitching in 
with the construction—manning a clipboard to check off lumber deliveries. Since 
Feynman belonged to the theoretical group and did not have to wait for a laboratory, 
he began working right away. A mixed group fi'om Berkeley and Princeton began 
learning from one another, taking turns at the only blackboard on the mesa. Feynman 
spent the rest o f the time studying; “Every day I would study and read, study and 
read.”"’ Most o f the scientists kept busy one way or another, and soon after Wilson 
took over supervision o f the building o f the laboratory, Los Alamos was the “best 
equipped physics center in the world.”"*
The laboratory was the “best equipped” not only because Wilson supervised its 
constmction, but because the scientists at Los Alamos could get almost anything, or 
anyone, they needed. They requisitioned two hemispheres o f pure gold from Fort 
Knox, each about half the size o f a basketball, to test gold’s ability to reflect neutrons;
"" CHeick, 161.
"’ Feynman, Surely You 're Joking, 112.
S8 Gleick, Genius, 160.
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once they completed their experiments, they used one o f the gold globes as a doorstop 
in the room that held a single small, warm, ball of plutonium upon a pedestal/®
People, too, could be requisitioned. When Feynman noticed a femiliar name on a list 
of available physicists, he simply filled in the name o f  the man he wanted, T. A.
Welton, on a form. Soon, a stranger invited Welton to a meeting in a hotel room in 
Chicago, and then offered him an undescribed job that would require relocation to an 
undisclosed place. Despite all o f the mystery surrounding the offer, Welton 
acknowledged that he, like many other physicists outside the project, knew that 
“something” was in the works. He accepted.""
The scientists worked under intense pressure and when they could not get. 
everything t h ^  wanted as quickly as they wanted, they improvised. The most 
sophisticated calculator at the time, the Marchant, could add, subtract, multiply, and 
divide (but only up to ten digits.) F^mman and a Greek mathematician, Nicholas 
Metropolis, organized banks o f Marchant calculators to perform like a primitive 
computer, and chains o f scientists’ wives handled bits o f complex equations in array, 
one cubing, another adding, each passing their finished piece to the next. Under the 
almost-constant pressure o f the serial routine, the mechanical calculators broke down 
often and were sent to California for repair. Frustrated at the waste o f time while the 
project ferried computers back and forth, Feynman and Metropolis learned to repair 
the calculators themselves, and advertised their new talents on a shingle; “Computers 
Repaired.” In 1943, the scientists requisitioned new computers and related equipment
Feynman, Surely You 're Joking, 135. 
"" Gleick, Genius, 169-170.
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from IBM; and, in yet another example of impatience, before the new machines arrived 
they figured out how to triple the machines’ output by rearranging the plugs. They 
had also requisitioned a recently-drafted IBM employee to set up and service the 
machines; but when the computers arrived ahead o f him, Feynman and Metropolis 
used the wiring diagrams that were enclosed in the crates to assemble the system. To 
make things interesting, Feynman soon developed programs that allowed the machines 
to “clatter” out the rhythms o f well-known songs."'
Intellectually, their boundaries were almost beyond understanding but they did, 
nonetheless, live under physical restraint. Feynman’s biographer James Gleick called 
Los Alamos a “magic mountain” and quoted one resident who compared it with the 
European stereotype o f an American pioneer community: “a self-contained town with 
no outside contacts, isolated in vast stretches of desert, and surrounded by Indians.”"^  
In an interesting shift, though, the ‘indians’ in the Manhattan Project turned out to be 
the Army. The irritation the scientists experienced by the Army’s attempts to 
discipline them was never far from their minds. Once, when Bethe presented a 
calculation to Feynman and his 40-man group, Feynman mechanically swiveled in his 
chair and commanded: “All right, pencils, calculate! Present pencils! Integrate!” Bethe 
laughed as the team mocked military drill and performed in perfect unison."' It was
"' Gleick, Genius, 181. Theoretical physicists seem strangely attracted to gadgets. 
Enrico Fermi’s wife Laura relates that he, too, had always been fascinated by 
mechanical and electrical labor-saving instruments; including the first Christmas 
present he bought her in America, a step-on garbage can. A gift she called “his never- 
forgotten present.” Atom is in the Family, 149.
Gleick, Genius, 185.
^^Fbid., 171.
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easy to share a joke over regimentation, and military regulations like censorship and 
restrictions on travel were bothersome, but compartmentalization posed additional, 
and serious, consequences.
It was particularly difficult for scientists to ignore the authoritarianism o f the 
Army when Oppenheimer insisted upon stringent egalitarianism and absolute 
democracy at Los Alamos. “Oppie” tolerated no distinctions between graduate 
students and world-renowned scientists,""* and the result was an untraditional ‘leveling’ 
o f professional relationships. The Army, though, managed to reduce some of the 
premier intellects o f the age even further since in the name of security, scientists (to 
the world outside Los Alamos) lost even their identity. Within a month o f his arrival, 
Feynman got a new drivers’ license, and in place of his name he became “Engineer” 
who Hved at “Special List B” and whose signature was “not required.”"" The famous 
Niels Bohr turned into Nicholas Baker."" To Groves, scientists were nothing but a a 
group of engineers. "’ The Army understood neither scientific complexities nor the
""* A technique Oppenheimer used to great effect to encourage fi-esh approaches and 
faster results. Because o f  that rule, and perhaps because of Feynman’s intellect and 
contrariness, he became the only man at Los Alamos to openly challenge Niels Bohr. 
Afterwards, Bohr bounced his ideas off Feynman first. Feynman, Surely You 're 
Joking, 133.
"" Ibid., 162. To the world at large Los Alamos did not exist. Children bom in the 
Los Alamos hospital were bom at Post Office Box 1663, Santa Fe. Fermi, 232.
"" When Danish police wamed Bohr that the Germans were looking for him, he took a 
small boat to Sweden, flew to London and then on to America with his physicist son. 
He left his Nobel medal in Copenhagen, but the Nazis were unable to locate it because 
he had dissolved it in a bottle o f nitric acid. After the war, he recovered the gold from 
the acid and the medal was recast. Fermi, Atom s in the Family, 223.
"’ Groves became “defensive” around the scientists, and told them on one o f his first 
visits that even though he did not have a doctorate, he had gone to school for ten years 
after West Point, so had eamed the equivalent o f two Ph D.’s. Goldberg in The 
Atom ic West, 47. Or soldiers—Groves awarded each o f them a special military-type
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pride the physicists took in “voluntarily” serving their country. A shared cause was the 
only bridge between the two cultures, and among the many barriers, censorship was a 
constant.
The Army opened all mail entering and leaving Los Alamos. In order to avoid 
the obvious suggestion that this was an illegal intrusion into the rights o f ordinary 
citizens, the Army asked the scientists to “volunteer” to the practice by not sealing 
their outgoing mail and agreeing that all incoming mail could be inspected. Feynman 
posed a particular problem for the censors, because along with the news he enjoyed 
receiving from his parents and his wife, they cooperated in his appetite for games by 
enclosing puzzles in their letters or by writing the whole letter in code. Feynman had 
to then decipher the code before he could read his mail. The censors (obviously) did 
not understand Feynman’s penchant for mental gymnastics, nor could they interpret his 
mail in order to censor it. The censors and Feynman worked out a deal: Feynman’s 
family would send a key for the censors to use, and the censors would remove it so 
Feynman could still enjoy his game. Another problem with the censors, though, arose 
when Feynman tried to pass on a division problem that resulted in a repeating number 
(‘I t ’s quite cute”) and he ended up afoul o f “Paragraph 17B: Letters are to be written 
only in English, Russian, Spanish, Portuguese, Latin, German.. Permission to use any
shoulder patch, an army star surrounded with a large question mark. According to  the 
news release, “the symbol betrayed no ‘military secrets’.” New York Times (August 22, 
1945) 4.
Laura Fermi treats Groves generously in her account o f life in Los Alamos, and 
even when she details Groves’ 1944 speech wherein Groves told the assembled 
military: “At great expense we have gathered on this mesa the largest collection o f  
crackpots ever seen” she insists that “The ‘crackpots’ were dear to the General. . .” 
Fermi, Atom s in  the Family, 226.
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other language must be obtained in writing. No codes.” He finally convinced them 
that it really was just a “cute” mathematical trick, but did then have to formally ask 
permission to use arable numerals in his letters. The problems persisted because 
Feynman could not resist needling the censors; and from then on, Feynman and Arline 
(until her death) came up with novel additions to their repertoire.®*
While the Army took some things very seriously, there were problems at Los 
Alamos that they simply, to Feynman’s astonishment, disregarded even after he 
pointed them out. When his verbal requests or suggestions failed, he turned to games. 
Noticing a hole in the perimeter fence, he alerted a guard. When he discovered later 
that the hole had not been repaired, he spent a day leaving the facility through the hole 
and re-entering through the gate. Finally, the sergeant at the gate called the lieutenant, 
who decided to arrest Feynman. He avoided jail by explaining, again, that he had been 
trying to get them to fix the hole.®  ^ He also became concerned when he realized that 
“terribly important secrets” were kept in wooden file cabinets equipped with cheap 
padlocks. When they were not replaced despite his repeated suggestions that someone 
should do something, he put his mind to work and figured out how to open every lock 
at Los Alamos, including the combination locks on the supposedly “secure” safes.
®* Feynman, Surely You ’re Joking, 114-118. Among the many rules the pair broke, 
Feynman found 8(1) a “delightful” regulation that disallowed any reference to the 
regulations, requiring the omission (or deletion) of “any information concerning these 
censorship regulations or any discourse on the subject o f censorship.” Gleick, Genius, 
186.
Feynman, Surely You 're Joking, 118. What Feynman did not know, and no one 
told him, at the time, was that the hole was there at Oppenheimer’s request so tliat the 
“people fi’om the local tribes” could watch twelve-cent movies in the Los Alamos 
theatre. Gleick, Genius, 187. Laura Fermi found many more, guided by her son 
Giulio. YevtvL, Atom s in the Family, 207.
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using mathematics. When Teller boasted that he kept everything important in his desk 
drawer, Feynman slipped out o f the meeting and emptied Teller’s desk of documents— 
-from the back of the drawer, pulling out the paper “like those toilet paper dispensers.” 
They never did change the locks, but Feynman acquired a reputation as a safecracker 
and even carried a dummy set o f tools around with him to keep up the charade.^®
Holes in the fence and less-than-adequate locks, however, were minor compared to the 
potential disaster Groves’ compartmentalization almost caused at Oak Ridge.
The Army so restricted the information it gave to workers at the Oak Ridge 
fecility that they unintentionally became ineffecient and careless, jeopardizing the 
whole plant, and everyone in it. The Army even tried to prohibit the better-informed 
Los Alamos scientists from teaching the Oak Ridge workers about uranium 235. 
Oppenheimer became aware, almost by accident, that the Oak Ridge team had no 
knowledge of why they were refining uranium, or even the most basic understanding 
o f uranium’s properties. Workers at the Tennessee facility separated uranium 235 for 
the bomb from uranium 238, though in very limited quantities because, as Feynman 
recalls, they were “practicing chemistry.”’  ^ When they began to have some success at 
recovering small amounts of the material, a  plant superintendant with Tennessee 
Eastman Corporation sent a letter to Los Alamos: “Dear Sir, At the present time no 
provisions have been made. . .for stopping reactions. . would it make sense to install 
some kind of advanced fire-extinguishing equipment...? ” Clearly, the superintendant 
had no idea of what type o f reaction uranium might cause; and almost certainly had no
™ Feynman, Surely You 're Joking, 118-119. Gleick, Genius, 189. 
Feynman, Surely You 're Joking, 120.
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idea that if  uranium 235 reached critical mass at Oak Ridge, the problem would 
become, immediately, critical certainly beyond the resources o f a fire extinguisher, 
beyond even his worst nightmare.
Feynman recalled that only the “higher people knew they were separating 
uranium” but no one knew why, “how it worked, or anything.”^  When Oppenheimer 
and Emile Segre, head of the experimental radioactivity group at Los Alamos, decided 
that Segre should go to Oak Ridge to not only brief them on more efiScient methods of 
uranium refinement, but also to check out their procedures for safety, the Army 
refused: “it is our policy to keep all the information o f Los Alamos at one place.”^
The scientists finally had to wield a big stick and threaten that limited production of 
uranium 235 would hamper the successful development of a bomb and also that 
careless handling o f the uranium Oak Ridge had refined could send the whole place 
“up in s m o k e . T h e  travel restrictions were removed.
When Segre got to Oak Ridge, the report he sent back to Oppenheimer 
resulted in an entire restructuring o f the procedures at Oak Ridge. Upon his arrival, 
Segre noticed that workers were wheeling uranium nitrite solution in tanks, and 
explained to them that only because the material had not been further refined did it not 
explode. Two teams at Los Alamos worked on the problems of accumulation and 
storage o f uranium 235, and when their calculations were complete, Feynman traveled
^  “Dear Sir. . . ” (Gleick, Genius., 198); “higher people.. .” (Feynman, Surely You 're 
Joking, 120)
^  Feynman, Surely You ’re Joking, 120 
Ibid., 121
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to Oak Ridge to help implement the new procedures, but discovered then that the
problems were worse than Segre had reported:
Through dozens o f  rooms in a series of buildings Feynman saw 
drums with 300 gallons, 600 gallons, 3,000 gallons.. .He realized 
that the plant was headed toward a catastrophe. . .At some point 
the buildup o f uranium would cause a nuclear reaction that would 
release heat and radioactivity at near-explosive speed.^^
He insisted the Army allow Oak Ridge workers to be briefed on basic nuclear physics
and demanded plant and procedure changes. When he believed he was not being taken
seriously, he used the magic words Oppenheimer had given him before he left: “Los
Alamos cannot accept the responsibility for the safety of the Oak Ridge plant unless. .
«76 while the Army’s methods protected the country’s secrets from the workers
at Oak Ridge, had the scientists from Los Alamos not stepped in, there would have
been no Oak Ridge for the Army to worry about.
It seems likely that the Manhattan Project could have proceeded more
efGciently and safely from the very beginning had the military recognized the role of
scientists as partners in atomic development, rather than as instrum ents toward a
specific goal. Only through Oppenheimer’s insistence that the expertise o f scientists
be recognized was the Oak Ridge facility saved from almost certain disaster. However
reluctantly and belatedly, the Army (and General Groves) recognized that the
scientists’ warnings were serious enough to warrant an exception to established
procedure.
*  *  *
Gleick, Genius, 197.
Ibid., 199; Feynman, Surely You 're Joking, 121-123.
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The nation’s commitment to secrecy. Groves’ military methods, and 
compartmentalization built the Manhattan Project, and at the same time, narrowly 
missed destroying it. But, in the end, nothing devastating occurred and the nation got 
a spectacular bomb while millions o f everyday Americans learned at least something 
about atoms and fission. This chapter has tried to show that the government carried 
out two experiments behind the closed doors o f  Washington conference rooms, the 
barbed wire enclosure atop a New Mexican mesa, and the high walls o f  Oak Ridge. 
One, o f course, was the development o f  the bomb. The other was the crafting of a 
system of governance based upon deceit and manipulation, justified and fueled by a 
military objective. Both were hugely successful, and both continued long after the war 
that stimulated their creation ended. The novelties o f the Manhattan Project, among 
them an ability to rely upon a military objective to secure funding and ensure secrecy, 
formed the core around which future testing progressed. Sadly, as those features 
became entrenched within the atomic testing program, they became ever more 
consequential.
*  *  *
Before leaving the Manhattan Project, it is important to look at the report on 
Trinity submitted to Groves on July 21, 1945 that illustrates that before the war ended 
the government gave more consideration to civilian and military personnel than would 
be the case by 1956. The report is not only useful as a chronicle o f the events of July
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16 but an instrument through which the personality o f one medical professional, 
practicing (literally) in the glare o f the first bomb, might, in at least one sense, be 
understood. The report, prepared by Colonel Stafford L. Warren, Chief o f the Medical 
Section of the Manhattan District, reflects that although the date of the test was 
accelerated, the effects o f the bomb upon civilian populations were not considered 
negligible.^ Warren reported that scientists considered July 16 and 17 appropriate 
since the wind direction and speed would “localize the outfall o f active material” and 
“dilute the outfall most effectively in the early hours o f the life of the cloud” even 
though these winds would make monitoring more difficult. In addition, monitors 
patrolled the entire area collecting data on radioactive intensity and could have 
vacuated, if necessary, the few families that might have been endangered.
Warren did not hesitate to voice his relief that no one had been injured in the 
first test, nor was he reluctant to assess the consequences of future tests upon 
persormel and civilians; and, additionally, to make recommendations to avert future
^  Although the bombing o f the Japanese has received enormous attention, some 
con&sion remains concerning the date the bomb was tested. As the bomb neared 
completion, the struggle between the scientists and the military assumed another 
dimension as the bomb became an integral, though at the beginning only potential, 
element o f the Potsdam Conference. Martin Sherwin asserts that Groves ordered (on 
July 2) that the scientists plan for a July 14 detonation, but Oppenheimer, concerned 
about “unacceptable risks” that would result fi"om a rushed detonation, asked for three 
extra days. Groves refused to grant the extension, and later that same night, 
telephoned Oppenheimer and insisted upon the July 14 date because the “upper crust 
want[s] it. . A W orld D estroyed 222. Oppenheimer evidently bought some time by 
insisting on appropriate precautions; that analysis, however, still cannot explain why 
even “official” accounts disagree: The test, of com se, took place on July 16, a date 
that Stafford Warren says as “two days ahead o f the tentative schedule because 
everything o f importance to the test was ready.” TSCMED, Warren to Groves 21 July
1945.
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dangerous tests. lEs account was neither neutral nor sterile; he found “fortunately” 
that the highest intensities o f radiation occurred only in deserted regions; those, 
however, were high enough to “cause serious physiological effects.” To protect 
resident populations, the monitors “all took considerable risks knowingly.. they 
should not be exposed to more radiation within the next month.” He pointed out that 
“quick and adequate” monitoring was essential and that radio communications, 
transportation, and meters needed improvement.
KBs conclusions reflect that his interest as a medical doctor took preference 
over accommodation to military objective. Finding “partially eviscerated dead wild 
jack rabbits” more than 800 yards fi'om the test and a farm house three miles away 
with “extensive damage,” Warren noted that personnel up to two miles away would 
sustain lethal or severe injuries. In addition, he warned that only “under very special 
conditions” should another test be attempted, since Trinity caused a “potentially.. 
very dangerous hazard” thirty miles wide extending ninety miles northeast. The 
government ultimately, and unfortunately, ignored Warren’s final recommendation; 
specifically, that no test the size o f Trinity be repeated unless a site could be secured 
that was fi-ee o f population for at least 150 miles.’* Unfortunately, too, the expertise 
of medical professionals such as Warren and other scientists lost ground as the military 
exerted even more influence in the continuation of the nation’s atomic weapons 
program.
’* “Report on Test 16 July 1945” Warren to Groves 21 July 1945, TSCMED.
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World War II had not been enough—generals wanted atomic energy. Millions 
in Europe tried to repair their war-shredded lives while they braced for winter, US and 
allied forces occupied Germany and Japan, and hundreds o f thousands o f Jewish 
refugees sought entry to British-controlled Palestine. Americans, still under shoe and 
tire rationing, neverthess sought out new things, instant coffee and kiss-proof lipstick 
made their debut.’  ^ In the meantime, the US military slabbered over the possibility of 
ever-more-lethal weapons. One can only imagine why, on September 4, 1945, the 
Joint Chiefs o f Staff asked General Groves about the “maximum rate o f delivery from 
storage in the United States. . using present persormel and facilities” and “How long a 
period o f time will be required to stockpile 123 bombs if production is continued on 
the same scale and priority as at present?”*®
On October 18, 1945, the military submitted to Groves a compilation of 
service requests, a ‘Dear Santa”, proposing the development o f a panoply o f 
atomically-enhanced weaponry.*' A very small sample o f the exhaustive list reflects 
the allure o f the atom: “to use as the explosive in the warheads for all missiles and 
projectiles” including conventional bombs, artillery projectiles and shells; short, 
medium, and hemispheric-range ground-to-ground missiles; ground-to-water and 
ground-to-air, for the coast. In addition, the military wanted countermeasures, 
including “neutron escape” warning devices and “means for the destruction o f
”  “The Year in Pictures” L ife  May 15, 1995, v. 18, note 6, 91.
*° “Memorandum for: Major General L. R. Groves, U.S.A.” from H P. Gibson for the 
“Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment” 4 September 1945, TSCMED.
*' See TSCMED “Memorandum for the Chairman [Groves], War Department Atomic 
Energy Advisory Board” 18 October 1945.
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vehicles used to transport atomic energy.”*^  The military also unimaginatively 
envisioned other conventional uses for the decidedly unconventional weapons: 
“simplification of the mechanisms of the warhead and associated bombs” so that 
military personnel could prepare and deliver the weapon; “techniques for storage and 
use under all climatic conditions,” “prophylactic treatment to be used by persormel 
exposed to the effects o f the bomb,” “detection devices” and “suitable indicators or 
warning devices” to alert “fiiendly” persormel o f dangerous conditions.*^
Although these extravagant requests, and many others like them, are (and 
were) perhaps meaningful in a military sense, one particular wish seems to stretch the 
bounds o f military necessity. One is hard pressed to imagine, even putting oneself in 
the shoes o f an overly-enthusiastic general, the need for ‘Development to perfect the 
loading and detonating techniques so that the carrying vehicles for atomic energy can 
penetrate the earth’s crust.”*^  It is an alarming request—illustrative, though, o f the 
military’s inflated sense of its own immediate importance and future purpose.
Atomic energy may have been all-but-imagineless to any but physicists before 
Hiroshima and Nagasake. Those events, though, erased old cognitive barriers and 
replaced them with visions terrifying to many but provocatively enticing and 
intoxicating to the military: vivid churning o f towering clouds 50,000 feet high and 
tens o f thousands of deaths—destruction at a  single stroke, fi-om a single airplane.
Ibid. 
^  Ib id
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Imaginations ran wild inside the nation’s military establishment, with only ‘the sky’ (or 
perhaps the Earth’s core) as “the limit.”
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CHAPTER IV
OPERATION CROSSROADS
A s soon as the war etuJed, we located the one spot on earth 
that hadn 't been touched by war and blew it to hell.
— Bob H ope‘
The atom bomb was the stuff o f warriors’ dreams, and the grisly wish list that the 
nation’s military men developed illustrates, perhaps, the extent to which each contributor 
believed that he might be only one weapon, one device, from heroic laurels. Other men, 
perhaps a little older, a little wiser, or just a little more realistic, recognized almost 
immediately that the bomb might be more portentious than promising—the stuff not of 
dreams, but of nightmares. A nation with the atom bomb did not need warriors, only 
scientists, planes and pilots. The reality struck the Navy particularly hard, for in those 
heady August days o f 1945, the Army ‘had the comer’ on scientists with its still- 
operational Manhattan Project and its Air Corps was replete with planes and pilots. So, 
long before the public and Congress began their clamor for demobilization, some top Navy 
men, with more ships and sailors than planes and pilots, started planning Operation 
Crossroads.
' “So This is Peace” Life (October 21, 1946), 119.
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The Navy insisted that Operation Crossroads was a pragmatic and practical 
experiment, designed to “evaluate the strategic implications”  ^o f the effects of atomic 
weapons upon naval vessels, and even though almost no one (except the Navy) thought it 
was a good, or even useful, project, on January 10, 1946, President Truman approved it. 
The Army bitterly opposed it, the scientists believed it uimecessary, the diplomats worried 
that it would aggravate already-shaky international relationships, many Congressmen tried 
to kill it, and a dean o f  women at a New York college said that it smacked of folly, “the 
whole project sounds like bad boys playing with matches in the hay mow.’” The 
opposition was understandable, for the Navy’s plan was not really an ‘experiment’ within 
any accepted usage o f  that term, and it can only be said to have been ‘pragmatic and
 ^Jonathan M. Weisgall, Operation Crossroads (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute 
Press, 1994), 31. The reader will note my reliance upon Weisgall’s book throughout this 
chapter. Weisgall, an attorney, successfully represented and negotiated the settlement 
between the US government and the Marshall islanders, and his book is a wonderful 
combination o f narrative and meticulous documentation that makes it a valuable resource 
for work on the Navy’s first attempt at Pacific testing. Weisgall’s book includes little 
analysis except as it pertains to his focus, the treatment o f  Bikini islanders.
Despite the enormous publicity Operation Crossroads received at the time and the 
importance that I beheve must attach to it as an element o f the atomic testing program, it 
has been all but ignored by historians, and even those scholars interested in atomic testing 
give the Operation only minimal attention, e. g. Barton Hacker deals with the operation in 
his straightforward, uncontroversial way and insists that “Crossroads adhered to 
Manhattan safety procedures” and that Baker surprised everybody (ignoring, of course, 
the scientists who had warned o f fallout before the project, especially DuBridge), 
concluding that the operation ended in “some haste.” Elem ents o f Controversy, 4-5; as a 
“source o f embarrassment” by Gregg Herkin in The W inning Weapon, 225; Richard Miller 
mentioned the operation only as a way to explain why Louis Slotin died from radiation 
exposure while trying to perfect a new trigger for the Operation’s bombs. Under the 
Cloud, 68. To this writer’s knowledge, the only works other than Weisgall’s that deal 
comprehensively with Crossroads are those prepared as technical reports by the Navy and 
the Report o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff Evaluation Board housed in the National and Naval 
Archives.
* The letter fi-om the dean o f women was one o f many that the White House received 
protesting the operation. Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 56.
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practical’ in the service o f precepts far more fundamental than those that the Navy posited 
publicly and to the president. Operation Crossroads was not about weapon effects, what 
an atom bomb might do to a ship; it was, instead, about the meaning o f the bomb and what 
atomic weaponry might mean to the military. The extravaganza that was Operation 
Crossroads should not be understood as an experiment or evaluation, but as an expression 
o f power and prestige—hubris cubed.
In July 1946 the Navy pitted two atom bombs. Able and Baker, against a floating 
array o f  95 allied and enemy ships and landing craft. Four times larger than the wartime 
invasion of Guadalcanal, the operation put a fleet o f over 250 support and target ships 
around Bikini, incorporated into its design over 150 aircraft, consumed the talents o f over 
43,000 military men, and sacrificed nearly 6,000 animals in a spectacle later valued at $1.3 
billion. Unlike the Manhattan Project, Crossroads was d e s ir e d  to make news, so the 
Navy handpicked 150 of the nation’s top reporters to relay home every detail the Navy 
wanted released. For a permanent record of the display, the Navy installed 328 automatic 
cameras in planes and purchased other 700 cameras—some of which went unused because 
the Navy could find only 500 photographers. The shortage of photographers proved 
insignificant when, within moments o f shot Able, the Navy used up half o f the world’s 
supply o f film.'*
The Navy already knew about ships, learned a good deal about cameras and a little 
about animals; but, as the operation’s Radiation Safety Advisor, Stafford Warren, soon 
discovered, it seemed content to remain blithely ignorant o f  radiation. During the week
Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 121.
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following the Baker shot Warren fought an uphill battle against ships’ captains and
crewmen who had little fear o f an invisible enemy and even less regard for Warren’s crew
of radiation monitors. Desperate, he took his case straight to the top and on August 3,
1946 urged Admiral Blandy to surrender. Warren warned that continued decontamination
promised only the exaggeration of an already “extremely difficult and dangerous
problem.”  ^ In a four-page top-secret memorandum, Warren explained that the extent o f
contamination combined with the dangers o f radiation demanded that someone reconsider
the whole operation. Over one-hundred acres o f ship surfaces remained seriously
contaminated: “In most cases areas o f dangerous intensities remain on deck surfaces in
spite o f strenuous efforts to remove them.” Warren then outlined the potential hazards to
crewmen if the Navy continued its attempts at decontamination:
progressively increasing sterility. . .defects in children o f first and second 
generation. . anemia. . good experimental evidence to show that in some 
tissues there is never complete recovery fi-om radiation injury no matter 
how small.®
Finally, Warren reminded the Admiral that sailors were more than “persormel” and were, 
after all, young men whose “heredity is o f prime importance to them and their families.”’ 
Warren’s arguments fell on deaf ears, and it was not until August 10, and, as will be 
shown, after more persuasive arguments by Warren, that he finally convinced Admiral 
Blandy to cancel the operation and postpone a planned third detonation, Charlie. The
® Memorandum from Stafford L. Warren, Radiatiological Safety Advisor to Admiral 
Blandy, Commander Joint Ask Force One, 3 August 1946; Stafford Leak Warren 
Collection, University o f California, Los Angeles, Collection 987, Reel 1, Box 75, 76 
(hereinafter cited as Warren MSS).
 ^Ibid.
’ Ibid.
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Navy then hurridly cleaned up and cleared support ships and personnel for a return to the 
States. For the men o f Crossroads, however, their job was not over even after t h ^  left 
Bikini.
Ken Haugen was one o f those men, and like many, many others, he had spent most 
o f the spring and the entire summer attached to Operation Crossroads. By September 
1946 he was anxious to get into port, perhaps have a few beers and maybe a little fun. HSs 
plans were delayed, however, because his ship, the USS Wharton, could not find a Navy 
port that would take her. It was, as Haugen said; “so radioactive it must have glowed in 
the dark.” After Kwajalein refused to allow the ship entry, the crew set their sights on 
Pearl Harbor only to be, yet again, turned away. The floating pariah finally stopped fifteen 
miles off" the California coast. Unwilling to spend any more time living through some 
modem perversion o f The Ancient M ariner, Ken and his shipmates did their best to “cool” 
off the ship. To do so, they threw everything made o f canvas or wood overboard, 
including all their spare clothing and blankets, mattresses, bunks, life rafts. Then, after 
they “scrubbed and scrubbed” everything else, the USS W harton finally got clearance and 
entered the Port o f San Diego, more than two months after the sailors got their first 
glimpse of an atomic bomb.*
* Ken Haugen’s is one o f  several stories o f atomic veterans told to Gary Turbak and 
chronicled in “Under the Mushroom Cloud” VFW M agazine, March 1998, 12-19. What 
Ken and his shipmates did not know was that they were, at the time, part o f a plan to see if 
the open ocean would reduce the levels o f radioactivity on the support ships. Ports were 
manned by radiation monitors and ordered to refuse the entry o f any radioactive ship to 
avoid “wagging tongues.” “As I see it, the most serious aspect o f it is the one which may 
arise in regard to public relations.. . ” Letter from George M. Lyon, Captain USNR to 
Vice Admiral Ross T. Mclntire, Chief o f the Bureau o f Medicine and Surgery, 12 August 
1946 Warren MSS, boxes 75, 76.
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In the eye o f the public. The Navy’s Operation Crossroads was a success—most of 
the target ships survived floating—but since cameras do not record radioactive 
contamination, only to  the Navy did it became abundantly clear (particularly after Baker) 
that the bomb’s most hazardous feature outlived its mushroom cloud.® Success is hardly 
the word to describe the Navy’s battle against radioactivity. Radiation was decidedly 
more tenacious than the Navy’s ships, and almost all o f the target vessels were later 
scuttled or sunk when efforts at decontamination failed. In addition, many non-target 
support ships like the USS Wharton became dangerously radioactive—exposed through 
contaminated seawater, marine life, and even crewmen themselves who returned to their 
bunks radioactive after shifts on the target ships and in the bay. As Haugen’s story 
shows, more than a  month after the Baker test many were still fighting radiation. The 
eventually-worthwhile efforts to slow the relentless clicking o f port inspectors’ geiger 
counters prove that Ken Haugen, and many others like him, had been continuously 
exposed to radioactive material even after leaving Bikini atoll— resting their heads on 
contaminated pillows, sleeping on contaminated mattresses, wearing contaminated 
clothing, ‘swabbing’ and sweeping with contaminated brooms and mops.'® They had 
lived for more than a month in an environment that was so radioactively hot that the Navy 
itself refused to allow them docking privileges at its own ports.
® The final report admitted that radiation was the real weapon, not the bomb: “These 
contaminated ships became radioactive stoves, and would have burned all living things 
aboard them with invisible and painless but deadly radiation. Weisgall, Operation 
Crossroads, 291.
'® Gary Turbak “Under the Mushroom Cloud” VFW M agazine, March 1998, 12-19.
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*  *  *
This chapter argues that Operation Crossroads was one element o f the nation’s 
testing program that adversely affected the nation’s future course of atomic development 
and also urges the reader to recognize the consequences of that contribution: that it so 
irradiated an island and its lagoon that the area remained completely uninhabitable for 
forty years, jeopardized the health and lives o f tens o f thousands of servicemen and 
islanders, and consumed enormous amounts o f  taxpayer dollars. In addition, the operation 
escalated the nature of governmental secrecy. Despite the fact that in response to 
opposition the president appointed civilians to serve in key evaluative roles during the 
operation, the Joint Chiefs o f Staff neutralized that civilian input, fearful o f “serious 
political problems for the military.”"
A year after Crossroads disbanded, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Evaluation Board 
issued a preliminary report, and even though the Pentagon had assured Chairman Karl T. 
Compton that civilians and the public would have access to the Board’s findings, the 
military decided to alter and delete the conclusions o f civilian board members and released 
only fragments. Compton resigned in protest, but returned when the Joint Chiefs told him 
that the deletions and alterations were the result o f inadvertent clerical errors. The final 
report evaluating the operation so “outraged” Truman that the White House requested all 
copies be turned over to the Joint Chiefs o f  Stafl^ who immediately suppressed the 
document because:
"  Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 289.
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the findings about the effects o f the atom bomb are so disturbing and 
frightening and the recommendations so sensational that the White House 
won’t permit it to be made public at this time.
Karl Compton refused repeatedly to relinquish his copy of the report, and even after his
death in 1954, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, the successor to the Joint
Crossroads Committee, tried unsuccessfully to retrieve his copy and then even asked the
FBI to investigate. The report revealed what scientists had said all along, that the bomb’s
radioactivity, not the bomb itself was the most lethal (and in war, effective) component of
the bomb. It quite simply “scared the hell” out of everyone on the evaluation board.
What the Joint Chiefs o f Staff wanted suppressed, and what Compton wanted everyone to
Imow about, was contained in the opening lines of the report, that radioactive fallout, the
extensive dispersal o f radioactive material that occasioned shot Baker, could:
especially if  employed in conjunction with other weapons o f  mass 
destruction, as, for example, pathogenic bacteria. . depopulate vast areas 
of the earth’s surface, leaving only vestigial remnants o f man’s material 
works.'®
293-298.
Ibid.
Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 291. In connection with this comment. Rear Admiral 
Ralph Ofstie, a Navy member o f the board suggested that the report, and its fiightening 
conclusions, left the impression on one “highly experienced and keenly intelligent naval 
officer” that “somewhere or other we may have slipped a cog.”
'® The Final Report o f the Joint Chiefs o f S ta ff Evaluation B oard for Operation 
Crossroads, June 30, 1947, JCS 1691/10, cited vnlbid., 291. Curiously, Weisgall had to 
cite Ross and Rosenberg, A m erica’s  Plans fo r  War, Vol. 9, for quotations from the 
report; suggesting, perhaps, that he was either unable to obtain a copy, or the one he did 
have still contained classified deletions. The report may exemplify one o f the many pitfalls 
o f the complications within the nation’s framework o f documentary classification. The 
government’s system is gargantuan, but often haphazard and fickle—and two copies o f the 
same document recovered at different times from different locations will often have quite 
varied deletions. Sometimes, with enough copies from different sources, the researcher 
can actually get the text o f an entire document.
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*  *  *
Manhattan scientists developed a method that allowed man to manipulate nature, 
instigating a reaction that changed the world, and the Project itself initiated a chain of 
practices that (since they seemingly contributed to its success) became inscribed within the 
testing program, changing the relationship o f the government to its citizens. This chapter 
will show how Operation Crossroads built upon the secrecy, military objective, and media 
manipulation o f  the earliest atomic weapons project and added a fourth element when it 
capitalized upon the divisions o f scientists to achieve military goals—all of which only 
multiplied the hazardous nature o f postwar atomic testing—and effectively altered the 
government’s perception o f the authority o f science and scientists. I continue to be 
interested in individuals and their ability to initiate behaviors and structure organizations, 
but do also believe that at this juncture the business o f  history first requires a broader 
perspective—especially since the atomic bomb caused monumental transformations in the 
ways that Americans look at the world and their leaders. Accordingly, then, it is 
important to look not only at what Operation Crossroads was and how it affected future 
atomic testing, but also to look at why it came about.
I have already suggested that the motivating influences o f power and prestige 
played the major role in the planning and execution o f Operation Crossroads, and although 
those two terms signify concepts that are commonly fi-amed in the mind’s eye o f the
The comments by the JCS concerning biological warfare should not come as a surprise 
to readers o f  Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman’s The U nited States and Biological 
Warfare (Bloomingdale, Indiana:Indiana University Press, 1998).
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historian with an oversize ‘warning!’ sign, they are, nevertheless, fundamental and worthy 
topics for consideration. Though a complete understanding of the ways that power and 
prestige—two multi-dimensional and complex features—have ever operated to shape the 
actions of individuals is impossible. Crossroads offers an opportunity for historians to 
confront an instance where their influence cannot be ignored—the historical record reveals 
that there is simply no other logical explanation for the Navy’s plan. First, there was no 
need to set bombs against naval vessels: scientists warned all along that radiation would 
pose the greatest hazard, particularly since the Navy’s ships were built for combat and 
structurally designed to withstand bombardment. Additionally, radiation’s effects upon 
ship material could be more safely, and scientifically, studied in a laboratory setting. 
Second, many contested the Navy’s presumption that any possessor of an atomic bomb 
would expend, actually waste, such a costly and supremely effective weapon o f 
depopulation upon ships at sea. Third, and particularly in light of the foregoing, the 
operation demanded an enormous expenditure at a time when the nation’s domestic 
problems demanded immediate attention. Fourth, the operation could only but aggravate 
the tense relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union and jeopardize any 
possible agreement on the hotly-debated issue of international control o f atomic energy. 
Finally, and perhaps even more telling, is that the Navy designed Operation Crossroads as 
a public demonstration—it fully intended to confi-ont and emerge victorious fi'om its battle 
with atomic weapons before an audience—armouncing to the world its superiority. It 
seems, then, a more-than-reasonable suggestion that the Navy’s public arguments for the 
operation shielded more primal, fundamental motives.
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To understand why the Navy sought to aggrandize itself at the expense o f atomic 
weapons and ships, it is important to bring the Navy and its relationship with the nation 
into context. In this regard, it is helpful to look at Operation Crossroads in light of the 
Manhattan Project and recognize that although there are similarities, there is also a very 
dramatic difference between them. In a very broad sense, if the Manhattan Project can be 
seen as a process driven by unity and confidence, then Operation Crossroads must be 
understood as the product o f  disunity and (though perhaps too modem a word) insecurity.
The Navy planned and executed the ostentatious Operation Crossroads to prove 
itseli^ and its ships, militarily viable in the aftermath o f  atomic weapons development and 
grossly underestimated both its costs and its consequences.'® To Congress, the Navy 
estimated the expense of the maneuver at $10 million, less than the actual $ 100 million the 
Navy itself spent, and miniscule compared to the actual cost to the nation o f  Operation 
Crossroads: $1.3 billion. This is not to say that the operation’s consequences and
'® It must be noted that the Navy, and perhaps almost all those who supported Operation 
Crossroads, failed to recognize the impact of radiation upon ships; and, failing to take note 
o f the scientists who tried to warn them, considered that if ships continued to  float, the 
operation would constitute a valid indicator of the Navy’s continued presence in the 
atomic world. Hanson Baldwin suggested that despite the concerns of scientists, the tests 
would help the Navy plan better ships, even if they were yet “another piecemeal 
improvisation which represents the daily evolution o f our postwar defense policy.” He did 
suggest other tests, though, so a citizen might “know how deep he might have to go 
underground to obtain some reasonable degree o f immunity fi-om atomic explosions.” New 
York Times, February 20, 1946, 9.
'’ This astronomical figure does not include later expenses associated with veterans’ 
compensation schemes or those connected with the settlement of claims brought by the 
Bikini islanders. O’Neill, “Building the Bomb” in Atomic Audit, V^\ and Weisgall, 
Operation Crossroads, 294. Blandy justified the lower, $10 million, figure by valuing the 
target ships as salvage, and estimating costs only upon their value per ton as scrap.
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influence can be legitimately measured in dollars alone,'* but the figures do illustrate the 
willingness o f the government to funnel postwar dollars into a military program despite the 
fact that few believed it worthwhile, and lends credence to my argument that the Navy 
placed enormous significance upon Crossroads; indeed, that the Navy believed that the 
operation might just secure its very survival. In 1994, Jonathan Weisgall, the attorney who 
later successfully represented the Marshalese in their lawsuit against the US government 
refused to lay blame, commenting: ‘This is a story o f  a fatal combination o f ignorance and 
arrogance. There is no conspiracy and no genuine villain—only victims.” '® There may 
have been no conspiracy, but there was plenty of blame to go around, beginning with the 
Army and Navy who trained their sights only on each other.
America’s war against Japan had been, in one sense, the Navy’s own battle, at 
least, that is, until the Army dropped two atomic bombs and ended the war. Japan had 
attacked the United States through the Navy—the raid on Pearl Harbor killed over two 
thousand, sunk or disabled nineteen ships and 150 planes, and coordinating attacks in the 
Philippines, Guam and NCdway only increased the losses of Naval personnel and
'* The solution is not that simple. How, for example, can one really place a value on the 
suffering of the displaced 167 Bikinians, the anxiety o f atomic veterans who knew that 
they were overexposed, or the illness and deaths o f those same veterans. Congress, 
though, has attempted to do so and has passed legislation compensating both islanders and 
veterans.
The Bikini islanders suffered tremendously. Rongerik, the island that served as their 
temporary relocation destination, had neither sufficient food nor space for the Bikinians.
It was one-quarter the size o f Bikini, and its lagoon carried more poisonous than nutritious 
fish. By August 1946, the islanders had harvested all the island’s food and during the 
winter o f 1946-47, the islanders sailed eighteen miles to Rongelap to leave their 
malnourished children and elderly and to ask for additional food to take back with them. 
WeisgaU, Operation Crossroads. 308-309
Ib id , 5
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equipment. Battleships, carriers and cruisers dominated the war in the Pacific even as the 
Army took to the field in the European theatre; but although Japan started the war against 
the Navy, the Navy did not get the opportunity to finish it.’® Instead, General Groves 
and a special Army squadron o f  bombers set up on Tinian Island and, in a week, ended the 
war. The atom bomb put the Navy at a perilous junction—it could either prove its viability 
or face eventual oblivion as the Army and its spawn, the Air Force, dominated a world of 
atomic weapons.”  Tension within the nation’s military establishment filtered into the 
public realm quickly, and before the Japanese had even signed the formal surrender, a New 
York Times article neatly defined the problem, reporting that the end o f the war gave the 
military a “green light to resume their campaign, and Navy leaders are preparing for the 
coming fight.””
The atom bomb enormously raised the stakes of a longstanding intraservice rivalry. 
Even during World War U, the military had not expended all o f its energies against the 
enemy, and their attacks against each other were so vociferous that Truman later said “. .
’® Indeed, Ralph Bard, Undersecretary o f the Navy and a member o f  the Committee that 
ostensibly decided whether or not the bomb would be used against Japan, argued that 
Japan was already “licked” and that Japan should be warned explicitly before the bomb’s 
use. In a memo to Stimson, he said that the Army only wanted to use the bomb to “be in 
on the kill.” cited in Robert Jay Lifton and Greg \CtcheU, H iroshim a in America, F ifty  
Years o f Denial (New York, NY; G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995).
Interestingly, the US even interviewed Nazi prisoners for their comments on the bomb 
and navies. In an August 10 interview, the Hermann Goering sympathized with the US 
Navy, noting that the atomic bomb would make “battleships impractical” but 
(optimistically) that a new defense was found for every new weapon. New York Times, 
August 9, 1945,17. Six months later. Admiral Chester Nimitz made the same argument: 
“There are some people who claim that the atomic bomb makes navies obsolete.. That 
has been claimed for every other new weapon.. .Let the ‘false prophets’ prepare the 
headlines in advance, such as ‘atomic bombs sink ships in test’ or ‘navy is doomed’ but 
don’t take them seriously.” New York Times, February 13, 1946, 13.
^  New York Times, August 25, 1945, 1.
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that if the Army and the Navy had fought our enemies as hard as they fought each other, 
the war would have ended much earlier.””  The Army and the Air Corps had delivered a 
stunning blow in Europe, and delivered the cotq? de grace in the Pacific. The Navy, faced 
with a loss o f prestige and money, accepted a suggestion by Lewis S. Strauss (later 
Chairman o f the AEC) and plaimed Operation Crossroads as the means to  insert a naval 
quotient into the atomic equation. Before it was over, the Navy had used up one-third of 
the nation’s supply o f atomic material and rendered a tropical paradise uninhabitable.”
*  *  *
Analysis reveals that practices within Operation Crossroads correlate to those of 
Manhattan: both capitalized upon an overriding military objective, secrecy, and media 
manipulation. Crossroads is, perhaps, less well known than Manhattan, but it also 
consumed vast amounts of money justified by an overriding military purpose. In fact. 
Admiral Blandy convinced a doubtful Truman by invoking not just the Navy, but the entire 
US military establishment—Crossroads was necessary: “of great importance by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff.””  And, just as the government and General Groves manipulated the 
media, so too did the Navy for Crossroads. The Navy’s operation, though, had the added 
benefit o f being able to deliver the goods, live. To chronicle its success, the Navy invited 
the most prestigious group of reporters ever assembled at government expense for a six-
”  Jonathan Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 26.
”  Truman signed the order authorizing a significant obliteration of the nation’s atomic 
arsenal without knowing its full implications; only Groves and Eisenhower knew how 
many weapons existed at the time. In fact, Truman chose ignorance, telling his cabinet 
that he did not want to know. WeisgaU, Operation Crossroads, 8-9.
”  James Forrestal, The Forrestal D iaries, Walter hfillis, ed., 22 March 1946, 22.
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week floating excursion to the Pacific—168 print and radio reporters became participants 
in the grand public relations scheme. Unfortunately, the large number o f talented 
reporters did not get a chance to excercise much creativity—secrecy remained paramount 
and the Navy excluded reporters fi'om everything (and everyone) save official press 
conferences. They were the epitome o f a captive audience, and according to one, had 
“fireedom o f action—on the end of a shrinkable leash.”’® But it is important to look at 
Crossroads as more than the sum total o f Manhattan behaviors with the addition o f 
displaced islanders and radiation-exposed veterans.”
Operation Crossroads represented a second and crucial stage in the development 
o f the nation’s weapons testing program because it was responsible for a profound 
perceptional and operational shift in the relationship between scientists and the 
government. While the operation promised to solve a number o f questions about atomic 
weapons and ships, one o f the most important things it proved was that scientific 
information itself could be manipulated in the interests o f a military objective. When the 
physicists developed the first atomic weapon, they assumed nearly mythic status but within 
a year fi-actures within the scientific community itself developed and the military 
capitalized upon those disagreements ’* The end o f the war provided the physicists with
’® Robert Littell “The Voice o f the Apple” Harpers September 1946, cited in Weisgall, 
Operation Crossroads, 142. The press fered better than the invited foreign contingent 
who were restricted fi'om even press releases. Two Russians attended, a physicist and a 
KGB agent who posed as a mineral processing expert. Idem., 144.
”  Weisgall does recognize that Crossroads instituted a pattern o f secrecy that had 
continued since the inception o f Manhattan, when the first atomic “seeds o f arrogance” 
were sown. Ib id , 8.
’* “. .  no dinner party is a success without at least one physicist to explain. . the nature o f 
the new age in which we live. Ib id , citing Harpers, 83.
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an opportunity to inteiject their own personal attitudes about the atomic bomb and its 
consequences. Anxiously, they instigated a national discourse that many thought would 
lead to international control and enhanced atomic development; progress divorced, they 
hoped, from the limiting and lethal utilization o f physics for warfare alone.
That conversation, though, infused as it necessarily was with the moral, practical, 
and political ramifications o f  atomic energy belied the all-too-human characteristics of the 
bomb’s creators: their image as derai-gods was shattered. Clearly, as long as scientists 
remained mysteriously gifted with knowledge o f the seemingly unknowlable they were 
elevated from the rest o f humanity, somehow detached from the cares o f everyday men; 
but, when they voluntarily re-entered the world by decrying the power o f their own 
invention and politicized their arguments, they became, like any other, susceptible to not 
only criticism, but appropriation. The division among physicists at the end o f the war 
allowed the Navy to utilize a “one guess is as good as another” philosophy, discarding 
those that did not suit their purpose and embracing those that did. Agreeable scientists 
became cogs in the military machine and science itself a tool o f the military.
Exception must be made for General Groves, o f course, who from the very start 
believed scientists little more than engineers. Groves’ fiustration with scientists only grew 
after scientists began to report radiation damage at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and although 
he was not particularly concerned with the injury to the Japanese, reports indicated that 
the white and red corpuscles o f  soldiers had diminished. Groves telephoned Lt. Col. Rea 
at Oak Ridge Hospital on August 25 who told him that the drop was possible, but believed 
the reports were generated as propaganda. Groves replied “O f course, we are getting a 
good dose of propaganda, due to the idiotic performance of the scientists and another one 
who is also on the project.” Dr. Rea, although implicating propaganda, admitted that the 
reports were probably correct: “O f course, those Jap scientists over there aren’t so dumb 
either and they are making a play on this too. They evidently know what the possibility 
is.” “Memorandum of Telephone Coversation between General Groves and Lt. Col. Rea, 
Oak Ridge Hospital, 9:00 a m. 25 August 1945” TSCMED.
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Though the previous chapter discussed the ways that the government suppressed 
information about the bomb, it is important to understand that those restrictions limited 
discussion about the science of the bomb, not attitudes about its use. After Hiroshima and 
before anti-communistic fervor became inscribed upon the nation’s consciousness, a 
vibrant and fluid national discussion ensued over the bomb and the future o f atomic 
energy. The issues raised in newspapers illustrate that during the last few montiis o f 1945 
and 1946, the nation’s reliance upon atomic weaponry was not (in the public’s mind, at 
least) a foregone conclusion and also that some believed that international control could 
successfully restrain future use o f the bomb and potential devastation.^ Naturally, too, 
others thought that America alone deserved the keys to wholesale destruction and relished 
atomic weaponry as an instrument o f everlasting superiority. Before this chapter turns to 
the exaggerated demonstration of naval pride that was Operation Crossroads, it will be 
helpful to look at the ways that some politicians, citizens, and scientists articulated their 
concerns and shaped a short-lived national debate over atomic weapons and energy.
The monumentousness o f the bomb itself stimulated immediate comment, and 
perhaps reflective o f the ‘absolute’ nature o f the bomb, a sampling o f press coverage
^  It is significant, however, that as early as September 21, most members o f Truman’s 
cabinet fevored American control of atomic information. The editor o f Forrestal’s diary 
indicates that at a meeting called to determine the US position vis a vis the bomb and 
international relationships, most agreed with Forrestal, whose point was that the 
knowledge o f the bomb was “the property o f the American people” and that the President 
could not give it away without the public’s permission. Willis, The Forrestal D iaries, 94- 
95. Forrestal’s point was undoubtedly reinforced when an October poll o f Congress 
reflected that ninety percent believed that the US should retain sole control o f the bomb 
and a public poll demonstrated that an almost identical number of Americans agreed. 
Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 59. Given this, then, it seems that those who urged 
international control through 1946 spoke to a small audience o f supporters and a far 
greater number o f the unpersuadable.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 6 9
reflects that the debate quickly assumed an all-or-nothing stance/® Two letters to the New 
York Times, both written on August 7, 1945, illustrate the polarity that occasioned the 
widespread belief that America should keep her own counsel. One writer believed that 
only wise choices o f leaders could save the earth and that the “fate o f humanity largely 
rests upon a course of wisdom or one o f primitive ferocity. . .[and] only men o f great 
vision and warm human understanding” should be elected. Another rejected 
“understanding” in favor o f aggression, and argued that theUnited States should use “all 
its power to obtain military and political control.’”  ^ After the bombing o f Nagasaki on 
August 9, yet another writer offered an even more determinative, if naive, solution to the 
problem of the bomb; “Let us. . .dump the whole thing into the middle o f the Atlantic or 
the Pacific, whichever is deeper. .
The bomb’s clandestine deployment also resulted in some poorly-articulated and 
decidedly uncontemplative responses. Three days after theUnited States bombed 
Nagasaki, New Mexico’s Senator Hatch, obviously a proponent o f  the “big stick” 
philosophy o f foreign relations and harbinger, perhaps, of atomic diplomacy, proclaimed
It is impossible, o f course, to assess the beliefs of those whose views were not recorded, 
but there is no reason to believe that they differed significantly fi'om those published. The 
British, too, were divided; Churchill proposed that the US maintain sole custody and 
control, while other members o f Parliament, especially Laborites, noted that “exclusive 
knowledge and exclusive use in the sole discretion of one power o f an overwhelmingly 
destructive force. . would make nonsense o f the whole conception o f collective security.” 
New York Times, August 22, 1945,4 
A. Diaz and R. Harrow, respectively. New York Times “Letters to the Editor” August 
9, 1945,11.
New York Times “Letters to  the Editor” August 11, 1945. On August 9, the New York 
Times published excerpts fi’om the English Press demonstrating allied anger over the 
bomb’s use: ‘Ts there to be no protest against the crime of Hiroshima” and “Japan has 
never aroused my sympathy until today, and now my heart goes out to her.” New York 
Times, August 9, 1945, 11.
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that the “the world” would have to accept the US way, or else: “we die together.. .the
world is going to have to accept the rule o f law and justice or be destroyed.’” ’^ A perhaps
too-patriotic chemist with the University of Washington concluded that international
control was unnecessary and thatUnited States should keep control; this, despite his belief
that other countries could not even build such a weapon: “It is doubfiil that any country is
capable of its development except the United States because of this country’s production
capacities and great resources.’’^ *'^
Others, though, had less faith in the possibility of maintaining the scientific secret
and thus emphasized international guardianship. Scientists, many o f  whom were
themselves members o f the world community, wasted no time in stressing the importance
o f international control. Oppenheimer, who said he spoke for the bomb’s developers,
relayed the united hopes o f  physicists that the bomb could ensure peace, “. . .the
cooperation and understanding between nations which has seemed desirable for so long
has become a desperate n e c e s s i t y . A  veritable “who’s who” o f scientists contributed to
a book. One W orld or None that relayed their desperation;
Make sure that your Senators and Congressmen know that you are aware 
o f the unprecedented gravity o f the problem. Urge them to act with 
courage and vision in solving the problem o f the atomic bomb within the
James D. White “Atom Bomb Secret is Big Responsibility” Arizona Republic, August 
12, 1945, 2.
The Arizona Republic August 9, 1945,5. There were utilitarian hopes at this early 
stage. The mayor o f Miami Beach, Herbert A. Frink, embraced a more functional use for 
the bomb and telegraphed a proposal to Truman that it be used against hurricanes, more 
particularly against the one brewing in the gulf that was about to threaten his city. Santa 
Fe New M exican, August 21, 1945, 1.
Oppenheimer, New York Times, August 9, 1945.
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framework o f the new ideas that, as this book shows, are necessary to the 
solution. Time is short. And survival is at stake.^®
Newspaper editors too, believed that the bomb’s secrets could not be kept and stressed 
the need for international control. Waldemar Kaempffert called it an “unsecretive secret,” 
noting that Great Britain and Canada already knew about it, Germany had come close, the 
Russians would eventually, and when small countries developed bombs “little Davids” 
would be able to lay Goliaths low.^’ Another editor with the Arizona Republic insisted 
‘Tf ever there was a need for international machinery to maintain the peace o f  the world. . 
the atomic bomb. . has made it vital.” *^ While those inside the nation argued whether 
international control was necessary, or desirable, statesmen negotiated with the Russians.
Perhaps because o f the rapidly changing international situation, or because 
historians are limited to written material and do not have the luxury o f  discovering what 
may have stirred in the minds of those long gone, it is difficult to establish a  clear measure 
o f commitment on the part o f the administration to an international agreement on atomic 
weapons. \^ th  little direction from the president. Secretary o f State James F. Byrnes tried
Contributors to the volume included, among others, Oppenheimer, Bethe, Louis 
Ridenour, Albert Einstein, Leo Szilard, Harold U r^ . Dexter Masters, Katharine Way, 
eds. One W orld or None (New York, NY; Wittlesey House of McGraw Hill Book 
Company, Inc., 1946), 79. The book’s reviewer, John J. O’Neill, said that “the scientists 
are, like Luther, tacking their thesis on the door of state departments and parliaments 
throughout the world.” New York H erald Tribune Weekly Book Review, VU, March 17,
1946.
See also the American Association o f Atomic Scientists ’ Bulletin  that stressed the 
maintenance o f  US military superiority in tandem with international control o f atomic 
energy: “Much as we may all hope that the millenium of peace is about to arrive, there is 
little reason to  believe that it is here.” April 1946, vol. 5, no. 4,27.
Waldemar Kaempffert, “Now That We Have Got an Atomic Bomb, What Do We 
Expect To Do About It? New York Times, August 26, 1945, E9.
Arizona Republic, August 9, 1945, 1.
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to secure a Soviet agreement to participate in an international scheme for atomic control. 
As the “only American ever to serve as governor, secretary o f state. Supreme Court 
justice, congressman, and senator” Byrnes probably had no doubt that he could solidify 
Soviet cooperation.^® His methods betray no lack of confidence, and during September 
1945 at a conference with Molotov, warned “If you don’t cut out all this stalling.. .1 am 
going to pull an atomic bomb out o f my hip pocket and let you have it.”^  By December, 
though, after Byrnes had taken some advice from Stimson, Kennan and Truman, he 
approached Stalin directly (with considerably less bravado) and received a verbal 
agreement from the Soviets on the issue of international control. Shortly after Americans 
got this news during Byrnes’ homecoming radio broadcast, Truman called him to the 
White House and chastized Byrnes for believing a Soviet promise.*”
International control was not “dead in the water”**^ but as Weisgall notes, the 
relationship between the Soviet Union and the Americans (and British) was beginning to 
deteriorate. On February 9, Stalin delivered a speech promising the trebling of Soviet 
industry and claiming that “peaceful international order. . was impossible under the
39
40
Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 57. 
Gregg Herkin, The W inning Weapon, 203
Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 58-60; and McCullough, Truman, 479.
In late March, 1946, the long-awaited Acheson-Lilienthal plan for international control 
received high praise, but Truman’s choice of the US representative for the plan, Bernard 
Baruch, casts some doubt upon the president’s commitment to the plan. When Baruch 
accepted the position, Truman noted “He wants to run the world, the moon and maybe 
Jupiter-but we’ll see.” The most outspoken proponent for intemation control, 
Oppenheimer, claimed that the day Truman appointed Baruch was the day that “he gave 
up hope.” Weisgall, Ib id ,lQ , citing Peter Goodchild, J. Robert Oppenheimer 
(Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 1981) 71. One of the plan’s developers and later Chairman of 
the AEC, David E. Lilienthal, had serious doubts about the Baruch appointment, 
particularly after Baruch admitted that “he wasn’t much on technical scientific stufl  ^but he 
could smell his way through it.” Lilienthal Diaries, The Atom ic Energy Years, 32,43.
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capitalist world economy,” a speech that Justice Douglas and James Forrestal considered 
privately the “declaration o f World War Shortly thereafter, the “breaking moment”
in this nation came on March 5, 1946, when Churchill delivered his ‘iron curtain’ speech in 
Missouri."” It cannot be known, o f course, whether all the publicity surrounding the atom 
bomb contributed to international friction, but it is not unreasonable to assume that it had 
some effect. If that is the case, then, the many confrontations over the Atomic Energy 
Commission and Operation Crossroads that played out in the nation’s press may have 
intensified the progress of the cold war.*^
The issue o f international control had given the scientists an arena through which 
they might articulate their uniform arguments, but domestic control of atomic energy 
provided them an arena of a different sort, and that issue became and highly public point 
o f contention between scientists. On October 3, 1945, Truman proposed that Congress 
establish an Atomic Energy Commission and two bills, one by Senators Andrew May and 
Edwin Johnson (the May-Johnson Bill), another by Senator Brian McMahon (the 
McMahon Bill), were introduced. Although Oppenheimer, Lawrence, Compton, and 
Fermi supported the May-Johnson Bill, most other scientists considered it simply a 
continuation of the Manhattan Project and argued that the associated military restrictions
Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, 134.
”  Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 61.
On Independence Day, 1946, the New York Times reported that Boris Izakov of the 
Soviet’s Pravda had claimed that Crossroads amounted to a military demonstration 
designed to force concessions. Crossroads “explode[d] something more important than a 
couple o f out-of-date warships. It fundamentally undermined the belief int he seriousness 
o f American talk about atomic disarmament. . This is what in the long run atom 
diplomacy boils down t o . . it is by no means more attractive when it is accomplanied by 
light and explosion effects. July 4, 1946, 4.
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would not serve science.**® Sixty prominent figures, including Albert Einstein and twenty- 
seven other physicists, petitioned Capital FBII in support of their argument that the May- 
Johnson bill would establish “totalitarian authority” and “promote a competitive arms 
race.” The rival bill reflected not only McMahon’s personal dislike o f General Groves 
(one o f McMahon’s Connecticut neighbors who previously threatened to run against him) 
but also his firm belief that atomic energy required civilian, not military, control.**  ^ The 
highly charged debates over the domestic issue o f atomic control drove a fi-acturing wedge 
through the heart of the scientific community and resulted in a long-term, and enormously 
consequential, division.
Even as international and domestic control o f  the bomb itself stimulated divisive 
and heated debates, the aptly-named Operation Crossroads became the locus for the 
gamut o f atomic concerns, including disputation o f international control, domestic 
trusteeship, military rivalry, and civilian atomic interests. Admiral Blandy had hoped that
**® A physicist’s letter to the Association o f Los Alamos Scientists declared that “my 
confidence in our leaders. . .is shaken.” Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 65. The 
supporters, however, pointedly qualified their support and urged for the relaxation o f both 
compartmentalization and secrecy so associated with Manhattan. In this regard, see 
Oppenheimer’s statement before Congress in TSCMED.
**^ The Bulletin o f the Atom ic Scientists, February 15, 1946,1; Weisgall, Operation 
Crossroads, 67. See also Herkin’s analysis o f the relationship between McMahon and 
Groves, The Winning Weapon, 133. As early as August 10, 1945, Senator McMahon 
urged some sort o f ‘constructive’ use for atomic energy, apart fi’om weaponry by sending 
a telegram to Truman “that the united energies o f scientists of the world be combined in 
some effort to discover causes and cures for the deadly diseases of mankind.” New York 
Times, August 19, 1945, 6.
Secretary o f War Robert Patterson “attacked” McMahon because his bill excluded the 
military control. Curiously, he argued that the civilian commission would not develop 
military weapons and also that any military weapons it developed would be un&miliar to 
the military forces asked to use them. Samuel A. Tower “Patterson Fights for Voice on 
AXoxpl'’New York Times, February 15, 1946, 3.
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the operation could be reviewed by an all-Navy board, but that proposal disturbed the 
Army Air Corps which became irate and insisted that it also participate in the review, but 
proposed to report only to the president. Senator McMahon, already an outspoken 
opponent o f the military’s influence in atomic affairs, criticized the operation and forced 
Truman and then-Secretary o f the Navy Forrestal to announce on February 13, 1946 that 
the operation would be evaluated by civilians."** Still, on February 17, Hansen Baldwin 
stated the obvious self-serving nature o f  the tests: that the Navy’s experiment would not 
result in the advertised fact-finding and scientifically-beneficial operation, but rather that 
the Navy planned the maneuver solely in its own best interests and would undoubtedly 
serve as “judge and jury.”**® On February 19, 1946, President Truman tried to quell some 
o f the debate and armounced personally that a civilian board w ould oversee the tests and 
report not to the military, but to him. This move infuriated both the Army and the Navy 
who joined in a rare display o f common cause, believing that it reflected executive 
mistrust and also because it appeared that Truman had finally committed to support the
*** During the meeting about the tests, Truman called the critics “crackpots” but decided 
that a special commission would attend the tests to validate the Navy’s findings for the 
benefit of Truman and the public. Forrestal and Admiral Leahy objected especially to 
McMahon’s bill, claiming that it insinuated a “distrust o f the armed services. . .[since it] 
proposed to turn over the making o f one o f the most effective weapons o f war to a civil 
commission.” The D iaries o f Jcanes Forrestal, 13 February 1946, 133. Their comments, 
though, do betray a like distrust o f civilians.
At the March 22 cabinet meeting, Truman insisted that Operation Crossroads (originally 
scheduled to begin on May 15) be delayed until after July 1 because a sixty-member 
Congressional delegation planned to attend while they still “had business” to take care of. 
McCullough,491. At the same meeting. Commerce Secretary Wallace proposed that the 
Navy limit the test to the deep-water detonation experiment. Mllis, The D iaries o f James 
Forrestal, 22 March 1946. Had that recommendation been accepted, the results might 
have been disasterous.
**® Hansen Baldwin, New York Times (February 17, 1946), 32.
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McMahon Bill, one that they were united against/® Additionally, Secretary o f  State 
Byrnes still worried that the publicity associated with the tests would disturb international 
relations and the summer’s Paris Peace Conference and asked that they be postponed/* 
Respected physicists agreed with Byrnes that the operation could be 
counterproductive to international cooperation on atomic energy and weaponry and that 
the tests promised to add little scientific information/^ The Bulletin o f Atom ic Scientists 
clearly defined its subscribers’ belief that the tests would have little effect upon battleships 
and that the American people might be convinced that the atomic bomb was ‘just another 
big bomb” and not worthy o f international control/*’ In its May issue, Lee DuBridge,
®® The president had vacillated in support for the May-Johnson and McMahon bills. 
Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, p. 66. Arthur Krock, “Civilian Atomic Rule” New York 
Times, February 20, 1946, 8. The Navy did not rely upon Crossroads alone, however, and 
spoke freely (and publicly) every chance they got to convince the American public that the 
Navy was necessary. On February 14, Secretary o f the Navy James Forrestal and Fleet 
Admiral Nimitz claimed that the Navy was the “surest defense” against atomic 
bombardment, and that the House should agree to increase the Navy’s enlisted men in 
order to build a “strong Navy with bases sufficiently distant to interdict a ll approaches to 
either surface or airborne launchers. ” (emphasis mine). Their testimony was 
accompanied by a map that generously sprinkled “Main,” “Secondary” ‘Naval Air” and 
“Submarine” bases throughout the Pacific and Atlantic. New York Times, February 15, 
1946,1,3. The Navy’s testimony came one day after retiring General “Hap” Arnold said 
that the US should “capitalize on the atomic bomb. . to assure world peace” with 
(naturally) a “strong air force.. to destroy hostile airpower before it reached its target. 
New York Times, February 14, 1946, 1.
Jonathan Weisgall proposes that Byrnes’ argument were probably more influential in 
Truman’s decision to postpone the operation from May till July than the stated domestic, 
legislative concerns. Operation Crossroads, 92.
Hanson Baldwin “U.S. Defense Held in Peril” New York Times, February 17, 1946, 32. 
Baldwin detailed the extent o f the opposition, “The atomic bomb physicists and many of 
the nation’s scientists” and noting that their arguments were “sound” suggested that 
Truman pick a committee o f “outstanding civilians with scientific or engineering 
background” to review and evaluate the tests. Baldwin’s suggestion was a good one, but 
unfortunately, few “outstanding” civilians wanted anything to do with the tests.
Bulletin o f Atomic Scientists, Y ebvuary 15, 1946, 1, 11.
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President of the California Institute o f Technology, worried that the tests could not 
possibly improve international relations, and that “at this critical hour they are in poor 
taste.” *^* The Association o f Los Alamos Scientists concurred, and Louis N. Ridenour, 
spokesman for the Federation o f American Scientists called Operation Crossroads “The 
Great Boondoggle.” A University o f Chicago physicist, Albert S. Cahn, succinctly 
analyzed the problem: “In case o f war, no power is going to be foolish enough to waste 
its bombs on a few boats. They are going to bomb the cities and harbors.” ®^ The 
operation’s supporters, though, pushed these legitimate concerns aside.
When some scientists questioned the safety o f the project and whether the 
ramifications had been carefully investigated, they were dismissed and the opinions o f 
supportive scientists (and civilians) accepted instead. DuBridge had also expressed health 
and safety concerns unaddressed by the Navy, particularly fallout—warning that water 
spray onto observation vessels or a sudden rainstorm that could trap radioactive material 
and carry it to unsuspecting, and unprotected, locations.^® When presented with 
DuBridge’s concerns, a member o f Operation Crossroad’s civilian evaluation board 
superficially dismissed them, saying ‘DuBridge has been wrong before.” The Navy’s 
choice of Technical Director for the project. Dr. Ralph Sawyer, an expert in spectroscopy, 
demonstrates the dearth o f  physicists willing to participate in the questionable 
‘experiment.’”
Lee DuBridge, Bulletin o f Atom ic Scientists, May 15, 1946, 7.
Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 86.
®® Lee DuBridge, Bulletin o f the Atom ic Scientists, May 15, 1946,7; Weisgall, Operation 
Crossroads, 88.
Ib id
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After Truman had decided to back the Navy’s operation, the administration began 
a process o f manipulation designed to stimulate support and avoid public criticism. As the 
list o f  opposing scientists grew and as their arguments became public, it looked for at least 
one famous scientist to support the project. Truman asked Groves to contact 
Oppenheimer and ask him to serve as part o f the president’s oversight committee. Groves 
agreed and contacted Oppenheimer, asking him to attend the tests, but knowing 
Oppenheimer’s objections, did not ask him to participate in the evaluation—a nuance 
apparently lost on Oppenheimer (and Truman.) Although Oppenheimer initially agreed, he 
wrote a lengthy letter to Truman on May 3, 1946, asking to be excused. The 
administration, reluctant to fuel the already-heated debate over the tests; or, perhaps, 
equally reluctant for the public to know wAy Oppenheimer chose not to participate, 
refused to excuse him or even announce that he would not be participating until after the 
operation began.®*
There was, indeed, no lack o f controversy or chicanery leading up to Operation 
Crossroads and those features only continued (and escalated) once the Navy’s ships were 
anchored around Bikini. Let us turn now and look more closely at Operation Crossroads 
to see why, in the interests of naval prestige, the Navy wasted almost a hundred ships, 
exposed tens o f thousands of servicemen to  radiation, and how one man, Stafford Warren, 
struggled to save crewmen from needless radiation exposure and how he finally 
convinced the Navy, with a radiographic image of a fish’s scale, to finally give up.
*  *  *
®* After a lenthy list of reasons, Oppenheimer told the president that whatever the outcome 
o f the tests, it “could well be most undesirable” for him to produce a report on the 
operation. Ibid., 98-99.
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When it was all over and he was on his voyage home, Stafford L. Warren, the 
operation’s Radiological Safety Officer, wrote his wife from sea on August 20 that, having 
slept for four straight days, he had partially recovered but was ready for a vacation; he 
was “tired o f bombs and radioactivity.”®® The Operation had been an ordeal throughout 
its planning stages, and once Crossroads got underway in the Pacific, Warren had battled 
not only radiation, but arrogant ships’ officers who seemed unable to understand the 
potential of the invisible enemy. He was not accustomed to such widespread disregard of 
his professional competence and had, after aU, spent years working to protect the 
uninformed from, and teaching others about, radioactivity. As Chief o f the Medical 
Section o f the Manhattan Project and Ad\isor to General Groves, he had built the medical 
and industrial radiological program “from scratch.” Additionally, he was second in 
command of the survey team that the United States detached into Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki.®® After he left Japan and had accepted the Navy’s offer to serve on Operation 
Crossroads, he realized immediately that his experiences with General Groves had not 
prepared him for the Navy and the highly politicized and publicized atmosphere of postwar 
atomic testing.®*
®® Letter from Stafford Warren to Viola, August 20, 1946, Box 1, Viola Warren 
Collection, Young Library, UCLA.
®® Letter to Dr. George F. Lull from Stafford Warren, December 5, 1946, Warren MSS, 
Box 73, 74. Warren performed the first studies in Japan and concluded there that 
radiation in Japan caused far more damage than the bomb itself and conducted the first 
systemic study o f fallout, and after Crossroads, developed an inexpensive meter to 
measure radioactivity.
®* Warren had demonstrated his willingness to take on the military in the interests of 
science, and humanity. While he served on the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission in 
Japan, he reported that Japanese scientists, “eager to publish the results of their studies” 
had been prevented from doing so by the military occupation. Additionally, and though he
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Warren confronted the potentially contradictory reality that while safety was his
responsibility, the Navy’s chief concern was publicity. Since Warren needed so many
physicians, trained medical personnel and technicians that he could not rely upon the
Navy’s resources, he began recruitment in the private sector almost immediately.
Acquiring civilians, though, presented an additional problem because Warren was unable
to tell them exactly when, or for how long, they might be needed. Scheduling posed
problems for Warren—it was a crucial factor that might determine whether or not Warren
could locate enough willing personnel. After Truman had already ordered the first of
three planned shots (originally scheduled for May) postponed until after July 1, the Na\y
proposed another change that would have extended the entire operation. At a January 22
meeting, they suggested a mid-August date for the second test. Warren became
“disgusted” and, blaming the delay on the Navy’s desire for publicity, demanded that
unless the two shots were scheduled closer together, he would insist that the entire team
leave after the first shot and then return for the second:
Groves’ method o f working.. .may have been upsetting but it was decisive 
in the main and accomplished what you were supposed to do. Blandy will 
soon have to put the foot dow n.. .there is no distinction between what is 
public relations and what is a working session.®^
Finally, Able was tentatively scheduled for July 1, and Baker as quickly as cleanup from
the first had been completed and weather permitted.
probably had little reason to include this statement except as a criticism o f the occupation 
forces, he noted that at the University o f Literature and Science in Hiroshima, a professor 
o f zoology had mated some rabbits that had been caged 1.6 km from the hypocenter, but 
(sadly) they had to be killed for food before the young were bom. Report No. 4: 16-22 
December 1946, Warren MSS, box 84.
®^ Stafford Warren to Viola Warren, January 22, 1946, \fiola Warren Collection.
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It is not necessary, however, to rely sole upon Warren’s disdain as evidence o f the 
Navy’s emphasis on public relations, since plenty of evidence exists to illustrate that the 
Navy’s commitment to the operation was firmly grounded in a desire for positive press. 
First of all, hoping that image just might, perhaps, be everything, the Navy changed the 
name of the operation. The new name, “Joint Task Force One,” carried none o f  the 
critical baggage that had been directed at “Operation Crossroads” and, additionally, 
acknowledged the Army’s contribution through both Manhattan Project cooperation and 
the Air Corps’ delivery o f  the Able weapon, de-emphasizing, too, the power struggle 
between the armed services.'’^* There is evidence that the tactic was not completely 
successful, for by the time the Navy published its official operation plan, the Navy insisted 
that all publicity refer to the operation as “Joint Army-Navy Task Force ONE.”®**
Secondly, the Navy’s public information office encouraged the development of a 
more positive image and coordinated all publicity to already-prevalent criticism. With the 
approval o f Admiral Blandy, the Navy’s Public Information Office distributed bulletins 
designed to help task force members deal with a wide range o f criticism. On March 7 
Warren received the first “Public Information Estimate” under a Joint Task Force One 
letterhead that informed him o f the “general attitude of the public toward Operation 
Crossroads” and suggested “appropriate public information policies to be followed.” The 
report’s short, positive, preface suggested that the public’s attitude seemed to be “sane 
and encouraging” and that the operation was “widely recognized as a forward-looking
®® Without legislation controlling domestic atomic energy, the Manhattan Project (and 
General Groves) maintained control o f atomic weapons and materiel.
®** “Appendix I to Annex ‘O’ o f  ComJointTaskFor ONE No. 1-46” (4)0-I-2. Warren 
MSS.
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military experiment” but the bulletin’s three pages of sample criticism and suggested 
responses demonstrate that it was clearly designed to assure that task force members 
respond properly to existing, and possible future, criticism/® The tone o f the missive 
clearly indicates that the Navy was confident that it could successfully sway public 
support, particularly since “opposition to the tests has been sporadic, relatively 
unorganized, and ineffective. Widest opposition appears to come fi'om the ‘dissatisfied 
scientists.’” The Navy indicated that the only “strong” opposition came from objections 
by the Society for the Prevention o f Cmelty to Animals.®®
Despite, or more likely because o^ the Navy’s investment in positive press, it 
severely limited the activities o f reporters allowed to participate in Operation Crossroads.
It did, though, accomodate them by setting aside one ship for reporters only, the 
Appalachian-, and another equipped with communications equipment and wire services, 
the Panamint. The Navy’s formal “Plan of Operation” covered every possible eventuality, 
and dedicated “Annex O” and its multiple appendices to the press corps.®^ In the interests 
of national security, the Navy invoked President Truman’s order o f September 14, 1945,
®® The Navy’s use o f the word “sane” as an attribute o f those who encouraged the tests 
leads one to wonder ifj perhaps, the Navy believed the obverse—that any criticism o f the 
operation was “insane.” The report includes a litany of criticism, some already noted 
earlier in this chapter, but other criticism cited included: “uncontrollable chain reaction. . 
volcanic eruptions. . radiation effects at great distances. . grave risks to personnel. . 
destruction o f  marine life and damage to fisheries. . pacifistic reaction. . .” It should be 
noted that although the testing resulted in no uncontrollable chain reaction or volcanic 
eruptions, the rest o f the criticisms seem to have been feirly leveled, rational, and borne 
out by time—including the feared, though perhaps too-long-delayed ‘pacifistic reaction’. 
“Public Information Estimate No. 1”, 7 March 1946; Warren MSS, box 73, 74, reel 1. 
^Ibid,  2 .
®^ Including a typhoon plan complete with air-sea rescue and evacuation.
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to editors and broadcasters to rely solely upon official releases/* and placed other 
restrictions upon reporters and the information they divulged. Information that focused 
upon the grandiose nature o f the operation, however, was encouraged. For example, the 
Navy admitted that it would use a Nagasaki-type bomb and although almost all other 
information was restricted, it made a notable exception where the size o f  the weapon 
might be used as a measure o f naval strength in the face of atomic weaponry: “Note; It 
may be said that the bomb has the explosive power equivalent to 20,000 tons of TNT; it is 
2,000 more powerful than any other bomb yet used.’’^ '^
Additionally, the Navy managed a far-flung empire devoted to public relations. It 
censored photography, posting “photographic review officers at all necessary points” 
including on the Appalachian, Kwajalein, and at “processing laboratories” in the US. The 
public relations aspect o f the operation was not limited to nationally-recognized reporters 
and broadcasters, however, because the Navy had “established procedures” to furnish 
stories to hometown newspapers o f participating servicemen. A not-insignificant task 
considering that over 43,000 servicemen participated in Operation Crossroads.^®
The Navy’s image, though, required the legitimazation o f its spectacle, a task 
which only increased the extent of the operation’s planning. The incorporation of 
‘scientific studies’ inserted a massive civilian component into Crossroads and required an 
elaborate set o f contingencies. To the already-complicated military organization was 
added the transportation, security, housing, and evacuation o f civilian researchers.
®* “Appendix I to Annex ‘O’ o f ComJointTaskFor ONE No. 1-46” (I)(2),0-I-l, Shields 
Warren Collection, box 79.
Ibid. (2)(b)(3),0-I-l. (emphasis mine).
'"'Ib id  (5)(e),0-l-2.
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General Groves, who had confidently gnawed through the intricacies o f building the 
Pentagon and the even more complex Manhattan Project said that . .it would be difficult 
to get it more complicated.” And the Navy itself said that the Operation’s planning was 
“so vast and detailed as to suggest the Book o f Fate itself.”’* Designed to illustrate the 
Navy’s commitment to methodical operational development, the statement also betrays the 
more fimdamental motivations and subjectivities lurking within the nation’s military in the 
wake o f the atomic bomb. The “fate” o f  the Navy rested upon its ability to justify its 
hairy-chested display as something more noble—a contribution to science.
Hence, Blandy publicly placed science ahead o f military concerns, repeatedly 
announcing that the operation was a joint scientific-military venture.”  One commentator 
fi'om Life noted that so many university scientists were involved that Bikini had become 
the most studied place on earth, and that “astrology” seemed to be the the only “ology” 
missing in the contingent.”  The military, though, placed great emphasis upon its own 
experimental animals. The Burleson, an attack transport modified with concrete-covered 
decks, holding pens, feeding troughs, special drainage systems, and carrying eighty tons of
’* Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 118.
”  The Navy was, perhaps, a little slow in recognizing the value o f co-opting science into 
their program, because although planning for the operation began in August, 1945, a letter 
fi'om the Massachusetts Fisheries Association o f December 12, 1945 to Secretary o f War 
Patterson complained bitterly about the ocean testing; “Warnings have already been 
issued to both branches o f the Armed Forces by the Fish and Wildlife Service o f  the 
Department o f the Interior, coupled with requests fi'om the industry for detailed surveys 
before such tests are conducted. If these experiments are carried out without regard to 
the effect on Marine life, the results are likely to be disasterous to commercial fishing 
operations both afloat and ashore.. W e suggest that you .. immediately request a 
postponement of all such experiments until conditions are properly studied.” Thomas D. 
Rice to The Honorable Robert Patterson, December 12, 1945. Warren MSS, Box 77.
”  Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 120.
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hay and grain in its hold, housed 5,664 pigs, mice, guinea pigs, goats and rats. Blandy 
announced that he regretted that “some o f these animals may be sacrificed.. but we are 
more concerned about the men and women of the next generation than we are about the 
animals of this one.””  The self-aggrandizement of that statement deserves little comment, 
but it should be noted that Blandy apparently assumed (and no one apparently questioned) 
that radiation experiments on animals could only be carried out 4500 miles from the 
nearest US laboratory.
Important, too, is the fact that Blandy’s statements about the operation’s animal 
experimentation reveals an inexcusable ignorance about radiation and its effects. The 
animals were destined for tether or cage on decks, bridges, turrets, and engine rooms of 
twenty-two target ships; some dressed in Navy antiflash suits, others covered with 
sunblock cream. Planned for exposure to shot Able, the Navy admitted that some animals 
might die, but believed that although many would become sick fi'om radiation, they would 
eventually be returned to Washington and remain subjects of study until they died “a 
natural death.”’® Initially, A ble seemed to confirm Blandy’s confidence: ten percent of the 
animals died immediately as a result o f  the blast, and the Navy boasted (and the press 
dutifully reported) that the goats, seemingly “imperturbable” had continued eating 
throughout the ordeal. Most animals, though, died within months o f the shot from 
radiation sickness. There was one survivor of the radiation: the lucky pig “3 11” had 
escaped sometime after the shot and was rescued while swimming in the lagoon. She lived 
out her days, though apparently sterile, at the Washington, D C. zoo, and finally died in
'^^Ibid.
Ib id , 120-121.
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1950.’® The public heard little about the delayed fate o f  the experimental animals since 
most died after the reporters had left Bikini and the Joint Chiefs o f Staff" suppressed the 
final report on the operation. Blandy’s willingness to believe, though, that the effects o f  
radiation might, like the flu or chicken-pox, subside, even despite mounting contradictory 
(and perfectly legitimate) evidence, explains bis almost-complete disregard for the effects 
o f  radiation upon servicemen that would be exposed during shots Able and Baker f
Shot Able was, ironically, both a success and a failure. The Navy believed Able 
would be the most predictable o f the planned tests, presumably since it was an air drop 
like ffiroshima and Nagasaki. As the first shot. Able enjoyed the most press coverage, and 
(as has already been shown) employed the so-called scientific animal studies. Additionally, 
the Navy hoped that Able would demonstrate the “joint” nature o f the operation since Air 
Corps pilots would deliver the bomb. The Army had held contests among General 
Groves’ special B-29 crews to chose the best one to fly D ave’s  Dream  and deliver Able. 
Perhaps to the Navy’s great satisfaction, though, the Army’s contribution to the operation 
was less-than-exemplary. Despite the weeding-out process, practice runs demonstrated 
that the pilot was unable to hit (or even locate) the Navy’s central target ship, the Nevada, 
with a dummy bomb. For the ease of Air Corps bombers, the Nevada, a ship that the 
Navy chose because she was the “most rugged ship available” and had served nobly
76 Ib id , 190-191.
”  Blandy had only to consider the warnings o f US scientists (including DuBridge), or his 
own RadSafe officer, Stafford Warren, to realize that radiation’s effects were not 
temporary. Indeed, had he sought a realistic appraisal o f  the potential for radioactive 
injury, the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission in Japan could have provided him with 
ample (and heartbreaking) evidence. In this regard, see the volumnous files in the Warren 
MSS, particularly box 84.
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throughout the Pacific theatre despite having been run aground at Pearl Harbor, was 
painted an undignified bright red and orange.”  The paint did not help. At 4:00 am on 
July 1, 1946, the bomb missed its target by over a half mile. It landed, instead, upon the 
Independence, a ship carrying an enormous quantity of instrumentation, “invalidating 
much of what had been planned as a scientific test.””  Fires burned on many ships, and 
others suffered twisted metal, but the rugged Independence kept floating even though the 
twenty-five fighter planes on her deck had been tossed into the sea. Blandy capitalized 
upon the dramatic scene and accompanying the official Crossroads press release was a 
picture o f Blandy and Secretary o f the Navy Forrestal rushing into the smoking hulks, 
emphasizing the duo’s bravery, “unmindful o f radioactivity still lingering aboard ships in 
th e .. bull’s eye circle.”*® After all the buildup, the bomb disappointed the press, and they 
returned to Bikini Island from their observation ships and noted that not only did the palm 
trees seem untouched, but photographic towers and even shoreline vegetation appeared 
normal.** The Navy had won, though, because the ships kept floating, the goats seemed 
ok, and the Army’s Air Corps had, after all, missed its mark.*’
’* Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 3, 168, 189. YoxBaker, the Navy put the Nevada in 
the outer ring o f ships, and was “listing” by July 28—three days after the blast. In a report 
calculating the amount of time necessary for ships to ‘cool o ff sufficiently to allow their 
re-use, Warren estimated that the Nevada could go back into service in 1949. Warren 
MSS, box 78, 79. After Crossroads, the Navy towed the Nevada to Pearl Harbor and 
sunk 65 miles southwest o f Pearl on July 31, 1948. The battleship, however, did not go 
gently into that good night’—it took “four days o f gunfire, bomb, rocket, and torpedo hits” 
to sink the Nevada. Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 317.
” /&«i,189; also Warren’s “Resume” 6 July 1946, Department o f  Energy, CIC 140588.
*® Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 191.
** Ib id , 191-192. One said that “there were more explosions in that first Red Sox game at 
Fenway” 187.
*’ Understandably, each service had a different version after Able. Admiral Blandy 
claimed that he had seen worse damage from Kamikaze attacks; the Air Corps armounced
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Warren and his radiation safety officers began their battle with the Navy over 
radiation almost as soon as A ble was detonated. The bomb exploded five-hundred feet 
over the array o f ships so there was little radioactive water spray, but radiation was an 
immediate problem—as was the Navy which refused to heed Warren’s warnings. The 
submarine Skate appeared to  have suffered severe damage, but since its structure was 
sound and watertight, it became the focus o f the Navy’s attempt to prove its invincibility. 
Reporters, unable to see more than the delapidated and burned surface believed her a 
goner. Warren’s team estimated that the Skate would remain dangerously radioactive for 
three days and his team posted large warning signs ‘DANGER! VERY RADIOACTIVE! 
KEEP CLEAR!” The signs, however, made little difference to the Navy and by July 2, the 
Skate, still carrying its warning signs, cruised around the lagoon with a full crew, receiving 
a salute fi'om Admiral Blandy and his flagship. A weapons team member from Los 
Alamos was astounded: “That submarine was hotter than all hell. . but here was the Navy, 
all gung-ho, lining up those sailors.”*® Warren was probably encouraged because the 
monitors after Able confirmed earlier estimates of amount and decay rate, but should have, 
perhaps, taken the Navy’s reluctance to respect his “warning” signs as an ominous sign o f 
the Navy’s lack of respect for radiation. Warren, however, made no particular notice o f it 
in either letters to his wife or in reports about Able. Instead, he looked ahead to the Baker 
shot and worried about a more fearsome battle with radiation.
that the test demonstrated the flexibility and power o f its force, and had they been at war, 
that bomb would have “wiped out” the entire fleet; and Groves was furious, not only 
because the Navy underestimated the bomb’s effects and associative radiation, but because 
the Air Corps missed its target. Ibid., 186, 196, 197-198.
*® Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 195-196.
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The Navy had been warned against trying an underwater shot like Baker, but they
had also been warned against the very deep water planned shot Charlie—zsA  they ignored
both. The potential for a disaster with Baker may have seemed inconsequential (“waves a
hundred feet high, winds reaching a thousand miles and hour, and heat measured in
hundreds o f  millions of degrees”) compared to the prospect for Charlie, a shot that even
Blandy admitted was lethally unpredictable:
no one can be sure what the results will be. . among the things that have to 
be considered are whether this bomb might set up an endless chain reaction 
in the ocean, or radioactivitize the water over large areas.***
Thankfully, in the aftermath o f Baker, the Navy postponed (forever) Charlie and one
can only be saddened that Blandy did not listen to the warnings about Baker that began in
December 1945. Warren and scientists from Los Alamos warned that an underwater
explosion would prevent the dissipation o f radiation and most radioactivity would fall
directly back into the lagoon or into shipping lanes. Additionally, that even support ships
would not be able to avoid the uptake of radioactively-contaminated saltwater into ships’
systems. One scientist warned Blandy that the Manhattan Project would fervently oppose
the underwater shot unless it could be “demonstrated to be absolutely vital and
[information] obtainable in no other manner.” In view of this warning, Blandy originally
abandoned the plans for an underwater shot, but then, under “political” pressure that the
*** Ibid. 116-123. Note that Blandy’s comments about Baker relate only to phycial effects- 
-waves, wind, heat—and ignore the problems he had been warned about concerning 
radiation.
*® Groves probably played a role in C harlie's cancellation. He had complained throughout 
that the tests compromised national security, and finally, with Charlie claimed that since 
the “important casualty producing radioactivity would be lost under water” it would be 
scientifically unproductive. Ib id , 257-261.
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Navy might just be trying to avoid damage to ships, took a firm stand in support o f an 
underwater atomic detonation.*®
It is clear that with Baker, the Navy knew and accepted that there would be an 
enormous radioactive contamination problem and that the only ‘mystery’ the test might 
solve was how long before ships’ crews could make the hot ships habitable.*’ A summary 
of scientific opinion gathered before the Baker shot reflects that Blandy, and the rest of 
Crossroads’ planners, knew that it would, without a doubt, contaminate not only target 
ships, but support ships as well. Los Alamos predicted a “witch’s brew” of plutonium 
near the surface—enough to poison all US forces at their highest wartime strength. The 
University o f California warned that a 10,000 feet or less rise of the atomic cloud {Baker 
had been estimated to rise 5,000-8,000 feet) would present “the greatest hazard.” A 
British explosives expert warned that the low cloud height would result in a “collapse of 
the water column. . .[and] cover many ships with water and contaminate them.”** It 
seems preposterous that, given all o f the warnings Blandy received (fi'om his own 
scientists and others) that Baker would result in catastrophe, he continued with the test 
because o f ‘political’ reasons; and, I suggest, for a chance at another public relations coup.
Baker was a precision weapon that delivered its punch with exactness, predictably 
(and unfortunately) confirming the fears of scientists. Before detonation, the Navy
*®/&/ril, 213-215.
*’ The ‘habitability’ problem was the only one he presented to the Joint Chiefs o f Staff 
when he advised them o f predictions for the shot—after he had received those dire, “it will 
undoubtedly be some weeks before the lagoon and target ships are again habitable.” Ibid., 
216.
Ib id , 215-217.
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anchored the bomb 90 feet under a specially-equipped landing craft/® At 8:50 am on July
25, the water column appeared “to spring from all parts of the target fleet at once” and
rising at a rate o f two miles per second, gained a mile’s height. Within 10 seconds it
formed a “doughnut-like circle.. .[and] seemed to wrap itself around the target fleet.”
The column was a half a mile across and carried two million gallons of water from the
lagoon. Only, possibly, did the 1883 explosion of Krakatoa create larger waves: fifteen to
twenty surge waves emerged, the first 94 feet high, moving at 50 miles per hour. The
waves’ backrush carried more than 50,000 tons of Bikini island back into the lagoon. This
time ships did sink, among them the Arkansas and the Saratoga and the crews who rushed
to try and save the latter (against Warren’s orders) suddenly “put heels in the water,
slowed down, stopped, and then backed up furiously.”®® Warren was pleased that at least
some seemed to be finally coming around to the fact that radiation was dangerous, and he
shared the vision in a letter to his wife:
while the Sara [Saratoga] was sinking in plain sight for hours even the 
salvage people could be seen charging in toward her & turning tail at 1 mile 
away! ..  .at least those with us. . are convinced of the danger now.®*
*® Before it was packed. Senator Hatch o f New Mexico (the same Senator who 
proclaimed that either the world would accept the rule of law or everyone would just die!) 
chalked “Made in New Mexico” on its side. Senator Hatch seemed to thoroughly enjoy 
his trip to the Pacific, and he appears in many, many pictures in the Warren MSS.
Spotting his presence in photographs became quite easy because he was always the only 
one in the frame with an absolutely clean white shirt—a standout compared to  the other 
individuals in the photographs whose garments were almost always rumpled, and generally 
sweat-stained from the heat and humidity.
®® Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 223-225. The blast floated submarines that had been 
anchored to the ocean floor, including the Tuna. Hanson W. Baldwin ‘Radioactivity Bar 
to Bikini Surveys” New York Times, July 28, 1946, 31.
®* Warren to Viola, 26 July 1946, Viola Warren MSS, box 5.
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They were not all completely convinced, however, and the longer the Navy captains had 
to sit around after the blast, the more impatient they became to get to the target ships. 
When they did get restless, Warren sent radiological safety team members out with the 
Navy crewmen far enough toward the target ships that the hand-held radiation monitors 
would register dangerously high levels of rad ia tio n .W arren ’s tactic seemed to solve the 
problem, for a time.
Warren was ill prepared, however, for the problems that would arise on the 
support ships once they re-entered the lagoon and the Navy became too impatient to 
handle. On July 27, the Navy had tried to reduce radiation on the target ships by washing 
them down from a distance with seawater sprays, but that had not proven effective. By 
July 29, the Navy was already looking for alternative ways to decontaminate the still- 
floating vessels, and Warren and the salvage oflScer Admiral Solberg suggested an 
abrasive spray—coconut and palm trees, pulverized with a grinding mill from Pearl 
Harbor.®  ^ Warren finally began letting small work parties attend to the less-dangerous 
target vessels, but set strict regulations on the amount o f time and exposure they would be 
allowed—regulations that they began, almost immediately, to violate.
Using geiger counters to measure the presence o f radiation, and allowing those alone to 
serve as a warning for the Navy, may have been a tactical error on Warren’s part. The 
geiger counters that the Radiological Safety team used, X-263, measured only high energy 
gamma radiation, not longer-lived plutonium. The Navy’s oflScers relied on the clicking o f 
the geiger counter rather than Warren’s calculations o f  alpha based upon gamma readings, 
and thus assumed an absence o f radiation in the absence o f a clicking counter; when, in 
fact, hazardous levels o f alpha and beta were present. On the geiger counter, see 
Weisgail, Operation Crossroads, 213, 233.
Memorandum 29 July 1946 “Radiological Safety Section to Admiral T .A  Solberg” 
Warren MSS, box 75, 76; Weisgail, Operation Crossroads, 230.
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The pressures o f mounting radiation in the lagoon combined with the Navy’s 
attempts to decontaminate its vessels had grown by August 1. Warren pulled out an old 
teletype that he had sent over the Navy’s wire on Able day to “Jupiter Pluvius” and “Davy 
Jones” requesting “half gale from Northeast with copius rainfall at Bikini Atoll. . urgently 
needed to clear lagoon o f hot water and wash target vessels” and updated it, scrawling 
across the bottom; ‘Tlease belay and replace 1 July by 1 August. Then send again with 
higher priority.”^  In addition to anxious Navy men wanting to get out to the target fleet— 
“staring us in the face and saying ‘when can we get aboard—we want our instruments..
the support vessels that came back into the lagoon refused to obey Warren’s 
directives for safety. He had issued orders forbidding the use o f any equipment, distillers, 
evaporators, and other equipment that would bring contaminated sea water into the ships, 
but the day after the ships re-entered the lagoon, Blandy countermanded that order and 
authorized the use o f evaporators to distill water for drinking. This one order resulted in 
the contamination o f every support vessel, as radioactivity became “concentrated in every 
ship’s condensers, evaporators, and saltwater pipes ’’^
There seemed to be no escape from radiation, and the problems became worse 
than even those predicted. When Bikini lagoon became highly radioactive, Warren 
instituted stricter regulations concerning the disposal of radioactive clothing and 
showering by the men returning from the target ships, but the levels o f radiation kept 
climbing. The Navy moved the support fleet to ‘cooler’ water on August 2, but even that
94
95
96
Teletype “Priority” “From CJTF-1, Haven (AH-12)” Warren MSS, box 75, 76. 
Warren to \fiola, 30 July 1946, Warren to \riola, Viola Warren Collection, box 5. 
Weisgail, Operation Crossroads, 230.
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move did not cool down the ships’ hulls. Radiation Safety men ordered the sailors’ bunks 
moved away from the walls to try and cut down on their exposure, but they still received 
more than an acceptable daily dosage just from their own ‘home’ ship—and that dosage 
climbed as they worked under orders to try and decontaminate the target ships. Later, 
Warren learned that much o f the radioactivity absorbed by the hulls came from marine life 
that typically concentrates “fission products by a factors of 100,000.” Barnacles on the 
hulls kept the ships “hot.”^
In the face of climbing levels of radiation, Warren urged the cancellation of 
Operation Crossroads. The day after Warren sent his letter to Blandy on August 3 
warning that continued decontamination could result in serious health problems for the 
seamen involved, Warren received word that Blandy would not cancel the operation.^
That same day his Radiation Safety team advised him that the Navy’s working crews had 
been deliberately avoiding his monitors (some at the urging o f their oflBcers) so he 
gathered proof and wrote another letter to Blandy. It, too, met with a negative
Ibid., 232-233.
^^Ibid.
^  After Baker, the Navy assigned over forty percent of its workforce at Bikini to ships’ 
decontamination.
Warren to Viola Warren, 11 August 1946. Viola Warren Collection, box 5. Navy 
officers ordered their men to disregard safety procedures, telling them that the 
recommended limitations bad “such a large safety factor that it can be ignored” and 
plundered the target vessels for material that would add to the comfort of their own, 
support, ships. Weisgail, Operation Crossraods, 237.
The Navy’s oflBcers simply did not fear invisible radiation. The radioactivity on one 
ship measured fifty times the maximum daily tolerance dose. “Nevertheless, crew 
members stayed on board the ship for as much as 16 hours or more. Some were ordered 
to spend the night there, because the ship’s oflScers believed that the daily tolerance dose” 
had a large “built-in safety factor.” Mike Moore, “The Able-Baker-Where’s Charlie 
Follies” Bulletin o f the A tom ic Scientists (May-June 1994), 24.
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response. In the meantime, one o f the Rad Safe team members sympathized with the 
Navy:
Decks you can’t stay on. . but that seem like other decks; air you can’t 
breath without gas masks but which smells like all other air; water you 
can’t swim in .. good tuna and jacks you can’t eat. It’s a fouied-up 
world.
The Navy, though, made little effort to understand radiation. Warren urged Blandy, again, 
to call off all decontamination efforts except on the almost-clean target ships. Blandy 
refused. Warren then called upon the Los Alamos lab for more sophisticated equipment 
and analysis, requesting that “this [be] treated as an actual emergency involving safety to 
life.” ‘°^  On August 10, with Blandy at Bikini for a visit and just hours before he was 
scheduled to leave, the Los Alamos reply arrived “just in the nick o f time.” While 
Admiral Blandy looked over the Los Alamos data—“curves” of possible rates o f radiation 
injury from beta and gamma—Warren took a scale that he had removed from one o f the 
lagoon’s radioactive fish and laid it on a piece o f photography paper in front o f the 
Admiral. When the scale reproduced itself on the paper, the Admiral said: “WeU, this 
stops us cold alright.” '^
*  *  *
Weisgail, Operation Crossroads, 234.
Blandy’s motivation stemmed from the adverse publicity that could accompany any 
armouncement that ships had been lost to radioactivity. At an August 6 staff meeting, he 
stressed that even the ‘hot’ ships could not be considered casualties “in the sunken ship 
sense o f the word” and ordered that any ship scuttled, sunk, or destroyed more than 30 
days after Baker would “not be considered as sunk by the bomb. . The idea must not be 
fostered that nothing can be done about the radioactive condition o f the ships.” Moore, 
“The Able, Baker, Charlie Follies” 24.
VIeisgdSi, Operation Crossroads, 241.
Warren to Viola Warren 11 August 1946, Viola Warren collection, box 5.
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Baker confirmed the worst fears o f the cautious scientists and jeopardized the lives 
and health o f thousands. Had it not been for Warren’s consideration for the health and 
safety of servicemen, many would have died. Baker certainly should have taught the 
government that fallout was fickle and fiightening.**^  ^ But then, the Navy continued with 
the planned underwater detonation even though they had ample warning that Baker would 
be dangerous. Many need not have been put into harm’s way. Scientists had known since 
the twenties that a few millionths o f a gram of ingested radium could fatally lodge in the 
bones o f radium dial painters . The levels of plutonium, in radium equivalencies, 
following Baker was measured in the “thousands o f tons,” and as radioactive mist it 
“settled on the decks, moistened every bit of exposed metal, wood, and canvas.” The 
Navy finally had to admit that although many ships might survive the blast, few would be 
serviceable because o f radioactive contamination—the crews would not stand a chance.
In its zeal to prove itself a worthy opponent in atomic warfare, the Navy had failed.
Given the history o f  atomic testing, though, it did not.
“In 1924, Blum discovered that severe osteomyelitis and necrosis o f the mandible 
occurred with great fi'equency in the workers of the New Jersey plant. The reports which 
followed on the clinical course and death o f those women from anemias, crippling bone 
lesions, bone tumors, have now become classics on the destructive effects o f 
radioelements in humans.”302. Karl Morgan and J.E. Turner, P rinciples o f Radiation 
Protection (New York, NY; Wiley, 1967) See alsol7-19, 303.
Weisgail, Operation Crossroads, 227, 224.
On August 13, Warren informed Blandy that casualties would result from future 
decontamination: “. . the presence o f beta emitters in even moderate intensities is an 
indication that it is present in dangerous if not lethal am outs.. .[it is] the most poisonous 
chemical known. It can only be measured with very preceise equipment which is not 
available, and cannot be made available. . The use o f personnel for cleaning without 
proper indoctrination and special complex protective equipment, particularly in the inside 
of ships, is exceedingly dangerous.” Memorandum, Warren to Commander, 13 August 
1946, TO 1.2, JTF-1.
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One o f the reasons for the disaster at Bikini was that the Navy seems to have 
forgotten that the war was over. They had the luxury to plan a relatively safe, peacetime 
exercise—but they were more accustomed to the pressures o f war. They rushed into the 
tests fearful that t h ^  might lose in the postwar arguments over demobilization and atomic 
w e a p o n s .W a r r e n  said that Crossroads “was conducted as an emergency and a lot of 
compromises were made to meet this emergency.’’” ” In 1946, the war was long over, but 
the Navy did not accomodate itself to peace. Crossroads was not about science or 
possible warfare—the Navy’s only enemies were its own insecurities, the Army, and the 
atom bomb—poor reasons to expose thousands o f military personnel and civilians to such 
dangerous levels o f radiation. ‘ ‘ ^
As with Manhattan, secrecy and media manipulation contributed to the success of 
the Navy’s planned operation and enchanced its detrimental effects. The Navy, and the 
military, shielded the public from the facts o f the operation. The Navy insisted that it was 
only carrying out its duties imposed upon the military by the Constitution; but its actions 
served only the Navy itself.”  ^ The Joint Chiefs o f Staff classified all adverse conclusions.
The Navy pushed an inadequate geiger counter into production without field testing it, 
and they neglected the measurement o f  inhaled beta radiation, until Warren (in an 
emergency) got Los Alamos to do the calculations.
” ” Weisgail, Operation Crossroads, 233.
Admiral Robert Monroe o f the Defense Nuclear Agency denied in 1979 that men who 
served in the military during Able and Baker later contracted radiation-induced cancers 
because the average exposure was 0.5r. Weisgail points out that families “do not think in 
terms of averages” and identified men who spent extended periods o f  time in ‘hot’ areas, 
never wore protective gear, suffered radiation bums, etc. EQs examples include men who 
worked up to nine hours in the radioactive lagoon repairing damaged ships, others who 
put out fires on newly-contaminated ships in tennis shoes, shorts, and t-shirts. Ibid. 274- 
278.
See Annex “O” Warren MSS, box 79.
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particularly the report by the Evaluation Committee, with such a high rating that only the 
they had access. As for other issues, particularly the acclaimed “scientific” nature of the 
operation, military media control allowed few to know that Crossroads only confirmed 
valid and widely-known scientific conclusions. It cost the nation over a billion dollars and, 
more than likely, resulted in the future deaths of at least hundreds o f over-exposed 
servicemen; but again, the true taxpayer cost was hidden and the military simply 
disavowed, until the 1980’s, that radiation exposure could have injured servicemen.
The Navy claimed that Operation Crossroads would solve a number of questions 
about atomic weapons, but among the most important things it proved was that scientific 
information its e lf could be manipulated in the interests o f a military objective. Operation 
Crossroads was the first time in the nation’s testing history that the military was able to 
draw from a divided group o f scientists “pick and choose” its desired opinion. Rather than 
err on the side of caution, the Navy picked the scientific opinion that best suited its 
purpose and instituted a practice that became tragically commonplace in the future of 
atomic testing. This practice widened the gap between policymakers and scientists just as 
the time when the correct opinion became ever more crucial because of the theoretical 
nature of atomic science. Additionally, the government learned one very important lesson 
fi"om Crossroads; that it could, in the interests of a military objective, and even in the face 
of hundreds o f  reporters, deceive the American public.
*  *  *
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Stafford Warren, “tired o f radiation and bombs,” left the Navy after Crossroads
and accepted an offer to become the Dean of the Medical School at UCLA. Warren was
clearly disillusioned with the military’s influence over atomic science. In January 1947,
Admiral Parsons asked him to participate in a Crossroads seminar and give his
recommendations on “radiation tolerance.” Warren refused, but did submit a letter.
Warren told Parsons that the only data available amounted to “guesses” by committees
with “no one” satisfied with, and no one willing to be held responsible for, the results.
Furthermore, he noted that no reliable estimate of safe radiation dosage would be possible
without a “proper program” o f  study, continuing for at least 10-12 years. He
recommended additionally:.
that no attempt be made at this time to fix a range o f tolerances. . .Once 
they are stated in writing or put in a manual, they are almost impossible to 
change. They would hardly be worth the paper they were printed on and 
would be misleading in the light o f  subsequent findings.” ^
Warren’s answers to a Navy questionnaire about Operation Crossroads also offer a good
summary o f the views o f  a knowledgeable Crossroads participant:
Are further tests necessary? From my standpoint, no.
If there are to be other tests should they be over land or water? Use B ikini.
Is there any likelihood that terrestrial conditions, such as the 
amount o f  dust in the upper air. . be significantly 
or permanently changed by a number o f atomic 
explosions? Yes.^ ^^
Unfortunately, his suggestions pertaining to dosage went unheeded, as did his admonitions
Warren’s remarks proved astonishingly correct, particularly given the 1956 experiences 
with the Atomic Energy Commission’s Division o f Biology and Medicine’s half-hearted 
attempt to change the standards for strontium 90 exposures. Warren’s letter to Admiral 
Parsons was not declassified until 1965. Warren to Parsons, 18 January 1947, Warren 
MSS, box 77.
“Impressions o f the Bikini Tests” Ibid.
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regarding future testing.
The repressive and hazardous practices that began with Manhattan were enlarged 
and enhanced by Operation Crossroads and were already solidified when the Atomic 
Energy Commission took over control o f  atomic energy and testing. By June, 1947, 
Warren had completed some articles on atomic weapons, but when he submitted them to 
the AEC, as required, they refused to give him permission to publish them. He wrote his 
wife from Washington that he was in quite a “tizzy” because the AEC feared public 
reaction;
I was advised [the papers] were too scary to publish now and they agreed 
to a panel o f psychologists, psychiatrists, and social scientists with war 
experience to study this problem so that the info could be put out without 
causing mass hysteria.” ^
It is likely, I suggest, that the AEC was less concerned with public hysteria than they were
about public outrage.
Warren to Viola 14 June 1947, Warren MSS, box 1. Perhaps no one will ever know 
what Warren said in his articles. Various articles appear in the Warren collection, but I 
have been unable to locate any articles that he wrote that would have been considered 
particularly alarming, even by 1947 standards.
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CHAPTER V
THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
Our obsession w ith the atom led  us to assign to it a  separate and unique status 
in the world So greatly d id  it seem to transcend the ordinary affairs o f men that we
shut it out o f those affairs altogether.
D avid E. Lilienthal, fir s t Chairman o f the AEC
Operation Crossroads made big waves not only in the Pacific, but in Washington 
as well. It is, perhaps, a reflection of the astuteness o f congressional leaders that as the 
Sara sank into the waters off Bikini they officially transferred control of atomic energy 
from the military to a civilian commission. Congress charged that commission with sole 
authority to control atomic development in the interests of national security and public 
safety. Congress, though astute, had seriously underestimated the military. By 1951, 
civilian control was only a mirage—the military had regained its hold over the atom bomb.
On July 26, after ten months o f hearings and controversy and two days o f intense 
negotiation, congress reached a compromise between the rival McMahon and May- 
Johnson bills and officially subordinated a Director o f Military Apphcation and Nfilitary 
Liason Committee to the all-civilian Atomic Energy Commission, with the responsibility to 
administer all future atomic development—for peace and war.^ The Atomic Energy Act of 
1946 effected no more than a notional transformation—indeed, the Act became the
* See Chapter IV, supra.
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legitimizing vehicle through which the hazardous practices o f the Manhattan Project and 
Operation Crossroads were authorized, continued, and enlarged when the military, 
ultimately, assumed control.
Congress did not mandate civilian control to limit weapons development, rather, 
those who sought to reduce the military’s influence in the realm of atomic energy 
apparently did so on methodological, not ideological grounds. Certainly, congress never 
believed that the military should be sequestered from atomic science; but the establishment 
o f an unconventional Joint Committee to relay Commission ideas to the public suggests 
that the short history o f atomic development haunted congressional leaders—a result, 
perhaps, of legislators’ recognition that traditional controls, namely approval and 
appropriations, had not been sufficient during the wartime Manhattan Project.^ Yet, 
congress linked this provision with extensive support o f military requirements and 
weapons development as evidenced by the Act’s provisions for a Director o f NClitary 
Application and Military Liason Committee. Additionally, congress directed the military 
to appeal directly to the president if it decided that the civilian commission had not acted 
in its best interests. Others, too, clearly supported weapons development. The first 
Chairman o f the Commission, David Lilienthal, and most scientists, believed that atomic 
development should not only serve industrial and medical applications, but also, crucially, 
weapons.'’ What they all seemed to fear and tried to  avoid, however, was not weapons
 ^Ball citing Niehoffi Justice Downwind, 225. Though well intentioned, international 
events and the growing fear of communist subversion kept the Joint Committee from 
fulfilling its intermediary role, a which might have benefited citizens.
 ^ Stafford Warren believed that weapons development would guarantee interest and 
appropriations for a wider range of atomic science, particularly in the field o f medicine. 
His continued interest in radiogenic diseases and radioactive treatment led to a
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development, but the perpetuation o f insidious wartime characteristics o f the Manhattan 
Project: extreme secrecy and the militarization o f science.
Their plan failed. Congress may have forced the military to relinquish the grasp it 
had held on atomic technology since the beginnings o f the Manhattan Project, but the 
armed forces did not, like Admiral Blandy at Bikini, surrender. Militarily-influenced 
behaviors that characterized the Manhattan Project and Operation Crossroads came to 
play crucial roles in the developing realm o f atomic energy despite the fact that so much 
emphasis had been placed upon civilian control.** Additionally, and although it probably 
was not evident at the time, the divisions within the scientific community that began to 
affect weapons testing as early as Crossroads became endemic as the military’s influence
professional interest in cancer; indeed, be is perhaps best known for developing (with 
another scientist) the ‘cervical smear’ for diagnosis o f cancer of the cervix.
Lilienthal constantly reminded the military o f his belief in the importance o f  atomic 
weapons. ¥ or examples, soo The D icaies o f D avid Lilienthal, December 21, 1946, 121; 
and Minis, Forrestal D iaries, March 27, 1947, 259.
** Since this thesis proposes to answer limited questions that relate to feUout and weapons 
development, other components o f the Act are not here addressed. This is not to say, 
however, that the Atomic Energy Act only served military concerns. Certainly the Act 
and the Commission stimulated, especially under the leadership and influence o f David 
Lilienthal, the development and application o f radiological science throughout medical, 
industrial, and scholarly fields. Features that attended the Act, however, particularly the 
licensing provisions and govemmental-imposed secrecy provisions, undoubtedly restrained 
(to some extent at least) innovation; and although the Act, and the cold war, stimulated a 
tremendous growth in the academy, the strings that accompanied funding carried with 
them their own set o f consequences. In this regard, see in especially Chomsky, The Cold 
War and the University, passim .
Though I have not researched the issue, it seems obvious that as anti-communistic 
fervor mounted, the funding for weapon-related science in laboratories and universities 
would flow more freely than that for peacetime applications. It is clear that the AEC’s 
budget grew proportionately with increased US tension, expanding five and one-half times 
between 1947 and 1952, from $312.3 to  $1,766.4 million dollars. Hilgartner, Bell, 
O ’Connor, Nuclear Language, Visions and M indset (San Francisco, C A  Sierra Club 
Books, 1982), 42.
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grew. Operating in concert, these characteristics limited the ability o f  the Atomic Energy 
Commission to properly administrate its congressionally-imposed duty, and significantly 
encouraged the de-emphasization of public health concerns in favor o f military objectives.
To better understand how these characteristics affected the Commission and the 
development o f the nation’s testing program, it will be helpful to look at three distinct 
consequences that I believe caused weapons testing to be more hazardous than necessary. 
First, and perhaps primarily, the military waged an almost-continual rearguard action 
through the president and congress against the commission and individual members and 
ultimately managed to exert enormous control over the civilian commission. Second, 
military-style secrecy and security precautions led to the classification o f nearly every 
element o f the testing program, a practice that severely limited meaningful debate and 
investigation both within government and without.^ Third, since the AEC’s policies 
limited discourse and since the AEC came to rely upon its own, hand-picked scientists, 
enormous cognitive barriers developed that (in the very best scenario) resulted in 
insignificant misinterpretations, but too often accomodated deceptive forms o f explanation 
and manipulation that promoted hazardous testing practices.
Although some scholars have argued that the predomination o f militaristic trends 
within the development o f atomic energy resulted fi-om the increased confi-ontational 
nature o f the international situation, and that the goals of the commission merely reflected 
this change, I think it is important to look at these features as they opposed, or at least
 ^The Department o f  Energy has recently declassified many hundreds o f thousands of 
documents, but the mass o f material and the haphazard organization makes research 
difficult. Additionally, many o f  those released documents still bear classified deletions.
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controverted, policy.^ This distinction between policy and its articulation may perhaps be 
recognized more conveniently as a distortion of national intent, and in this regard 
Crossroads offers a convenient and familiar example. Clearly, the president approved the 
operation and congress appropriated money for it because the Navy convincingly argued 
that it needed to test its ships against the atom bomb. The operation certainly fulfilled that 
goal—but it is abundantly clear that there were additional motivations than those presented 
and approved, and certainly the operation itself vastly exceeded the expectations o f both 
the president and congress. Additionally, and most importantly for the scope o f this study.
® Research suggests that domestic considerations, particularly convenience for the 
laboratories and economic considerations o f the military, played a far greater role in the 
development o f the continental testing site than the worsening international situation; 
indeed, both the Army and the weapons laboratories began lobbying for a site more 
accessible than the Pacific Proving Grounds before either the Berlin Airlift, the first 
Soviet atomic detonation, or the Korean War:
“The Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory program for development o f 
nuclear weapons requires nuclear field tests .. .In 1947 the Laboratory 
programs had progressed to a point where developmental field tests were 
required and LASL proposed that the AEC activiate a continental site. A 
survey disclosed possible sites on the coast of the Carolinas, at 
Alamogordo (N.M), Dugway (Utah), and two sites in Nevada. Largely 
because o f unresolved questions concerning off-site hazards to the United 
States public. . it was decided to have the spring 1948 (Sandstone) series 
at Eniwetok.”
“Summary o f Minutes Committee on Operational Future, NPG” meeting January 14, 
1953, CIC 26306. Most historians give the Korean War at least some credit for 
influencing the decision, though they differ as the the extent o f its significance. Miller 
places most emphasis upon the Army’s desire for tactical weapons and economic 
considerations (Under the Cloud, 80) while A  Constantina Titus asserts that the Korean 
War was the determinative factor in the selection of a continental testing site (Bombs in 
the Backyard, 55.) Hacker strikes an in-between note, noting earlier requests for a 
continental test site but places the emphasizing economics, suggesting that weapons 
development coincided with economic cutbacks in atomic weapons (forced by the Korean 
War) to stimulate the creation o f the Nevada Proving Groimds. Elements o f C ontrovert, 
p 38-40.
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is a direct confrontation between policy and practice—that the government certainly did 
not knowingly and intentionally, as a function o f policy, approve an operation that would 
needlessly waste resources and endanger men. As the Navy shaped Operation Crossroads, 
so did the military with the AEC—overwhelming official intent in the service o f its own 
objective.^
The following discussion o f Crossroads and the militarization o f the AEC raises 
important questions about the relationship between the state and the military and seriously 
jeopardizes the notion that the military operates solely as a state functionary. Thus, while 
I have argued, and hope to have made clear, that the practices that developed within the 
Manhattan Project filtered into peacetime atomic development and weapons testing, those 
behaviors could not have become determinative without access to the levers o f power. 
Accordingly, it is important to look at not only habitus but beyond—to the complexities of 
a substrata o f power relationships as they developed under the auspices o f  the Atomic 
Energy Act. My desire to burrow beneath a conception of the military as merely an organ 
o f the state has been influenced by the French political philosopher Foucault who 
admonished political theorists to “cut off the King’s head”— to see that the influence o f the 
state is limited by the existence of power relationships that operate independently—and 
explore the ways that those those forms o f  power structures become “detached” from the
 ^The reader should note that although the term ‘AEC’ refers technically to the 
commission formed under the Atomic Energy Act, the use o f it here encompasses not only 
the collective activity o f a small group o f  presidential appointees, but unless otherwise 
apparent from the context, also the range o f  organizational initiatives and institutional 
management of that governmental agency that administered the development o f  atomic 
energy and weapons.
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state itself* Additionally and in accord with this alternative interpretation o f the
relationship o f  subterranean levels o f influence that function within and comprise the state,
is a recognition that all relationships are by nature, fluid. In this regard, my attempts to
puzzle through some o f the many curiosities of policy and its articulation have been
influenced by Nietzche, and particularly his reminder that aU things, including institutions,
are not appropriately understood through an analysis o f either initiational intent,
construction, or ultimate terminus since they are inherently transformative and
unpredictable. Although Nietzche’s analyses are rooted in a period far removed from the
cold war, they address the prerogatives o f power and are equally applicable here, where
military objectives seem to have subverted the intent of congress. Nietzche warns
historians especially:
That the actual causes o f a thing’s origin and its eventual uses, the maimer 
o f its incorporation into a system o f purposes, are worlds apart; that 
everything that exists is periodically reinterpreted by those in power in 
terms o f  fresh intentions. . .But all pragmatic purposes are simply symbols 
o f the fact that a will to power has implanted its own sense o f function in 
those less powerful.”
It is clear from this examination that the military managed to overcome the barriers
congress imposed through the Act, and successfully “implanted its Own sense o f function”
into the “less powerful” commission. Additionally (and ideally) this discussion of the
military’s relationship to the AEC should also help shape the reader’s understanding of the
* “The State, for all the omnipotence o f its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy 
the whole field o f actual power relations. . .which render its functioning possible.” 
Foucault,‘T ruth and Power,” particularly 121-123.
” Nietzche, Genealogy o f M orals, trans. Kaufinan, (New York, NY: Viking Press, 1979), 
2 . 12.
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following chapter that explores the AEC’s impact the nation when it came to Southern 
Nevada. Toward this end, then, it will be useful to first return to the AEC’s beginnings.
*  *  *
The AEC immediately became the target of postwar military insecurities. The last 
chapter explored the Navy’s attempt to come to terms with its postwar world, but it is 
important to view the immediate postwar period as one o f extreme transition and conflict 
between the nation’s collective armed forces and the government itself. A push for rapid 
demobilization by the public was matched by congressional scrutiny of military budgets 
and appropriations; additionally, the proposed National Security Act threatened each 
branch individually with its cabinet-level consolidation of the forces under a Secretary of 
Defense.*” Into that mix o f antagonism, then, ten months o f  heated hearings and 
negotiation eventually resulted in the subordination of the military to civilian authority 
under the Atomic Energy Act. Such intense public scrutiny and transformation perhaps 
only strengthened the military’s resolve and, focusing a measure of animosity against the
*” In this regard, see James Forrestal’s letter to Edward Hopkinson of December 7, 1946 
where he points out the obvious paradox between verbal assurances of maintained military 
strength and budgetary restrictions: “There is great danger o f repetition o f the pattern 
which developed after the last w a r.. in wrapping up a balanced budget and a decreased 
tax rate. That these are sometimes accompanied by reaffirmation of necessity for 
remaining strong isn’t much consolation.” NGUis, Forrestal Diaries, 236.
There was a clear line o f influence from the Manhattan Project through Crossroads to 
the development o f the AEC. As Secretary o f Defense, Forrestal retroactively authorized 
the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project that had been initiated during the planning 
stages o f Operation Crossroads. Under the leadership o f its first chief. Major General 
Groves (of Manhattan fame) it “was charged with providing nuclear weapons support to 
the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Maj. J. Stinson and K.K. Horton “Historical Chronology 
o f DOD Weapons Testing Organizations” October 19, 1984, Defendant’s exhibit DX 
21958, Prescott v. USA [consolidated] CIVLV-80-143.
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president who had proposed consolidation and (eventually) supported civilian control of 
atomic energy, the armed forces began strident behind-the-scenes lobbying efforts. They 
found a ready-made alliance in the form o f the new Secretary of Defense, former Navy 
Secretary James Forrestal, and in Republican legislators led by Senator tCckenlooper of 
Iowa, a vociferous critic not only of Truman, but also of former TVA Director and the 
new Chairman of the AEC, David Lilienthal.
Tension between the AEC and the military characterized atomic development from 
the beginning. Truman firmly believed that atomic energy belonged in civilian hands, and 
when David Lilienthal and the other four members o f  the Atomic Energy Commission met 
with him on December 11, 1946, .Truman told them that if necessary he would mediate 
problems between the Commission and the War Department. “The Army,” he said “will 
never give up without a fight.”** Six days later, the Army’s Manhattan Project seemingly 
assented to the Act, and “lots o f braids and stars,” surrendered to the Commission and the 
Military Liason Committee its accounting o f the nation’s atomic stockpile—the most 
“critical numbers in the world.” *^  On New Year’s Eve, 1946, after a month of what 
Lilienthal reported as “very deep troubles with the War Department about who got what” 
atomic energy became the official responsibility of the Atomic Energy Commission.*^
** Lilienthal, Diaries, 118.
^llb id , 119.
*" Although diaries are an invaluable source of impressions and conversations that would 
otherwise not be available to researchers, this quote points up one o f the pitfalls of 
reliance upon them when exploring questions o f atomic development. This chapter uses 
the diaries o f two men, Lilienthal and Forrestal, both o f  whom were extremely cognizant 
of security; thus, it is impossible to know exactly what type of custody issues Lilienthal 
referenced. Ibid. 127.
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The military, having already lost the public battle over control, began to wage a 
private one. During a meeting on January 22, 1947, five days before Lilienthal began the 
ordeal o f Senate confirmation, the military and its congressional supporters were already 
pinpointing dangerous influences in the AEC.*** At a meeting between Jfickenlooper, 
Forrestal, and Rear Admiral Parsons o f  the Military Liason Committee, Hickenlooper 
complained o f Lilienthal’s “tremendous power and responsibility” and (perhaps in an 
attempt to shape future discourse) complained o f a “pacifistic and unrealistic trend” within 
the commission.*^ After a month o f confirmation hearings, Hickenlooper hinted that 
Lilienthal had been negligent and was possibly lenient toward communists. Complaining 
o f  Lilienthal’s “intransigence and inflexibility” he asked Forrestal to bring to the attention 
o f the president that Lilienthal had hired appointees without having them screened by the 
FBI. Forrestal considered Hickenlooper’s charges serious indeed, and contacted Truman 
that very evening to relay the concerns.*” Animosity mounted even after Lilienthal’s 
confirmation, and in September, Forrestal noted in his diary that he had told Lewis Strauss 
that the Military Liason Committee had complained to him that Lilienthal was 
uncooperative.*’
*** Regarding the Senate confirmation, Lilienthal privately questioned his own judgment: 
“what is it in a man that makes him willing to risk his name, his health, and his chance of a 
decent way o f  living to get into such an impossible setup?” He knew from whence he 
spoke, having been on the receiving end o f  congressional opposition from his years with 
the TVA. Lilienthal, D/or/ej, 133.
Is/ËXàs, Forrestal Diaries, 240-241. This is an curious comment to make about a 
spanking-new commission with no history upon which to base a pattern or ‘trend.’
*” Ibid., 255. Forrestal also contacted Lewis Strauss to discuss HBckenlooper’s concerns, 
demonstrating (perhaps) Strauss’ complicity in the subversion o f Lilienthal’s leadership 
long before it was recognized by the Chairman. In this regard, see Chapter H, supra.
Ibid., 319.
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The increasing political pressure that occasioned complaints about Lilienthal 
eventually resulted in Truman’s decision to replace a retiring committee member with 
Gordon Dean, a favorite o f the militarists—thus changing the ideological constituency of 
the commission.** As time went on, Lilienthal’s aggressive public relations campaign for 
atomic energy and his national popularity as a speaker had only increased the suspicion 
with which his opponents viewed his leadership, and Forrestal’s role as intermediary 
between Lilienthal’s military and congressional enemies and the president grew.*” During 
a lunch meeting in February 1948, Forrestal, Hickenlooper, and the president o f 
Bethlehem Steel discussed their “vague misgivings” about the direction o f the AEC. 
fBckenlooper also voiced concern about Lilienthal’s public speeches that emphasized the 
use o f atomic power for industrial and other private purposes, and complained that there 
had been no significant advances in the “art” since the dissolution o f the Manhattan 
District. Hickenlooper especially disliked Lilienthal’s repeated public references to the 
control o f atomic energy by “the people” believing they smacked o f “statism.” Again, 
anti-communism played a role in attacks directed against Lilienthal. Within days, the 
AEC’s Director of Security, Rear Admiral John Gingrich, told Forrestal that Lilienthal 
observed lax security procedures, based on his observation that Lilienthal had distributed 
$40 million to Brookhaven Laboratories through which “nine universities” shared 
participation.’” There is no evidence that Truman suggested to Lilienthal that he change
** See Chapter H, supra., for a more thorough discussion o f Gordon Dean’s appointment 
to the Commission and the political circumstances of that appointment.
*” Lilienthal traveled extensively promoting atomic energy and attempting to stimulate 
academic and industrial interest in its development. Lilienthal, Diaries, passim .
’” NfiUis, Forrestal D iaries, 3 79-3 80.
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his methods. Politically, though, Truman tried to pacify congressional opponents such as 
IBckenlooper through the appointment of one of their chosen, Gordon Dean.
Although international events played into the military’s hands, it still found itself 
unable to officially retrieve the bomb from civilians. The Berlin Blockade o f June 1948 
encouraged the military to take a more aggressive stand against what they perceived as 
pacifism within the Truman administration as a whole and especially against Lilienthal and 
his custody o f the atom bomb. On July 15 Forrestal and the armed forces scored a victory 
against Secretary of State Marshall and convinced the National Security Council to send 
B-29s, the atom bomb’s delivery system, to England.’* Forrestal apparently anticipated 
that England would become a permanent outpost for an American atomic arsenal, since he 
noted that the force would not only demonstrate American resolve (domestically and 
abroad) but would “accustom” the British to the accommodation of an “alien. . though 
allied, power” so that the force would become an “accepted feature.””  Emboldened by 
this victory, perhaps, Forrestal approached the president that same day and and requested 
a meeting to consider the transfer of the bomb to military custody. On July 21, at a 
meeting between the President, Forrestal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the AEC, and the Act’s 
military liason, Forrestal presented a formal request from the “National NClitary 
Establishment” for custody o f the bomb.”  Lilienthal objected, insisting on civilian control, 
the president agreed, saying “You have got to understand that this isn’t a military weapon.
. .we have got to treat this differently from rifles and cannon and ordinary things üke that.”
’* Despite assumptions made at the time (particularly those importantly made by the 
Soviet Union) theUnited Stateshad not armed the B-29s with atomic weapons.
”  Mülis, Forrestal Diaries, 455-457.
”  Ibid., 459-461.
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That, however, was just what the military intended, and the Secretary of the Air Force 
resolutely told the president that “our fellas need to get used to handling it” as though an 
atomic weapon could be handled like any other weapon.’** Aside from mentioning that he 
would personally maintain responsibility for the weapon, the president delayed. Within 
two days, however, Truman told Forrestal that there would be no change o f custody from 
the AEC because it would be disadvantageous politically. All was not lost, though, for 
Truman told Forrestal that he would reconsider the issue after the election.’^
*  *  *
The foregoing demonstrates not only the vigor with which the military 
maneuvered to regain control of the bomb but also that it did so by discrediting David 
Lilienthal. It is worth considering that Lilienthal was targeted not only because he was 
Chairman of the rival civilian commission but also because he had been one o f the main 
opponents of the elaborate apparatus that the Army had developed to hide all atomic 
issues from the nation’s public. The value of secrecy to the military establishment had 
grown proportionately with its plans for atomic weapons, and although Lilienthal was not
’“* McCullough, Truman, 650.
Millis, Forrestal D iaries, 459-461. Although Forrestal’s entry is limited to the decision 
itseb^ it appears that Forrestal did not want the public to leam that the military had lost the 
battle for the bomb. Lilienthal received the news at his office, and was advised that 
Forrestal fairly graciously accepted the President’s decision, but did object to the 
President’s plan to announce publicly the intention to leave control of the bomb in civilian 
hands. Forrestal apparently “objected strongly.. .questioning why it should be announced 
that he had been overruled.” Liüenthal, Diaries, 392.
The President’s attempts to assuage antagonistic congressmen (particularly 
Hickenlooper) with the appointment o f Gordon Dean to the Commission and Lilienthal’s 
objections to this politically-stimulated appointment have been discussed in Chapter n, 
supra.
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the only one opposed to military classification methods (Truman had nominated Lilienthal 
and congress confirmed his appointment with full awareness o f his steadfast objections to 
the Army’s broad provisions for secrecy) he was a powerful adversary. To understand 
why the armed forces wanted to remove Lilienthal fi'om his position with the AEC, the 
deep roots of Lilienthal’s abhorence o f  military-style secrecy need to be examined.
Long before Lilienthal became Chairman of the AEC, he had made a clear 
distinction between the type o f secrecy favored by the Army (as exemplified by General 
Groves’ management of the Manhattan Project) and security precuations that unavoidably 
occasioned atom bombs. The University o f Chicago invited Lilienthal, scientists, 
researchers and philosophers to attend a Conference on Atomic Energy Control on 
September 20-21, 1945. The conferees addressed a number o f issues including 
international control, Soviet development, psychological effects, and comparison between 
jellied gasoline bombs that were dropped by the thousands on Japanese cities before two 
atom bombs ended the war.’”
The issue o f secrecy, however, stimulated the most discussion; prompted to some 
extent, perhaps, by the fact that the Army itself had tried to obstruct the University of
’” Curiously, Lilienthal referred to some ‘unmentionable’ scientific developments that, for 
him at least, could made international control o f  atomic energy irrelevant, or at least too 
limiting to deal with the broadening field o f general scientific developments: “I note that 
all these proposals address themselves to the particular kind o f hell that the scientists have 
brewed in the atomic bomb. . .Would it not be important to make plain to the American 
people—if such is the fact-that you fellows have other things cooking, not related to 
atomic explosions, that may be just as bad or worse? Why work ourselves blue in the face 
to develop a method o f . . .[inspection]. . when science has other, equally destructive 
things on foot that do not involve either uranium or even the atom?” Lilienthal, Diaries, 
640.
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Chicago from even holding the meeting.”  The group concluded by the end of the first day
that there were really only two ‘secrets’ that might remain so for any period o f time: the
materials required for the diffusion process; and, the production rates (“super secret”) o f
‘critical’ materials. On the second day, Lilienthal drew a firm line between issues of
security (weapons and weapons production and secrecy (oppression):
These scientists are under a rule—whether legally enforceable or not is 
immaterial—that they will submit everything they say, before a 
congressional committee, say, or elsewhere, to the “review” and 
“approval” o f the Army.. .Nothing o f the kind has ever been proposed.. 
that a citizen’s opinions shall be subject to a pre-audit by the military in 
peacetime. What happens to the “right to talk” . . This pre-audit over the 
opinions o f men will create a . . .creep/wg-paralysis.. mental. . ethical, 
moral. This whole discussion. . has been wholly in terms o f power 
politics, surely it is assumed that there are other forces at work in the 
world. . that are within the individual controls and disciplines and urges. . 
moral compulsions.”
Lilienthal told scientists that they must “insist” upon their moral duty to educate the 
public; and then, with obvious pleasure, received the enthusiastic support of the other 
conferees. It is clear that while Lilienthal believed it was undoubtedly necessary to keep 
certain information secret, he was (almost from the outset) wary o f  the expansion o f 
secrecy and believed that it could detrimentally transform the nature o f governance and 
science. Had this sophisticated distinction between “secrecy” and “security” been allowed 
to develop in the postwar period, the progression and nature o f atomic testing could have, 
perhaps, been a safer enterprise.
^  Ibid., 642.
”  Lilienthal, Z)/ar/e.s, 642.
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Secrecy, though, was not the only issue discussed at the conference, and this is an 
appropriate place to provide an example o f early postwar thinking about the atomic bomb, 
and how structures of secrecy operated against discourse and thwarted the development, 
or even consideration, o f alternatives during the cold war. The following forgotten 
dialogue demonstrates the range and value of intellectual insight that might have 
influenced crucial national issues had it been allowed to circulate publicly. Jacob \riner, a 
University of Chicago economist, technically disagreed with a point made by Reinhold 
Mebuhr: that the only secret (“techniques not known”) was patently insignificant. Viner 
though, traced Niebuhr’s argument to its logical conclusion and identified the consequence 
that Niebuhr had only hinted at:
There is a secret—perhaps a six-months’ secret, but still a secret.
Will six-months’ secret generate another six-months’ secret—can we remain
six months ahead indefinitely?”
The issues that would shape decades o f American history were, prophetically, addressed 
by fifty participants in a conference that few, if any, paid much attention to, except, of 
course, for the Army which tried to prevent its occurrence. It is unavoidable that the 
bounds o f secrecy essentially strangled those who might have been able to influence, 
through meaningful debate and intellectual stimulation, a vastly different (and I believe, 
probably better) postwar environment—one without, perhaps, an arms race. Fear, though, 
rapidly overtook reason.
*  *  *
29 Ibid., 644.
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It seems clear that secrecy offered far too many benefits not to prevail. Mounting 
anxiety that America might lose its atomic monopoly encouraged congress to incorporate 
stringent military controls on atomic energy. The extreme secrecy and classification 
systems that occasioned the Manhattan Project have already been discussed, and those 
same structures served the Navy well in its management o f the media during Operation 
Crossroads and inquiries after. Similar restrictions gave the Army, the AEG, and the state, 
the perfect opportunity to effectively conceal a rch in g  it could even remotely link with 
atomic science, whether related to valid matters o f national security or not. Additionally, 
the supporters o f secrecy held a tactical advantage against their opponents, and those who 
criticized the implementation o f strict security measures might as well have drawn a giant 
red buHseye on their backs. Indeed, Lilienthal’s continuing objections to needless 
security precuations simply gave Hickenlooper, for example, the means through which he 
could attack Lilienthal’s credibility. Secrecy then, served many purposes—it purportedly 
kept rival countries out o f the atomic loop, it provided a convenient shield for 
questionable practices, and the value placed upon it rendered its opponents vulnerable to 
attack.^” It is important, now, to look at the meaning o f  secrecy as it was applied to the 
field of atomic science and development.
The Atomic Energy Act authorized the most comprehensive classification system 
known, exceeding even that o f the National Security Council—the organ primarily
This discussion, o f  course, addresses only the very obvious uses o f ‘secrecy’ and 
unavoidably ignores its psychological role—a topic intelligently discussed by Hugh 
Gusterson in his anthropological examination o f Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, 
Nuclear Rites, 68-100.
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responsible for the nation’s security/^ The National Security Council’s methods of 
restriction required a decisive act to classify information: an individual actually reviewed a 
document and rendered a decision whether or not it was in the nation’s best interests to 
restrict access. By contrast, the AEC adopted the Army’s stringent scope where 
anything even remotely associated with atomic science was classified but then it added a 
twist: everything within its pervue was ‘bom’ classified. In other words, everything 
associated with atomic weapons or science immediately entered a classified realm and 
required no positive decisive action on behalf of anyone to restrict its circulation.'’^
The AEC’s system severely compromised legitimate oversight and substantially 
thwarted the effectiveness o f  the representative function o f congress and the intermediary 
function of the Act’s Joint Committee."^ On May 5, 1947, the Joint Committee learned.
“Security markings” had long been a feature of military documentation during wartime, 
but the practice was not formally extended into peacetime until 1921. Roosevelt issued an 
Executive Order four days after Mussolini joined the Axis powers that gave presidential 
recognition, and added legitimacy, to the practice. Initially, the process affected only 
public exposure, as with the press, and Congressional committees remained entitled to full 
disclosure. Roosevelt’s action, however, resulted in the practice becoming an institutional 
feature of the State Department and it soon spread throughout the government. Access to 
classified documents remained restricted after the war. By 1951 Truman had authorized 
any executive department or agency to classify information.
“Any information related to  the design, manufecture, or utilization o f atomic weapons, 
the production o f enriched uranium or plutonium, or the use o f  those materials for the 
production of energy is Restricted Data, unless the information has been removed fi'om the 
Restricted Data category by order o f  the Secretary o f Energy. . no matter where 
originated or by whom generated.” Hilgartner, 62-63. A1957A'ew York
Times article focused on the problems o f a system that classified ideas and concepts. “An 
anonymous professor awaiting citizenship and clearance, ‘Professor X a renowned 
scientist, has an embarrassing faculty for producing ideas that rail in the classified realm; in 
effect, he thinks classified thoughts. Ifis colleagues cannot discuss his own ideas with 
him—not because they aren’t  cleared, but because he isn’t.” Idem .
H. Peter Metzger, The A tom ic Establishm ent (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 
1972.)
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for the first time and to their great amazement, that British and Canadian scientists had
worked in cooperation with American scientists and knew how to “make the bomb.”
Lilienthal was stunned when he learned that the committee had not been given access to
(admittedly) classified information that they required. Lilienthal’s subsequent diary entry
notes that “we caimot operate on a reasonable basis with the congress if the congress does
not receive information that is classified.’” '* The Army did not agree, and continually
thwarted the exchange o f  information. In 1949, it stepped up its attack and publicly
lambasted Lilienthal and the AEC because its yearly report to congress divulged secret
information.'’^  The inability o f the Joint Committee, let alone congress itself to acquaint
itself with atomic developments rendered it useless: nothing more than a superficial
intermediary between the Commission and the public. Equipped, perhaps, only to confirm
or deny the obvious—that a certain bomb had (or had not) been detonated.
The atom bomb was the perfect excuse for the imposition of exaggerated security
precautions, but as weapons testing progressed, it became patently obvious to even
militarists that the detonation o f a bomb was a difiScult thing to hide. The 1952 test o f the
first hydrogen device in the Pacific exemplified, for at least those with logistical ties to Los
Alamos, the absurdity o f trying to conceal a blast equivalent to tens o f thousands o f tons
o f TNT. An editorial in The New M exican that discussed an awe-struck sailor’s letter
home is representative o f  the obvious contradiction between secrecy and bombs. The
sailor’s letter exposed the supposedly secret Eniwetok explosion:
All of which makes the AEC’s super-duper security precautions look pretty 
silly.. .With Los Alamos only 35 miles away, it has been common
Lilienthal, D/or/es, 176. 
Ibid., 493.
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knowledge for m onths.. .but strictly hush-hush as far as the AEC was 
concerned. . .With modem detection instruments, it is a foregone 
conclusion that if the Hell bomb is at last a reality, the Russians know that 
it has been exploded and knows when it was exploded and how powerful it 
was."®
This example illustrates not only the recognition of a fundamental flaw in the AEC’s 
security precautions but also that those regulations perhaps needlessly infringed upon 
domestic rights in the interests of spurious assertions."^
Despite the opposition of a few bold critics, the AEC zealously clung to its 
stringent classification system throughout its history and the practice has been continued 
by its succcessor, the Department o f Energy. The DOE itself may have only a vague idea 
of the number o f documents that remain classified. In 1993 it estimated the number at 25 
million, yet in 1995 claimed that it maintained over 250 million classified documents.^* It 
is not enough, though, to count the reams o f material that ended up within locked file 
cabinets; one must also explore the consequences o f the AEC’s policies.
The AEC used its ability to restrict the dissemination o f information to encourage 
and maintain support for the military’s program of weapons development and testing.^^ 
Certainly, many people had at least a minimal awareness that an atomic detonation posed
"® The New M exican, November 8, 1952, 2.
The issue remains a valid one—who is served by such extreme precautions: The USSR 
duplicated US efforts and detonated a hydrogen device on August 12, 1953. Meanwhile, 
historians and other researchers are still trying to pry records from the AEC’s grasp that 
were produced during the early atomic period, in the mid-1940s.
National Research Council A Review o f the Department o f Energy Classification Policy 
and Practice (Washington, D C : National Academy Press, 1995) 12.
Anthony S. Mathews recognizes this as a universal problem: “When too much secrecy 
surrounds government institutions, the implementation o f  its policies discourages a 
feedback o f relevant information and increases the tendency o f pushing through its 
programmes come hell or high water.” The Darker Reaches o f Government, (Berkeley, 
CA' University o f California Press, 1978), 34.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
221
risks beyond the actual explosion itself. Certainly, too, the AEC knew that it could
reliably conceal neither an atom bomb nor its remnants—fallout and the dispersal o f
radioactive material. The military, though, had wanted an accelerated testing program
since (at least) 1947, and the government’s remote Pacific site was an expensive option.**®
In the wake o f the Navy’s Operation Crossroads (and perhaps envious of the spectacle), a
memorandum to the Army Chief of Staff fi'om Commanding Lieutenant General Hull
demonstrates that the Army not only wanted its share o f  atomic weapons, but that it
believed only public opinion stood between it and an exhorbitant arsenal o f bombs and
smaller, tactical weapons. Accordingly, Hull hoped to desensitize the American public;
tremendous monetary and other outlays [for Pacific testing] have at times 
been publicly justified by stressing radiological hazards.. .1 believe that it is 
high time to lay the ghost.. There appears to be a need for adequate 
education o f the people.. in order that the hysterical or alarmist complex 
now so prevalent may be corrected. . Alleviation o f their fears would be a 
matter o f reeducation over a long period o f time, and, until the public will 
accept the possibility o f an atomic explosion within a matter o f a hundred 
or so miles o f their homes.***
The outbreak o f the Korean War may be said to have helped initiate General Hull’s re­
education program since it gave both the military and the AEC an excuse for the 
development o f  a convenient and relatively inexpensive weapons testing site within the 
US. The Nevada Proving Ground became a reality despite the fact that the government’s 
experiences with fallout at Trinity, Crossroads, and subsequent Pacific testing vividly
**® Other countries, too, found remote, ocean, testing cost prohibitive. The Soviet Joe 
One was detonated continentally, and although Great Britain eventually chose an island 
site off the coast o f  Australia, they had seriously considered a site in the Scottish 
Highlands near Wick. y^ex ,U n d er the Cloud, 81.
*** International Physicians for the Prevention o f  Nuclear War and the Institute for Energy 
and Environmental Research Radioactive H eaven and  Earth  (New York, NY; The Apex 
Press) 53.
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demonstrated its unpredictability and potential for harm. The military got its way, though, 
and to avoid adverse public reaction, the AEC engineered an elaborate campaign that 
emphasized its ability to safely test weapons in the continental US—the education had 
begun.
It was not too difficult to convince the uninformed that weapons testing and fallout 
posed no hazards. After all, the few who knew the most facts about radioactive fallout 
either worked for the government or were oppressed by it. The AEC held licensure 
authority over atomic material, and any scientist who might choose to speak out against 
continental testing or individual who earned his livelihood through government contracts 
could find himself unemployed. Additionally, the AEC’s ability to classify knowledge 
meant that there was little information readily and conveniently available to the public that 
might have cast doubt upon the AEC’s assertions of safety. In the absence, then, of 
contradictory information, the comforting ‘spin’ delivered by the AEC prevailed.
*  *  *
Even though congress delegated authority for atomic science to a civilian 
commission, the military wasted no time in usurping that civilian authority and insinuating 
its own agenda and methods into the development and testing of atomic weapons—turning 
the AEC into little more than a military functionary. Indeed, a transformative trend in 
military influence is evidenced by the correspondence between the military’s weapons 
development and its requests for a continental testing site.**^  In 1947 the AEC received
42 The military relied upon Los Alamos for weapons development.
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the first request for a continental site; the request was renewed in 1948 but the AEC
remained hesitant “largely because o f unresolved questions concerning off-site hazards to
the United States public.” Again, in 1949, the continental testing issue came before the
AEC because of a “need” for a test in advance of the planned Pacific Greenhouse testing
series. Finally, in 1950, “security of a far distant Pacific site” and “Korean logistics”
overrode earlier concerns of off-site hazards and the AEC approved a site in Southern
Nevada, less than seventy miles firom Las Vegas.**" Reason itself, though, would seem to
disallow (to some extent, at least) this argument since if the Korean War were the primary
reason for a change of testing location fi’om the Pacific to Nevada, then once the situation
stabilized and theUnited Statesbegan to pull out of that country, why did testing not return
to the Pacific site? The AEC offers, perhaps, the solution to the puzzle.
A close reading o f the same AEC document reveals a subtle, but different set of
reasons than “Korean logistics” or Pacific security. Indeed, economy and efficiency
seems to have played the greater role.**** Under the heading “Reasons for a Continental
Site” the first specifically identified:
The basic reason was the material advance in pace of weapons 
development foreseen if Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory could have a 
backyard laboratory where developmental tests could be quickly mounted 
and quickly held .. coupled with this primary reason were obvious
**" “Summary of Minutes Committee on Operational Future, NPG” January 14, 1953.
**** This analysis is also evidenced by an announcement made publicly in 1952 by AEC 
officials at the opening o f the Tumbler-Snapper series; “we needed a continental test site 
because the program was moving, by necessity, very rapidly, and the delays which are 
involved in making overseas tests were such that the program was necessarily being 
seriously delayed, you cannot have overseas tests without planning and worry. . .Dollar 
wise, aside from overseas effort, etc., I think the taxpayer, the country as a whole, you and 
myself can feel that this is a wise expenditure of money.” See “Appendix B—Texts to be 
used in briefings by Carrol L. Tyler, Dr. Alvin C. Graves, Everett F. Cos and Dr. Gaelen 
Fast”, [undated], Tumbler-Snapper, Vol. 2, CIC 39040.
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secondary advantages in economy of manpower (particularly scientific), 
time (of scientists and in gaining new weapons goals) and o f money /®
The promise (“foreseen”) o f more efficient and economical weapons development appears
to be the primary reason why the AEC agreed to continental weapons testing and why,
finally, only Americans were injured by those same weapons that the military so wanted
rushed into service/®
*^IbicL, 4.
‘*® This somewhat unsatisfactory conclusion may be disputed (forever) by historians. It is, 
after all, their penchant, if  not their duty, to engage in interpretational quibbles. In this 
instance though there may be no other choice, since even the AEC, in its own document, 
could not pin down an exact cause.
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THE NEVADA PROVING GROUND
. .  .somewhere in the sands o f the desert 
A shape w ith lion body and the head o f a  man, 
A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun.
Is m oving its slaw thighs, while a ll about it 
Reel shadows o f the indignant desert birds.
William Butler Yeats
Many take some small, and too often smug, comfort in asserting that no global war 
has ever been fought on American soil, but they are wrong. This nation fought the cold 
war in the Nevada desert, and, like all wars, there were casualties. These soldiers did not 
die with dog tags, they did not come home in body bags or govemment-issue coffins, and 
at their funerals no soldiers fired rounds in salute to their sacrifice or played Taps at their 
passing. With the cold war over, the United States stands proudly above the disorganized 
rubble that was the USSR and claims victory. But that does not tell the whole story, for 
where—in what office, what file, what government safe—is the tally o f  the war’s toll?
That gruesome balance sheet would be embarrasing indeed, for it would show that the 
only casualties o f the cold war fell victim to fiiendly fire. Unlike the atom bomb itself that 
dramatically announces its presence in a furious burst o f energy, power, light—radiation is 
insidious. It kills quietly, sometimes slowly, and its effects often go unnoticed, 
unrecognized, hiding behind other causes. The victims o f the cold war, then, remain, for
225
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the most part, unnamed, faceless. It would take a talented artist indeed to memorialize the 
diversity o f these casualties—the weathered Nevada cowboy, the pigtailed Utah schoolgirl, 
the paunchy Indiana farmer, the NYU student sampling mysteriously radioactive rain. The 
only failures of these, and so many others like them, were commonplace: they drank 
contaminated milk, or ate bread baked with radioactive wheat, or drew stick figures in the 
radioactive talc that settled on the Buick in the driveway. They stand witness to a war that 
did not end.
We cannot count the cold war’s casualties, but it is possible to look into the 
program itself—to the military’s approbation o f the Nevada Proving Ground—to find the 
seeds of their suffering. This thesis nears its conclusion at the historical moment when the 
hazardous practices o f the nation’s testing program—secrecy, media manipulation, 
misapplication of science, and an exaggerated military objective—coalesced and became 
inseparable from the program itself. This examination o f the Nevada Proving Ground 
demonstrates that with the inception o f continental testing, atomic governance had taken 
root, matured, and blossomed into full, poisonous, flower. Indeed, even the birth of 
continental testing was marked with an odious taint of deceit and manipulation.
Evidence suggests that the AEC hedged its bets on the proposed weapons site and 
misled the president, proposing that any continental testing would be minimal. And, based 
upon that proposal (supported, incidentally, by the National Security Council), Truman 
had every reason to believe that scientists fi'om Lawrence Livermore or Los Alamos might 
just need to spend a day or two in the Nevada desert to solve some puzzling experimental 
riddle that would otherwise have required a trip to the Marshall Islands. Indeed, the
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record fully supports that assumption. Truman authorized the testing o f atomic weapons 
at the Nevada Proving Ground on December 18, 1950 before the Army Corps o f 
Engineers had completed studies on radiological factors because the site would be used 
for a “few relatively low-order detonations” on an "“emergency basis.”* There is no doubt, 
however, that the AECs intentions were distinctively different than those it proposed to 
the president, an ‘operation’, not an ‘emergency experiment’, was certainly already in the 
works. Six weeks after Truman approved continental testing, the first unimaginatively- 
named shot o f Operation Ranger, Able, had caused doors to slam in nearby Las Vegas, 
and four more detonations followed within two weeks. There were, obviously, more than 
a ‘few’ shots necessary, and the elaborate maneuvers planned by the military belie any 
characterization of the tests as ‘emergencies. ’ Slightly more than a year later, by the time 
Truman left office, the military had detonated twelve atom bombs in the Nevada desert 
with three equal or greater than the 21 KT weapon dropped on Nagasaki. It was, 
however, only the beginning. By October, 1958, the United States detonated 119 atomic 
weapons in Nevada and all but 23 released radioactive fallout off site.
When the civilians lost the tug-of-war over atomic energy, the military took a 
trophy—the Nevada Proving Ground. There, and in Washington where decisions 
continued to be made, military objective reigned supreme, achieving primacy over all other 
considerations, including ethical responsibilities to the commander-in-chief and, (so very 
importantly) moral responsibilities to the health o f participants and iimocent civilians. In 
his excellent history of atomic testing, Richard Miller drew an enthusiastic portrait; “The
* Washington Post, December 19, 1978, 12.
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generals rushed to the chalkboards. There would be war games to end all war games. 
Troops. Tanks. Artillery. Paratroopers.”  ^ The Army played its games (not unlike 
Admiral Blandy’s Navy) against an unbeatable opponent and to try and win—to harness 
the bomb Iot something, perhaps just pride—it pressured and cajoled the AEC onto its 
team.
The complicity o f the AEC in the military’s program o f atomic game-playing, 
when combined with established behaviors within the AECs institutional structure itself, 
contributed to what we can now recognize as yet another step along a perilous pathway. 
The decision to locate the test site in Nevada offers an ideal opportunity to explore the 
ramifications of the screening out o f disadvantageous scientific opinion that had become 
commonplace (since Operation Crossroads) within the nation’s atomic program.^ In 
considering the Nevada location, the AEC relied upon only those scientific opinions that 
supported its intentions. According to the AEC, the choice o f the Southern Nevada site 
was based upon the “approval o f eminent advisory scientists as to safety factors” who
 ^Richard Miller Under the Cloud (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1986).
 ^Scientists were, of course, crucial and as the number o f ‘approved’ scientists became 
fewer in number, the government increasingly relied upon a small coterie o f ‘experts’ that 
increasingly became less and less iimovative, supporting each others’ opinions and 
apparently hesitant to point out discrepancies ( if  indeed, they noticed them) and unable, 
or unwilling, to inject any element o f innovation into the program. It is perhaps only 
through hindsight that this becomes obvious. Eisenhower framed the problem in terms of 
numbers, not variety o f opinion, and in 1953 indicated that “[national security] in this 
atomic age is endangered by a shortage o f first-rate research scientists, particularly 
physicists.” c/owrAia/, May 18, 1953, 1. Eisenhower remained alarmed though and
in 1954 commented in relation to the denial o f a security clearance for Robert 
Oppenheimer, said ‘We’ve got to handle this so all our scientists are not made out to be 
Reds, because that Goddam McCarthy is just likely to try such a thing.” Hewlett and 
HoU, Atom s fo r  Peace and War (Berkeley, CA: University o f California Press, 1989) 89.
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claimed that the site was suitable even though it was “only 65 miles from Las Vegas.”** By 
accepting that recommendation, however, the AEC ignored the 1945 advice o f Stafford 
Warren, the primary medical officer on the Manhattan Project who witnessed Trinity. 
Although Warren had recommended that no test of a weapon of Trinity’s size be repeated 
in any area not “free of population” for at least 150 miles, the AEC detonated three 
weapons larger than the Trinity device during the first 1951 testing season at the Nevada
** I acknowledge that I have chosen to take this evidence at its ‘face’ value, yet recognize 
that the reasons given in 1953 for the establishment of the test site may be more self- 
serving that factual, particularly since the motivations of historical actors (and particularly 
those who relied upon an earlier assertion o f ‘emergency’ for the test site’s creation) may 
have changed. “Summary o f  Minutes Committee on Operational Future, NPG” January 
14, 1953, CIC 26306. Certainly, the supportive influence o f Nevada Senator McCarran 
may have been significant. McCarran sat securely on the military appropriations 
committee and favored the Southern Nevada site and was influenced, undoubtedly, by the 
promise of economic benefits to Nevada that testing would bring. Additionally, and 
officially, the site was large, remote, and not prone to rain. See too, Titus, Bombs in the 
Bakcyard, 56, 57.
An internal memorandum prepared in anticipation of the formal meeting to settle the 
details of the official report for the choice o f the Nevada Test Site, prepared also in 1953, 
includes some points left out of the final memorandum mentioned above. That document 
indicates that fallout was a consideration, and shows that the AEC was perfectly aware 
that a good portion o f the United States would be exposed to perhaps “prohibitive 
concentrations” o f fallout. The memorandum indicates that a lthou^  “the probable 
distribution o f  waste from carefully conducted nuclear tests has been described. . The 
fact was established during the Eniwetok tests o f 1948 that no prohibitive concentrations 
o ffa ll-ou t were observed beyond a radius o f300 m iles from  the test site. The suspicious 
samples collected within this radius came from air-craft runway water following rain 
showers.. It is also self-evident that fall-out occurs anywhere toward the surface under 
the vertical projection o f the radioactive cloud aloft. It has been shown, however, that this 
fallout has a  negligible concentration a t the surface outside a radius o f600 m iles from 
the test site. . .”  [emphasis mine] Memorandum from Carroll L. Tyler, Manager Santa Fe 
Operations Office “Documentation o f Establishment of Continental Test Site” September 
14, 1953,326 US Atomic Energy commission. Location; LANL, Collection Records 
Center C-2 D-44, Folder Comm, to Study on Future of Nevada Proving Grounds” 
Defendant’s exhibit Prescott v. US, DX 21914.
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Test Site.® The AEC could so comfortably reach a decision contrary to earlier 
recommendations because no agency but the AEC had access to the records of the 
Manhattan Project or knew the identities o f  the mysteriously unnamed “eminent advisory 
scientists” that the AEC said it had relied upon in 1950.® The self-serving and dangerous 
decision to ignore an informed warning about the safety o f weapons testing, is, however, 
only a start.
It seems clear that as the military assumed greater control over atomic 
development, the commission paid less and less attention to the ramifications of testing.
As has been shown, in 1948 the commission disallowed a continental site based upon 
safety considerations.’ Yet in anticipation, perhaps, o f the military’s push for a continental 
site and accompanying troop maneuvers. Dr. Shields Warren, Director of the Division of 
Biology and Medicine, contacted Dr. Joseph G. Hamilton at the University o f California in 
July 1949 and requested his help in evaluating radioactive hazards. Warren, who is not
® “Report on Test 16 July 1945” Warren to Groves 21 July 1945, TSCMED. Trinity’s 
yield was estimated at 21 KT; o f the ten detonations at the Nevada Test Site during the 
first season, three exceeded 21 KT.
® It is important to remember that secrecy continued to permeate every element o f the 
program. William Twitchell, who had been in charge o f a California radiation laboratory, 
was hospitalized at the Letterman Army Hospital for security reasons so that anything he 
might say during periods of delirium would be safeguarded. Bulletin o f the Atom ic 
Scientists Mscy 1953, 150.
’ It is important to note the effort that Lilienthal individually expended in his effort to 
understand atomic weapons and their consequences. In mid-1949, before he resigned as 
Commission Chairman, Lilienthal made note o f his concern: “How many atomic bombs, 
set off within a short space o f time, will so contaminate the atmosphere as to kill off a 
substantial part o f the world’s population. Stafford Warren and others have emoted about 
this, placing it very low; E.O. Lawrence [of Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, a long­
time participant in atomic weapons development] and his people think this is rot. . .Now 
we get a report, fi'om one individual only but pursuant to a request I made, that puts it 
very low. We must try to get a reasonable answer. What a business!” Lilienthal, Dicay, 
553.
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related and should not be confused with Stafford Warren o f Operation Crossroads, 
nevertheless tried, like the earlier Warren, to temper the military’s enthusiasm for atomic 
weaponry by attempting to instill some realistic concern for radiation’s dangers/ He, like 
Stafford Warren, failed.
Hamilton received all the health information collected from Trinity, Japan, Bikini 
and Eniwetok, and by November 28, 1950 had completed his research. Hamilton’s 
analysis focused upon acute injuries that might result from a serviceman’s radiation 
exposure. Significantly, he warned against the very things that troops would eventually 
face at Camp Desert Rock. For example, Hamilton noted that the chances o f radiation 
injury would probably be enhanced if  the exposed individuals had “been subject to 
previous stresses such as prolonged physical effort, loss of sleep and other fatigue” and 
that the effects of inhaled material might be significant, producing “a severe and possibly 
fatal radiation injury to the pulmonary tissue.” Hamilton believed that there existed 
insufficient data upon which to base more reliable predictions o f  injury, and his conclusion 
offers a glimpse into the macabre subcurrents of thought that flowed through this early
* The AEC demanded that the military assume radiation safety responsibility. Letter to 
“Commanding Officer Test Command AFSWP [Armed Forces Special Weapons Project] 
from K.F. Hertford, Director, Office o f Test Operations, June 2, 1952. Prescott v. US,
CIV LV 80-143, Defendant’s Exhibit DX 21920. The military’s committment to radiation 
safety, though, turned out to be negligible. In 1953 the Test Director complained to Seth 
Woodruff^ Field Manager o f the Las Vegas Office, that although a  great deal o f 
decontamination work followed a test, the technicians o f the military rad-safe group that 
remained was “not well-qualified. . I  was questioned by the rad-safe officer and technician 
regarding the proper film developer temerature to be used .. and dosimeter techniques.. 
questions were raised which indicated there was a real problem o f being able to 
differentiate between gamma and beta radiation in the film measurement and analysis.” 
Memo dated 28 May 1953, 326 Us Atomic Energy Commission, LANL Records Center, 
Collection C-2, Folder Rad-Safe (Upshot-Knothole) TR 306.
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stage o f  atomic weapons tests. Even as he urged controlled experimentation, Hamilton
significantly qualified his proposal:
For both politic and scientific reasons I think it would be advantageous 
to secure what data can be obtained by using large monkeys. .
.Scientifically, the use o f such animals bears the disadvantage o f the fact 
that they are considerably smaller. . and evaluation o f their subjective 
symptoms is infinitely more difficult. I f  this is to be done in humans, I 
feel that those concerned in the Atomic Energy Commission would be 
subject to considerable criticism, as admittedly this would have a little of 
the Buchenwald touch.®
Unfortunately, history has borne out not only Hamilton’s obvious concerns, but also the
disdain for human radiation experimentation that Hamilton predicted. Unfortunately too,
however, Warren’s emphasis upon preventative health and safety, based upon hazards
fully recognized at the time, deteriorated within the institutional culture o f atomic
guardianship, the AEC.
By September 1952, AEC oversight had become notional, at best. After twenty
atomic bombs had sent tons o f radioactive debris into the air and eventually onto
teetertotters in Louisiana and milksheds in Dakota, in September 1952 AEC Chairman
Gordon Dean “said he was interested in knowing how responsibility for health and safety”
was determined and applied.*® In accordance with the AECs promise to the president and
the National Security Council to consider each continental test in light o f its consequences,
though, the commission should have asked that question before the testing began.
® Hamilton to Warren, November 28, 1950; original in the Bancroft Library.
*® Memorandum to Brig. Gen. K. E. Fields, Director of \Clitary Application fi'om Acting 
Secretary to the Commission, Harold D. Anamosa, September 26, 1952, US DOE 
Archives, RG Commission, Collection Secretariat, Box 1264, Folder MRA 7-1, Proving 
Grounds, Vol. I.
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By 1953, after two years o f continental testing, the commission had been 
transformed into a board almost completely ignorant, apparently, of the most fundamental 
qualities o f atomic testing itself and one that only superficially directed or controlled the 
decisions made by its operational staff. When the commissioners learned that 
thunderstorms might result in heavy, isolated concentrations of radioactive fallout, they 
asked Alvin Graves, the site’s test director, how weather affected the testing o f 
weapons.** Graves’ response was, at best, vague: “. .  .what was safer for nearby areas 
might be more dangerous for distant regions, and vice versa.” Graves then agreed with 
Commissioner Eugene Zuckert’s conclusion that “a lot seemed dependent on good 
luck.” *^
*  *  *
Commissioner Zuckert’s reference to luck betrays a realization by the AEC, and a 
reminder, that atmospheric testing was more than a nation’s need for defense, more than 
bombs, more than fallout; it was—as Stafford Warren tried to convince a self-indulgent 
Admiral Blandy—about human beings. It is certainly worthwhile to examine institutional 
culture, to look at the ways that individual personalities shaped cold war policies; how the
** There was really no reason for anyone associated with atomic testing to not recognize 
the hazards of thunderstorms and âllout. Trinity, itself^ was delayed until thunderstorms 
passed for fear that fallout would not become dispersed, but instead could become trapped 
within the storm cell and deliver a potent radioactive stew onto a small area. The 
problems o f secrecy, though, will rear their ugly heads indiscriminately: “. . .many 
govemmnet enterprises go wrong because unpalatable facts are screened out and mistaken 
decisions consequently go unreviewed.” J.R. Lucas, Democracy and Participation 
(Harmondsworth; Baltimore, MD: Penguin, 1976) 155.
*^  Fuller, The D ay We Bombed Utah, 36-38.
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atomic program paired secrecy and deception from the very beginning; how the 
government first separated atomic scientists from the everyday world and then capitalized 
upon the scientists’ own philosphical and professional divisions; and, how the government 
manipulated the media to serve its own ends. History, though, properly asks us to look 
beyond the processes o f the politically prominent (and also, in the case of the atomic 
establishment, the administratively and institutionally secretive); to remember, as Linda 
Kerber urges, that “history involves simultaneously the stories of the powerful and the 
stories of the weak.”*"
Accordingly, it is importam now to track the decisions o f the mighty as they made 
a journey from the Washington conference room to the Nevada desert and confront the 
impact of those decisions upon the less powerful, the weak. What did the practices and 
behaviors that characterized the atomic testing program mean to Southern Nevada? the 
Utah schoolgirl? the soldier in a fox hole less than four miles from an atomic detonation? 
the rest of the nation? These people are the main focus of this chapter because their 
stories reveal that by using the bomb as a measure of national strenth to keep the Soviets 
at bay, the nation put iimocent people directly in the line o f fire.
The atom bomb, as Operation Crossroads demonstrated, was not a precision 
weapon. Its effects were terribly widespread and to capture its diverse impact, this 
chapter will examine the dual facets of atomic testing, those who set off the bombs and 
those affected by them. First, then, and even though it is clear that the military played a 
fundamental role in the decision to christen a continental testing site, it is important to
*" Linda K. Kerber, in “Teaching American History” The American Scholar (Winter, 
1998) 99.
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look also at the ways it positioned itself in the institutional heirarchy and came to ‘occupy’ 
the Nevada Proving Ground despite some tentative attempts by the AEC (with at least 
some concern for radiation safety and prompted additionally by laboratories that wanted 
to preserve the area for scientific studies) to curtail, at least to some extent, the military’s 
extravagance/** The military, though, once firmly entrenched, blatantly disregarded not 
only commonsensical but also scientific approaches that could have made testing a safer 
enterprise/® Second, this chapter will show how the military’s overweening self-
*** Even the weapons laboratories had become weary of the military by 1953. Norris 
Bradbury, Director o f Los Alamos objected to the military monopolization o f the site; ‘T 
regard the tendency to use the NPG. . .for weapon system tests, for civil defense.effects 
tests, for troop indoctrination and maneuvers, and for the reportorial press as quite outside 
the original concept o f the site. . this trend, if continued, can force us to abandon this site 
for no other reason than that the military has taken it over. . it may sometime be necessary 
to recall that this area was actually established at the specific request o f the LASL for its 
own needs.” Another member of Los Alamos focused on the unique characterists o f 
atomic testing and consequent limitations imposed: “If these five sites [at Yucca Basin] 
are contaminated by being used for other purposes they are not available for 
developmental tests.” “Summary of Minutes Committee on Operation Future, NPG” 6, 
CIC 26306. LASL also tried to get the AEC to curtail the military’s influence by pointing 
out (in a later memorandum) that military involvement seriously compromised security by 
allowing access to personnel who had not been sufBciently ‘cleared.’ “Memorandum to 
Reuben E. Cole, Chairman fi'om Dr. Ralph Carlisle Smith, LASL” May 8, 1953.
*® The conclusion is unavoidable that by July 1951 the ‘tail’ was energetically wagging the 
dog. The military demanded that the AEC report directly to the military liaison committee, 
and had decided that the AEC had become simply a “contractor” for the military— 
accordingly, the armed forces would present to the AEC its specifications for weapons 
that the AEC would then provide. A memorandum from the NClitary Liaison Committee 
to the Chairman o f the AEC proposed that to avoid ‘misunderstandings’ the AEC report 
directly to the military on a monthly basis o f  “all the latest concepts and possibilities in the 
atomic weapon field plus the status and progress o f all previously presented concepts” 
together with study plans, designs, specifications, and time estimates for delivery; 
quarterly reports from the AEC summarizing and updating the above and the same from 
the contractors and laboraties engaged in development; and letters “when there arises any 
change or an actual or foreseeable delay. . [including] the reasons therefor, alternatives. . 
and new times estimates.” ‘Memorandum for the Chairman, Atomic Energy 
Commission; Subject: Nfilitary Guidance in the Atomic Weapon Field” from NClitary 
Liaison Committee, July 18, 1951. RG 326 US Atomic Energy Commission, Location
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importance, not policy, may have harmed the lives o f some of those who, perhaps unaware 
o f it at the time, were touched by the atom bomb.
*  *  *
So, what did it mean to the Test Site, to Nevada, to the rest o f the US, for the 
militaiy to get the chance to p lcy  with atomic weapons? This section looks at the 
military’s use o f  the Test Site to explore the ways it not only maneuvered the AEC into 
developing the site; but, also, how it overran all AEC objections to military plans for the 
site that seemed (to the AEC) either irrelevant or hazardous.*® When the AEC asked the 
National Security Council and the president to dedicate a portion of the Nevada Bombing 
and Gunnery Range to the atom bomb, it promised to maintain vigilance (and although
ALOO, Folder MR & A 9 FY-52. The president approved the military’s proposition on 
September 10, 1952. See Memorandum from the Executive Office of the president. 
National Security Council, December 1, 1952. 3. US DOE ARCHIVES, 326 US Atomic 
Energy Commission, Collection Secretariat, Box 1277, Folder O&M 12 National Security 
Council.
*® The AEC was, of course, in the best position to identify possible hazards—and also to 
have prevented them. Allan Favish, in a comprehensive article aimed at the burden- 
shifting provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act and the consequences o f those 
provisions on downwinders and atomic veterans, details the wide range o f information 
available to, and even produced by, the AEC prior to the institution o f continental testing. 
His research suggests that definitive links had been established between radiation and 
anemia, lung cancer, diseases o f the blood and lymphatic systems, bone disorders, 
malignant changes over long periods o f  time, leukemia, and stomach cancer. “Radiation 
Injury and the Atomic Veteran” H astings Law Journal, 32; 1 (1981), 939.
One o f the sites under consideration, on the Carolina coast, offered the significant 
benefit o f prevailing winds that would have swept fallout away from populated areas and 
over the Atlantic was discarded because o f its “relatively great distance from Los Alamos, 
does not have the necessary Government-controlled land area.. .” Memorandum from 
Carroll L. Tyler, September 14, 1953, (see note. 4, supra?).
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reliant upon the somewhat questionable objectivity o f its “recognized experts”)
optimistically declared:
some o f the most urgent atomic weapons tests can certainly be 
conducted well within acceptable limits of public radiological safety.
Each specific test operation would o f course be subject to  examination 
and approval by recognized experts.”*’
On the contrary, although the AEC may have hoped it could retain authority, the military
had only to cite a military necessity to overcome AEC reluctance or threatened
disapproval. By 1951, even the AEC had to concede, at least privately, that the military
was running the show.
The military wasted no time in positioning its objectives above those o f the AEC.
After the military’s successes with their first tests at the Nevada Test Site held in January
1951 (code-named Operation Ranger) they immediately began planning for two successive
operations, Buster and Jangle. Problems arose, however, when the AECs test director,
officially in charge of all tests at the site, objected to the Army’s planned use o f animals,
specifically 32 dogs and 26 sheep for thermal bum experiments and “bio-medical”
experiments on 15 dogs and “some rats.” The director lodged his objections based upon
adverse public reaction (a continual, and perhaps since so often mentioned, primary
concern) and the fact that any data received fi’om the experiments would only duplicate
previous experiments. Identified in an AEC Operations Report as a “difference of
opinion” the problem was summarized “as one of concept of responsibility and authority
o f  the Test Director.” The Department o f  Defense, however, told the commission that
“military requirements are not matters for decision by either the commission or its test
17 Ibid.
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organization.” In the end, the AEC refused to support its test director’s recommendations 
against the planned experiments and surrendered instead to the Department o f Defense. 
The Army’s animal experiments remained features o f Operations Buster and Jangle.**
Men, too, joined animals as victims of military requirements as the military sought 
not only to introduce troops to the atom bomb but also to explore the psychological 
reactions o f exposed soldiers.*® In 1951, the AEC successfully limited troop participation 
to one shot and required that soldiers remain five and one-half miles fi’om ground zero 
during Buster-Jangle.^® Severely disappointed with the results o f this limited exposure, the
** “Atornic Energy Commission Operations Planned for Buster-Jangle” and attachment 
“Report by the Director o f Military Application” September 5, 1951, US DOE Archives, 
326 US Atomic Energy Commission, Collection 1951-58 Secretariat, Box 1261, Folder 
MR & A-9 Buster-Jangle, Vol. 1. See also note 50 infra., on the prioritization o f  positive 
public relations.
Affects to industry and public relations were a major feature o f Buster-Jangle, even if 
radiation safety was not. The military ordered ‘long range cloud tracking to Atlantic 
Coast” not for possible feUout measurements to civilians, but “for puposes o f industrial 
protection and AEC public relations.” The government had been concerned about 
radiatioactive fallout to Eastman Kodak laboratories, who threatened to claim extensive 
damages should its photographic processes suffer. It became one of the only private 
entities in the nation privileged to advance information o f any atomic test after Trinity. 
Miller, Under the Cloud, 58-59.
*® ‘Tndoctrination in essential physical protective measures under simulated combat 
conditions, and observation o f the psychological effects o f an atomic explosion are reasons 
for this desired participation.” Memorandum fi’om NClitary Liaison Committee to 
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, July 16, 1951.
^  For Buster-Jangle, the military had requested permission to expose servicemen to  
excessive levels o f radiation, considering the AEC’s limit of 3.9r “unrealistic.” Shields 
Warren objected, the AEC turned authority over to the Test Director Carroll Tyler, but 
Warren wasted no time in warning the him that the Division of Biology & Medicine took 
their job (at least under Warren’s direction) seriously. In a letter to the Santa Fe 
Operations office of October 11, 1951 conceded that although the Test Director had 
ultimate control over the military’s request, the Test Director would have to explain 
thoroughly to Warren why he allowed excesses: “this Division does not look lightly upon 
radiation excesses. Only true emergencies should be granted special privileges” and if 
such emergency should arise, the Test Director would be required to present thorough 
documentation including “full explanation as to why the job cannot be performed in
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Army planned more extensive maneuvers for the 1952 test series. The AEC rebuffed the 
Army’s arguments and established a seven-mile limit for trenched troops for Operation 
Tumbler-Snapper in 1952. The Army, though, wanted its troops stationed less than four 
miles from the site o f  the explosion—a proposal considered ludicrous by Shields Warren.^* 
He was less concerned with the initial burst of radiation than with the thermal energy of 
the blast—energy which he calculated would scorch “most anything” within two and one- 
half miles.^ Considering Warren’s limit “tactically unrealistic,” the Army and Air Force
another manner, how many people are to be over-exposed, how much over-exposure, and 
. . .  the recent exposure hiAory o f the individuals and what is planned to enable them to 
pay off the over-exposure.” Additionally, Warren told Tyler that he believed the military 
should be able to accomodate the requirements with only minimal inconvenience and ‘Tn 
other worlds, compliance with the permissible limit should become a mark o f  distinction in 
the exercise o f ingenuity, rather than a concession to be avoided upon pretext. 
Indoctrination o f this attitude early in this series may save us much trouble, and possible 
radiation injuries, in the several series to come.” Letter included in the “Minutes” of the 
Advisory Committee for Biology and Medicine, September 12 and 13, 1952. US DOE 
Archives, 326 US Atomic Energy Commission, Collection Secretariat, Box 1271, Folder 
B&M7 Biology & Medicine adv. CMTE, vol. 1. The meeting was held after Dr. Warren 
had left his position as Director o f the division, and is indicative o f  insider recognition o f 
Dr. Warren’s strident refusal to back down to the military that his letter was used as an 
example o f the ‘safe’ nature o f the 3.9r limit.
Shields Warren should not be confused with Stafford Warren, who left government 
service permanently right after Operation Crossroads.
^  Dr. Warren’s first letter illustrates the disparate interests within the atomic testing 
program, and particularly the importance of public relations to the AEC:
“The Division o f  Biology and Medicine recognizes that it is not its function to set 
standards for the military nor to impede the operations o f the Department o f Defense. 
However the test and the Continental Proving Ground are the responsibility o f the 
commission both in fact and in the public mind.
“The Division o f  Biology and Medicine recommends against permitting troops to 
be closer to ground zero than the seven miles used in the Desert Rock [1951] operation 
for the following reasons: 1. The Continental Proving Ground is o f great value to the 
program o f the Atomic Energy Commission and has been accepted by the public as safe.
2. Accidents occuring at the time and place of an atomic explosion are magnified by the 
press out o f all proportion to their importance, and anay injury or death during the 
operation might well have servions adverse effects. 3. The explosion is experimental in
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launched a letter-writing campaign, and the AEC backed down. The AEC’s Los Alamos 
manager suggested that the AEC simply relieve itself o f responsibility. That hint was the 
tool the commission needed; it suggested that the military prepare a safety plan acceptable 
to the test manager; if, however, “officials of the Department o f Defense.. .still feel that a 
military requirement justifies the maneuver, the commission would enter no objection.”^  
The military ultimately decided to place its troops within 7,000 feet of ground zero—and 
the AEC, while indicating that its own safety precautions for civilians remained in effect, 
deferred to military objectives and admitted that there was “the necessity for realistic 
training by the military in all fields, often accompanied by serious injuries, and that such 
training was also necessary in the field o f atomic weapons.” *^* The military may have 
readily admitted to the AEC in 1953 that it expected that serious injury could result fi'om
type and its yield cannot be predicted with accuracy.” Warren to Brigadier General K.E. 
Fields, Director, AEC Division o f Military Applications, March 25, 1952.
Additionally, the desert sand was “thermally nonideal.” Since an intensely hot 
“preshock thermal layer” could be expected to surge ahead o f  the shock wave, carrying 
“dust, smoke, and heated air,” the effects on troops in foxholes were unknown, but 
potentially lethal. Miller, Under the Cloud, 139.
Warren probably relied upon Stafford Warren’s report after Trinity that emphasized the 
termal effects o f the blast, “several times greater than that expected.” Trinity eviscerated 
jack rabbits more than 800 yards fi'om zero and a farm house three miles away suffered 
“extensive damage” including doors tom loose. He predicted “severe casualties” to any 
personnel within two miles and severe eye damage to those within five to six miles o f zero, 
“sufficient to put personnel out o f action several days if not permanently.” Warren to 
Groves, 21 July 1945, TSCMED.
^  “The Commission has approved the attendance o f a military combat unit.. .for the 
purpose o f  indoctrination and training o f individuals and organizations.. .No responsibility 
was accepted for this administrative movement, security control or support o f this 
personnel but the authority to impose necessary operational restrictions on their 
participation was reserved. You will set the criteria of time, place, radiological safety and 
security necessary. . .” “Designation o f Authority as AEC Test Director for Buster- 
Jangle”, US DOE Archives, 326 US Atomic Energy Commission, Collection 1951-1958 
Secretariat Files, Box 1261, Folder MP & A-7 Buster Jangle, Vol. 1. See also NCUer, 
Under the Cloud, 142.
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troop maneuvers with atom bombs, but veterans since have spent years trying to get the
government to admit that their service in Nevada trenches and in the midst o f  radioactive
dust may have caused their cataracts, their cancers/®
Warren tried (albeit fruitlessly) to protect not only troops, but also civilians, from
military extravagance. Although there were civilian injuries from radioactive material at
the test site (particularly employees o f government contractors) it is clear that fallout
needlessly constituted the greatest hazard to civilians off-site. As was demonstrated by
both Trinity and Baker, the amount o f radioactive material exploded into the air
corresponded with the proximity o f the bomb’s detonation to the surface. Accordingly, in
1951, Warren recommended against a military experiment that would involve a tower
shot—a method to detonate a bomb close to the surface that deviates from a safer, plane-
delivered “air-drop” bomb that would explode at a higher altitude. It appears that Warren
recognized that the armed forces might not be convinced by his appeals to radiation safety,
so he also mentioned the problem o f public relations:
It is not possible for us to disregard a potential long-term inhalation 
hazard. There would be a continually recurring problem of dust 
contaminated with material o f long half-life being blown around by the 
winds. The arid character o f the region increases this hazard.. .From 
the policy standpoint, hazards that might arouse alarm and prejudice 
against its future use should be avoided. . .We would have no objections 
to such a test being carried out in an area where much o f the fallout 
material would land over the ocean.. .eliminat[ing] the problem of 
recurrent spread of contaminated dust by the winds.^®
Cited by Favish, “Radiation Injury and the Atomic Veteran” 945, n. 39.
^  Cataracts and eye injury was the most common immediately-recognizable consequence. 
Six soldiers from Harrisburg, Pennsylvania suffered eye injury from witnessing blasts. Las 
Vegas Sun, March 20, 1955, 1.
^  Office Memorandum to General James McCormack, Jr., Director Division o f Military 
Applications from Shields Warren, M.D., Director Division of Biology and Medicine, 
February 21, 1951. US DOE Archives, Collection DMA, Box 3783, Foler MRS 7.
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Three months later, an unnamed committee met to “consider the feasibility and condition’ 
for the shot that Warren had warned against. The committee overruled Warren, 
specifically addressing his warnings concerning inhalation hazards by relying, as had 
become the custom, on scientific opinion that conformed to the military’s (and thus, 
AEC’s) wishes;
It is not obvious that a very nonhomogeneous distribution o f radiation is 
always more toxic and therefore less tolerable than a uniform 
distribution. . .Many pathologists do not believe that cancer is due to a 
somatic mutation which produces a malignant ce ll.. .when such 
[insolubale and radioactive] particles are breathed, however, large 
particles are filtered o u t.. .with the result that the number o f particles o f 
diameter, greater than 5 microns which find their way into the lungs is 
negligjble.^^
Later, Warren had to combat the military’s request for a “deep sub surface shot” to 
produce a “low cloud”—a shot that could have been disasterous. He won. AEC meeting 
no. 584, July 27, 1951. US DOE Archives, 326 US Atomic Energy Commission, 
Collection 1951-58 Secretary Files, Box 1261, Folder MA& A-7, Buster-Jangle, Vol. 1.
The AEC might have taken a lesson fi’om history. Although under tremendous pressure 
to prove the viability o f the first atomic bomb. General Groves noted the Manhattan 
Project’s considerations for civilian populations following a tower shot: “With the bomb 
explosion only one hundred feet off the ground, we expected a great deal o f material fi"om 
the tower and the ground surrounding it would be made radioactive and carried as small 
particles for great distances through the air. . .we did not want the cloud, if one 
developed, to pass over any populated areas imtil its radioactive contents were thoroughly 
dissipated. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, 291-292. While Groves’ own personal (and 
often self-serving) recollections are admittedly problematic, this statement is substantially 
verified by Stafford Warren’s report and his emphasis on fallout.
There was widespread interest in the possibility detonating a weapon that would remove 
“something on the order of 50,000 cubic yards” o f material fi'om a bomb crater. It was a 
large committee by AEC standards, 20 nülitary, university, laboratory, and AEC 
individuals topped the list of those present, and the bottom o f the list mentioned “(And a 
few more)” “Meeting o f a Committee to Consider the Feasibility and Conditions for a 
Preliminary Radiologic Safety Shot for Jangle, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, May 21 
and 22, 1951” Prescott v. US, Defendant’s Exhibit DX390241.
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Warren’s warnings were ignored by a determined military, and tower shots—those that 
carried a large amount o f radioactive material onto ofiP-site locations—confirmed his 
predictions. The heavily-deleted minutes o f an AEC meeting in May 1952 illustrate that 
the commission considered (probably high) levels of off-site fallout. Warren warned the 
commission that it could not risk any shots larger than those already fired, and additionally 
to avoid tests when “winds in the upper air reach high velocities.” Chairman Dean, 
however, declined (apparently but not conclusively since a large portion of the minutes are 
still classified) to address the health consequences to which Dr. Warren alluded. Instead, 
recognizing the problem as one o f public relations and information management, 
suggested a “popular” article would “reduce the possibility o f  public anxiety.” *^ The 
AEC has become not the watchdog, but the accomplice o f the military.
*  *  *
As this discussion turns to the victims o f atomic testing, it is important to 
remember that the medical effects of radioactivity are, perhaps, as hard to pin down as the 
motivations o f historical actors. There are, after aU, many different radioactive elements 
with many different properties, potencies, and effects. While it is readily accepted that 
radiation causes various forms of cancer and probably distresses the immune system, even 
those “pure” sciences that promise to offer definitive answers become hesitant and 
indecisive about the effects o f radiation. It is a murky problem, compounded by the 
presence of so many other carcinogenic substances in our environment. For example.
28 AEC Commission Meeting No. 694, minutes. May 14, 1952, item 3.
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radiation can cause lung cancer, but so can cigarettes and petroleum fumes; radiation can 
cause colon cancer, but so can biscuits and gravy. ^  Some scientists argue that any 
radioactive exposure equal to or less than “background” solar radiation must be harmless— 
others that human beings live in equilibrium with solar radiation and that there is no safe 
threshold beyond that equilibrium. Congress finally admitted in 1990 that the nation had 
to bear some responsibility and passed legislation designed to compensate some for their 
losses, but the claimants face a tremendous burden o f proof It may be impossible to 
prove that fallout caused increased rates o f cancer (together with other illness and disease)
^  This last argument applied with biting success by a young Justice Department attorney 
during trial testimony in Prescott v. US. When asked by the attorney to explain why she 
believed her late husband died prematurely o f  colon cancer, the widow o f a deceased test 
site worker explained that while he worked in a tunnel at the Nevada Test Site he had 
been exposed to dangerously high levels o f radiation and then collapsed. She went on to 
explain his lengthy hospitalization that followed this exposure. The attorney patiently 
waited through this explaination and then asked the woman whether her husband had ever 
eaten biscuits and gravy. The witness chuckled and explained that since she and her 
husband were both fi'om the South, they had eaten a lot o f biscuits and gravy. The 
attorney then asked the widow if she was aware that biscuits and gravy were high in fat, a 
substance known to contribute to the incidence o f colon cancer.
The Radiation Exposiue Compensation Act supports compensation for uranium miners, 
test site workers, and downwinders and each is faced with a strict burden of proof based 
upon the particular circumstances under which they were exposed. The disease criteria is 
limited to fifteen radiogenic cancers based upon the Radium Dial Painter legislation. This 
is interesting for two reasons. First, the circumstances o f exposime differ between the two 
groups. Radium dial painters were exposed to  radioactive substances primarily through 
ingestion. Fallout posed inhalation and ingestion hazards. Second, our understanding of 
radiogenicity has increased substantially since the approval of the Radium Dial Painter 
legislation. The National Academy of Science has published six “BIER” reports by the 
time Congress enacted the RECA legislation, and although those reports altered and 
expanded upon earlier categories o f radiogenic cancers. Congress ignored those analyses.
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that seem to have visited areas exposed to fallout, but important to consider those who 
firmly believe that their own government poisoned them/^
Important, too, to look at the ways that the government d id  recognize the 
problems of fallout yet how it also so woefully misdirected its concern; It warned the 
photographic industry because it feared lawsuits, and followed the clouds o f radioactive 
fallout across the United States in planes for public relations purposes; but failed the 
people most affected. Instead, the government—too concerned with public relations— 
issued constant reassurances that any radiation off-site was harmless.^^ The government 
pressed its emphasis on public relations at, probably, great cost.^^ The circumstantial 
evidence is irrefutable—prior to atomic testing, the Mormon population o f  St. George 
suffered incidences of cancer at one-half the national average. By the 1960s, Irma 
Thomas, a woman who lived on a block with only five homes, noted that there had been 
seven cancer deaths and two additional cancer surgeries. Within another one-block radius, 
Irma identified another eight cancer or leukemia deaths and twenty-nine afiOicted others.^ "*
Cancer, reduced immunities, and birth defects all have so many causes other than 
radiation and all are such complex physiological processes, that exact causes are all-but- 
impossible to discern.
During the first series at the Test Site, Operation Ranger, the AEC set a range for off- 
site exposures almost ten times that for workers, and emphasized not safety, but public 
relations; “It is felt that figures must be used as general guides but that no drastic action 
which might disturb the public should be taken unless it is clearly felt that such action is 
essential to protect local residents fi’om almost certain damage.” cited in Jenkins, Allen v. 
US, 386.
See Jay Gould and Benjamin Goldman, Deadly Deceit, passim; and Fuller, who cites 
Dr. Joseph Lyon’s research that shows childhood leukemia in Southern Utah grew to two 
and one-half times the normal rate. The Day We Bombed Utah, 152.
^  Fuller, The Day We Bom bed Utah, 152.
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It is, perhaps, unlikely that radioactive fallout caused all of these cancers; but is is just as 
unlikely that it did not cause some.
Had secrecy and the government’s emphasis on public relations not been such 
important features o f atmospheric testing, it could have addressed fallout and 
recommended simple precautions that would have effectively reduced the likelihood o f 
exposure to hazardous levels o f fallout. Martha Laird, in a televised interview, said that 
she lived within 80 miles o f  the test site and believes (without any doubt) that the 
government destroyed her family. Living on a small farm, Martha and her family drank 
milk from the family’s cow, drew their water from a shallow well, played in the spring and 
ate vegetables from a backyard garden. When someone from the test site visited the 
Laird family, Martha asked about the fallout clouds that she said lasted, sometimes, “all 
day.” He told her that the radiation was harmless, no worse than an X-ray, and even 
though the representative must have noticed that the family was probably ingesting fallout 
that settled on its own produce and in the water, he gave her no precautionary advice. In 
1955 she lost her son, a first-grader, to cancer. Shortly after that, she suffered a late-term 
miscarriage and delivered a stillborn child with no legs. The family left the farm and 
moved to northern Nevada. Martha, though, still mourning her losses, wrote a letter to 
the Chairman of the AEC, Lewis Strauss, who, she says responded to her coldly to her 
concerns: “former President Truman had said that any dangers that might result from 
fallout were a small sacrifice.”^^  Martha, whose daughter had since contracted thyroid 
cancer, did not agree. Nor would many other victims.
Martha Laird told her story to Peter Jennings during “Coverup at Ground Zero” a 
segment o f “Turning Point” that aired on ABC in 1994.
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Although Nevada’s sparse population was one o f  the reasons for the test site’s 
location, it appears that the AEC was unprepared to deal with the consequences o f atomic 
testing upon Nevada’s scattering of mines, ranches, farmhouses and temporary occupation 
by those who used large open range areas for periodic grazing o f  sheep and cattle. The 
Air Force’s use o f the bombing range had previously affected the people who earned their 
living in remote regions o f  Southern Nevada and it had established a procedure for rapidly 
compensating residents for broken windows, injured livestock, and short-term loss o f use 
(as with mines). When it took over part o f the bombing range, the AEC adopted this 
policy, and required only the submission o f claims to settle with those who had suffered 
damage as a result o f  blast effects, e.g. shock wave damage to structures or livestock.^® 
Fallout damage, though, posed a new set of circumstances that often caused confusion 
between not only residents and the AEC, but among the various test site components and 
other governmental agencies involved in recompense.
The experiences o f mine operator Daniel Sheahan and his wife provide a good 
example o f the AEC’s problems with a rural Nevada mine operator affected by testing."^
A prominant Nevadan, Floyd Lamb, filed a claim against the AEC for radiation damage 
to cattle. Aware that Lamb had hired an attorney, the AEC decided to wait and see 
whether the animals’ symptoms conformed to typical radiation disease progression; “A 
period o f 60 to 90 days in the future may give us the clue to whether these animals will 
‘heal’ or develop the typical Trinity lesions.” US Attorney Madison B. Graves to Mr. 
Chester G. Brinch, Assistant General Counsel, US AEC, Albuquerque; CIC 1338.
This account is drawn primarily fi’om government communications: a letter fi’om the 
Manager o f the Santa Fe Operations office to Brig. Gen Fields, Director o f  Military 
Applications dated August 20, 1954, CIC 78946; letter fi’om Chalmers C. King, General 
Counsel Santa Fe Operations Office to William Mitchell, General Counsel (Washington) 
dated April 14, 1955, CIC 78937; Memorandum to Colonel Alfred D. Starbird, AEC 
Director o f Nfilitary Application from Donald J. Leehey, Manager o f  Santa Fe Operations, 
September 9, 1955, CIC 78977; Daniel and Martha Sheahan filed a claim against the 
United States in District Court, Case No. 100-55.
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During the early 1950s, the Sheahan’s Groom mine, located at the northeast comer o f the
test site, suffered damage from Air Force weapons practice and atomic tests, and although
the government sometimes advised the family to evacuate because of either possible shock
or radiation damage, its warnings and promises were often contradictory. Though
radiation monitors advised them to leave the area because o f fallout, they also told the
Sheahans that the fallout posed no danger. Sheahan though, an avid diarist, believed
differently—especially after he began to notice changes in resident animals. He recorded
his impressions during those years and later testified;
that the hides o f deer, horses, and cattle that grazed in the area were 
speckled with bum m arks.. A group o f researchers from the University 
of California at Los Angeles. . .fled the area [because o f high 
radioactivity].^*
Contradiction characterized the information Sheahan received from the government. After 
the 1951 tests, an oflGcial (who he was unable to identify) told him that “such dangerous 
type tests” would not be held again within the US.^^ He also claimed that on another 
occasion “health men” said that “none of us should live at Groom during the tests.” When 
confronted with irrefutable evidence o f its contradictory statements to Sheahan, the 
government found a way to  deny responsibility. Although the government had to admit 
that a Los Alamos employee had written a letter to Sheahan that advised him to reach a 
settlement with the AEC or try to initiate special legislation, others within the AEC simply 
claimed that the letter’s author lacked authority and though the employee “purported to 
act oflScially, had no authority to discuss the matter o f the Groom Mine with the
Testimony o f  Daniel Sheahan in Bullock v. US, cited by Philip Fradkin Fallout (Tucson, 
AZ; University o f Arizona Press, 1989) 5-6.
39 Leehey to Starbird, September 9, 1955, CIC 78977.
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Sheahans.”^  Sheahan obviously had no idea o f how to separate the authorized from the 
unauthorized statements o f the AEC upon which he necessarily relied.
The government was willing, however, to admit responsibility for relatively-minor 
damage to Sheahan’s property for not only structural damage, but also effects of fellout. 
As a result of 1952s Tumbier-Snapper series, the government paid (in 1953) $1,000 of a 
$1,138.78 claim to Sheahan for loss o f income following a test-related mine shutdown.
The AEC noted that during negotiations for that payment, Sheahan mentioned that his 
wife Martha had recently been diagnosed with skin cancer, and though he filed no claim, 
indicated that he thought her condition might be related to fallout. More damage to his 
mine followed, and the government had one o f its contractors replace windows and repair 
building siding at the mine. Shortly thereafter, on June 14, 1953, Sheahan sent a letter to 
the AEC and requested that the government buy his mine for $150,000 since continued 
testing precluded its continued use.'*  ^ The government declined, not because it disagreed 
with Sheahan that radioactive and shock damage ammounted to a ‘taking,’ that the AEC’s 
activity precluded Mr. Sheahan’s use of the property, but because “AEC appropriations 
do not permit purchase o f property for which it has no use.” In September, Sheahan filed 
a claim against the government for $ 100 for “radiation damage” to his 16-year old horse. 
The government had the horse appraised, twice, and based upon those estimates of value
See note. 37, supra.
The Sheahans blamed the Air Force too because it (according to the government’s own 
review) “dropped missiles over and upon and in the close vicinity o f the. . mine” while the 
Sheahans and other workmen were on the property, additionally “the Air Force discharged 
machine gun fire or dropped missiles. . upon the mill with such devastating eflFect as to 
cause an explosion which resulted in the total destruction o f the mill.” April 14, 1955. See 
note 37, supra.
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offered Sheahan $50.00. Unable to receive compensation for his mine and blaming the 
government for his wife’s eye disease, Sheahan contacted a lawyer and in 1955, when the 
AEC refused the proposed settlement, the Sheahans filed a lawsuit. They were 
unsuccessful.
Sheepmen, too, peppered the southern Nevada desert; but, unlike the ranchers and 
miners who had permanent residences or recorded locations o f business, they used various 
areas for fall and winter grazing in Nevada that might only be accessible from horseback 
and were, thus, often more unaware than even the Sheahans. Kem and Mac Bulloch were 
two such sheepmen who lived through the late spring and early summer at their Utah 
homes. They knew that the government had begun to test atom bombs west of their 
traditional winter range, but without radio or newspapers, the Bullochs often found out 
about a test only when they saw the mushroom clouds in the west (the dawn shots, 
“bloodred and ugly”) after which they would be engulfed by debris that rushed relentlessly 
toward them and their s h e e p . O n e  such onrushing radioactive dirt storm changed their 
lives forever.
Fallout from one o f  1953 s Upshot-Knothole series, Nancy, found the Bulloch 
brothers and their 2,000 RambouUet sheep in Sand Springs Valley on March 24, 1953. 
Twenty miles south, radiation monitors from the AEC and scientists from UCLA who 
were performing experiments associated with the test took shelter in a mine. The 
monitors knew the two sheepmen were directly in the path o f the highest radioactivity and
Unless otherwise noted, this summation of the Bulloch brothers and their problems with 
the government is taken from John G. Fuller’s The Day We Bom bed Utah, passim  and 
particularly here, 4.
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called their superiors to discuss a helicopter rescue, but the idea was abandoned. Later 
that day, another radiation safety team on their way to the mine in a jeep told the Bullocks 
that they were “in a hell o f a hot spot.” '^’ The team told the brothers that they should 
leave the area immediately. The two men, though, would not leave their sheep and since 
sheep graze as they walk, the group moved slowly. At six miles per day, the brothers 
continued their move toward the lambing sheds o f Cedar City, Utah.
It proved a difficult and unusual trip for the experienced sheepmen. Many ewes 
gave birth prematurely to potbellied lambs without legs or wool; and equally strange, the 
ewes took no interest in their young, abandoning them on the desert floor and rejoining 
the flock. The lambing sheds o f Cedar City offered no relief; deformed lambs were bom 
and died, and hundreds o f adult sheep succumbed. Some died standing, some while 
eating—frozen as if in a stupor. Their hooves became hard, their wool separated from 
their skin and oozing sores covered their bodies and the insides o f their mouths. Other 
ranchers returning from the Nevada range suffered the same misfortimes as the Bullochs. 
Though thousands of animals died, the AEC denied responsibility, and the Bullochs and 
other sheepmen who finally filed suit in federal court, lost."”
Ibid., 13
At a June 10, 1953 AEC meeting, the AEC’s medical officer Gordon Dunning reported 
that he estimated approximately 10,000 sheep grazing within 50 miles o f the test site and 
some had beta bums in their nostrils and on their backs and that collected “specimens” 
would be tested. AEC Meeting No. 875, CIC 14013. Unfortimately, this section o f the 
meeting identified as item 10, is the first declassified portion o f the entire document.
The Iron County Record  reported that the AEC cited “malnutrition” as the cause o f the 
sheep deaths, but the Utah Health Commissioner said that although malnutrition was 
present, so was radiation. July 2, 1953, 7; July 16, 1953,2.
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The bomb that so devastated the Bullochs, Nancy (24 KT) was only one of three 
o f the eleven Upshot-Knothole shots that became memorable. The other two, Simon (43 
KT) resulted in high levels o f  radioactive rain in Albany, New York, and Harry (32 
KT) was so consequential that it has come to be known as “Dirty H a r r y . B e f o r e  
exploring the effects o f H arry it is worthwhile to consider that the shot may provide an 
excellent example of the way that the government compromised health and safety in its 
effort to promote its public relations campaign; for although the AEC had been warned by 
Shields Warren to avoid shots when the cloud might encounter high speed winds—that is
The second shot o f Upshot-Knothole, Simon, caused a ‘hot-spot,’ isolated 
concentrated fallout, that showed up in New York. Students at the Rensselaer 
Polytechnic Institute in New York noticed their geiger counters registering radioactivity. 
They alterted radiochemistry professor Herbert Clark who called the AEC. An official 
denied that testing might be the culprit. Clark and his students turned the mystery into a 
project, and measured radioactivity in outside puddles at 270,000 times more radioactive 
than water approved for drinking. Finally, the AEC investigated and discovered that 
Albany, New York, had had an “unfortunate” encounter with fallout carried by a 
thunderstorm. The dose estimated for Albany ranged up to a ‘%w thousand milirads.” 
Miller, Under the Cloud, 170. The AEC launched its investigation too late to have 
warned residents, had it decided to do so at all. On March 20, the New York Times told 
New Yorkers that radioactive rain had fallen, “City is sopping but safe.” 25.
Fallout was ‘planned’ into Upshot-Knothole. In a memorandum from Test Director 
Alvin C. Graves to Personnel concerned with Weapons Test Report Programs” dated May 
6, 1953, one item (27.1) is defined as “Study o f Off-Site Air-Bome radioactive materials, 
Nevada Proving Grounds, Gamma Fallout originating from Upshot 2,3,4,5,7 and 8 at 
various distances up to 100 miles from ground zero.” CIC 14169,
There is additional evidence that given the high kiloton range of testing planned for 
Upshot-Knothole, fallout became a real concern for the AEC before the tests began. It is 
presently impossible to leam more than that on on February 4, 1953, the AEC held and 
meeting and developed an “information plan concerning the public health aspects of spring 
tests” since the meeting minutes for that date, and others associated with Upshot- 
Knothole remain almost completely classified. AEC Meeting no. 814, CIC 14001. As is, 
for example. Meeting no. 845 on April 1, 1953 that discussed fallout and “PR aspects” 
CIC 14003.
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exactly what happened with Harry.'*' The AEC planned the shot as a demonstration, and 
the government had invited a large group of Congressmen and (because o f complaints that 
resulted from earlier testing) a large group o f visitors from Utah together with an 
assortment o f national observers to watch Harry. Originally scheduled for May 2, the 
test was postponed because high levels o f radioactivity from a prior shot precluded 
workmen and scientists from entering the area. Rescheduled for May 16, rain and clouds 
against caused another delay."*^  There must certainly have been some impatience on the 
part o f those who had gathered in Las Vegas prior to May 2, the first scheduled date and 
then ended up waiting, only to be disappointed yet again. It is likely, too, that the AEC 
was also anxious to put on its show before everyone gave up and returned home. On May
The AEC also apparently ignored the problems associated with fallout and weather 
systems. The Las Vegas Review Journal reported that the mushroom cloud was not 
visible from Las Vegas because o f an “overcast” sky. May 19, 1953, 1. Additionally, 
Harry, was a ‘tower’ shot—the type that Warren had suggested was not appropriate for 
the continental test site.
Animosity had been building in Utah against the testing. One year before H arry, an 
article in Salt Lake’s D eseret News said “We are living in the atomic age whether we like 
it or not; but we don’t want the atomic age to be living with us.” May 9, 1952, 2B. Ralph 
Hafen, a student at the University of Utah demanded that the AEC address plutonium 
inhalation, fallout-induced cataracts and radiation-induced mutation. Iron County Record 
May 7, 1953, 9.
The AEC invited himdreds of people from Utah to witness the test. One, Rae Ashton, 
president o f the Women’s Auxiliary, said H arry had “spun like a child’s toy top” yet an 
editorial printed along with her article noted “The [AEC assurance] is comforting. But at 
the same time, an eminent and experienced nuclear scientist. Dr. Lyle Borst o f  the 
University o f Utah expressed increasing concern. . .even a small amount o f radiation can 
be harmful to a degree.” Deseret News, March 27, 1953. Dr. Borst later wrote an article 
for the B ulletin o f Atom ic Scientists that called into question the AEC’s reported ‘safe’ 
dose (3R) for downwinders was not appropriate. Saying that the AEC apparently made 
no allowance for beta. Dr. Borst complained; “Predictions o f this level will cause the test 
organization to evacaute communities. Communities are not notified to keep children 
indoors in the case o f fallout contamination unless predicted levels are near the 3R 
integrated limit. These levels are far above the levels set for [reporters] at the test. April, 
1953, 73.
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19, although the sky was overcast and winds aloft from the northeast, the AEC finally 
detonated Harry before the huge group of awed spectators. The cloud climbed to 38,484 
feet before it met up with a 91 mph northwest wind. The problems began when the cloud 
began to fall; but, as will be shown, although the AEC did actively make some attempts to 
reduce the dangers posed by the highly-radioactive fallout—positive public relations again 
took precedence over precautions.^"
The AEC ordered a roadblock between Las Vegas and St. George and washed 
contaminated cars, but the most highly-populated area affected by H arry's cloud was St. 
George, Utah, itself.^ ‘ The AEC instructed the Chief o f  Police to advise residents to stay 
indoors and wash their clothes, and the chief proudly claimed to have done so in such a 
way “as not to fiighten or alarm the people.”^^  Meanwhile, even inside their homes, 
residents noticed a “strange metallic taste in their mouths, possibly due to the presence in
Las Vegas Sun, May 16, 1953, 1; May 19, 1953, 1.
Upshot-Knothole’s “Test Director’s Operation Order” instructed radiation safety 
monitors on the fine art o f  public relations. Above all, the monitors were “instructed to 
avoid causing fear”  and to assist them in that task, the Order issued substantial dialogue to 
help the monitors deal with the public. Some phrases were particularly soothing, e.g. at 
check points; “If  we find traces o f fall-out inside your car, we may wash or vacuum the car 
at our expense, even if there isn’t enough of the s tu ff to  hurt anyone . . .  We fired an 
Atomic bomb near here this morning and we are checking to see if  any dust from it fell on 
the highways. Don’t be worried if  the needle kicks around a bit, because things like a 
luminous alarm clock can give you quite a reading on this meter.” 210 [italics mine]. Note 
that ‘fallout’ became innocuous ‘dust’ and ‘stuff’ in the mouths o f  radiation monitors. 
“Operation Order No. 1-53 (Upshot/Knothole)” 326 US Atomic Energy Commission, 
location LANL, Collection Records Center E-7 B-39; Folder Test Director’s Operation 
Order No. 1-53.
Ib id , May 20, 1953. The local press (in typical fashion) stressed the relatively-small 
number of cars that ended up contaminated; “Fewer than 100 automobiles required 
washing following yesterday morning’s atomic cloud fallout, although.. hundreds of 
vehicles at six check points.. were monitored.” Idem. 1.
The Chief, Lamb, added that radioactive clouds “always come over” St. George. Ixts 
Vegas Sun, M ay 10, 1953, 1.
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the air o f microscopic iron particles—remnants o f the shot tower. The AEC told its
radiation monitors to avoid arousing concern among the public. People were already 
concerned, however, and anxiety spread out o f Utah.
To counter adverse publicity, the AEC took its case to the press. Two additional 
radiation safety officers went to Utah to “reassure miners” who blamed their illness on 
fallout; but, according to the AEC the trip was meaningless since “radiation feUout from 
yesterday’s shot was not hazardous.” '^* Residents in Utah were not convinced, and neither 
was president Eisenhower who ordered a re-study o f civil defense precautions, a fact that 
went unreported in both Las Vegas newspapers.^* On May 24, Utah’s Congressman 
Stringfellow began calling for an end to testing altogether.*^ The AEC and the local press 
trivialized the complaints, “information men yesterday were working like proverbial one- 
armed paper hangers trying to deflate the mass hysteria.”*^
The radiation safety persoimel that the AEC pressed into service after H arry did, 
indeed, monitor radiation but they did very little that could have been done to guarantee 
safety. One of the monitors assigned to St. George, Frank Butrico, later said he contacted
*^  Miller, Under the Cloud, 175.
*'* “Doubt Illness Caused by Fallout” Review Journal May 20, 1953, 3
** New York Times March 19, 1953, 21. Assorted articles indicate that the local press 
paternally protected the AEC. “AEC Takes Dim View of Utah Atom Protests” May 21, 
1953, 1.
*^  Stringfellow said that AEC assurances that there was no danger contrasted with their 
warnings to St. George to the residents to remain inside was “disquieting. . .particularly 
when we find nuclear scientists themselves voicing a considerable difference o f opinion on 
the possible harmful effects o f radioactive fallout. . Human life is too precious to be 
risked in experimentation and guess-work.” D eseret News,M ay 20, 1953, 1; May 24, 
1953, 1. “Nevadans Fight to Retain A-Tests” i?ev/ew JoMrwa/, May 24, 1953, 1.
*^  “AEC Men Deflate Reports o f Utah Radiation Illness” Review Journal May 22, 1953,
1.
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the test site for instructions when his monitoring instrument in the middle o f St. George 
began registering radioactivity, but it took more than an hour after his monitor reached the 
maximum range o f the instrument (300-350 mr/hr) for the site to approve a warning to 
stay indoors. Later, he said, many apparently had not received it. As he drove through 
town, he said that cars were on the road, people on streets, and grade-school children still 
played outside on morning recess. In contact with the site, he received instructions to 
keep changing and washing his clothes and taking showers until his personal readings 
decreased; when he asked if he should issue the same instructions to the community, he 
received a “resounding ‘no’” because it might cause “panic.”** Additionally, and despite 
the fact that the readings after H arry were extraordinarily high, the AEC performed no 
internal monitoring (urine, fecal, or blood samples) even though that procedure was 
customary at the time in laboratories when workmen had been exposed to even lesser 
dosages. The AEC also neglected a device that could have offered a more complete 
picture of the damage in St. George; instruments used routinely to detect radiation to the 
thyroid.*" Important, too, is the fact that the AEC refused, again in the service of public 
relations, to allow its monitors to sample local milk—even though the monitors asked if 
they should.*" After the furor had died down, the AEC—in the interests of “public
** Frank Butrico’s story was one included in “Coverup at Ground Zero”, see n.35, supra.
*" Jenkins, Allen v. US, 374.
*" Ib id , 375. Fuller states that Butrico decided to check local milk supplies for 
radioiodine, but feared public alarm i f  he requested samples from local dairies or backyard 
cows. He bought a quart of milk from a store, but whether it was ever tested remains a 
mystery. The Day We Bombed Utah, 34. In any event, the milk would only have reflected 
radioactivity from earlier tests since it would have been bottled before Harry. Times have 
changed; The government evacuated pregnant women and children at Three Mile Island 
when radiation doses reached 2 to 25 millirems per hour. Harry has been estimated to 
have caused exposures reaching 1,000 millirems per hour. Idem., 218.
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education”—re-situated Frank Butrico in St. George and asked the residents and 
shopkeepers to appear in a government film that ostensibly recreated the day H arry struck 
St. George. It emphasized that the residents were good, patriotic citizens and that the 
AEC was a sympathetic, safety-conscious, outfit.** Some o f  the “actors” have become 
bitter over the years over the ways that the AEC co-opted them into its public relations 
campaign. Elmer Pickett, a St. George shopkeeper, lost his wife to cancer in 1959. 
Claudia Peterson remembers that she was in school on the day o f H arry and when 
someone checked her with a geiger counter, he told her the clicking meant “you had a 
dental x-ray.” Claudia’s father later died of brain cancer and her sister and daughter 
Bethany succumbed to leukemia.*^
A later analysis by the Public Health Service in 1962 compared H arry's dosage to milk as 
comparable to those at Windscale in Britain. Britain’s response to radioactive 
contamination of milk following the Windscale accident on October 10, 1957 that caused 
an immediate release o f radioactive material and an immediate analysis o f  milk supplies.
As a result o f that analysis, the government instituted a ban on milk deliveries stretching 
for 200 square miles. Interestingly, this work references American downwinders and 
problems with the AEC. “It seems as if the people o f Nevada should join forces with the 
people of Japan in asking for suspension of all nuclear bomb tests. Because o f the 
fantastic secrecy with which the United States Atomic Energy Commission surrounds its 
test explosions in Nevada, there is little quantitative data about the spread o f radioactive 
fallout. A. Pirie, ed.. F allout (London;MacGibbon & Kee, 1958), 120; 78-79. Windscale 
provides a test case for the ability o f  a government agency to both prevent ‘panic’ and deal 
with radioactivity responsibly. A report after the incident stated “The sober, coolheaded 
handling of the incident will serve as a classic model. . it undoubtedly prevented general 
panic in the area and prevented the mishap from turning into a disaster.” cited in Jenkins, 
A llen V. US, 376.
** Reviewing Upshot-Knothole, the AEC emphasized public relations, not fallout. 
“Developments since Upshot-Knothole have recently been reviewed. Events have 
intensified the need for a pre-series educational program. . .[to] keep public 
misunderstanding or apprehension over use of the Nevada Proving Ground at a minimum 
level.” “Atomic Energy commission Public Information and Public Education Programs” 
December 6, 1954, US DOE Archives, 326 US Atomic Energy Commission, Collection 
1951-1958 Secretariat File, Box 1263, Folder MR & A-7 Teapot Vol. 1.
*^  “Coverup at Ground Zero” note 35, supra.
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The institutional framework o f the AEC resulted in the filtering out of vital 
information that could have mitigated the danger of atomic testing. Only positive reports 
made their way to the commission, those which reflected poorly upon operations were 
never considered. Dr. Gordon Dunning o f the Division o f Biology and Medicine played a 
large role in reassuring the commission after Upshot-Knothole. Seven veterinarians 
analyzed the sheep deaths, two from the State of Utah, one from the Navy Radiological 
Defense Laboratory, one from Los Alamos, and three from the US Public Health 
Service.*"* All concluded that radiation caused the animals’ deaths, but their written 
reports never saw the light o f  day. Instead, the commission relied upon the conclusions of 
its own advisor. Dr. Dunning, who also had examined citizens complaining of puzzling 
skin conditions after Harry. Those skin conditions, Dunning claimed, were the result of 
“allergic dermititis [sic]” or “simbum.” Though reassuring, Dunning’s diagnosis could
*"* In August, a large gathering of livestockmen met with the AEC and other US officials 
and representatives from Iron Coimty and the State of Utah to discuss the sheep deaths. 
Though the AEC consistently tried to place the blame on other disease (p. 1), lack of 
rainfall (p. 2), photosensitivity (p. 4) the livestockmen and the State Health Department 
logically countered most o f the AEC’s statements. Because it was unable, though, to 
address knowledgably details about radiation, the AEC ended with the upper hand, for 
example:
Livestockmen: When you made your tests, you mentioned some sheep
were hot.
What did you mean?
AEC: It is true that some sheep had relatively high values who weren’t
ill. The Thorley herd has as high an external value on the instruments as 
any.
Livestockmen: You said, “This sheep isn’t as hot” or “This is a hot one”. What 
did you mean? A dead one was usually hot.
AEC: Any radiation was hot. It didn’t mean anything special. External readings 
have no consistency.
“Notes From Meeting o f Atomic Energy Commission, State Health Department, 
Livestockmen and Others Held at the City and County Building In Cedar City August 9, 
1953” CIC 14039.
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have been checked more thoroughly—his only technical expertise was as a high school 
physics teacher and his only credential a Ph D. in education from Syracuse University.*^
*  *  *
Fallout from H arry aroused the public’s curiosity and fear. It joined international 
events and forced the AEC (perhaps for the first time) to explain its activities. Public 
safety concerns escalated as the AEC admitted that radioactive fallout had caused injuries 
in the Pacific. Shortly after Americans learned the devastating potential o f hydrogen 
weapons they learned to their horror that the Soviets, too, possessed hydrogen weapons. 
The consequences o f  the escalated experimentation were so dreadful that even Churchill 
asked for a re-evaluation o f atomic testing. The national conversation about radioactivity 
and the fears o f citizens, despite the AEC’s emphasis on secrecy and governmental 
attempts to control atomic information, had begun to play out in the press.
The hydrogen bomb caused increasing concern. The AEC, through Chairman 
Strauss, admitted that it had exposed twenty-eight Americans and 236 “natives” to
*"* Fuller, The Day We Bom bed Utah, 40-42. The secreted reports (along with many 
others that had been hidden) came to light in the 1970s as a result o f  a Congressional 
subpoena. 217. That subpoena provided the investigators with a revelation: “All
evidence suggesting that radiation was having harmful effects, be it on the sheep or the 
people, was not only disregarded by actually suppressed.” US House Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations o f the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, The 
Forgotten Guinea Pigs, 11. Plaintiffs in the Allen trial presented evidence that Dunning’s 
repertoire o f deceit continued. At a workshop for radiation monitors in 1980 Dunning 
destroyed an experiment that allowed the evaluation of iodine in a milk sample: “So, 
anyway, Frank and I did a few o f  these.. and we showed it to Gordon Dunning. He got 
mad, red in the face, took it, threw it on the floor and stomped on it. ‘Don’t you do that.’ 
So I don’t  know whether it meant a damn thing or not, it is immaterial, but it sure got 
Gordon excited.” Judge Jenkins, too, remained at a loss to explain the significance of 
Dunning’s action, cited by Jenkins, Allen v. US, 376, n. 125.
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radiation in the Pacific. Fallout had unexpectedly descended onto an atoll that the 
government had reckoned safe.** Radioactive material also fell on the Japanese fishing 
crew of the inappropriately-named Lucky Dragon, who, unaware o f the source o f the ash 
that fell on them, made no effort to avoid the fallout and suffered bums and blisters.
When they returned to port, the Japanese government quickly blamed American weapons 
tests.** Soon, the Japanese accused both the Soviets and Americans o f poisoning its 
people and its fisheries, and demanded schedules for testing.*’ Strauss denied that the 
Pacific testing had injured the Japanese. Under intense scrutiny, though he did discuss 
another issue—strontium 90—and said that strontium 90 might cause bone damage if it 
entered the body.** The American public grew only more apprehensive as they finally 
began to leam the serious consequences posed by atomic testing posed.
The boasting fi'om Russians and Americans startled and apalled an American and 
international public that had finally begun to confi-ont the morbid absurdities o f the arms 
race. On March 26, 1954, the Russians announced that their hydrogen bomb could be 
used tactically and that it was “eight to ten times” the power of an atomic bomb.*" 
Chairman Strauss responded to Russia’s announcement on March 3 1 and (probably) no 
one laughed when the full text o f his speech appeared in the New York Times on April 
Fools Day. Strauss’ answer to the American public and to the Russians smacked (perhaps
** New York Times, March 12, 1954, 1. See also Titus who emphasized that Strauss chose 
to keep secrets fi'om congress over the issue. Bombs in the Backyard, 19.
** New York Times, March 16, 1954, 19.
*’ The request was, o f course, refused in the interests o f national security. New York 
Times, March 26, 1954, 5.
*" New York Times, March 27, 1954, 1.
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too much) o f a schoolyard taunt: Strauss admitted that although the Soviet’s weapon 
could destroy New York City, the American’s H-bomb could level cities with a 
destructive capacity “600 to 700 times that o f  Hiroshima and Nagasaki.”’" Americans, 
astounded at the magnitude of destruction possible, publicly demanded realistic 
alternatives to the arms race and the government aimounced an increased emphasis on civil 
defense.’* Fears on this side o f the Atlantic were joined by those on the other. On May 5, 
1954, the same day that the AEC detonated a 13.5 MT atomic device {Yankee) in the 
Pacific, a group of scientists and engineers in Great Britain called for an end to testing, 
and by November, Churchill joined them.’  ^ In an attempt to stem the rising tide o f 
national and international fear. Chairman Strauss disclosed that three divisions o f the AEC 
were studying the effects o f fallout, but that he could not comment on those studies until a 
later date.’^
Congress, too, began to recognize that the AEC had, perhaps, become 
dangerously self-assured and too willing to hide behind notions o f “national security” and 
called upon not only the AEC Chairman Strauss to explain himself, but also a non­
governmental scientist to try and leam the t r u t h . B e f o r e  the subcommittee, Strauss
’" New York Times, April 1, 1954, 1. Strauss could have promised even more complete 
devastation had he included fallout considerations in his estimates.
’* New York Times, April 16, 1954 (Letters to the Editor); April 1, 1954, 21.
New York Times, May 5, 1918, 18. Churchill aimounced that he had information that 
indicated radiation exposure was cumulative (a fact scientists had known for a long, long 
time) and could pose serious problems fbr the earth for as long as 5,000 years. He also 
expressed concern that hydrogen weapons only increased the danger. Baldwin Hansen, 
New York T/mes November 8, 1954.
Elie Abel, New York Times, December 18, 1954, 1.
The damage that had been done to the reputations of (particularly non-govemmental 
and sometimes critical) scientists had already become firmly entrenched in some segments 
o f  the public before Congress decided to rely upon them. Westbrook Pegler, in a
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admitted that the AEC had purposely kept the report on the Pacific Test that had injured 
the crew o f the Lucky Dragon “hidden” for three months because, he said, he feared 
“adverse affects” concerning international situations and that disclosure would only have 
led to “confusion.” George W. Leroy, a dean fi'om the University o f Chicago, addressed 
the committee concerning fallout, and castigated the AEC for its security regulations, 
telling the committee that “vital medical information was being withheld fi'om the public 
needlessly.”’*
By 1955, Congress’ reliance on an independent scientist spurred a  rash o f articles 
that not only called into question the government’s stringent security measures, but also 
focused upon fallout and its consequences ’* In July, the New Yorker published a twelve- 
page article on the fallout question with regard to both atomic and thermonuclear testing 
that reveals that the public feared not only Soviet weapons, but US experimental testing as 
well. As an example o f the very real fear that began to circulate concerning fallout, the 
AEC’s New York office regularly received phone calls on rainy days fi'om concerned 
citizens;
nationally-syndicated column ranted against scientific ‘doomsayers’; “Today’s scientist is 
tomorrow’s hairy ape. . .Oppenheimer, Einstein and Urey are [no] better than a low- 
handicap golfer.” Review Journal, March 14, 1955. Locally, on March 21, 1955 Hank 
Greenspun responded to critics o f atomic testing in an editorial eneitled “Who’s Behind 
the Movement?” indicating that there was an “organized attempt to discredit the Nevada 
work o f the Atomic Energy Commission. . among a lot of people in the nation who don’t 
know the facts and are misled into believing a lot o f hokum about radiation.” The article 
placed the blame on Russian “front” organizations and appallingly declared that there had 
been “no two-headed babies bom at Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital.” Las Vegas 
Sun, 2.
’* New York Times, March 25, 1955, 11.
’* See, for example, the Bulletin o f A tom ic Scientists, January, February, June, October, 
and November, 1955 passim ; and Life March 21, 1955, 32.
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That’s a perfectly rational question, but then they suddenly break down 
completely—crying and carrying on about what’s going to become o f the 
world.
Additionally, noting that elements o f radioiodine and radiostrontium had been “found in 
the thyroids of cattle and sheep grazing near the Nevad Proving Grounds,” it quoted Dr. 
John Bugher of the AEC who stated that the levels in humans were less than those found 
in animals. The reporter pressed further, reminding Burger that he had earlier told a 
gathering that radiation could shorten life expectancy “apparently from a general 
acceleration of the aging process.” Burger sidestepped a conclusion by saying that the 
entire issue was problematical: “human beings have yet to experience the distinction 
between a condition that does not cause death but shortens life.” The article concluded 
that the disagreements within the scientific community were not only “both exasperating 
and baffling, if not actually fiightening.””  While fallout alarmed Congress, fiightened the 
public, and alerted the reporters—the military, and the militarily-directed AEC, continued 
its business, seemingly unaware or at least unaffected by, the controvery that surrounded 
it.
Hindsight should not preclude the recognition that the AEC did have its 
supporters. Whilst many on the national front became increasingly concerned about the 
testing program, at least one Nevada newspaper editor remained nonplussed. In 1955,
Las Vegas Sun editor Hank Greenspim believed that a Los Angeles article focusing on 
fallout might threaten Southern Nevada’s tourism industry, he claimed that the only 
concerned tourist he had encountered feared that if his wife found out he was in Las
77 The New Yorker, “Fallout”, July 16, 1955.
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Vegas, she might worry about his “procreative processes.” Greenspun said he “assured 
this person that there is danger o f  losing one’s potency in Las Vegas but it wouldn’t 
necessary come from atomic radiation.” Greenspun believed atomic testing was a 
godsend:
Be brave. Face squarely to the north and breathe a silent prayer every time 
another nuclear device hits the dust o f  Yucca F lat.. .At last Las Vegas has 
found a good reason for its existence.’*
*  *  *
Military objectives certainly drove the development and operation o f  the Test Site, 
but other features built into the AEC as an institution also contributed to the hazardous 
nature o f testing at the Nevada Test Site. The commissioners themselves showed 
increasing reluctance to try to understand the fundamental nature of atomic testing and, 
relying on only those scientists who would provide approving analyses, allowed the 
military to virtually control testing. Additionally, the AEC not only isolated itself from the 
public and refused to address in any meaningful way the widespread and growing fears of 
radioactive fallout, its multiple components also remained virtually independent entities, 
unaware (or unwilling to accept) information generated within alternate strata o f the 
organization. A document prepared by a “group leader” after Operation Upshot-Knothole 
illustrates a complete failure to integrate known facts into the planning o f testing programs 
that permeated the AEC and atomic weapons testing in the US.
78 Las VegasSun^M arch.25, 1955, 1.
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That group leader, one Gaelen Felt, prepared his 1954 document at least six years
after Stafford Warren had issued his voluminous reports o f  Trinity and Operation
Crossroads that urged caution relative to detonation size, location and weather.
Additionally, it was prepared at least two years after Shields Warren recommended that
tower shots be prohibited at the Nevada Proving Ground and additionally that shot size be
limited. It was, too, prepared after fallout problems associated with high-yield tower shots
distinguished the Upshot-Knothole (a series o f incidents that Felt interestingly referred to
as “the troubles”— as though the fallout from atomic testing could, perhaps, be equated
with some unavoidable plague or divine retribution.) Yet, Gaelen Felt, Group Leader for
Group J -15 had (quite proudly) concluded:
generally speaking, tower shots are more hazardous than free air bursts, 
high yields are more hazardous than low, and weather conditions have a 
pronounced effect.’"
Felt, o f course, may have been unaware that his insights were unoriginal. But if he 
harbored any notion that his (by then so well-worn) input might make some small 
difference in the continued operation o f the Nevada Test Site, he was wrong.
In 1955, the AEC addressed public concern, but only through re-education—not by 
any réévaluation o f its own responsibility for causing injury.*" Despite growing scientific 
reconsideration of risks attendant to atomic testing and the the conclusions reached by 
Gaelen Felt (and others before him) the AEC launched Operation Teapot, preceded, of
’" “Memo to A1 Graves, J-Division Leader from Gaelen Felt, Group J-15, Subject: 
Radiological Hazards Near Nevada Proving Grounds.” August 1953, CIC 0000892.
*" It perhaps does not have to be pointed out that the “education” did not involve 
providing legitimate answers to questions about feUout; rather it was designed specifically 
to minimize  any chance that the public might object to continued tests and so concentrated 
on the lack, rather than the presence, o f hazards.
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course, by an elaborate educational campaign. It was a large undertaking and brought 
over 9,000 military personnel and 3,500 AEC and civil defense workers to the site and Las 
Vegas—a town with a population o f40,000.** Of the fourteen atom bombs detonated 
during the series, ten were exploded from towers, one with a yield of 43 KT, and all 
released radiation off site.*’
** Moehring, Resort City in the Sunbelt, 99, 106.
*^  US DOE “Announced United States Nuclear Tests July 1945 through December 1988’ 
September 1989.
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CHAPTER V n
CONCLUSION
The darkness drops again: but now I  know 
That twenty centuries o f stony sleep 
Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle 
A nd what rough beast, its hour come round at last. 
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be bom.
William Butler Yeats
This has been a history o f but one element of the cold war, but it has also 
emphasized that a chronological characterization o f regimes matters less than the 
practices and behaviors of individuals who participated within those regimes. According to 
the DOE’s oflhcial record o f nuclear tests, one hundred mushroom clouds rose from the 
Nevada desert before the United States suspended atmospheric testing in 1962. After 
that, radioactivity continued to stray out o f government tunnels and shafts periodically, 
with the last reported escape in April o f 1986 from M ighty Oak. Of the 815 nuclear 
experiments performed, only 31 were not weapons related.^ In the change of 
governmental philosophy that accompanied the development o f the atom bomb, did the 
markers that separate chronological events matter that much?—the end o f World War II? 
the cessation of conflict in Korea? the cooling and thawing of the cold war?
* Twenty-seven under the auspices o f Operation Plowshare and four related to storage and 
transportation of nuclear materials.
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I cannot say whether all o f the atomic and nuclear tests the United States carried 
out were necessary and can only aver that those who argue that policy was a crucial factor 
in all o f  this are not entirely wrong. While I have purposefully disengaged this study o f the 
bomb’s development from its role as a mechanism solidifying US interests within the 
international realm, I can not deny the bomb’s influence. No Wall Street public relations 
firm could have crafted a more eflScient means o f advertising American power and resolve 
than the US government did with its experimentation with atomic weapons. Mushroom 
clouds that majestically bloomed tens of thousands o f feet into the atmosphere and 
obliterated Pacific islands were, without a doubt, persuasive. Admittedly, then, the atom 
bomb served US policy, but this history has shown that policy neither directed nor 
controlled the nation’s atomic weapons testing program.
Throughout this examination I have urged the reader to think about atomic 
weapons development and testing in a different way: to separate its ends as a component 
of national security from its means, atomic governance. Doing so has required a 
willingness to consider that policy played only an indirect role in the hazardous nature of 
atomic weapons experimentation—that the inceptual and authorizational nature of policy 
does not sufficiently explain its implementation. Instead, discrete components—secrecy, 
militarism, manipulation o f scientists and media—became integrated and coalesced into 
increasingly important (and increasingly dangerous) functional attributes o f the weapons 
testing program. It is against these govemmentally-instituted practices and the 
simultaneous self-serving behaviors of individual actors—not policy or national security— 
that the rage o f victims must resonate.
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Others, too, admit that the blame must lie at the feet of the participants. Dr. John 
Gofinan, former chief o f the biomedical division o f Lawrence Livermore Laboratory wrote 
in 1979 that he considered his own participation, and that o f hundreds of other scientists, 
criminal. We should have been, he lamented, “candidates for Nuremberg-type trials for 
crimes against humanity for our gross negligence and irresponsibility.”  ^ Yet, despite this 
disturbing confession, the goverment has steadfastly maintained that policy alone deserves 
the blame. In 1981, Rex Lee o f  the Department o f Justice blamed policy alone:
'Decades ago, federal policymakers decided to run some enormous risks. Innocent 
American citizens were involuntarily and unwittingly made the subjects of those risks.”  ^
Likewise, the government applied the same reasoning in its apology to radiation victims, 
the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act o f 1990. Since I hope to have made clear in 
earlier chapters why my argument against a policy-centered approach is reasonable, I 
should now like to briefly address why, aside fl*om historical understanding, that the 
government’s refusal to acknowledge any other reason for fallout and its consequences is 
significant.
Like the behaviors and practices o f atomic weapons testing that became simply too 
useful, the government’s reliance upon “policy” initiatives or “national security” serves a 
functional purpose—that trope allows the government to avoid litigation and operates 
against any reappraisal o f governmental institutions and behavior. Lawsuits can be brought 
against the government only through the Federal Tort Claims Act; however, a provision of
 ^John Gofinan, An Irreverent, Illustrated View o f Nuclear Power, cited in Gould, D eadly 
D eceit, 95.
" US House Subcommittee on Oversity and Investigations o f the Committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce, The Forgotten G uinea Pigs, 11.
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that Act, the Discretionary Function Exemption, precludes any claim resulting from an 
initiative grounded in “policy” or “national security.” Thus, the government is actually 
absolved from responsibility as long as it asserts that its activities (however regrettable) 
flowed directly from the exigencies of national security. The rubrics of “national security” 
and “policy” operate as a shield against embarassing and costly litigation and also, under 
the provisions of the Act, discourage any investigation o f the very real and potentially 
lethal influence of habitus within the government’s own institutions, its departments and 
employees—whether that investigation might prevent future harmful practice or more 
carefully explore the behaviors o f the past.
*  *  *
Since the government seems so disinclined to examine the disturbing mistakes of 
its past, is it possible that scientists today still sit around tables and bargain away lives in 
the interests of institutional goals? That question may only be answered by historians who 
have yet to be bom. We, however, should now finish the business of this thesis and bring 
to a close that with which it started—the AEC’s meeting o f the Division of Biology and 
Medicine. Only by doing so can historians, at least, address the tragic nonchalance of 
scientists who, in 1956 and with such ease, bartered with humankind.
It is an interesting paradox that while the National Security Council justified 
immense precautionary measures against every imaginable worst-case scenario, another 
high-level component of government, the AEG, cavalierly dismissed so many precautions 
on the basis o f best-case prognostications. Despite the fact that the scientists admitted that 
further testing posed an increasing environmental burden o f strontium 90 and the
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accumulation already approached hazardous levels (“there is not very much leeway for
additional tests”)'* the committee decided to take no immediate action. Dr. Dunham, in
particular, was especially reluctant to reach any printable decision, saying;
There is a lag obviously between body burden o f strontium and fallout.
This would appear to me, then, to give us a fairly reasonable assurance that 
we can go ahead for some time, and see what the proof o f the pudding is. .
.1 think in another two or three years we will be able to have a much 
further concept o f what the relation between milk and bone in children is 
really likely to be.^
Dunham chose to gamble with childrens’ lives, and so did all o f the others at that meeting 
who agreed with him. That they did so demonstrates that those who attended that 1956 
meeting clearly placed favorable publicity and sustained testing ahead of more worthy, 
ethical and moral, considerations.
*  *  *
I began this study with the hope that I could find answers to the many perplexities 
that infiltrated the processes o f the nation’s atomic testing program, yet conclude it in full 
recognition that more questions remain. How, for example, could  some people decide 
years ago to take risks with the lives of children for the sake o f yet another testing season; 
or why, so many years later, some seem so disturbingly willing to threaten nuclear 
annihilation?® The remaining curiosities and puzzlements, though, are ui - ml in
* Transcript, “Special Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Biology & Medicine to the 
Atomic Energy Commission” November 26, 1956, 118.
^Ib id ,  121-122.
® “We will create new Hiroshimas and Nagasakis. I will not hesitate to deploy nuclear 
weapons. You know what Chernobyl meant for our country. You will get your own 
Chernobyl in Germany.” Russian ultranationalist Vladimir 2ffiirinovsky, quoted in 
Newsweek, December 27, 1993, 13.
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themselves—it is, after all, the unanswered questions that energize historians. One can 
never, o f course, leam all the answers; but I should like to think that by encouraging the 
examination o f a national endeavor in terms o f individuals, I have called into serious 
question the notion o f the state as a dominant, controlling force that manages the 
behavior o f its employees and agents. This study has instead illustrated the impressively 
important roles played by individuals who negotiated through the state’s own framework, 
directing and channeling a national endeavor, atomic development, toward the fulfilment 
of individually myriad motivations and appetities. Additionally, and while I have not been 
able to do justice to the many people that I believe became victims o f atomic weapons 
experimentation, I have tried also to show that the apparatuses o f state power—as 
exemplified by something as terrifyingly grand as a mushroom cloud—can only be properly 
understood with reference to an ultimate consequence: an intersection easily exemplified 
and imagined, perhaps, by the vision of a bowtied and beribboned teenage couple in 
Kansas, caught unawares on prom night in a radioactive rainstorm.
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